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Reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
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Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2 
by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
18th May 1983 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-eighth annual 
report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORA:NDUM 
submitted by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
I.B Activities of the Council - defence questions 
1. Level of forces of member states 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe 
3. Control of armaments 
Ill. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(a) Non-application of controls 
(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(c) Conclusion on the control of armaments 
(d) Studies by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
V. Conclusions 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
APPENDIX 
Recommendation 380 and the reply of the Council 
I. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to I with 
abstention. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Cavaliere (Alternate: 
Valiante) (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, van den Bergh (Vice-
Chairme"'l); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: 
Wilkinson), MM. Bernini, Bonnel (Alternate: De Decker), 
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Baume{), Edwards, Fosson, Galley, Sir Anthony Grant 
(Alternate: Lord Reay), MM. Kittelmann, Lemmrich (Alter-
nate: Miiller), Mayoud (Alternate: Caro), Menard (Alter-
nate: lung), Pecchioli, P1gnion, Prussen, Scholten, Sir 
Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Vohrer. 
N.B. The names of those takmg part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
- reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply thereto, and on the 
proposition that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s ; 
(ii) Noting that the Council has received with great interest and is considering the Assembly's 
recommendation to cancel the few remaining restrictions on the production of conventional weapons 
in one member country, and is considering the technical, military and political aspects of the 
Assembly's recommendation to vary by reducing the list of weapons subject to quantitative controls ; 
(iii) Aware that the controls on atomic and biological weapons provided for in the modified 
Brussels Treaty have never been applied, but considering in the present circumstances that it is no 
longer appropriate to apply them ; 
(iv) Believing that the fullest use should be made of the qualified staffs of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, both for the study of problems within 
their respective competence for the benefit of the alliance as a whole, and to assist the Assembly in 
the preparation of its reports, and warmly welcoming the first tentative experiment in the latter 
connection, in implementation of the Council's reply to Recommendation 331; 
(v) Deploring the severe reductions which the present United States administration has imposed on 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with which the WEU Agency for the Control of 
Armaments has co-operated from time to time ; 
(vi) Welcoming the inclusion in the Council's annual report, in response to Recommendations 331 
and 348, of specific information on the levels of British ground and air forces assigned to SACEUR, 
and recognising that no provision of the Brussels Treaty requires this information to be included ; 
(vii) Regretting however the Council's refusal in recent years to include in annual reports various 
other items the Assembly has requested, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. In application of Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel 
paragraphs IV and VI of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill; 
2. Submit to the Assembly in the near future the results of its consideration of the technical, 
military and political aspects of varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, in application of 
Article V of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, while taking into consideration the 
possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical weapons ; 
3. Instruct the Agency for the Control of Armaments to extend its studies of control, verification 
and exports of armaments, in co-operation with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, with a view to assuming for the benefit of the alliance as a whole certain tasks which the 
latter agency is no longer in a position to undertake ; 
4. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to extend its study of the European armaments 
industry to include a survey of the status of the two-way street and an analysis of the factors which 
would help to increase the proportion of European equipment in the armed forces of all allied 
countries; 
5. Request the international staff of the Standing Armaments Committee to assist within its 
competence in the preparation of reports of Assembly committees when these so request, and to 
extend such assistance to the collection of the necessary information ; 
6. To include in future annual reports: 
(a) a statement of the levels of forces which the WEU countries make available to NATO, and 
of the French forces in Germany ; 
(b) information as full as in reports for 1981 and earlier, on the production and procurement of 
armaments in member countries ; 
(c) as far as possible the latest approved lists of chemical and biological weapons subject to 
control. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Prussen, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
0.1. At its meeting on 2nd December 1982 
the P_residential Committee followed usage b; 
r~fernng to the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments the following chapters of 
the a!lnual report of the Council : Chapter I : 
RelatiOns between the Council and the Assem-
bly (to t~e extent of the committee's compe-
tence, whtc_h . ~avers defence questions) ; Chap-
ter 11 : Achvthes of the Council - B. Defence 
questions ; Chapter Ill : Agency for the Control 
of Armaments; Chapter IV: Standing Arma-
ments Committee. 
0.2. The committee notes that Recommenda-
tion 380 I, adopted by the Assembly on 15th 
June 1982 on the committee's previous report 2, 
was largely accepted by the Council and several 
ministers of member countries have commented 
favourably on the report in question. As the 
basic situation has not evolved, the principal 
ideas in the present report follow those of last 
year's report : 
- The fundamental provisions relating to 
security in the modified Brussels 
Treaty (Articles IV, V and VIII (3)) are 
still as valid today as when they were 
signed. Public demonstration of their 
credibility is to be found in the dia-
logue between the Assembly and the 
Council. 
- The WEU Assembly provides the best 
forum for public debate between Euro-
pean members of parliament on 
defence, security and armaments control 
matters, a debate which is essential in 
order to keep public opinion informed, 
and to support the defence effort for 
our countries' security. 
- For the rest, and particularly as regards 
the control of levels of forces and 
armaments provided for in Protocols 
Nos. 11, Ill and IV to the treaty, WEU 
must as far as possible be adapted to 
the political circumstances of the 
eighties. 
- Allied defence plans proper continue to 
be the preserve of the NATO bodies in 
accordance with Article IV of the 
Brussels Treaty. 
I. Text of Recommendation 380 and the Council's reply 
at Appendix I. 
2. Document 908, adopted on 20th April 1982. 
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0.3. As the committee recognises in another 
report I, European intergovernmental consulta-
tions on defence questions are necessary. These 
consultations are at present held in the flexible 
framework of the Eurogroup, and more general 
" security " questions in the framework of 
European political co-operation. The commit-
tee notes that since the Brussels Treaty was 
modified in 1954, no member government has 
asked that the WEU Council be convened, as 
provided for in Article VIII (3) of the treaty, to 
allow the seven governments " to consult with 
regard to any situation which may constitute a 
threat to peace ... ". This problem is discussed 
in the committee's other report I. 
I. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
1.1. Relations between the Assembly and the 
Council in 1982 were very good, as shown by 
the detailed replies given to the various recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly on the 
basis of the committee's reports. With regard 
in particular to Recommendation 380 of the 
Assembly on the application of the Brussels 
Treaty, adopted by the Assembly in June 1982, 
the approving words of the various ministers 
who in turn addressed the Assembly should be 
quoted. 
1.2. Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External 
Relations of Belgium and then Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, addressing the Assembly 
on 14th June 1982 once again underlined the 
importance of the treaty and indicated that the 
Council was prepared, where the control of 
armaments was concerned, to take account of 
the evolution of the situation in Europe : 
" By way of conclusion to this part of my 
statement, may I reaffirm WEU member 
countries' adherence to the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its protocols and 
their determination to fulfil the obliga-
tions they have entered into. They stress 
once again the importance they attach to 
the commitment to collective self-defence 
contained in Article V of the treaty, 
which is one of the cornerstones of the 
European security system. 
I. Burden-sharing in the alliance, Document 947, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson. 
In the matter of armaments control, the 
Council has repeatedly indicated its wish 
to take account of the changing situation 
in Europe ... " 
1.3. It was then the turn of Mr. Leister, 
Minister of State for Defence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, to describe on 16th June 
the broad lines of his country's defence policy, 
stressing the importance of NATO and express-
ing his government's agreement with the 
Assembly's proposals for adapting WEU to the 
needs of the day and deleting those treaty 
provisions which seem obsolete : 
" There is no doubt that when speaking 
of collective security policy for Europe 
we have to think above all of NATO and 
the NATO security system which inclu-
des our North American partners. How-
ever, against the background of the pre-
sent global - and not exclusively military 
- threat to our free way of life, it appears 
increasingly necessary to direct our deli-
berations to the possibilities arising from 
European co-operation in the various 
existing forums. 
In this connection the WEU Assembly is 
of particular importance as a forum for 
the discussion of European security pol-
icy. Not only is WEU the sole European 
parliamentary forum dealing with matters 
of security and defence policy, but by 
pledging military assistance in the form 
of a treaty it also contributes decisively to 
deterrence and, consequently, to the safe-
guarding of peace. 
The Federal Government is following 
with interest and attention the Assem-
bly's endeavours to adapt the WEU treaty 
to present requirements. We were there-
fore pleased to note that the Assembly 
passed, by a large majority, a proposal to 
cancel some provisions of the treaty 
which seem outdated. Let me stress, 
however, that the Federal Government's 
commitment to its WEU treaty obliga-
tions will remain as unreserved as in the 
past. " 
1.4. Addressing the Assembly on 15th June 
1982, Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External 
Relations of France, laid particular emphasis on 
the need for a public debate on peace, the 
balance of forces, security and disarmament and 
the importance of the WEU Assembly in this 
context: 
" ... Let me ask you this : how many years 
is it since our national parliaments last 
had any real debates on peace, the 
balance of forces, security and disar-
mament? 
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You are an elected Assembly, the only 
one in our European countries at present 
to have the competence, the qualifica-
tions and the interest to discuss these 
matters. You must help the govern-
ments, you must help those responsible 
by enabling this debate to take place. 
Furthermore, you are the elected repre-
sentatives of our European countries, and 
in this debate the European countries 
have an interest, an approach and ideas 
of a specific and particular nature. 
Do not misunderstand me. There is no 
question of dividing the defence of 
Europe from that of the other countries 
of the alliance. With the present imbal-
ance of forces on the continent of 
Europe itself that would be a fatal risk. .. 
So there must be absolutely no doubt that 
defence on the continent of Europe and 
global defence go hand in hand. No-
thing could be more dangerous than to 
doubt this, until there is something like a 
balance of forces on the continent itself, a 
balance of forces and weapons capable of 
reaching the continent and sited there. 
But while nothing must be done which 
might separate the defence of Europe 
from that of the alliance as a whole, it is 
nevertheless extremely useful for us to be 
able to express our own ideas. They do 
exist, and in some variety, too. 
. .. So it is a good thing, when public 
attention is at last involved and a genuine 
debate on these defence problems begins, 
that the opinions and constraints peculiar 
to the people of these countries should be 
expressed. 
Mr. President, this is the French Govern-
ment's appeal to this Assembly. It must 
become the main forum in which our 
peoples can discuss, through their elected 
representatives and with the necessary 
feedback, all the problems connected 
with our security ... " 
1.5. Reporting to the National Assembly on 
6th July 1982 on his address to the WEU 
Assembly, Mr. Cheysson again underlined the 
latter's importance : 
"The other day, on behalf of the French 
Government, I addressed the Assembly 
of Western European Union, not because 
the executive of WEU seems to have a 
very great future but because the Assem-
bly is an elected one, elected in the 
second degree. This elected Assembly is 
competent to handle these matters, which 
must be discussed among members of 
parliament... " 
DOCUMENT 948 
Perhaps to a greater extent than his prede-
cessors, Mr. Cheysson in fact stresses the 
importance of the NATO integrated command 
for the security of non-nuclear European coun-
tries which cannot be protected by the French 
nuclear force. This is what he affirmed in his 
article in the Wall Street Journal of 
25th February 1983 : 
" Adequate to guarantee our vital inter-
ests, our nuclear arms are not now inten-
ded - nor will they be in the future - to 
insure the protection of the entire Euro-
pean zone of the Atlantic Alliance. Nor 
may they be used to this end, since we 
retain exclusive control over them. The 
guarantee of European territories that do 
not have nuclear weapons therefore can 
come only from the integrated command 
of NATO, that is to say, in fact, the 
United States. For this reason, maintai-
ning the American nuclear deterrent and 
continually modernising it insofar as this 
is necessary are in our view essential. " 
1.6. Most recently, on 1st December 1982, 
Lord Belstead, Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, 
particularly showed his government's agreement 
with the Assembly's views as expressed in the 
last two recommendations on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty: 365, adopted on the report 
by the Defence Committee (Rapporteur : Mr. 
Tanghe) in June 1981, and 380, already 
mentioned, adopted in 1982 : 
" Also this [WEU] is the only European 
parliamentary forum empowered by sta-
tute to address defence matters. This is 
of great importance and will continue to 
be so. But it is also important to be 
realistic about the aims we pursue here. 
Recommendation 365 was right to 
acknowledge that 'for greater effective-
ness the material organisation of collec-
tive defence is undertaken in the wider 
framework of the North Atlantic Council 
and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group'. We cannot consider 
collective defence adequately without 
giving full weight to the contribution of 
the United States. 
If I have understood correctly the views 
expressed in the Assembly in recent 
years, the Assembly now believes that, 
twenty-eight years after the Brussels 
Treaty was modified, the time has come 
for some adaptation. The message 
which emerges from Recommendations 
365 and 380 is that the political situation 
has evolved since 19 54 and the Assembly 
therefore questions, for example, the need 
to defray so many of WEU's limited 
resources on checking on member 
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governments' armaments... Checks on 
armaments data lie at the heart of arms 
control negotiations with the Warsaw 
Pact, but the records of the member 
states of WEU are not closed books and I 
am sure that it is right that the Council 
should be giving careful thought to 
Recommendation 380. 
In the preamble to Recommendation 
380, the Assembly urged that WEU 
should be adapted to the needs of the 
1980s. With this the Government of the 
United Kingdom agree. However, I do 
not mean to imply support for complete 
revision. For one thing, the United 
Kingdom Government, along with our 
European partners, regard the mutual 
defence commitment in Article V of the 
Brussels Treaty as of fundamental impor-
tance. It is a commitment that uniquely 
expresses our support to each other as 
Europeans. " 
1. 7. The committee finds it particularly 
encouraging that its recommendations, ratified 
by the Assembly, should be listened to so care-
fully by the governments. 
1.8. In its reply to Recommendation 380, the 
Council lastly undertook to endeavour to 
communicate its annual report to the Assembly 
by the end of February. As the last chapter 
reached the Office of the Clerk in mid-March 
this year, committee members had time to 
examine it before discussing the draft of the 
present report. 
II.B. Activities of the Council -
defence questions 
1. Level of forces of member states 
2.1. Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels 
Treaty, completed by the Council's resolution 
of 15th September 19 56 and the agreement of 
14th December 1957, imposes limits on mem-
ber countries' armed forces and provides that 
changes in the level of these forces must 
receive the approval of member countries 
expressed either in the WEU Council or by the 
representatives of the seven member countries 
on the North Atlantic Council. With regard to 
the land and air forces which the six mainland 
countries place under the command of 
SACEUR in peacetime, these are subject to 
upper limits laid down in a special (unpub-
lished) agreement appended to the stillborn 
European Defence Community treaty. When 
NATO defence plans make provision for 
increases in the levels of forces assigned by 
these countries, any increase must receive the 
unanimous approval of the seven member 
countries, which may be expressed in NATO. 
2.2. The annual report for 1982 informs us 
that: 
" The Council, at their meeting of 
24th February, noted that the level of 
forces of the member states of WEU, as 
set out in the NATO force plan, fell 
within the limits specified in Articles I 
and 11 of Protocol No. 11, as in force at 
that time. They also took note of a 
declaration on French forces made by the 
representative of France. 
On 15th October, the Council examined 
the report of a further meeting of the 
same six permanent representatives to the 
North Atlantic Council, and approved 
the acceptance by one member state of 
the increase in its force level recommen-
ded by SACEUR. " 
This is believed to refer to an increase in the 
number of helicopters which Germany assigns 
to NATO. This cumbersome procedure for 
approving the levels of various categories of 
member countries' forces provided for in Proto-
col No. 11 and related documents, like the 
control of armaments provided for in the treaty, 
has clearly been overtaken by events. How-
ever, the treaty provisions do not allow the pro-
cedure to be modified unless the treaty itself is 
modified. 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed 
on the continent of Europe 
2.3. Under Article VI of Protocol No. 11, the 
United Kingdom initially undertook "to main-
tain on the mainland of Europe ... the effective 
strength of the United Kingdom forces which 
are now assigned to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe, that is to say four 
divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or 
such other forces as the Supreme Allied 
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Commander, Europe, regards as having equiva-
lent fighting capacity ... not to withdraw these 
forces against the wishes of the majority of the 
high contracting parties ... ". Following succes-
sive decisions of the Council, the level of this 
commitment is now down to 55,000 men plus 
the Second Tactical Air Force. 
2.4. The committee notes with satisfaction 
that the information concerning this commit-
ment given in the Council's annual report for 
1982 again fully meets its wishes as expressed 
inter alia in the Assembly's Recommendations 
331 and 348. The report states in fact that the 
average number of British land forces stationed 
on the mainland of Europe in 1982 in accor-
dance with Article VI of Protocol No. II was 
59,567. However, it continues: 
" ... The continued need for the presence 
of troops in Northern Ireland made it 
necessary for units of the British Army 
of the Rhine to be redeployed for short 
tours of duty there. In 1982 there were 
on average 909 men in Northern Ire-
land. As has been previously stated 
these units would be speedily returned to 
their duty station in an emergency affect-
ing NATO." 
It may be deduced that the average number of 
British troops stationed in Germany was 58,658 
men, whereas the commitment is for 
55,000. In the previous year, 58,885 were 
declared for Germany and 1,899 for Northern 
Ireland, making an average of 56,986 actually 
on the spot. 
2.5. Like last year, the annual report gives the 
following details on the strength of the United 
Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force: 
" Furthermore, in accordance with the 
Council's reply to Assembly Recommen-
dation 348 the Government of the United 
Kingdom have informed the Council that 
the strength of the United Kingdom's 
contribution to the Second Allied Tacti-
cal Air Force in 1982 was: 
Role Aircraft/Equipment Squadrons 
Strike/ Attack Buccaneers 2 
Jaguars 4 
Offensive support Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance Jaguars 1 
Air defence Phantom 2 
Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles 
Rapier surface-to-air missiles 4 
Air transport Puma 1 
Ground defence RAF regiment 1" 
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These figures have not changed since last year 
but the report does not indicate whether, as was 
supposed, Rapier units were sent to the 
Falklands in 1982. 
2.6. Although the foregoing statements on 
United Kingdom force levels on the continent 
show that the United Kingdom has more than 
met the current Brussels Treaty commitment of 
55,000 men plus the second TAF in 1981 and 
1982, the June 1981 White Paper " The way 
forward" announced that "(17) BAOR's man-
power which had been planned to continue to 
increase beyond the 55,000 level, will be held 
at that level ". Planned reorganisation of 
BAOR over the period 1983 to April 1984 
involves both some strengthening of units in 
Germany with armoured regiments and Rapier 
missile units, but also net reductions of about 
2,000 men with one divisional headquarters and 
an infantry battalion being withdrawn to the 
United Kingdom. The committee will wish to 
be assured in future years that the level of 
55,000 men is met, irrespective of any tempo-
rary deployments to Northern Ireland or 
elsewhere. 
2. 7. Last year, in its report on the application 
of the Brussels Treaty, the committee proposed 
the tacit extension to the other member 
countries of the commitment to maintain 
adequate forces under allied command. In 
fact, under the Brussels Treaty only the United 
Kingdom (which escapes most controls on 
armaments) has to maintain a minimum num-
ber of forces on the mainland of Europe 
assigned to SACEUR. In its reply to Recom-
mendation 380, the Council rejected the 
Assembly's proposal to invite the other member 
countries taking part in the NATO integrated 
system to make unilateral declarations 
concerning the level of forces which they 
undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe. Nor did the Council 
agree to include in its annual reports a declara-
tion on the level of such forces, similar to the 
one already made with regard to United 
Kingdom forces. 
2.8. The committee recalls that publication in 
the Council's annual reports of the level of 
British forces assigned under Article VI of 
Protocol No. 11 is in no way a requirement 
imposed by the treaty.· The United Kingdom 
agreed to include these figures in the annual 
report only in response to Assembly Recom-
mendations 331 and 348, and only after 
repeated requests by the Assembly in several 
consecutive years. The committee sees no 
reason why the other six member countries 
should not agree to include in the annual report 
similar declarations concerning the forces which 
they assign to NATO command or, in the case 
of France, the forces which it maintains in 
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Germany and which, according to the Council's 
annual report, are treated by the Council, as far 
as approval of their levels is concerned, in the 
same way as forces under NATO command. 
The committee therefore repeats this proposal 
in the draft recommendation. 
3. Control of armaments 
2.9. In the context of its proposals for 
adapting WEU to the needs of the eighties, the 
committee has for several years been pointing 
out that the provisions relating to the control of 
armaments contained in the Brussels Treaty 
and its protocols have completely lost their 
point in the circumstances now prevailing in 
Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. The 
committee proposed that the control system be 
reduced to the minimum which could be 
achieved by using the procedure for amendment 
contained in the treaty itself and its protocols, 
but without having recourse to international 
negotiations which would be required to modify 
the treaty texts themselves. 
2.1 0. Two lists of armaments subject to control 
can be amended by the procedure laid down 
in the treaty : 
(i) the list of certain conventional 
weapons which Germany undertook 
not to manufacture on its territory 
(Protocol No. Ill, Annex Ill) ; 
(ii) the list of atomic, biological and 
chemical weapons and certain 
conventional weapons subject to 
quantitative controls on the mainland 
of Europe (Protocol No. Ill, Annex 
IV). 
2.11. With regard to the first list, which 
concerns Germany, this may be amended or 
cancelled " in accordance with the needs of the 
armed forces " if a recommendation to this 
effect is made by the competent supreme 
commander of NATO, if the German Govern-
ment submits a request accordingly, and if the 
WEU Council approves the proposals by a 
two-thirds majority. Since it was signed, this 
list has been reduced on several occasions, most 
recently on the Assembly's recommendation, 
and now includes only strategic bomber aircraft 
(paragraph VI) and long-range surface-to-surface 
missiles (paragraph IV). Last year, in Recom-
mendation 380, the Assembly recommended 
that the Council cancel these last two items. 
In its reply, the Council recalled that in 
applying the controls provided for in the treaty 
" account should be taken, to the fullest extent 
possible, of the evolution of the situation in 
Europe... The Council have received with 
great interest and are considering the Assem-
bly's recommendation to cancel paragraphs 
IV ... and VI... ". 
2.12. Last year's proposal is taken up again by 
the committee in the draft recommendation. It 
is suggested that Germany take the initiative (as 
provided for in the treaty) of asking for this 
cancellation not because it intends to manufac-
ture such weapons in the immediate future but 
in order to put an end to an obsolete situation. 
2.13. With regard to the second list, which 
applies to all member countries on the main-
land of Europe, Article V of Protocol No. Ill to 
the treaty provides quite simply that " the 
Council of Western European Union may vary 
the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision ". 
Last year, in Recommendation 380, the Assem-
bly asked that the Council " vary by reducing 
the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill". In 
its reply, the Council informed the Assembly 
that " the Council are considering the technical, 
military and political aspects of this problem ". 
Now this three-page list has not been amended 
since the treaty was modified in 1954. The 
Council is at present examining the proposal 
made by the Director of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments on the amendment of 
this list. The committee for its part considers 
that the Council should report to the Assembly 
on the result of its consideration of the 
problem, and should consider deleting the 
list except for atomic, biological and chemical 
weapons. 
2.14. It might have been thought that for poli-
tical reasons it was wise to retain controls on 
the atomic, biological and chemical weapons 
which head this list. In reality the Council has 
never allowed the controls provided for in the 
treaty to be applied to atomic or biological 
weapons, and the committee considers in 
present circumstances that it would no longer 
be sensible to apply them. Quantitative 
controls are not applied to chemical weapons 
because no country has declared that it has 
stocks of such weapons. But by retaining 
atomic, biological and chemical weapons on the 
list of weapons subject to quantitative controls 
by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, a 
certain degree of reciprocity of commitments 
will be maintained with Germany, which has 
renounced the right to manufacture these 
weapons. 
Ill. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
3.1. Chapter Ill of the Council's annual 
report of the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments follows, with one slight difference (refer-
red to in paragraph 3.9 below), the one for the 
previous year. The committee therefore consi-
ders it worthwhile to repeat in the present 
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report the same explanations as it gave last year 
on current practice relating to the application 
of controls. 
3.2. The extent of the Brussels Treaty 
controls is not widely understood, nor is the 
fact that the Council failed to apply many of 
the control provisions from the outset. The 
control provisions of the treaty may be summa-
rised as follows: 
(i) Germany undertook not to manufac-
ture atomic, biological or chemical 
weapons on its territory; 
(ii) Germany also undertook not to 
manufacture certain conventional 
weapons, the list of which may be 
amended or cancelled in accordance 
with a special procedure, the Coun-
cil deciding by a two-thirds majority; 
(iii) the Council determines the level of 
stocks of atomic, biological and 
chemical weapons which countries 
manufacturing them may hold on 
the mainland of Europe 1; 
(iv) levels of atomic, biological and 
chemical weapons and certain 
conventional weapons held by mem-
ber countries on the mainland of 
Europe1 are subject to verification 
by the WEU Agency for the Control 
of Armaments. The list of these 
ABC and conventional weapons may 
be modified by a unanimous deci-
sion of the Council; 
(v) the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments verifies that the above 
provisions are respected, except for 
the weapons of forces assigned to 
NATO, which are verified by the 
latter. 
(a) Non-application of controls 
3.3. In the earlier days when the controls 
could be held to serve some purpose, the Com-
mittee had frequent occasion to draw attention 
to the major shortcomings in their application 
by the Council. The twenty-eighth annual 
report of the Council indicated no change in 
this situation. 
3.4. Like earlier reports, the Council's present 
report refers to fields where the Agency does 
not exercise its activities: 
" Atomic, chemical and biological 
weapons 
1. The expression " on the mainland of Europe " excludes 
British weapons on British metropolitan territory. 
DOCUMENT 948 
The position described in the last annual 
report of the Council has remained 
unchanged. 
The activities of the Agency cover nei-
ther nuclear nor biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these 
two categories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only 
non-production controls take place; no 
quantitative controls are made since the 
member states have always declared they 
possessed no such armaments. " 
Previous reports have included a statement to 
the effect that: 
"The non-nuclear components of such 
[nuclear] weapons (namely the missiles 
themselves and other specially designed 
equipment) are subject to control except 
as regards the weapons qualified as 
' strategic ' by one member state. Further-
more, as this state has declared that its 
nuclear capability as a whole is directed 
to one and the same objective of deter-
rence, its missiles with nuclear capability 
and tracked launchers are no longer sub-
ject to control. "t 
The Committee has noted2 that the state in 
question was France and that Pluton tactical 
nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from 
Agency control as from 1979. 
3.5. The Council's report goes on to say: 
" As the convention for the due process 
of law3 has not yet entered into force, 
the control measures carried out by the 
Agency at private concerns had, in 1981, 
as in previous years, to take the form of 
'agreed control measures'. 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the 
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a 
few weeks' notice. Since this agreement 
has never been withheld ... " 
3.6. The annual report also specifies that: 
" In application of Article Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill, which lays down conditions to 
I. Document 833, 28th March 1980. 
2. Document 875, 4th May 1981. 
3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by mem-
ber states of Western European Union in order to enable 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its 
control effectively and makmg provision for due process of 
law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels 
Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd 
October 1954. (Signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but 
ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.) 
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enable the Council to fix levels of chemi-
cal weapons that may be held on the 
mainland of Europe by those countries 
which have not given up the right to pro-
duce them, and in accordance with the 
Council decision of 19 59, the Agency 
asked the countries concerned in its ques-
tionnaire whether production of chemical 
weapons on their mainland territory had 
passed the experimental stage and entered 
the effective production stage. 
All the member countries concerned once 
again gave an explicit negative reply in 
1982. 
In addition, in the covering letter to its 
questionnaire, the Agency, as in previous 
years, asked the member states to declare 
any chemical weapons that they might 
hold, whatever their origin. In reply to 
this questionnaire, no country reported 
holding any chemical weapons and, 
because of this, the quantitative control 
of weapons of this nature raised no 
problems. " 
3. 7. On the subject of biological weapons the 
Council's report states: 
" All the member countries reported their 
agreement on the renewal in 1982 of the 
list of biological weapons subject to 
control as accepted by the Council in 
1981. The Council noted the fact. " 
The Committee calls as far as possible for the 
revised list of biological weapons subject to 
control to be communicated to the Assembly, 
together with the list of chemical weapons 
subject to control, a first version of which was 
communicated to the Assembly in the annual 
report for 1960, whereas the list of chemical 
agents which the Council has added to the list 
in the meantime has been communicated only 
to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI)1• 
(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
3.8. Although the WEU controls have lost 
their usefulness, and the Agency's true areas of· 
activity remain limited solely to conventional 
weapons, the number of inspections carried out 
by the Agency each year shows that generally 
speaking there has been no reduction in its acti-
vities, as may be seen from the following table. 
Non-production controls no longer apply to 
I. The list of chemical agents subject to control, appro-
ved by the WEU Council, was published by SIPRI in 1973 
in "The problem of chemical and biological warfare", 
Volume II, " CB weapons today ", page 217. 
German shipyards because, following a recom-
mendation to that effect by the Assembly, the 
Council in 1980 deleted warships from the list 
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of armaments not to be produced in Germany. 
Quantitative controls still apply to shipyards 
of all member countries on the continent. 
Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
Non-production 
Quantitative control measures control 
measures Total 
control 
at units (of which measures 
at at non- (all 
at under production Sub-total production production categories) depots national plants plants of chemical command weapons) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1961 29 15 12 66 7 (2) 63 
2 26 20 11 57 7 (2) 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 (4) 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 (4) 80 
5 26 16 11 53 7 n.a. 60 
6 * * * * * n.a. 78 
7 * * * * * n.a. 70 
8 * * * * * n.a. 79 
9 * * * * * (3) 77 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 
1 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 
2 * * * * * n.a. 66 
3 * * * * * n.a. 66 
4 * * * * * n.a. 71 
5 * * * * * n.a. 72 
6 * * * * * n.a. 71 
7 * * * * * n.a. 70 
8 * * * * * n.a. 68 
9 * * * * * n.a. 70 
1980 * * * * * n.a. 70 
1 * * * * * n.a. 70 
2 
* * * * * 
n.a. 70 
Notes a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth 
counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of 
inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of 
figures (old and new style- a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
n.a.: Information not available. 
Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the 
Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns I to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the 
published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those 
for 1970 to 1982 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permis-
sion to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and 
are without significance. 
* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report. 
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3.9. The committee finds particularly useful 
the lists of armaments currently being produ-
ced, set out in parts 1 to 4 of Section E on the 
state and problems of control in certain 
particular fields which is a summary of current 
armaments production programmes in member 
countries. However, in the present annual 
report the Council has cut down this section 
considerably. The committee asks the Council 
to retain in future reports all the useful infor-
mation which the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments can provide. 
(c) Conclusion on the control of armaments 
3.1 0. The annual report of the Council stresses 
the limited nature of the field control pro-
gramme, particularly visits to private firms, but 
it is clear that the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments performs its tasks efficiently in 
those fields which are open to it. 
3.11. For the reasons given above, the com-
mittee now recommends that the Council 
abolish non-production controls of conventional 
weapons and consider abolishing quantitative 
controls. The Council is empowered to take 
this step under the terms of Article V of 
Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, by modifying the list at Annex IV 
to Protocol No. Ill. This step will leave in 
force the unilateral undertaking by Germany 
not to manufacture nuclear, biological or che-
mical weapons on its territory. It continues to 
be the policy of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many not to manufacture such weapons. While 
controls on these non-production undertakings 
would remain in force under the treaty, 
as noted above the Council applies them only 
in the case of chemical weapons and then only 
in the form of " agreed verifications ". The 
unilateral undertaking by Germany not to 
manufacture specified conventional weapons on 
its territory would come to an end with the 
cancellation in accordance with Article 11 of 
Protocol No. Ill of the only weapons still on 
the list: long-range surface-to-surface missiles 
and strategic bombers. 
(d) Studies by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
3.12. The Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments conducts important studies on the princi-
ples of arms control, sometimes in technical 
fields. Its experts are in contact with various 
outside bodies. In the past the Agency has 
co-operated with the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, particularly 
in connection with the observation of military 
manoeuvres organised by ACDA on Salisbury 
Plain (England). But this United States agency 
which, since it was set up, had acquired 
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a worldwide reputation for the objectivity of 
certain of its publications', has been partly 
dismantled by the present United States admi-
nistration2. The committee proposes that the 
WEU Agency re-establish its former contacts 
with ACDA to examine to what extent it might 
take over from it, for the benefit of the alliance 
as a whole, certain major studies on principles 
governing the control, verification or export of 
armaments which ACDA is having to relin-
quish for lack of funds. Such a contribution 
on the part of the WEU countries to studies 
hitherto conducted by the United States alone 
would be a further contribution to defence 
burden-sharing in the alliance. 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
4.1. As in recent years the work of the 
Standing Armaments Committee in 1982 was 
concentrated chiefly in exchange of information 
by countries in Working Group No. 8 on 
operational research. It is also updating the 
economic (first section) part of its study of the 
situation of the armaments sector of industry in 
the member countries of WEU. An unclas-
sified version including the updated legal 
section and the " presentation " of the first sec-
tion of the economic part was communicated to 
the Assembly on lOth May 1982. 
4.2. The Council has agreed, in its reply to 
Recommendation 331, to consider the possi-
bility of the SAC assisting the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments to under-
take specific studies " within the competence of 
the SAC as defined in the decision of 7th May 
19 55 " (the Council decision whereby the 
Standing Armaments Committee was estab-
lished) and Mr. Lemoine, Secretary of State to 
the French Minister of Defence, addressing the 
Assembly on 12th December 1981, added: 
" And rather than need to obtain the 
Council's consent each time, could not 
the SAC be authorised, at each session of 
the Assembly, to give help with the 
various studies decided upon?... If the 
political will exists, I do not think 
anyway that institutional obstacles could 
hinder the expansion of the SAC's role. " 
I. See for instance the series "World military expendi-
tures and arms transfers ". 
2. Since President Reagan took office the ACDA annual 
budget has been reduced from $ 18.5 m to $ 15 m; its staff 
reduced from some 200 to 150 and one-third of senior posts 
left unfilled; its operational analysis office abolished; its 
computer removed and twenty years of research material 
transferred to a Washington University. Mr. Eugene Ros-
tow, the Director originally appointed by President Reagan, 
was dismissed on 12th January 1983 and replaced by Mr. 
Kenneth Adelman after a controversial confirmation by the 
Senate. Mr. David Emery, who has now been nominated 
as Deputy Director, is likely to face equally controversial 
confirmation hearings. 
However, in its reply to Recommendation 379, 
communicated to the Assembly on 24th Novem-
ber 1982, the Council unfortunately did not 
follow Mr. Lemoine: 
" As regards the Standing Armaments 
Committee, which also was the subject of 
proposals by the State Secretary of the 
French Ministry of Defence, the Council 
recall that this body was set up on 7th 
May 1955 to promote co-operation in the 
matter of armaments. If in this respect 
the international secretariat of the SAC 
were occasionally to assist the Assembly 
in the study of clearly-defined themes, 
this could only be done under a proce-
dure involving a case-by-case examina-
tion by the Council, under whom the 
SAC is placed. It is clear that such work 
could not have the effect of relieving the 
SAC of its responsibilities nor could it 
affect its competence, these being the 
Council's exclusive responsibility. " 
4.3. However, agreement has now been 
reached with the Council to allow the secreta-
riat of the SAC to assist in the preparation of 
the major report by the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
on the harmonisation of research in civil and 
military high technology fields 1• The commit-
tee welcomes this first attempt at co-operation, 
which will have to be extended in the future. 
As Mr. Lemoine said in the abovementioned 
address: 
" With, as it were, an information and 
research department available to it, the 
Assembly would be in a position to ini-
tiate more ambitious studies. " 
4.4. The Standing Armaments Committee 
could make a further useful contribution to 
joint production among the allied countries if it 
were to extend its study of the armaments 
industry to include a survey of the present sta-
tus of the two-way street, and an analysis of the 
I. However, it appears that the SAC secretariat has been 
unable to assist in the collection of data from public sources 
for the Scientific Committee's report. The committee 
accordingly recommends that the SAC be empowered to 
collect information. 
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factors which help to increase the proportion of 
European equipment in the armed forces of all 
allied countries. 
V. Conclusions 
5.1. The committee's principal conclusions 
are set forth in the draft recommendation which 
relates to this explanatory memorandum as 
follows: 
Draft recommendation Explanatory memorandum 
Preamble 
(i) and (ii) Appendix and Chapter I 
(iii) Paragraphs 2.14 ; 3.4. 
(iv) Paragraphs 3.8 to 3.12 ; 4.2 to 4.4. 
(v) Paragraph 3.12. 
(vi) Paragraphs 2.3 to 2.8. 
(vii) Paragraphs 2.7; 3.7; 3.9. 
Operative text 
1 and 2 
3 
4 
5 
6(a) 
6(b) 
6(c) 
Paragraphs 2.9 to 2.14; 3.10 and 3.11. 
Paragraph 3.12. 
Paragraph 4.4. 
Paragraph 4.2 ; 4.3. 
Paragraph 2.7. 
Paragraph 3.9. 
Paragraph 3.7. 
5.2. In paragraph 2.6 above the committee 
also notes the need for assurance in future years 
concerning the levels of United Kingdom forces 
on the mainland. 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
6 .1. The report as a whole was adopted by 
15 votes to 1 with 1 abstention. The minority 
which voted against did not state in committee 
its reasons for so doing. 
DOCUMENT 948 
The Assembly, 
APPENDIX 
RECOMMENDATION 380 1 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
- reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Counci/ 2 
APPENDIX 
(i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto; 
(ii) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the 
Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their 
full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instru-
ment of European security; 
(iii) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve 
any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that " in applying the provisions of Protocol No. 
Ill and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the 
situation in Europe "; 
(iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. In application of Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel para-
graphs IV and VI of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill; 
2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by redu-
cing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill; 
3. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not 
already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. 11, to make unilateral declarations concerning the level 
of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed 
with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties; 
4. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces; 
5. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-eighth ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 908). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 380 
The Council welcome the fact that the Assembly recognises that the fundamental provisions of 
the Brussels Treaty retain their full value and that it stresses the importance of WEU in the sphere of 
security. 
1. The Council recall their position, namely, that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. Ill 
and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situa-
tion in Europe. This is why Annex Ill of that protocol has been amended on several occasions 
since 1958. The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assembly's 
recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV ("Long-range missiles and guided missiles") and VI 
("Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes") of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill according to the 
procedure laid down in Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. As regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, the Council welcome the fact that, 
as a result of the debate and vote by the Assembly, the initial draft recommendation was amended to 
take account of certain legal and political considerations. 
The Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem. 
3 and 4. The overall system organised under the treaty and its protocols, the implementation of 
which, as regards level of forces, regularly appears in the annual report, enables the Council to be 
informed of and to assess the situation of the level of forces and their armaments assigned to 
SACEUR for the common defence. 
The level of forces thus assigned results from the undertakings made by the member states 
within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in 11.5 and 6 and IV of the final act 
of the nine-power conference, held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954. The 
forces assigned by the various countries to the common NATO defence are in fact defined on the 
basis of a plan which is kept up to date within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces result from 
the joint effort of the member countries in accordance with the capacity of each to contribute and 
with the aim of ensuring at all times an adequate level of forces. 
Consequently, there appears to be no need to invite the states concerned to make unilateral 
declarations to the WEU Council concerning a matter which is already dealt with in the multilateral 
context of NATO. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of including in future annual reports 
any statements on the level of forces other than those which are already given. 
5. The Council will endeavour, as in the past, to communicate its annual report to the Assembly 
before the end of February. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982. 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Lagorce 
29th November 1983 
1. In the last line of paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "by 
reducing". 
2. Leave out paragraph (iii) ofthe preamble to the draft recommendation. 
3. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " while taking into 
consideration the possibility of deleting the list concerned except for atomic, biological or chemical 
weapons". 
4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper. 
1. See 7th sitting, 29th November 1983 (amendments negatived). 
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AGENDA 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 28th November-1st December 1983 
I. Political Questions 
l. Economic relations with the Soviet 
Union 
2. Middle East crises and European 
security 
3. Africa's role in a European security 
policy - Chad 
11. Defence Questions 
l. Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report 
of the Council 
2. European security and burden-sharing 
in the alliance 
3. Role and contribution of the armed 
forces in the event of natural or other 
disasters in peacetime 
Ill. Technical and Scientific Questions 
I. Assessment of advanced technology in 
Japan 
2. Harmonisation of research in civil and 
military high technology fields -Part 11 
IV. Budgetar,· and Administrative Questions 
l. Budget of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1984 
2. Accounts of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1982 - The Auditor's report and 
Motion to approve the final accounts 
V. Relations with Parliaments 
The Assembly of WEU and the North 
Atlantic Assembly - Impact of the exis-
tence and work of the North Atlantic 
Assembly on relations between the 
WEU Assembly and national parlia-
ments and on public awareness of the 
existence of WEU 
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Report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on beha(( q( the 
General Af(airs Comnuttee 
Report tabled by Lord Reay on beha(( of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Muller on beha(( q( the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled b_1• Mr. Prussen on beha(( q( the 
Committee on Dc:(ence Questions and .clrma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on beha(( of the 
Committee on Dc:fence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Pecchioli on behalf' 
of the Committee on Dc:(ence Questions and 
Armwnents 
Report tabled by Lord Nortl!field on beha((()(the 
Committee on Scient(fic. Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on beha(( of 
the Committee on Scient(tic, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on beha(( 
of the Committee on Budgetan• Affairs and 
Administration 
Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on beha(( 
of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Stof(elen on beha(( of the 
Committeefor Relations with Parliaments 
Document 952 
Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session 
Paris, 28th November-1st December 1983 
MONDAY, 28th NOVEMBER 
Meetings of political groups. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
I. Opening of the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President ofthe Assembly. 
3rd November 1983 
4. Adoption of the draft order ofbusiness of the second part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session. 
5. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance: 
4p.m. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
6. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO. 
7. European security and burden-sharing in the alliance: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUESDAY, 29th NOVEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Application of the Brussels Treaty- reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Role and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in 
peacetime: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Pecchioli on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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Afternoon 3 p.m. 
l. Assessment of advanced technology in Japan: 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Northfield on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields - Part 11: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bassinet on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
WEDNESDAY, 30th NOVEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
l. Harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields- Part 11: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1982 - The 
Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft texts. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
l. Economic relations with the Soviet Union: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. The Assembly ofWEU and the North Atlantic Assembly- Impact of the existence and work of 
the North Atlantic Assembly on relations between the WEU Assembly and national parliaments 
and on public awareness of the existence ofWEU: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments. 
Debate. 
THURSDAY, 1st DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
l. Africa's role in a European security policy - Chad: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Muller on behalf ofthe General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
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10.30a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Hemu, Minister of Defence of the French Republic. 
3. Africa's role in a European security policy - Chad: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
Middle East crises and European security: 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Reay on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly 
for the Financial Year 1982 
THE AUDITOR'S REPORT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE 
ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1982. 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE AUDITOR OF THE ASSEMBLY 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1982. 
APPENDICES 
Appendix I : Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1982. 
Financial position as at 31st December 1982. 
Appendix 11 : Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the 
financial year 1982. 
Appendix Ill : Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, 
in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1982. 
Appendix IV : Provident Fund- Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1982. 
Report of the external Auditor 
to the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
on the accounts for the financial year 1982 
General 
1. The following financial statements, toge-
ther with an explanatory memorandum, were 
submitted to me by the President: 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
for the financial year 1982 and finan-
cial position as at 31st December 
1982 (Appendix I). 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
for the financial year 1981 (Appendix 
11). 
(c) Statement of sums due and received 
from the Secretary-General of Wes-
tern European Union, London, in 
respect of contributions to the Assem-
bly of Western European Union 
budget for 1982 (Appendix Ill). 
(d) Account of the provident fund for the 
financial year ended 31st December 
1982 (Appendix IV). 
2. My examination of the accounts has been 
carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
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Summary of income and expenditure 
(Appendix /) 
(a) Financial position during 1982 
3. The budget provided for expenditure of 
F 12,709,000 of which F 427,000 was expected 
to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the 
balance by contributions. 
4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted 
to F 12,244,050. Income amounted to 
F 12,799,492 comprising F 12,282,000 from 
contributions and F 517,492 from miscel-
laneous receipts. There was thus an excess of 
income over expenditure of F 555,442 arising 
from a budgetary surplus of F 464,950 (as 
shown at Appendix 11) and extra miscellaneous 
receipts ofF 90,492. 
(b) Pension scheme 
5. Under the common pension scheme 
implemented in 1977 by the co-ordinated orga-
nisations, Western European Union, Council of 
Europe, NATO, OECD and the European 
Space Agency, pension benefits payable by the 
Assembly of WEU are charged to the Assem-
bly's budget and staff contributions under the 
scheme are credited to the budget as miscel-
laneous income. In 1982 these staff contributions 
amounted to F 312,124 (Appendix I). 
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6. Staff members who had been employed 
before 1st July 1974 and who had decided to 
join the new scheme were required to meet the 
cost of validating their past service through 
surrender of their provident fund holdings. 
Where, because of withdrawals, the holdings 
were insufficient for that purpose, staff were 
required to meet the deficiency, plus compound 
interest at four per cent per annum, by monthly 
payments over a period of five years from 
30th June 1978. In 1982 payments under 
these arrangements amounted to F 16,060 and 
were credited to the budget as miscellaneous 
income. 
Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix If) 
7. The transfers between sub-heads within 
the same head of the budget were duly author-
ised in accordance with Article 6 of the Finan-
cial Regulations. These regulations contain no 
provision for the authorisation of transfers 
between heads. However, in accordance with a 
procedure approved in 1973, the Council has 
been informed that expenditure ofF 8,622 on 
Head Ill and F 45,009 on Head VI was incur-
red in excess of the budget provisions for these 
heads, and that these excesses were met from 
savings on Heads I and IV. 
Provident fund 
(Appendix IV) 
8. The provident fund continues to operate 
for those members of staff who opted to remain 
affiliated to the fund when the pension scheme 
was introduced. At 31st December 1982, three 
staff members were fully affiliated to the fund 
and four others maintained balances in it. The 
assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are 
amalgamated with the assets of the provident 
funds of the other organs of Western European 
Union in joint deposits administered by the 
office of the Secretary-General. These deposits 
were held in French francs, sterling, United 
States dollars and German marks and, due to 
variations in the exchange rate between the 
French franc and the other currencies, a gain 
of F 121,583 was made in the value of the 
deposits during the year . This gain has been 
credited to the individual accounts of the 
members of the fund in proportion to their 
holdings. 
9. I have received a certificate from the 
fund's bankers showing the amount of the joint 
deposits held at 31st December 1982 and a 
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statement from the office of the Secretary-
General confirming the share of these deposits 
standing to the credit of the Assembly's provi-
dent fund at 31st December 1982. This share 
is equivalent to the balance ofF 2,741,026 on 
members' accounts as shown at Appendix IV. 
Thus, at 31st December 1982, the assets of 
the fund were sufficient to meet its liabilities. 
10. I wish to record my appreciation of the 
willing co-operation of the officers of the 
Assembly during my audit. 
Gordon DowNEY 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
3rd June 1983 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(communicated by the President to the Auditor of the 
Assembly in connection with the financial year 1982) 
1. The statements attached hereto refer to: 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
- financial position as at 31st Decem-
ber 1982 (Appendix I); 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11); 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill) ; 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows that 
a sum of F 464,950 remains unexpended, 
whereas the final balance of income over 
expenditure was F 555,442. The difference 
between these two figures, F 90,492, represents 
the excess of receipts over those estimated made 
up as follows: 
F F 
- Bank interest. ........ 13 7,066 
- Sundry receipts....... 18,758 
- Sale of publications. . . 3 3,484 
- Contributions 7% .... 312,124 
- Reimbursement of 
loans on validation . . . 16,060 
- Receipts for 1982 
estimated in the 
budget. ............. . 
517,492 
427,000 
90,492 
Validation of pensions 
3. On 31st December 1982 there remained 
one outstanding loan on validation of pensions 
totalling F 17,106. In accordance with the 
regulations the outstanding loan must be 
cleared in 1983. 
Transfers 
4. Excess expenditure amounting to 
F 344,583 has been met by transfers between 
sub-heads within heads. Nevertheless excess 
expenditure resulting from the payment on 
renovations of offices (Head Ill) amounting to 
F 8,622 and payment of a pensioner which had 
not been foreseen when preparing the budget 
1982 (Head VI) amounting to F 45,009 has 
been deducted from the overall amount of 
unexpended credits in Heads I, 11, IV and 
V. The Council has been informed of this. 
Contributions 
5. All contributions were received from the 
Secretary-General WEU London before 31st 
December 1982. 
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Provident fund 
6. The Assembly's funds are incorporated 
with those of the other organs of WEU and the 
entire fund is administered by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
7. The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of the funds. On 31st December 
1982 the fund was held in French francs, 
sterling, German marks, United States dollars 
with the International Westminster Bank, 
London. 
8. The Assembly's provident fund on 31st 
December 1982 amounted to F 2,741,026 as 
shown at Appendix IV. At 1st January 1982 
there remained loans to three staff members 
amounting to F 67,900. Repayments of 
F 39,650 reduced the loans outstanding as at 
31st December 1982 to F 28,250. 
9. The President would like to take this 
opportunity of expressing the appreciation of 
the Assembly for the help which was extended 
to the Office of the Clerk by the United 
Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General. 
17th May 1983 
Fred MuLLEY 
President of the Assembly 

APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1982 
(in French francs) 
Per auached sratement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) .............. . 
Miscellaneous 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest .............................................. . 
Sundry receipts ............................................ . 
Sale of publications 
(R) Pensions 
Contributions (7 %) ........................................ . 
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.) .... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation ..................... . 
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads Ill and 
VI ....................................................... . 
Total expenditure (see Appendix 11) ......................... . 
Excess of income over expenditure .......................... . 
Financial position as at 31st December 1982 
Assets 
Cash at bank 
Sundry advances ........................................... . 
Accounts receivable ........................................ . 
Liabilities 
Accounts payable 
Excess of income over expenditure .......................... . 
Certified correct : 
137,066 
18,758 
33,484 
312,124 
16,060 
12,190,419 
53,631 
902,222 
110,196 
129,558 
586,534 
555,442 
DOCUMENT 953 
12,282,000 
517,492 
12,799,492 
12,244,050 
F 555,442 
1,141,976 
F 1,141,976 
Fred Mt.:LLEY 
Pre.\ident of the Assembly 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk o.fthe Assembly 
Hugo ADRIAENSENS 
Chairman ofthe Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets 
and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I 
certify. as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct. 
3rd June 1983 
Signed: Gordon DowNEY 
Comptroller and Auditor General. 
United Kin!{dom 
External Auditor 
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APPI 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE AI' 
DETAILS 
HEAD I - ExPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 (a) Salaries of permanent establishment 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades 
A, B and C), including travelling expenses and 
insurance 
Sub-Head 2 Allowances, social charges, etc. 
I. Document 891. 
(A) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 
(b) Children's allowance 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(/) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-
French staff 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
(B) Social charges 
(a) Social security 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
(c) Provident fund 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates 
not residing in Paris, who are convened for 
examinations and interviews, and cost of marking 
examination papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installation allowance 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(/) Medical examination 
Total of Head I 
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Total budget for 
1982 1 
5,388,000 
72,000 
195,000 
183,000 
453,000 
20,000 
33,000 
100,000 
2,000 
470,000 
184,000 
116,000 
1,600 
1,500 
3,400 
7,500 
12,000 
10,000 
7,252,000 
I 
APPENDIX JJ 
X ll 
~EXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1982 
in French francs 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure cred1ts 
+ -
212,301 5,175,699 5,031,806 143,893 
102,743 174,743 174,743 -
195,000 170,498 24,502 
183,000 152,280 30,720 
453,000 387,669 65,331 
I 
20,000 10,536 9,464 
2,993 35,993 35,993 -
100,000 81,814 18,186 
2,000 370 I ,630 
I 06,565 576,565 576,565 -
184,000 170,604 13,396 
116,000 113,247 2,753 
1,600 - I ,600 
4,785 6,285 6,285 -
5,165 8,565 8,565 -
5,165 2,335 - 2,335 
4,785 7,215 4,865 2,350 
10,000 6,051 3,949 
222,251 222,251 7,252,000 6,931,891 320,109 
t 
1 
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DETAILS Total budget for 1982 
HEAD 11 - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3 l. Temporary staff 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the 
Assembly 671,000 
2. Linguistic staff 
(A) Interpretation services 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of 
the Assembly 270,000 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of 
committees between sessions 267,000 
(B) Translation services 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the 
Assembly 560,000 
3. Insurance for temporary staff 5,000 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions 305,000 
I 
I 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions 65,000 
Total of Head 11 2,143,000 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 l. Premises 356,000 
2. Work on the building 53,000 
Sub-Head 5 Capital equipment 27,000 
Total of Head Ill 436,000 i 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
17,740 653,260 612,207 41,053 
270,000 239,802 30,198 
267,000 251,421 15,579 
30,128 529,872 521,073 8,799 
5,000 3,366 1,634 
30,128 335,128 335,128 -
17,740 82,740 82,740 -
i 
47,868 47,868 2,143,000 2,045,737 97,263 
356,000 360,771 ~ 53,000 53,100 0 
27,000 30,751 1-3,751 1 
t 436,000 444,622 1-8,622\ 
I 
I 
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DETAILS 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6 
Sub-Head 7 
Sub-Head 8 
Sub-Head 9 
Sub-Head 10 
Sub-Head 11 
Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, trans-
port of documents 
Office supplies and hire of machines 
Printing and publishing of Assembly docu-
ments 
Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
Official cars 
Bank charges 
Total of Head IV 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12 Travel and subsistence allowances and insu-
rance for the President of the Assembly, 
Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs 
Sub-Head 13 Expenses for representation and receptions 
Sub-Head 14 Committee study missions 
Sub-Head 15 Official journeys of members of the Office of 
the Clerk 
Sub-Head 16 
Sub-Head 17 
Sub-Head 18 
Sub-Head 19 
Sub-Head 20 
Expenses of experts and the auditor 
Expenditure on information 
Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
Contingencies and other expenditure not else-
where provided for 
Non-recoverable taxes 
Total of Head V 
HEAD VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 Pensions, allowances, etc. 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 
(b) Invalidity pension 
(c) Survivors' pension 
(d) Orphans' pension 
(B) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 
(b) Dependants' allowance 
(c) Education allowance 
(d) Relief allowance 
(C) Severance grant 
(D) Supplementary insurance 
Total of Head VI 
Total budget for 
1982 
370,000 
237,000 
1,110,000 
33,000 
35,500 
500 
1,786,000 
96,000 
150,000 
3,000 
240,000 
56,000 
203,000 
203,000 
3,000 
12,000 
966,000 
70,000 
36,000 
18,000 
2,000 
126,000 
I TOTAL 1 ................. 12,709,000 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 198:.. 
Fred MULLEY Georgt 
President ofthe Assembly Clerk o}t; 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
44,483 414,483 414,483 -
654 237,654 237,654 -
45,658 1,064,342 1,050,565 13,777 
521 33,521 33,521 -
35,500 29,275 6,225 
500 73 427 
45,658 45,658 1,786,000 1,765,571 20,429 
96,000 81,270 14,730 
150,000 134,265 15,735 
3,966 6,966 6,966 -
27,065 212,935 201,990 10,945 
23,099 79,099 79,099 -
203,000 171,061 31,939 
203,000 203,000 -
3,000 1,967 1,033 
12,000 5,602 6,398 
27,065 27,065 966,000 885,220 80,780 
1,323 71,323 107,777 1-36,4541 
1,264 34,736 34,736 -
477 17,523 17,523 -
3,311 1- 3,3111 
5,244 1- 5,2441 
418 2,418 2,418 -
1,741 1,741 126,000 171,009 l-45,009! 
~ 344,583 344,583 12,709,000 12,244,050 464,950 
111.:1 for up to 31st March 1983, in accordance with the Fmancial Regulation~ of the A~>embly. 
fouuAs Hugo ADRIAENSENS 
Assembly Chairman of the Committee on 
Budf?etary Affairs and Administration 
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APPENDIX Ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1982 
Contributions Budget surplus Revised Net Member states 600ths overpaid budget contributions 
in 1981 1981 for 1982 required 
F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 35,595 (-) 78,256 1,207,730 1,093,879 
France 120 (-) 72,396 (-) 159,166 2,456,400 2,224,838 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 72,396 (-) 159,166 2,456,400 2,224,838 
Italy 120 (-) 72,396 (-) 159,166 2,456,400 2,224,838 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 1,207 (-) 2,651 40,940 37,082 
Netherlands 59 (-) 35,595 (-) 78,256 1,207,730 1,093,879 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 72,396 (-) 159,166 2,456,400 2,224,838 
600 (-) 361,981 (-) 795,827 12,282,000 11,124,192 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1982 
Balance brought .fiJrward: 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1982 
Contributions of staff members and 
Assembly of Western European Union 
Repayments of loans by staff members 
Interest received during the year 
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1982 
Fred MuLLEY 
President of the Assembly 
of the 
F 
2,096,450 
167,336 Withdrawals 
39,650 
327,507 
Accounts of existing 
121,583 December 1982 
2,752,526 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
in French francs 
F 
11,500 
staff members as at 31st 
2,741,026 
2,752,526 
Hugo AoRIAENSENS 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in 
my opinion this statement is correct. 
3rd June 1983 
Gordon DowNEY 
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
Document 953, Addendum 26th September 1983 
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1982 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1982 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1982, together with 
the Auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial 
responsibility. 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chair-
man); Mr. Haase (Vice-Chairman); MM. Adriaensens, 
Biefnot (Alternate: Bogaerts), Delehedde (Alternate: 
Baumel), Hartmann, Hengel (Alternate: Margue), Lord 
Hughes (Alternate: Sir Paul Hawkms), MM. Jeambrun. 
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Linde, Martino, Michael Morris (Alternate: Lord McNair), 
Orione, Petrilli (Alternate: Amadet), Schleiter (Alternate: 
Oehler), Schmitz, Stokes, Tripodi, Tummers, de Vries. 
N.B. The names of those taking part m the vote are pnnted 
m italics. 
Document 954 26th September 1983 
DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1984 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2 
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Head/ 
Head II 
Head Ill: 
Head IV: 
Head V 
Head VI: 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of estimates of expenditure and income for the finan-
cial year 1984 
Allocation of expenditure under heads and sub-heads 
Analysis of estimates and expenditure 
Explanatory memorandum 
Comparison between the draft budget for the financial year 
1984 and the budget for the financial year 1983 
Summary of estimates of expenditure and income for the financial year 1984 
Details Estimate for 1984 F 
Expenditure for staff ................................... 8,496,800 
Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly .......... 2,593,000 
Expenditure on premises and equipment ................. 561,000 
General administrative costs ............................ 2,246,000 
Other expenditure ..................................... 1,157,000 
Pensions .............................................. 677,000 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ....................... 15,730,800 
TOTAL RECEIPTS ........................... 571,000 
NET TOTAL ............................... 15,159,800 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved 
by the Presidential Committee. 
(Alternate: Sir Paul Hawkins), MM. Jeambrun, Linde, 
Martino, Michael Morris (Alternate: Lord McNair), Orione, 
Petrilli (Alternate: Amade1), Schleiter (Alternate: Oeh/er), 
Schmitz, Stokes, Tripodi, Tummers, de Vries. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chair-
man); Mr. Haase (Vice-Chairman); MM. Adriaensens, 
Biefnot (Alternate: Bogaerts), Delehedde (Alternate: Bau-
me{), Hartmann. Hengel (Alternate: Margue), Lord Hughes 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Allocation of expenditure under heads and sub-heads 
Details 
Head / - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 : Salaries of permanent establishment ............. . 
Sub-Head 2 : (A} Allowances .............................. . 
(B) Social charges ............................ . 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival 
and departure of permanent officials ........ . 
(D) Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, 
allowances, etc.) .......................... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Head /I - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3 : 1. Temporary staff ............................ . 
2. Linguistic staff ............................. . 
3. Insurance for temporary staff ................ . 
4. Installation of equipment for sessions ......... . 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions .... . 
6. Provision for revising emoluments ............ . 
TOTAL OF HEAD 11 .................... . 
Head /I/- EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 : 1. Premises ................................... . 
2. Work on the building (joint areas) ............ . 
Sub-Head 5 : Capital equipment ............................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD Ill .................... . 
Head /V- GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of 
documents .................................... . 
Sub-Head 7: Office supplies and hire of machines ............ . 
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents .. . 
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. . .... . 
Sub-Head 10: Official cars .................................. . 
Sub-Head 11 : Bank charges ................................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Head V- OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance 
for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of 
Committees and Rapporteurs ................... . 
Sub-Head 13 : Expenses for representation and receptions ....... . 
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions ..................... . 
Sub-Head 15 : Official journeys of members of the Office of the 
Clerk ........................................ . 
Sub-Head 16 : Expenses of experts and the auditors ............ . 
Sub-Head 17 : Expenditure on information .................... . 
Sub-Head 18 : Expenses for groups of the Assembly ............ . 
Sub-Head 19 : Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for .................................. . 
Sub-Head 20 : Non-recoverable taxes ......................... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD V 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Head VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 : (A} Pensions ................................ . 
(B) Allowances .............................. . 
(C) Severance grant .......................... . 
(D) Supplementary insurance ................. . 
ToTAL oF HEAD VI ................... . 
Estimate for 1984 
F 
5,670,000 
1' 101,300 
920,500 
112,000 
693,000 
742,000 
1,235,000 
5,000 
350,000 
82,500 
178,500 
446,000 
30,000 
85,000 
465,000 
300,000 
1,400,000 
40,000 
40,500 
500 
125,000 
150,000 
3,000 
290,000 
68,000 
253,000 
253,000 
3,000 
12,000 
613,000 
55,000 
9,000 
8,496,800 
2,593,000 
561,000 
2,246,000 
1' 157,000 
677,000 
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Analysis of estimates of expenditure 
Head I- Expenditure for staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate: F 5,670,000 
Estimate: F 5,595,000 
Rank WEU Grade 
The Clerk ............................................. . Hors cadre 
Senior Counsellors ...................................... . A6 
Counsellors ............................................ . A5 
First Secretaries ........................................ . A4 
Secretaries ............................................. . A3 1 
Secretaries-Translators/Publications 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator .............. . A2 
Chief Accountant ....................................... . B6 
Personal Assistants ..................................... . B4 2 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . B3 
Switchboard Operator ................................... . B3 
Head of Reproduction Department ....................... . C6 
Assistants in Reproduction Department ................... . C4 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), 
including travelling expenses and insurance 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
1 
5 
5 
1 
1 
2 
28 
Estimate: F 
I. Transformation of the A3 post approved for one year into a permanent post. 
2. Regrading of a Grade B3 requested in 1983. 
45 
Total 
F 
391,700 
710,600 
1,013,800 
577,000 
379,500 
587,200 
195,000 
710,300 
591,000 
97,000 
130,900 
211,000 
5,595,000 
75,000 
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Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
(a) Household allowance 
Rank 
Clerk .................................................. . 
Senior Counsellors ...................................... . 
Counsellors ............................................ . 
First Secretary .......................................... . 
Secretaries ............................................. . 
Personal Assistants ..................................... . 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . 
Head of Reproduction Department ....................... . 
Assistants in Reproduction Department ................... . 
(b) Children's allowance 
9,24 7 F per year per child x 22 : 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Rank 
Senior Counsellors ....................................... 
Counsellors 0 0 •••••••••••• 0 •••• 0 •••••••••••••••• 0 •• 0 ••••• 
First Secretary ........................................... 
Secretaries 0 0 •• 0 •••• 0 •• 0 ••••••• 0. 0 ••••••• 0 •••• 0. 0 ••• 0 •••• 
Secretary-Translator/Publications 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator ............... 
Personal Assistants •••• 0 •••••••••••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •••••••••••••• 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists •• 0 •••••• 0. 0 •••• 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 •••• 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(f) 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
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Estimate: F 1,101,300 
Estimate : F 231 ,300 
WEU No. Total Grade F 
Hors cadre 1 23,000 
A6 2 42,600 
A5 3 60,800 
A4 1 17,300 
A3 2 22,800 
B4 2 16,500 
B3 4 27,700 
C6 1 7,900 
C4 2 12,700 
18 231,300 
Estimate: F 203,000 
F 203,000 
Estimate: F 496,000 
WEU No. Total Grade F 
A6 2 142,000 
A5 1 68,000 
A4 1 57,600 
A3 2 75,800 
A2 2 64,700 
B4 2 45,700 
B3 2 42,200 
12 496,000 
Estimate: F 16,000 
Estimate: F 33,000 
Estimate: F 120,000 
Estimate: F 2,000 
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(B) SOCIAL CHARGES 
Estimates : F 920,500 
(a) Social Security Estimate: F 644,000 
28 officials F 644,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance Estimate: F 176,000 
(c) Provident fund Estimate: F 100,500 
14 % of basic salaries x 717,200 F F 100,500 
(for 2 officials who opted to continue with the provident 
fund) 
(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing 
in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews 
and cost of marking examination papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and depar-
ture of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installation allowance 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(f) Medical examination 
Estimate: F 112,000 
Estimate: F 10,000 
Estimate: F 10,000 
Estimate: F 40,000 
Estimate : F 30,000 
Estimate: F 15,000 
Estimate: F 7,000 
(D) PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, ALLOWANCES, ETC.) 
Estimate: 693,000 
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Head li- Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TEMPORARY STAFF 
Temporary staff required for sessions of the Assembly 
Function 
Head of the sittings office ................................ . 
Heads of sections ....................................... . 
Sergeant-at-Arms ....................................... . 
Secretaries for the Assembly ............................. . 
Precis writers ........................................... . 
Verbatim reporters ...................................... . 
Assistants .............................................. . 
Head ushers ............................................ . 
Ushers ................................................. . 
Offset/ Assemblers ...................................... . 
Daily 
remuneration 
F 
850 
690 
740 
645 
495 
645 
495 
645 
645 
808 
325 
282 
475 
432 
263 
238 
388 
238 
Estimate: F 2,593,000 
Paris: 10 days 
No. 
2b 
2a 
2b 
1 b 
3a 
2b 
3a 
3b 
14 b 
6c 
6a 
10 a 
4b 
27 b 
2a 
12 a 
3b 
10 a 
112 
Total 
F 
27,200 
31,600 
7,800 
30,300 
38,000 
160,000 
210,000 
5,300 
42,500 
28,500 
581,200 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside France. 
c. Recruited as free-lance staff. 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 160,800 
F 742,000 
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2. LINGUISTIC STAFF 
(A) Interpretation Services 
(a) Interpretation services required for sessions of the Assembly 
10 days 
Function 
No. Total F 
Interpreters • 0 0. 0 ••••••• 0 •••••••• 0 0. 0 ••••••••••••••••• 0 ••• 12 252,000 
12 252,000 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . F 18,000 
F 270,000 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions . . . . F 330,000 
(B) Translation Services 
Temporary translators for sessions of the Assembly 
Dally Estimate 1 Function remuneration No. 
F F 
Revisers 
•••••••••• 0 •• 0 0. 0 ••••••••••• 0 •••• 0. 0 •••••• 0 •••••• 742 3a 234,400 
1,202 4b 
Translators 0 •• 0 •• 0 •••••••••••••••• 0. 0. 0 •• 0 0. 0. 0 •••••••••• 594 3a 227,500 
1,003 5b 
Assistants 
•••••••••• 0 ••••• 0 0 •• 0 0. 0 0 0 ••••••••• 0 •••••• 0 0 ••• 282 4a 145,100 
325 3a 
475 3b 
432 2b 
27 607,000 
I. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators. 
a Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside France. 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . . F 28,000 
F 635,000 
3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF 
Estimate: F 5,000 
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4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
-Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 340,000 
-Installation of telephone booths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Estimate: F 350,000 
5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS 
- Removal expenses 
-Medical service (Doctor and Nurse) 
- Hire of typewriters, a technician and screens 
- Servicing of lifts 
-Cleaning 
- Overtime for switchboard staff 
- Snacks for reproduction service 
Estimate: F 82,500 
6. PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, PER DIEM ALLOWANCES) 
Estimate: F 178,500 
Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimate : F 561 ,000 
Sub-Head 4 
1. PREMISES 
-Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simulta-
neous interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
-Joint overheads, furniture for the premises and insurance ............. F 390,000 
-Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture ... F 26,000 
- Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
- Changing the switchboard 
2. WORK ON THE BUILDING 
(joint areas) 
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Estimate: F 446,000 
Estimate: F 30,000 
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Sub-Head 5 
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 
- 1 duplicating machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 61,000 
- 2 typewriters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 24,000 
Estimate: F 85,000 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Estimate: F 2,246,000 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEX CHARGES. TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
- Postage ................................................ F 300,000 
- Telephone ............................................. F 145,000 
- Telex .................................................. F 15,000 
- Transport of documents ................................. F 5,000 
Sub-Head 7 
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES 
- Purchase of duplication paper, headed writing paper and 
other office supplies 
- Hire of machines for photocopying and printing 
Sub-Head 8 
Estimate: F 465,000 
Estimate: F 300,000 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of 
debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents) 
- Printing of reports of the Council 
- Printing of texts adopted 
- Miscellaneous - bulletins, printing of the agenda 
and order of business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc. 
- Reprints 
- Brochures 
Sub-Head 9 
Estimate : F 1,400,000 
PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC 
Estimate: F 40,000 
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Sub-Head 10 
OFFICIAL CARS 
- Hire of official cars for the President 
- Maintenance, garage, petrol and insurance for the official 
car of the Clerk Estimate: F 40,500 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK CHARGES 
Estimate : F 500 
Head V- Other expenditure 
Estimate : F I, 15 7,000 
Sub-Head 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, 
CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate: F 125,000 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Estimate: F 150,000 
Sub-Head 14 
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head 15 
OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Estimate: F 290,000 
Sub-Head 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR 
Estimate: F 68,000 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate: F 253,000 
Sub-Head 18 
EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Estimate: F 253,000 
Sub-Head 19 
CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR 
Estimate: F 3,000 
Sub-Head 20 
NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES 
Estimate: F 12,000 
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(a) Retirement pension 
(b) Invalidity pension 
Head VI- Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC. 
(A) Pensions 
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Estimate: F 677,000 
Estimate : F 613,000 
Estimate: F 381,600 
Estimate : F 1 70,300 
(c) Survivors' pension ...................................... Estimate: F 40,800 
(d) Orphans' pension ....................................... Estimate: F 20,300 
(B) Allowances 
Estimate: F 55,000 
(a) Household allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate : F 16,500 
(b) Dependants' allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimate: F 30,500 
(c) Education allowance .................................... Estimate: F 8,000 
(d) Relief allowance ........................................ Estimate: pro mem. 
(C) Severance grant 
Estimate : pro mem. 
(D) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate : F 9,000 
Income 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Estimate: F 140,000 
(a) Sale of publications ..................................... F 25,000 
(b) Bank interest ........................................... F 100,000 
(c) Social security reimbursements ........................... F 15,000 
(B) Pensions 
Estimate : F 341 ,000 
(a) Contributions (7 %) (x F 4,870,000) ....................... Estimate: F 341,000 
(b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.) .. Estimate: nil 
(C) Levy on basic salaries of Grade A o.((icia!s 
Estimate: F 90,000 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 15,159,800. The budget for 1983 amounted 
to F 13,893,000. The difference is therefore F 1,266,800, i.e. an increase of9.10%. 
2. Head I- Expenditure for staff 
This estimate, in accordance with the instructions given to the Office of the Clerk, takes into 
consideration: 
(I) the maintenance of two Grade A.6 posts; 
(il) the transformation of the Grade A.3 post, approved in 1983 for a period of one year, into 
a permanent post. This would become effective at the end of the fixed-term contract 
(1 year) given to the current holder of the post. The 1984 budget consequently takes into 
account the salary of that official until 15th July 1984 (F 135,000) and with effect from 
that date the salary and allowances of a non-French official, married, with 2 dependent 
children (F 200,000). However, actual expenditure for this post would be less if an 
unmarried official is recruited. 
(iii) the regrading already requested in 1983 of a Grade B.3 post to Grade B.4; the additional 
cost would be F 700; 
{iv) annual increments; 
(v) the "Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, allowances, etc.)" (9 %). 
Salaries and allowances have been calculated on the basis of those in force on 1st January 
1983. 
3. Head//- Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-head 3.1 - Temporary staff 
Sub-head 3.2 (A)- Interpretation services 
Sub-head 3.2 (B)- Translation services 
Sub-head 3.6 - Provision for revising emoluments (salaries, per diem allowances) 
Salaries for temporary staff (as in the Council of Europe) are calculated on the basis of salary 
scales for permanent staff. The figures given are those in force on l st January 1983 and include 
"provision for revising emoluments (salaries and per diem allowances)". 
Sub-head 3.4 - Installation of equipment for sessions 
A new temporary installation carried out in 1983 has proved economical and no change has 
therefore been made in this estimate for 1984 in spite of inflation. 
4. Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-head 4.1 - Premises 
This estimate covers the Assembly's share in the upkeep of the premises and the urgent 
problem arising from the fact that the office furniture and certain floor coverings are in poor 
condition. 
Sub-head 4.2- Work on the building (joint areas) 
This estimate covers the Assembly's share of the hire-purchase of a new switchboard over a 
period of five years under a contract concluded in 1983. 
Sub-head 5 - Capital equipment 
The sum of F 8 5,000 is for the replacement of two typewriters purchased in 1968 and 1971 
and of some of the reproduction equipment which, now more than five years old, is no longer reliable 
enough for carrying out the Assembly's work. 
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Moreover, it should be recalled that the volume of work has increased considerably over this 
period, making it necessary for the reproduction service to use two other offset machines during peak 
periods, this equipment having been made available to the Assembly by the manufacturer free of 
charge until the last session. For future sessions, this absolutely essential equipment will have to be 
hired provisionally. This matter will be examined in the context of the replacement of present 
equipment. A credit ofF 61,000 has therefore been requested. 
5. Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sub-head 6 - Postage, telephone, telex charges, transport of documents 
The increase of F 58,000 in this estimate is to cover expected increases m postage and 
telephone rates and the hire of a telex and attendant costs. 
It should be noted however that the telex requested m 1983 has not yet been hired. This 
matter will be examined in the context of future measures. 
Sub-head 7 - Office supplies and hire of machines 
The increase of F 38,000 in this estimate is to cover the higher cost of paper and office 
supplies. Account is also taken of the hire of a photocopying machine and an addressograph 
machine. 
Sub-head 8 - Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
The increase ofF 188,000 in this estimate is to meet expected increases in the cost of printing 
and paper. 
Sub-head 10 - Official cars 
This estimate covers the maintenance, garage, insurance, etc., of the official car, account being 
taken of the expected increase in the cost of living, plus the hire of an official car for the President. 
6. Head V- Other expenditure 
Sub-head 12 - Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the 
Assembly, Chairmen of committees and Rapporteurs 
The increase of F 15,000 in this estimate is to cover the expected increase in travelling 
expenses and per diem allowances. 
Sub-head 13 - Expenses for representation and receptions 
The increase ofF 6,000 corresponds to rising prices. 
Sub-head 15 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
The increase ofF 26,000 is based on the expected increase in travelling expenses and per diem 
allowances in 1984. 
Sub-head 16 - Expenses of experts and the auditors 
The increase ofF 6,000 is to cover the higher fees of the auditor and experts. 
Sub-head 17 - Expenditure on information 
The increase ofF 23,000 takes account of the expected increase in the cost of living. 
Sub-head 18 - Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
The increase ofF 23,000 takes account of the expected increase in the cost of living. 
1. Head VI- Pensions 
The increase in this head corresponds to the payment of a pension for a Grade A.6 official who 
has retired and an invalidity pension for a Grade A.3 official. 
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8. Sundry receipts 
Expected receipts ofF 571,000 in 1984 include: 
(z) sale of publications; 
(iz) bank interest; 
(iiz) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave; 
(iv) income from the 7 % contribution from staff subscribing to the pensiOn fund, the 
reimbursement of loans and levies; 
( v) levy on the salaries of Grade A officials. 
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Comparison between the draft budget for the financial year 1984 
and the budget for the financial year 1983 
Head I- Expenditure for staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
(a) Basic salaries 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 5,595,000 
Budget for 1983 ...................................................... F 5,404,100 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 190,900 
1982 expenditure: F 5,031,806 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2. 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C), including travelling expenses 
and insurance 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure: F 174,743 
75,000 
75,000 
These salary scales are the same as those in force on 1st January 1983. See the explanatory 
memorandum, paragraph 2. 
Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
(a) Household allowance 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure : F 170,498 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(b) Children's allowance 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase ................. F 
1982 expenditure : F 152,280 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure: F 387,669 
231,300 
191,300 
40,000 
203,000 
170,000 
33,000 
496,000 
468,200 
27,800 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the 
allowance. 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 16,000 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 10,100 
----'-::"~ 
Net increase ................. F 5,900 
1982 expenditure: F 10,536 
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This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of 
officials qualifying for an allowance. 
(e) Overtime 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure: F 35,993 
(f) 
(g) Education allowance 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net decrease ................. F 
1982 expenditure : F 81,814 
33,000 
33,000 
120,000 
130,000 
10,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this 
allowance. 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 2,000 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure : F 3 70 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this 
allowance. 
(B) SOCIAL CHARGES 
(a) Social security 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure: F 576,565 
This takes account of increases in 1983 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net decrease ................. F 
1982 expenditure : F 170,604 
(c) Provident fund 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure: F 113,247 
644,000 
608,500 
35,500 
176,000 
180,400 
4,400 
100,500 
112,600 
12,100 
This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the 
provident fund scheme. 
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(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for 
examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure : nil. 
10,000 
10,000 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent 
persons 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure : F 6,285 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(c) Removal expenses 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure: F 8,565 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(d) Installation allowance 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure : nil. 
Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements. 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure : F 4,865 
Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1984. 
(/) Medical examination 
Estimate for 1984 ..................................................... F 
Budget for 1983 ...................................................... F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure : F 6,051 
(D) PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES. ALLOWANCES, ETC.) 
10,000 
10,000 
40,000 
40,000 
30,000 
30,000 
15,000 
15,000 
7,000 
7,000 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 693,000 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 664,800 
----'--
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 28,200 
1982 expenditure : nil. 
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Head II- Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-Head 3 
1. TEMPORARY STAFF 
Temporary staff required for sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase ................. F 
1982 expenditure : F 612,207 
The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
2. LINGUISTIC STAFF 
(A) Interpretation Services 
(a) Interpretation services required for sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimated unchanged 
1982 expenditure: F 239,802 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure: F 251,421 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(B) Translation Services 
Temporary translators for sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure: F 521,073 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF 
742,000 
682,500 
59,500 
270,000 
270,000 
330,000 
300,000 
30,000 
635,000 
573,000 
62,000 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 5,000 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 5,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure: F 3,366 
4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure: F 335,128 
This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
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5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure: F 82,740 
6. PROVISION FOR REVISING EMOLUMENTS (SALARIES, PER DIEM ALLOWANCES) 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase ................. F 
1982 expenditure: nil. 
Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-Head 4 
1. PREMISES 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure: F 360,771 
82,500 
82,500 
178,500 
164,000 
14,500 
446,000 
396,000 
50,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and 
the hire of committee rooms. 
2. WORK ON THE BUILDING 
(joint areas) 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 30,000 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 60,000 
----'----,---,-
Net decrease ................. F 30,000 
1982 expenditure: F 53,100 
This represents the Assembly's share in work to be carried out in the building and for changing 
the switchboard. See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Sub-Head 5 
CAPITAL EQUIPMENT 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 85,000 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 36,000 
------'---
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 49,000 
1982 expenditure: F 30,751 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEX CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure: F 414,483 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
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Sub-Head 7 
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure : F 23 7,654 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 8 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS 
300,000 
262,000 
38,000 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1 ,400,000 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,212,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 188,000 
1982 expenditure: F 1,050,565 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 9 
PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS. REFERENCE WORKS, ETC. 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 40,000 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 37,000 
--~--
Net increase ................. F 3,000 
1982 expenditure: F 33,521 
Sub-Head 10 
OFFICIAL CARS 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 40,500 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F __ 3--,--7'-"-,5-'-0.c_O 
Net increase ................. F 3,000 
1982 expenditure: F 29,275 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK CHARGES 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure : F 73 
Head V- Other expenditure 
Sub-Head 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN 
OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase ................. F 
1982 expenditure: F 81,270 
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Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, 
including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments. 
The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of 
the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected 
with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are 
subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee. 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase ................. F 
1982 expenditure : F 134,265 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 14 
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure: F 6,966 
Sub-Head 15 
OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase ................. F 
1982 expenditure : F 201,990 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 16 
EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS 
150,000 
144,000 
6,000 
3,000 
3,000 
290,000 
264,000 
26,000 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 68,000 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F __ 6_2'----,o_o_o 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 6,000 
1982 expenditure : F 79,099 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure: F 171,061 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
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Sub-Head 18 
EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Budget for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 
1982 expenditure: F 203,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Head 19 
CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR 
253,000 
230,000 
23,000 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 3,000 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure : F 1 ,967 
Sub-Head 20 
NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 
Budget for 1983 ....................................................... F 
Estimate unchanged 
1982 expenditure: F 5,602 
Head VI- Pensions 
Sub-Head 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC. 
(A) Pensions 
(a) Retirement pension 
12,000 
12,000 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 381,600 
Estimate for 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 166,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 215,600 
1982 expenditure: F 107,777 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(b) Invalidity pension 
Estimate for 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 170,300 
nil Budget for 1983 ....................................................... . 
1982 expenditure : nil 
(c) Survivors' pension 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 170,300 
Estimate for 1984 ...................................................... F 40,800 
Estimate for 1983 ...................................................... F 36,400 
-----'--
1982 expenditure : F 34,736 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
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(d) Orphans' pension 
Estimate for 1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 20,300 
Budgetforl983 ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo F 18,600 
---'--
Net increase 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 1,700 
1982 expenditure : F 17,523 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7 0 
(B) Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 
Estimate for 1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 16,500 
Budget for 1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 6,200 
----'--
1982 expenditure : F 3,311 
(b) Dependants' allowance 
Net increase 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 10,300 
Estimate for 1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 30,500 
Budget for 1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 9,300 
-----'--
Net increase 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 21,200 
1982 expenditure: 5,244 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7 0 
(c) -Education allowance 
Estimate for 1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 
Budget for 1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net increase 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 
1982 expenditure: nil 
(C) Severance grant 
8,000 
nil 
8,000 
pro memo 
(D) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1984 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 9,000 
Budget for 1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 3,500 
Net increase 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F 5,500 
1982 expenditure: F 2,418 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Stoffelen, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. It is quite clear that perhaps the main task 
of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
is to try to communicate the decisions of the 
Assembly of WEU to national parliaments and 
the public. In a way we have to sell Western 
European Union, the activities of WEU and in 
general the defence of Europe to the public. 
2. We had to conclude several times that 
awareness of the existence and the activities of 
WEU is very poor. 
3. In practice the problem is confusion - not 
just with the European Communities and the 
Council of Europe, but with the North Atlantic 
Assembly too. No doubt the Atlantic Alliance 
is better known than WEU. Even the activities 
of the North Atlantic Assembly are perhaps 
better known than the activities of our own 
Assembly. 
4. There is no doubt that the activities of the 
North Atlantic Assembly have an impact on our 
activities in our efforts to communicate and 
publicise more widely and effectively the activ-
ities of the WEU Assembly to parliaments and 
the public. For that reason it is worth while to 
compare the North Atlantic Assembly with our 
Assembly and to try to draw conclusions on the 
basis of such a comparison. 
11. North Atlantic Assembly 
A. General information and background 
5. The North Atlantic Assembly is the inter-
parliamentary organisation of member countries 
of the alliance and as such it provides the forum 
where North American and European parlia-
mentarians meet to discuss problems of com-
mon concern. 
6. The assembly was founded in 1955 and, 
until 1966, was known as the Conference of 
NATO Parliamentarians. Its aims are to 
strengthen co-operation and understanding 
among the countries of the alliance, to encourage 
governments to take the alliance viewpoint into 
account when framing legislation and to 
encourage a common feeling of Atlantic solida-
rity in national parliaments. 
7. Although the assembly is completely 
independent of NATO, it constitutes a link 
between parliamentarians and the alliance. The 
highest military and civilian authorities of the 
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alliance address the assembly at their annual 
sessions and at meetings of the assembly's 
committees during the year, when the range of 
alliance policies and activities are examined and 
discussed in detail. 
8. The North Atlantic Assembly constitutes 
a link between NATO and parliamentarians 
of member countries of the North Atlantic 
Alliance. 
9. The assembly plays an important role in 
acting as a forum through which NATO policies 
and activities can be discussed in detail by 
alliance parliamentarians. 
10. It also acts, more specifically, as a 
medium for disseminating precise military infor-
mation about NA TO's defence and strategic 
aims, as explained by the military authorities of 
the alliance. 
11. Assembly staff maintain close working 
relations with the NATO secretariat and with 
specialist NATO agencies. 
12. The Secretary-General of NATO usually 
presents a comprehensive statement on the state 
of the alliance for the assembly's consideration 
at the annual plenary session. 
(a) Members 
13. The assembly 1s composed of serving 
parliamentarians from the sixteen member 
countries of the North Atlantic Alliance who are 
appointed in their respective parliaments under 
national procedures. 
14. The number of effective members is 184 
distributed as follows: United States 36; United 
Kingdom. France, Federal Republic of Germany 
and Italy 18 each ; Canada and Spain 12 : 
Turkey 10; Belgium, Greece and the Nether-
lands 7 each; Denmark, Norway and Portu-
gal 5 each ; Iceland and Luxembourg 3 each. 
15. Each country's representation is deter-
mined according to its population and by a 
sliding scale formula which decreases representa-
tion per capita as population increases. 
16. National delegations are multi-party and 
thus represent the ideas of a cross section of the 
community. 
17. No serving minister or government 
member may be a delegate to the assembly. 
18. Alternates are included in national delega-
tions. However, while more than one alternate 
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may sit and speak m place of a member, only 
one alternate may vote for him. 
19. Delegates are normally appointed for a 
minimum period of one year and, where pos-
sible, for the duration of their current national 
legislature. 
(b) Officers 
20. The officers of the assembly are the Presi-
dent, three Vice-Presidents, of which one is the 
retiring President, and the Treasurer. 
21. They are elected by a simple majority vote 
of the members present at the annual plenary 
sessiOn. 
22. Their mandates are renewable with the 
exception of the longest serving Vice-President. 
The three Vice-Presidents must always be of 
different nationality. 
23. North America must always be represen-
ted among the officers by a Canadian or United 
States parliamentarian. 
(c) Standing Committee 
24. The Standing Committee, as the govern-
ing body, has overall responsibility for directing 
the activities of the assembly. 
25. It is composed of one member and 
alternate from each delegation with the right of 
substitution. 
26. The President, Vice-Presidents and the 
Treasurer are ex-officio members of the Standing 
Committee, and are entitled to vote in Standing 
Committee meetings only in the absence of the 
member representing their delegation. 
27. The main responsibilities of the Standing 
Committee are to represent the interests of the 
assembly between sessions, to prepare the 
assembly's budget and manage the funds accord-
ingly, to draw up the proposed agenda for the 
assembly's plenary sessions and to take all 
possible steps to secure the implementation of 
the recommendations and resolutions of the 
assembly. 
28. The Standing Committee appoints the 
Secretary-General and has final authority over 
the size and functions of the secretariat. 
29. Each member of the Standing Committee 
has one vote, except on decisions involving 
additional expenditure, when the votes are 
weighted according to national contributions. 
30. Meetings of the Standing Committee are 
held at least three times a year - in the early 
spring, prior to the spring committee meetings 
and during the full autumn plenary session. 
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However, additional meetings of the Standing 
Committee are held at other times during the 
year according to prevailing circumstances. 
(d) Committees 
31. The assembly operates through five com-
mittees which cover the assembly's wide range 
of activities. 
32. The committees are the Economic Com-
mittee with 36 members, the Education, Cultu-
ral Affairs and Information Committee with 
22 members, the Military Committee with 
40 members, the Political Committee with 
46 members and the Scientific and Technical 
Committee with 28 members. 
33. The national representation of member-
ship of the five committees reflects the same 
proportional pattern as for membership of the 
assembly itself. 
34. The committees meet twice a year - once 
during the spring and a second time prior to the 
autumn plenary session. 
35. With the occasional exception of the 
Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and 
Information, meetings are closed to the public. 
36. Each committee annually elects its officers 
- a Chairman, one or more Vice-Chairmen and 
a General Rapporteur. They often serve for 
more than one year. Special rapporteurs may 
also be selected to deal with specific topics. 
The Rapporteur's function is to present a report 
to his committee which serves as a basis for 
debate and, usually, as a source of draft 
resolutions and recommendations for consi-
deration by the members. Each committee 
submits its proposals to the plenary session for 
consideration by the full membership. 
(e) Sub-committees 
37. When committees wish to analyse in 
depth specific problems of the alliance arising 
from their committee work, they may appoint, 
subject to the approval of the Standing Commit-
tee, sub-committees for limited periods of time 
composed of their own members. 
38. Recent examples of sub-committee inter-
ests include European defence co-operation, 
economic relations between member countries, 
negotiations on mutual and balanced force 
reductions (MBFR), energy supplies, work of the 
Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
(CCMS), reserve forces and home guard units 
and Soviet maritime threat. 
B. The plenary session 
of the North Atlantic Assembly 
39. The North Atlantic Assembly meets m 
plenary session once a year in the autumn to 
debate the subjects it feels are of concern and 
interest to the Atlantic Alliance. For the most 
part, the plenary session considers issues 
presented to it by the committees, although 
individual members have the right to introduce 
their own proposals. 
40. The assembly's position on various 
matters is expressed through a recommendation, 
a resolution, an opinion or an order. 
41. A recommendation is directed to the 
North Atlantic Council requesting it to take 
certain action in pursuit of the aims of the 
assembly and in expectation of a reply from the 
Secretary-General of NATO expressing the 
Council's views. A recommendation requires a 
two-thirds majority vote. 
42. A resolution is a formal expression of 
opinion on a particular matter and is usually 
addressed to member governments and 
parliaments of the alliance, or to international 
organisations. A resolution may be adopted by 
a simple majority vote. 
43. An order deals with matters of internal 
procedure and is usually directed to the Standing 
Committee or the secretariat. A simple 
majority vote is required. 
44. Delegates normally vote as individuals 
and by show of hands, although in certain 
circumstances delegates may choose to register 
their votes by a roll-call of national delegations. 
C. Examples of decisions 
by the North Atlantic Assembly 
Reconzmendations 
78. on support for the North Atlantic pro-
gramme for the advancement of science, 
culture and society : 
79. on the adoption by NATO of a dynamic 
information policy ; 
Resolutions 
121. on East-West relations after the events in 
Poland: the search for an alliance 
consensus; 
122. on Afghanistan ; 
123. on the economics of Atlantic security; 
124. on Poland and the first anniversary of the 
introduction of martial law: 
125. on support for the initiative by the Presi-
dent of the United States to promote 
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exchanges between American and Euro-
pean youth; 
126. on alliance armaments co-operation: 
127. on alliance security; 
128. on East-West relations: 
129. on international terrorism; 
130. on East-West relations after Brezhnev ; 
131. on acid rain ; 
132. on arms control in outer space ; 
133. on the International Atomic Energy 
Agency; 
134. on nuclear weapons in Europe. 
Order 
24. on the establishment of an Atlantic foun-
dation for culture and the signing by the 
member countries of the alliance of a 
Euro-Atlantic cultural charter. 
45. Especially interesting is the recommenda-
tion on information policy, which reads as 
follows: 
" The Assembly, 
Considering the pressing need for the 
alliance to promote a better public 
understanding of its role in the service of 
peace: 
Considering also that the citizens of 
the member countries of the alliance 
should be informed clearly, fully and 
objectively of NA TO's decisions in the 
military field and of the reasons for them, 
as well as of the western positions on the 
control and reduction of nuclear 
weapons; 
Convinced that it is necessary to 
develop now a new and more forceful 
information policy to be implemented by 
NATO with the aim of publicly promoting 
the principles of NATO as a free and 
peace-loving association of nations bound 
together by their attachment to common 
values, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
CouNCIL: 
1. Make every effort to strengthen the 
role, scope for initiative, and facilities of 
the NATO international staff, and to 
strengthen the press or public relations 
services of the various bodies of the 
Atlantic Alliance; 
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2. Ensure that the information 
published by these services keeps the 
public clearly and properly informed, in 
order to obtain public support for those 
decisions ensuring the future of the 
Atlantic community. " 
Ill. Modified Brussels Treaty 
A. Origins 
46. In 1950, the United States asked its Euro-
pean allies for Germany to be associated with 
the Atlantic Alliance. The European members 
of the Atlantic Alliance consequently looked for 
a way to allow the Federal Republic to take 
its place in the defence of Europe and, on 
24th October 1950, Mr. Pleven, then French 
Prime Minister, proposed that a European army 
be set up to include all the forces of the Euro-
pean member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. 
47. The ensuing negotiations led in May 1952 
to the signing of a treaty by which the six coun-
tries which had just set up the European Coal 
and Steel Community (Belgium, France, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands) would form a European 
Defence Community. This community was to 
place member countries' integrated forces under 
the guidance of a single European authority. 
However, on 30th August 1954 the French Par-
liament, in a vote on a previous question. 
rejected the proposed European Defence Com-
munity and another treaty had to be prepared. 
48. The seven governments then decided to 
take up the text of the Brussels Treaty of 
17th March 1948, which extended the defensive 
alliance formed in Dunkirk on 4th March 1947 
by France and the United Kingdom to Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and to 
modify it to allow the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Italy to accede. The 1948 treaty 
provided for economic, social and cultural 
co-operation between the member countries and 
included provision for automatic mutual assis-
tance. It also laid the foundations for a Euro-
pean defence organisation since it allowed a 
political Consultative Council and a standing 
Military Committee to be set up to prepare a 
defence plan and to ensure the co-ordination of 
military means. However. this treaty still bore 
traces of the aftermath of the second world war, 
since its preamble stipulatoo that the high 
contracting parties were resolved " to take such 
steps as may be held necessary in the event of a 
renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression". 
This called for far-reaching changes which 
were sought in the Paris Agreements of 
23rd October 1954 modifying the Brussels 
Treaty. 
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49. The signatories of the 1954 Paris Agree-
ments clearly indicated their aims in the pre-
amble to the modified Brussels Treaty: " to 
reaffirm their faith in fundamental human 
rights ... and in the other ideals proclaimed in the 
Charter of the United Nations ... to preserve the 
principles of democracy ... to strengthen ... the 
economic, social and cultural ties by which they 
are already united " by co-operating '' to create 
in Western Europe a firm basis for European 
economic recovery ... to afford assistance to each 
other. .. in resisting any policy of aggression ... to 
promote the unity and to encourage the progres-
sive integration of Europe ". This was tant-
amount to saying that they considered Europe's 
unity and security to be closely linked, as well as 
its economy and defence. which explains the 
place they accorded in the framework of WEU 
both to armaments co-operation and to the 
establishment of mutual confidence which, at 
that time, implied collective control of levels of 
forces and armaments. Consequently. while 
Protocol No. I to the Paris Agreements modi-
fied the Brussels Treaty, Protocols Nos. 11, Ill 
and IV contained further provisions relating to 
the levels of forces and armaments of member 
countries. 
B. The treaty 
50. The cornerstone of the treaty is Article V, 
which lays down that: 
"If any of the high contracting parties 
should be the object of an armed attack in 
Europe, the other high contracting parties 
will, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, afford the party so attacked all 
the military and other aid and assistance 
in their power". 
It thus defines a defensive alliance far more 
binding than the North Atlantic Treaty or any 
other treaty now in force since it commits the 
forces of all the member countries uncondition-
ally in the event of an attack on one ofthem. 
51. Article VIII of the treaty sets up a Council 
so organised as to be able to exercise its 
functions continuously and deciding by unani-
mous vote questions for which no other voting 
procedure had been agreed. The Council's aim 
is to strengthen peace and European security and 
also to promote unity and encourage the progres-
sive integration of Europe. At the request of 
any of the high contracting parties it may be 
immediately convened to consult " with regard 
to any situation which may constitute a threat to 
peace. in whatever area this threat should arise, 
or a danger to economic stability". No limit is 
placed on the Council's responsibilities and the 
preamble to the treaty underlines that its aim is 
to "preserve the principles of democracy, per-
sonal freedom and political liberty, the constitu-
tional traditions and the rule of law '' and " to 
strengthen, with these aims in view, the econo-
mic, social and cultural ties " uniting the signa-
tory countries. In other words, nothing is out-
side the responsibilities ofWEU. 
52. Article IX sets up "an Assembly com-
posed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty 
powers to the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe " to which the Council has to 
make an annual report on its activities. 
53. Protocol No. 11 to the Paris Agreements 
makes it incumbent on signatory mainland 
countries not to exceed a certain level of forces 
without the unanimous agreement of their 
partners and to submit their force levels to the 
Council for approval. The United Kingdom for 
its part is committed to maintain four divisions 
and the Second Tactical Air Force on the 
mainland of Europe. This undertaking is 
subject to verification but there is no check on 
British forces stationed elsewhere. 
54. Protocol No. Ill provides the framework 
for the Federal Republic's renouncing the pro-
duction of certain armaments and makes all 
member countries' heavy weapons subject to 
verification by WEU, for which purpose an 
Agency for the Control of Armaments was set up 
under Protocol No. IV. 
55. Finally, Article IV of the treaty stipulates 
that the WEU Council is to " rely on the appro-
priate military authorities of NATO for informa-
tion and advice on military matters ''. 
C. Application of the treaty 
56. While the modifed Brussels Treaty gave 
West ern European Union extremely vast not to 
say unlimited, responsibilities, it also demon-
strated its signatories' concern that the body they 
had set up should not duplicate the work of 
other international organisations. Already, 
following the signing of the North Atlantic 
Treaty on 4th April 1949, the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation had decided in its resolution of 
20th December 1950 to transfer- the exercise of 
Western Union's defence activities to NATO. 
while specifying in paragraph 4 of that resolution 
that " these new arrangements will in no way 
affect the obligation assumed towards each other 
by the signatory powers under the Brussels 
Treaty" nor "affect the right of the Western 
Union Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff to 
meet as they please to consider matters of 
mutual concern ". 
57. Although not fundamentally changing it, 
the Paris Agreements amending the treaty 
described the relationship between WEU and 
NATO. Article IV of the treaty stipulated that 
the signatory countries and any organs estab-
lished by them " shall work in close eo-opera-
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tion with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion " and recognised " the undesirability of 
duplicating the military staffs of NATO". The 
statute of the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments specified, for instance. the nature of the 
information on the level of forces of member 
countries that NATO was to submit to it each 
year. Conversely, the exercise of the WEU 
Council's strictly military responsibilities was 
transferred to NATO from the outset. 
58. The same concern to avoid duplication of 
work led the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe, obviously with the approval 
of the WEU Council, to transfer in 1960 the 
exercise of WEU's social and cultural respons-
ibilities under Articles II and Ill of the modified 
Brussels Treaty to the Council of Europe with 
the exception of those exercised by the WEU 
Public Administration Committee. This 
measure affected the Council's activities but not 
its actual responsibilities, as the Council speci-
fied in its annual report on its activities in 1959. 
59. The Council's activities in the economic 
field, defined in Articles I and VIII of the treaty, 
have effectively been pursued, particularly since 
the agreement of 11th July 1963 organised 
exchanges of views between the United King-
dom and the then six member countries of the 
European Economic Community. However. 
when negotiations began between the United 
Kingdom and the Communities on 14th Septem-
ber 1970 the Council decided to halt its activ-
ities, without however calling in question the 
agreement of 11th July 1963 and the principle of 
consultations. 
60. Finally, the Council's activities in the 
political field proper diminished considerably as 
and when consultations developed between the 
member countries of the European Commun-
ities in this field. Thus, consultative meetings 
between representatives of member countries 
prior to meetings of many international organi-
sations, including the United Nations General 
Assembly, came to an end as a result of a 
decision of the WEU Council of 24th May 1972, 
without however this measure prejudicing the 
future of political consultations in the frame-
work ofWEU. 
61. Conversely, in application of Article 
VIII.2 of the treaty, the Council decided on 7th 
May 1955 to set up a Standing Armaments 
Committee to promote the joint production of 
armaments. However, the creation and deve-
lopment of NATO bodies with parallel tasks, 
subsequently Eurogroup and finally the Indepen-
dent European Programme Group prevented the 
Standing Armaments Committee assuming the 
importance which the authors of the 1955 deci-
sion undoubtedly expected. 
62. The main reason why the WEU Council 
has found itself gradually deprived of many of 
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the activities for which the treaty had made it 
responsible is certainly that all the WEU 
member countries were also members of NATO, 
the Council of Europe and then the enlarged 
EEC, together with other countries. 
63. In order to understand the present situa-
tion of WEU, three main factors must therefore 
be noted: 
(i) its Council is mainly concerned with 
the implementation of the protocols; 
(ii) nevertheless, it retains all the respon-
sibilities conferred on it by the treaty 
and may at any time be called upon 
to resume this exercise; 
(iii) the Assembly is still responsible for 
the overall application of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty and although the 
Council has relinquished the practical 
aspects it must reply to recommenda-
tions by the Assembly or questions 
put by its members relating to the 
application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, even if the treaty is applied in 
other frameworks. It has always 
recognised this principle and has 
furnished effective replies in many 
cases. 
IV. Comparison between the two assemblies 
64. Your Rapporteur believes a number of 
useful indications may be drawn from the above 
observations. First, although the WEU Assem-
bly supervises an organisation which is far 
smaller than NATO, it has certain advantages. 
and particularly that it was set up by the 
modified Brussels Treaty itself, which confers 
upon it an official status which the North 
Atlantic Assembly lacks. This means that the 
WEU Council and its member governments 
have commitments towards the Assembly: it 
must be kept informed of all matters covered by 
the modified Brussels Treaty - and these are 
very vast - and the Assembly's recommenda-
tions must be followed up even if this is restric-
ted to the seven member countries having to 
reach agreement on the replies to such recom-
mendations. But the Assembly does not seem 
to have derived full benefit from this advantage 
because the Council has never agreed to apply 
the treaty correctly, i.e. to consider the Assembly 
as a true partner, as so strongly emphasised by 
Mrs. Knight in the report she presented on 
behalf of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments in June 1981 on relations between 
parliaments and the press. 
65. Admittedly, the sanctions which the WEU 
Assembly can take against the Council, mainly a 
" motion to disapprove ", do not, as matters now 
stand. constitute a very serious threat for the 
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governments and the Assembly has probably 
been right not to display its disapproval too 
often, in spite of its feelings about the way in 
which the Council treats it, because this sanction 
would very quickly have lost all credibility once 
observers noted that it was ineffectual. 
66. However, this does not mean that mem-
bers of the Assembly have no means of action 
since, all being members of parliament, they are 
all able, in their own parliament, to call 
upon their governments to apply the modified 
Brussels Treaty more seriously. They have 
often tried to do so by putting written questions, 
whose results have generally been mediocre, but 
they have probably not resorted often enough to 
procedure resulting in a debate which would 
have been more effective because it would have 
been more likely to reach public opinion. 
67. Moreover, the WEU Assembly benefits 
from the fact that the WEU member countries 
are in close proximity geographically, thus 
allowing more frequent committee meetings 
than is the case for the North Atlantic Assembly, 
not to speak of the advantage of holding two 
plenary sessions a year instead of one. This 
allows the WEU Assembly's reports to be 
prepared in closer touch with political events 
and the reactions of public opinion and its 
debates are better able to portray these reactions. 
Even so, these facilities should be put to better 
use particularly by parliamentarians being more 
assiduous in attending committee meetings and 
by the more systematic use of procedure making 
it binding on rapporteurs to mention, in their 
reports, objections and views conflicting with 
their own during the discussions in committee. 
68. In the case of the North Atlantic 
Assembly, this difficulty is however at least 
partly alleviated by the existence of sub-
committees which may meet more often - up to 
eight or nine times a year - and gather 
information for preparing reports. There is 
provision for this in the Rules of Procedure of 
the WEU Assembly but it is in fact hardly ever 
applied. 
69. The methods of work of the North 
Atlantic Assembly often allow it to have reports 
which are more fully documented than those 
presented to the WEU Assembly. However. the 
standard of this information often results in the 
reports having no political orientation, being 
hardly controversial and provoking no real 
debates in plenary session. This allows the 
North Atlantic Assembly to adopt a large 
number of reports in short sessions which are 
largely taken up by addresses by guest speakers. 
a practice which is not entirely satisfactory for a 
parliamentary assembly. Conversely, the 
documents emanating from the North Atlantic 
Assembly are often more useful for the work of 
the national parliaments on security matters 
than are those ofWEU. 
70. It is not evident that in this respect the 
Assembly should follow the methods of the 
North Atlantic Assembly, it being beneficial for 
each assembly to retain its own characteristics. 
71. Moreover, the fact that the WEU Assem-
bly holds sessions more often allows there to be 
fewer items on the agenda and hence the pos-
sibility of more substantial debates than in the 
North Atlantic Assembly. To a certain extent, 
this is already the case, but it might be even 
more so if the Presidential Committee confor-
med to the wishes so often expressed by our 
committee and ensured that the order of busi-
ness for each session was not too full and 
included matters oftopical interest. 
72. Conversely, the North Atlantic Assembly 
has a number of advantages, but it might 
perhaps be possible for the WEU Assembly to 
learn some lessons from its own organisation. 
73. The first is probably that as the North 
Atlantic Assembly has no permanent chamber in 
which to meet it holds sessions in the capitals of 
the various member countries in turn. It is 
naturally easier to interest the press and local 
public opinion in sessions held very infrequently 
in the same town than in sessions of an assembly 
which always meets in the same place. Foreign 
correspondents in Paris cannot consider WEU 
Assembly sessions to be exceptional events. 
They do not necessarily specialise in defence 
questions. The French press is almost alone in 
being able to send specialised journalists to 
cover WEU Assembly sessions, whereas at each 
of its sessions the North Atlantic Assembly 
enjoys the presence of journalists from the 
country in which it meets who are specialised in 
defence questions. 
7 4. Your Rapporteur well realises that the 
organisation of sessions away from the seat of 
the Assembly involves considerable expense and 
that at the present juncture economies have to 
be made. However, he suggests that a rather 
greater effort be made than in the past to ensure 
that sessions are held outside Paris from time to 
time so as to make a greater impact on the press 
and public opinion. This has been done several 
times in the past since the Assembly has already 
held sessions in London, Rome, Brussels and 
Bonn, but this experience might be renewed 
from time to time. 
75. A second significant advantage for the 
North Atlantic Assembly is the presence of 
American parliamentarians at its sessions. 
Everyone knows the overwhelming place 
occupied by the United States in the defence of 
Europe, and the dialogue between European and 
American parliamentarians is of undeniable 
interest. Public opinion and the press are well 
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aware of this. It is obviously impossible for 
there to be such a dialogue in the WEU Assem-
bly since the United States is not a member. It 
could however do rather more than in recent 
years to invite representatives of non-member 
countries to take part in its work, particularly as 
observers with the right to speak during debates 
on matters of direct interest to their countries. 
It could also be more systematic in inviting 
ministers from non-member countries to speak 
on reports which concern their countries 
directly. If for instance a minister from the 
People's Republic of China had taken part in the 
debate leading to the adoption of Mr. Caro's 
report on China and European security in June 
1983, it would certainly have been of great 
interest to the European press. Generally 
speaking, invitations to persons outside the 
Assembly, whether parliamentarians or govern-
ment representatives, should not become routine 
or seek solely to attract the press, but should 
correspond to the requirements of the Assem-
bly's work. Flexible, varied procedure 1s 
already applied in this field. 
76. These are the thoughts which come to 
your Rapporteur's mind after a first analysis of 
the statutes, regulations and work of the two 
assemblies. He has no doubt that more detail-
ed analysis and the development of exchanges 
between the two assemblies would allow these 
thoughts to be carried further. 
V. Conclusions 
77. What conclusions can be drawn from a 
comparison between the North Atlantic 
Assembly and our Assembly? To be brief and 
concrete I mention the following conclusions : 
(i) Apparently there is no Eurogroup activity 
in the North Atlantic Assembly, though one 
could say that a Eurogroup does exist in the 
NATO Council of Ministers. 
(ii) Certainly several equal or comparable 
elements exist between the aims and activities of 
the North Atlantic Assembly and of the WEU 
Assembly. 
(iii) Although there are supposed to be good 
and close contacts between the North Atlantic 
Assembly and the WEU Assembly, in fact no 
communication or relations between the two 
assemblies exist. 
(ir) In general, we must promote the establish-
ment of such relations and communications 
with the North Atlantic Assembly. We have to 
propose that to the Presidential Committee. 
The fact that certain parliamentarians take part 
in the work of both assemblies might allow them 
to be better informed about each other's work, 
for instance by means of a verbal or written 
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report once or twice a year presented to the 
appropriate committee. Of course, this sug-
gestion would have to be worked out. 
( v) Apparently the NATO Assembly faces the 
same problems with its information policy as 
our Assembly. It might therefore be very 
interesting for our committee to contact the 
authors of the recommendation on information 
policy. 
(vi) Once again it is clear that we have to urge 
WEU and our Assembly to restrict themselves 
more to European security and the defence of 
Europe. 
(vii) Most probably our committee will have to 
concentrate its activities more on European 
security and the defence of Europe than 
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primarily on details of specific decisions taken 
by our Assembly. 
( viii) Perhaps after contacts with members of 
the North Atlantic Assembly we will be able to 
develop more and/or better concrete proposals. 
(ix) It would be in the interest of our 
Assembly to organise sessions more often in the 
capitals of member countries other than the one 
in which it has its seat. 
(x) Considering that the very name of the 
Assembly of Western European Union poorly 
describes, for an uninformed public opinion. the 
nature of its activities, the committee proposes 
that the competent authorities consider the 
possibility and usefulness of changing the 
Assembly's name in order to give a better idea of 
its security and defence responsibilities. 
\PPENDIX I 
Recommendations 
adopted in 
1956 ............. 
1957 ............. 
1958 ............. 
1959 ............. 
1960 ............. 
1961 •••• 0 •••••••• 
1962 ............. 
1963 ............. 
1964 ............. 
1965 ............. 
1966 ............. 
1967 ............. 
1968 ............. 
1969 ............. 
1970 ............. 
1971 •• 0 •••••••••• 
1972 ............. 
1973 ............. 
1974 ............. 
1975 ............. 
1976 ............. 
1977 ............. 
1978 ............ 
1979 ............ 
1980 ............ 
1981 ............ 
1982 ............ 
Total 0 •• 0 ••• 0 ••• 
Annual average .. 
APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by country for each session) 
Member countries 
Federal 
Belgium France Republic Italy fLUXembourg Netherlands 
of 
Germany 
0 0 3 0 0 0 
4 0 1 0 0 5 
2 0 3 0 0 4 
0 0 9 0 0 0 
3 12 2 8 0 3 
0 2 0 3 0 6 
2 4 4 6 2 3 
0 0 13 22 1 2 
4 14 9 11 1 5 
0 11 12 24 0 5 
2 12 12 49 1 4 
14 9 22 29 2 6 
6 14 20 22 1 16 
11 15 17 8 0 4 
3 15 15 7 2 3 
0 4 19 9 0 6 
0 6 2 1 0 1 
0 4 2 6 1 0 
0 1 3 13 2 0 
10 28 8 19 3 11 
16 40 13 14 2 3 
4 18 4 15 1 1 
20 26 12 21 4 8 
16 15 16 10 12 1 
0 34 24 15 14 0 
15 42 14 4 16 5 
0 20 10 6 5 3 
132 346 269 322 70 105 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the assessment of ad1•anced technology in Japan 
The Assembly, 
(1) Aware ofthe limitations imposed on Japan's defence capabilities under Article 9 of the Japanese 
constitution restricting its military forces to defensive purposes: 
(Ii) Conscious of the growing industrial power of Japan and of Japan's 5ucccss 111 the tield of lllllTO-
tcchnology, in exploration of space and the oceans and in energy : 
(111) Considering that defence-related expenditure is about 5% of the total budget and that Japan ha5 
by far the lowest per cap1ta defence expenditure in the free world : 
(tr) Considering also that, although Japanese technological research and development i5 not directed 
towards military goals, new weapons systems or possibly the export of armaments. electronic 
developments make the dividing line between civil and military high technology incrca5ingl~ difficult 
to trace : 
(l') -'\.ware of projects of Japanese collaboration with the EEC and ESA, 111 OECD and \\ith \ariou~ 
member states and manufacturing companies in WEU and the United States in advanced technolog~ 
and of the impetus given by decisions at the Versailles and Williamsburg summit meetings on areas of 
co-operation : 
(l't) Noting the similarity of problems and of the approach to them by WEU member ~tatcs and 
Japan: 
( rti) Convinced of the need for a jomt approach to problems in the fields of science, technolog~ and 
aerospace. 
RECOMMENDS THH THE CouNcIL 
1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study Japanese progress in militar~ h1gh techno-
logy, or technology which may have military applications, together with its prospects and 5ubmit the 
conclusions of this study to the Assembly: 
" Examine the whole field of possible collaboration with Japan so as to promote more joint 
projects on a bilateral or a multilateral basis : 
J. Examine in particular the possibility of collaboration with the Japanese Institute for Ne\v 
Generation Computer Technology (I COT) on the project for a fifth generation computer: 
4. Examine the possibility of collaboration in production of militar~ and ci\ Ii aircraft : 
5. Examine with the authorities of EEC member states how to make fuller use of the present 
arrangements for scientific and executive staff. government officials and others to t~m1iliari-;e 
themselves with Japanese culture, management techniques and scientific development b~ courses and 
periodsof~udyinJapan: 
6. In order to develop practical collaboration in space, and taking account of the fact that Japan has 
just appointed a permanent representative to Paris for space matters, propose the nomination of a 
permanent representative of ESA to Japan to enable ESA to consult continuously on collaborati\ e 
projects. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Lord Northfield, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
I. During the 1970s some members of the 
committee were able to visit Japan m their 
national capacities and it was considered within 
the framework of the committee's tasks to study 
the numerous advanced technology projects in 
this country. their direct relationship with 
Western Europe as a whole and the individual 
European countries and the impact those pro-
jects would have on advanced technology here. 
With the agreement of the Presidential Com-
mittee. contact was established with the Japan-
ese Embassv in Paris and. through the good 
offices of the Embassy, a programme was drawn 
up for a committee visit to Japan from 3rd to 
I Oth July 1983. The committee asked your 
Rapporteur to prepare a list of questions for 
discu~sion in Japan 1• This was sent to the 
competent Japanese authorities in Tokyo and to 
the science and technology committees of the 
House of Representatives and the House of 
Counsellors. 
"' Your Rapporteur wishes to express his 
and the committee's gratitude to the competent 
officials from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministrv of International Trade and Indus-
try. the Natlonal Space Development Agency of 
Japan (NASDA). the Agency for Science and 
Technology and the members of the competent 
committees of the houses of parliament. Of 
great interest for the committee was the visit to 
the Mitsubishi Heavv Industries factorv at 
Nago~ a and the Fujitsu· computer firm where the 
committee was able to visit a factory and some 
laboratories. 
3. In its contacts with the competent com-
mittees on science and technology from both 
houses of parliament, many questions related to 
high technology and employment or re-employ-
ment were discussed. 
4. Your Rapporteur also expresses the com-
mittee's sincere thanks to the ambassadors of the 
member countries in Japan and their collabora-
tors as well as to the EEC Ambassador who gave 
the committee and individual members great 
assistance by briefing them on Japanese prob-
lems. Thev also helped to resolve the language 
difficulties.· 
5. During the visit. special attention was 
paid to the general technological policy of the 
Japanese Government, foreign policy aspects 
connected with the law of the sea and space 
developments. the activities of the Science and 
1. See Appendix I. 
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Technology Agency m the field of nuclear 
energy. computers and Japanese achievements 
in major conventional industries. Japan has 
become an important competitor in many fields. 
especially electronics. new communications and 
computerisation of industrial programmes. It 
is already applying robotisation in the car 
industry and this process is now being extended 
to the aircraft mdustry and elsewhere. Great 
attention was also paid to Japanese development 
in nuclear and conventional energy. At all 
times in the discussions special emphasis was 
laid on the political and military aspects of 
science and technology developments. Apart 
from the United States, no other country could 
offer so much information to the committee and 
was willing to do so. Japan's military industrial 
policy is becoming more and more active in 
man~ high technology fields - aeronautics. 
communications. electronics, marine science 
and many fields of great importance for 1ts 
energ) supplies. 
11. The Japanese miracle 
6. " The disease St((fered by industrialised 
countries 
If one sees the trends in industrialised 
countries from a slightly long-term stand-
point, it is clear that most of them suffer 
what may be called an advanced nations' 
disease characterised by such symptoms as 
increasing absenteeism, growing bureau-
cracy and a decline in enthusiasm for 
investment, which often leads to deceler-
ation in the improvement of labour 
productivity, continuation of stagflation 
and other examples of poor economic 
performance. " 
7. This diagnosis is from a 1982 report by 
the Longterm Outlook Committee of Japan's 
official Economic Council. What, by contrast, 
explains the dynamism and momentum of the 
Japanese economy? This is not the place for a 
thorough study ; but the main reasons for the 
catching-up and passing of western economies 
are essential background to a description of 
Japanese advances and applications in science 
and technology. 
8. There is increasing understanding of 
factors behind the" Japanese miracle". Talk of 
"rice-standard wages", excessive hours of work 
and others forms of over-exploitation of the 
workforce has virtually ceased. Instead, obser-
vers appreciate the success of Japanese manage-
ment techniques in the large firms, the vigour of 
the small-firm sector, the guiding role of govern-
ment, and the historical factors that have 
provided a favourable setting for the growth of 
the national economy. The high level of the 
national educational system plays an important 
role, as does their thorough professional 
training. 
9. Average annual growth in Japan was 3.1% 
from 1885 to 1940 - a faster pace than in 
Western European nations, but falling short of 
that in the United States. It was a period of 
self-sustained industrialisation, leaving behind 
the stage of a developing nation. After the 
collapse and devastation of the second world 
war, Japan entered a " catching-up " period of 
very high growth, the annual average being no 
less than 9.5% from 1955 to 1973. This pheno-
menal rate was due to several causes: the process 
of rapid reconstruction and the reform of the 
economic and social systems after the war ; 
growth for a substantial period behind protective 
trade barriers ; the period of undisturbed power 
of the liberal-democratic government devoted to 
free enterprise and close relations with the 
United States - giving stability and continuity 
which helped long-term planning and confidence 
to invest; correct choice of investment so as to 
catch up and then overtake many western 
nations in the new technologies ; low defence 
spending commitments ; a vast and educated 
young labour force ; the high savings ratio of the 
nation and the government's guidance system to 
promote growth sectors and wind down others ; 
propitious international conditions, including a 
stable world monetary system, expanding world 
trade and falling barriers ; and cheap oil. From 
1973, the Japanese economy has shifted from 
high growth to medium growth of under 5% per 
annum - as a result of the energy crisis, the 
consequent recession and slowing in world trade, 
and a rise in the age of its capital goods. 
Government expects growth to be about 4% per 
annum for the rest of the century, well ahead of 
our expectations in Western Europe. 
10. Today, despite the need to import most of 
its energy requirements, Japan's overseas trade 
is back in surplus, interest rates are about 5%, 
inflation is running at under 2% per annum. 
there is little unemployment and real GNP per 
head is up to the standard of the average of 
countries in the EEC. Gross national product 
was 3% of the world total in 1960 ; it is 10% 
today (about half that of the United States) and 
is set fair to exceed the combined total of that of 
EEC member states by the year 2000, when its 
population will be about 130 million. Spurred 
by age-structure projections which show that the 
present youthful population will give, by the 
year 2030, a greater proportion of elderly people 
than in the western countries, the Japanese are 
beginning to consider how to use the intervening 
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period to avoid the very problems of an over-
mature society that they see in the West today. 
" The forthcoming twenty years will constitute 
a valuable period left for us to ensure a soft 
landing on the advanced-aged society in the 
coming twenty-first century. " (Economic Coun-
cil report.) 
(a) Growth and productivity in the sector 
of large manufacturing firms 
11. Productivity, however measured, certainly 
grew faster in Japan than in most of the Euro-
pean industrialised countries in the crucial 
period from 1955 to 1973. Of course, some of 
the growth reflects a backlog of inefficiency and 
a low starting point. Nevertheless, there are 
indicative figures in sectors like automobiles and 
steel: annual output per worker of over forty 
vehicles as against twenty-five in the United 
States and eleven in Germany ( 1979) ; annual 
production per worker in steel double that in the 
United States and Germany. There are many 
other examples. Some studies indicate that 
about half the growth in Japanese production 
was due to increased education and skill per 
worker. But when you come down to the 
microeconomic level - particularly in the perform-
ance of individual large manufacturing firms -
the following are the main aspects in which the 
management of Japanese firms has succeeded in 
achieving greatly-improved productivity. 
(i) Labour management 
12. Japanese wage levels have soared in the 
post-war years. Today, per hour, they are 
approaching those in the United States and 
Germany, and are above those in other Western 
European countries. Hours per week are only 
slightly greater. With approaching comparabi-
lity in these respects, it is other factors that help 
make the Japanese workforce more productive. 
For example, working days lost as a result of 
industrial disputes are a fraction of our levels in 
Europe. To the extent that "lifetime employ-
ment " is applied, labour turnover rates are low, 
with consequent savings in training and orienta-
tion costs and a useful stock of work experience. 
The turnover rate is about half that of the 
United States. In addition the rates of tardi-
ness, absenteeism, work stoppages, sick-outs 
and the like are low. 
13. There may be some misunderstanding 
about the extent of lifetime employment in 
Japanese factories. In fact, the actual recipients 
of this job-security arrangement are only about 
25% of the entire Japanese workforce. It 
applies only to full-time (not part-time) 
employees in the main large corporations. 
Moreover, a Japanese Ministry of Labour survey 
shows that nearly half of the workforce in their 
twenties change their job at least once, and about 
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a quarter of those aged between thirty and 
forty-four. Some 20% of workers under nine-
teen years of age change their job and leave 
voluntarily. 
14. High morale and loyalty in Japanese 
companies derive in part from a policy of direct 
and continuous involvement of management in 
factory-floor problems and of making sure that 
as manv employees as possible are included in 
problem-solving. This has been brought out by 
recent research 1 into management style in 
Japanese manufacturing companies located in 
the United Kingdom. Because management 
involves itself so obviouslv in the actual 
production processes, there is a stronger sense of 
unity between management and the shop-floor, 
without the sort of division that is all too 
common in the western world. ··While we have 
been puzzling over the intractable problems of 
bringing workers close to management through 
participation or industrial democracy. the Japan-
ese firms have been rooting management more 
firmly in the workplace. "2 This closeness, this 
sharing of work disciplines results in a commit-
ment to work that greatly improves producti\ lty, 
and succeeds in evoking that set of traditional 
values that is usually referred to as the .. work 
ethic". 
15. Such means as factory-floor meetings 
before and/or after shifts in order to brainstorm 
production problems and resolve grievances 
have a significant and measurable effect on 
output. A general principle of decision by 
consensus, involving as many people as possible, 
underpins the general approach. The system is 
given added strength through the racial homoge-
neity of Japanese society and through the ethical 
code that is indebted to Confucian philosophy: 
great emphasis is placed on the concepts of 
harmony, loyalty and hard work, and this has 
led in turn to a sense of cohesion in groups. 
The prospect of approaching western standards 
of living, the high cost of food and housing in 
Japan and the lower welfare state benefits - all 
these have combined with the factors mentioned 
earlier to make the young workforce ambitious, 
anxious to receive extra training and to earn 
enough to put aside significant savings. The 
trade union system, mainly company unions, 
does protect members' interests, and strikes are 
not unknown ; but the identity of goal and the 
tradition of loyalty predominate in most large 
enterprises. 
(ii) Plant and equipment investment 
16. Strong and effective labour management 
has been backed up by close attention to use of 
new machines and technology. Capital invest-
I. "Under Japanese management" by Wh1te and Trevor. 
PSI and Hememann, London. 
2. Ibid, page 139. 
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ment as a proportion of GNP was as much as 
double that of Western European countries in 
the 1960s and 1970s. At least half of the 
industrial robots in the world are in the larger 
Japanese factories and the government has made 
arrangements to lease robots to small- and 
medium-sized companies that cannot afford to 
buy them. Most of the welding in the large 
automobile plants is done by robots ; and the 
world knows of the spectacular machine-tool 
plant that now works day and night virtually 
without a human workforce in attendance. 
Japanese management assumes that labour costs 
will grow annually, whereas the cost of robots 
will fall with increased production. In the areas 
of machine and equipment yield, the Japanese 
steel industry's rebuilding in the post-war years 
resulted in fourteen out of the twenty-two largest 
blast furnaces in the world being in Japan by 
1978. At the other end of the production scale, 
Japanese companies in household electrical 
products have consciously maximised use of key 
components (e.g. small electrical motors) to 
produce a huge variety of gadgetry, resulting in 
price reductions while the price of western 
equivalents was inexorably climbing. Produc-
tion for domestic and export markets is com-
bined for production planning, giving economies 
of scale from that global approach. 
17. Again, there has been spectacular benefit 
from adapting machinery and equipment bought 
from overseas, so as to achieve speed of output 
or savings in changeover time for other or 
modified products. Much of this comes again 
from shop-floor involvement of the manage-
ment and from seeking workforce co-operation 
in practical problem-solving. 
18. Finally, there is conscious attention to 
economy in the use of materials and of energy -
a high percentage of grain recovery, for example, 
and high use of by-products (e.g. chemicals). 
The per capita consumption of energy is the 
lowest among industrial economies. The 
energy-saving campaign has been outstandingly 
successful and has helped Japan to surmount the 
oil-price crises and to revert quickly to balance 
of payments surplus. 
(iii) Quality control 
19. Anyone familiar with the atmosphere in a 
Japanese plant knows that this is a cardinal 
feature of the approach to productivity. What 
is called the " hidden plant " - the resources 
needed to repair the defects, to retest the pro-
duct, and honour the guarantee to customers -
can eat up a large part of productive capacity: 
figures of 10% or even 15% of sales revenue are 
not uncommon in some western companies. 
The Japanese, anxious to eliminate memories of 
shoddy goods from pre-war Japan, have a special 
extra-incentive to reduce these costs. The 
individual worker on the production line is 
made responsible for quality: the overall aim is 
2 % or less of sales revenue and there are well-
known examples of the way figures have been 
reduced when Japanese companies have taken 
over plants abroad. 
20. Given that many large firms in Japan are 
assemblers rather than producers, the control 
over quality has to extend to tight control over 
quality in bought-in components, tough specifi-
cations and inspection of the subcontractor's 
plant and working methods. Indeed, this prob-
lem has often been a main concern and deterrent 
to Japanese companies planning to start assem-
bly plants overseas and to buy components 
locally. In essence western management is 
often defect-detection orientated, whereas the 
Japanese are defect-prevention orientated. 
Careful records are kept of experience with 
quality control problems so as to ease the situa-
tion when new designs or modified products are 
developed. Matsushita's slogan is: " The better 
the quality, the lower the price. " 
(iv) Inventory control 
21. This again is a hallmark of the Japanese 
approach in many large manufacturing compa-
nies. The "Kamban" system ("Just in time") 
results in considerable cost savings. The large 
numbers of component suppliers are highly orga-
nised so as to supply. where possible. virtually 
direct to the assembly line. Inventory costs are 
minimised. The supply is often measured in 
hours and can be as low as thirty minutes of 
supplies at any one time during the shift. 
(h) The small firm sector 
22. A major factor that gives Japan its present 
price advantage in such sectors as automobiles is 
undoubtedly the low price of many components 
bought from the thousands (estimated at 32,000 
in the case of the car industry) of small 
suppliers. In one sense it is in this sector that 
Japan has noticeably not yet "caught up" with 
the West and is not yet'' mature". In numbers 
of firms, the one-man business is a far larger 
sector than in our countries of Western Europe. 
23. The assemblers are powerful enough to be 
able to dictate not only the quality but also the 
price to the small suppliers, and every labour 
overhead or management cost is ruthlessly 
pared. Wages in these small firms can be 
reduced to 70% or even 40% of those in the 
large companies, and the hours, particularly in 
the myriad one-man businesses, can be substan-
tially greater. Of course there is not a totally 
homogeneous sector of small firms. The front-
line suppliers might typically employ up to 
200 workers, with wages and conditions just 
below those of the main customer's plant. 
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Then there will be enterprises employing ten to 
seventy workers, sometimes in substandard 
premises, making small components and paying 
rather lower wages and bonuses. Finally, there 
is the large number of family enterprises, work-
ing perhaps in substandard workshops or at 
home, making all kinds of small parts, making 
a living by long hours. But the net result has 
been that the large assemblers get their compo-
nents at an estimated 30% below the price of 
comparable producers in Western Europe. 
24. Distribution has also not " caught up ". 
Some writers see the excessive numbers of staff 
employed in shops and distribution generally, 
and the continued survival of a surplus of small 
shops, as the way in which the Japanese eco-
nomy absorbs the real surplus in the youthful 
workforce. Supermarkets have grown only 
slowly against a conservative tradition in choice 
of food and purchasing habits. There is no doubt 
that, ifthis sector were to be rapidly westernised, 
the levels of unemployment would grow appre-
ciably. Indeed, the committee was warned that 
some young people were now staying on for 
extended education precisely because they 
cannot find employment, and there is no doubt 
that there is a lurking fear that the present full 
employment cannot be secure, particularly since 
the tradition of lifetime employment is making 
some companies - faced with prospects of 
increasing automation - take on rather less 
young people than they have done traditionally. 
Nevertheless, in looking ahead to the year 
2000 and beyond, the Economic Council report 
seems optimistic: it sees continued growth in the 
machinery manufacturing sector centring on 
electronics, and a substantial switch of labour to 
those parts of the services sector that supply 
individual and social services like health - com-
pensating for further decline in the primary 
sector and such " troubled " sectors as textiles, 
aluminium refining and shipbuilding. 
(c) The organisation of the economy 
and the role of government 
25. The banking system, the trading compa-
nies, the government acting through the educa-
tional and taxation systems, through its machi-
nery for planning and the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (MITI) work together in ways that 
assist economic growth. The banks have 
played a major financing role - closely regulated 
by and to a large extent reliant upon government 
funding or guarantees through the Bank of Japan 
(which is under the control of the Ministry of 
Finance): they have been used to fund industry 
with short- and long-term loans in the absence of 
an adequate capital market. The high level of 
personal saving, direct tax incentives to improve 
it still further, and the low level of credit 
available to individuals have made it easier for 
companies to seek finance from the banks; and 
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there are many examples in manufacturing or 
distribution of a group structure led by a bank 
(e.g. Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo). Bank 
assistance has been supplemented by govern-
ment aid through the Joint Development Bank, 
the Export-Import Bank of Japan and the Small 
Business Corporation. The laws concerning 
help for small businesses are complex and all-
embracing, relying heavily on enforced co-
operation between small firms in some cases, 
and designed to prevent small enterprises from 
being out-distanced by the huge resources and 
technology of the large firms. There are special 
loans, at low interest rates, for modernising 
equipment, and an elaborate structure of consult-
ation. At the same time, the educational 
system encourages the practical professions: 
university research is very much geared to the 
needs of industry and there are strong links 
between the two (e.g. in space research). 
26. The integrated trading companies (sogo 
shoshas) play a special role. Nine companies, 
highly integrated with major industrial groups 
and with financial organisations, account for 
more than half of both exports and imports. 
They are closely connected with the banks, 
which give them consistent support. Apart 
from financing international trading operations 
that are vital to the whole economy, the trading 
companies are virtually banks for the small 
business sector (loans, guarantees, etc.) and thus 
the sector is heavily dependent on them. They 
are closely involved in energy and raw material 
supply, factory development and domestic 
wholesaling. All in all, they are more powerful 
than their near-equivalents in France or Ger-
many: they have a highly developed information 
network and close links with the whole of the 
manufacturing sector. 
27. Taxation has generally remained fairly 
light by western standards. In Europe, heavy 
taxation has often been an impediment to 
progress. Despite pressure for increased spend-
ing to protect the environment from damaging 
industrial pollution, to improve the poor infra-
structure and to develop the social services, 
public and social expenditure has been kept 
below 30% of GNP as opposed to 40% and more 
in WEU countries. The momentum of the eco-
nomy and restraint in wage demands as growth 
brings satisfactory increment in take-home pay, 
have enabled the state to operate with a signifi-
cant budget deficit (5% to 8.5% ofGDP) and low 
interest rates, without inciting inflationary pres-
sures. As in Europe, there are substantial tax 
incentives for capital investment and direct 
assistance for over 200 projects designed to 
improve development and application of new 
technology. 
28. MITI - a huge department of state - has 
agencies and divisions, all highly specialised, 
enabling it to study and to intervene discreetly 
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in all parts of the productive economy so as to 
ensure success for the indicative multi-annual 
plans that are drawn up through MITI machi-
nery in the first place and then become a 
national plan outlining and charting the strategic 
path of the whole economy. The plans are not 
detailed or coercive and are usually successful 
more by strengthening confidence in investment 
rather than by showing a precise way ahead. 
The key companies and the agencies of MITI 
work together so as to elaborate growth and 
contraction plans for various industries and to 
allocate funds, e.g. for research programmes. 
Industries with high growth potential are identi-
fied (e.g. communications and data-processing ; 
housing ; nuclear power; ocean development; 
labour-saving equipment; leisure) and "structu-
rally troubled " industries, such as those threat-
ened by products of developing countries 
(textiles) or by excess capacity (shipbuilding, for 
example), are singled out for determined 
contraction. The speed of voluntary redeploy-
ment of labour and resources compared with 
that in the other industrialised countries is 
remarkable; and only France in Western Europe 
has proved to be anything like so adaptable 
when enforced decline has proved to be neces-
sary for particular industries. 
Ill. General policy 
29. The committee was received on Monday, 
3rd July 1983, by Mr. Ishikawa, Parliamentary 
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In his welcoming 
address he mentioned the committee's visit to 
Japan ten years ago and stated that in Japan they 
say that ten years in the past is already history. 
Looking back on the past ten years, it was 
noticeable that the environment in world poli-
tics and the economy had become difficult. In 
politics, 1973 was a year which saw a further 
strengthening of the tendency to relax tension 
between East and West and it was then that the 
multilateral force reduction talks were started. 
In recent years, however, East-West relations 
centring on the two superpowers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, have become 
increasingly strained. 
30. Turning to the economy, the Minister 
stated that in these ten years the world had expe-
rienced two oil crises and had not yet completely 
shaken off their consequences. In such cir-
cumstances what was needed more than ever to 
revitalise the world economy and also to contri-
bute to the maintenance and strengthening of 
peace and stability among nations was unity and 
co-operation between Japan, the United States 
and Europe which share in common the basic 
values of freedom and democracy. 
31. Unfortunately, in relative terms, ties 
between Europe and Japan had been undeniably 
weak compared to the relationship between 
Japan and the United States or between the 
United States and Europe. However, they were 
now being strengthened rapidly. It was urgent 
for Japan and Europe to build a co-operative 
relationship in economic matters and also over a 
broad range of activities covering politics, 
culture, science and technology, aware of our 
respective positions and responsibilities in the 
world for" we are in the same boat". 
32. The field of science and technology was an 
aspect of co-operation between Europe and 
Japan which should be further strengthened. It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that never 
before had there been such awareness or 
expectation that science and technology could 
revitalise the world economy and increase the 
welfare of mankind ; nor had so much emphasis 
been placed on the importance of international 
co-operation in that field. Progress in science 
and technology could increase opportunities for 
economic growth and employment. It could 
enrich the lives and energies of our societies and 
finally serve to protect the most important 
values, namely freedom and democracy. Japan, 
fully conscious of the important role that 
science and technology has to play, has been 
actively promoting international co-operation in 
this field. With countries in Europe, Japan has 
been building a continuous co-operative 
relationship through the exchange of research 
and joint research projects and with some coun-
tries agreements in science and technology have 
already been concluded for promoting co-
operation in a comprehensive manner. Japan 
wishes to continue to strengthen such relations 
with countries of Europe as their standards of 
science and technology are among the highest in 
the world. 
33. The Minister finally expressed the hope 
that the committee would be able, within the 
limited time available, to achieve the desired 
objectives during its visit in Japan and asked it 
to continue co-operation in that regard. 
Training programmes 
34. Answering questions, the Minister pointed 
out that, in order to promote a better under-
standing between Europe and Japan, there were 
training programmes for young people coming 
from different European countries on an 
exchange basis. The first seven young people 
were now working in different industries and 
activities in Japan in order to acquire a better 
understanding of Japanese society. Japan's 
contacts with the EEC countries were to be 
intensified and there would be visits of ministers 
and high-ranking officials to discuss the diffi-
culties and friction which were harming relations 
between Europe and Japan. 
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Free trade 
35. As the Japanese Prime Minister, 
Mr. Nakasone, said at the summit in Williams-
burg, it was of the greatest importance for the 
United States, Europe and Japan to strengthen 
the free trade system. Japan would take serious 
measures to open up its market and there was no 
alternative to international co-operation. The 
assembled strength of Europe, the United States 
and Japan could be used for many purposes, 
such as problems of the environment, energy 
and many fields of science and technology. 
Technological collaboration 
36. With the EEC Japan is now participating 
in eighteen subjects of advanced technology and 
in sixteen of these it will play a major 
role. Agreements on science and technology co-
operation have been and will be concluded in 
the fu~u~e with many countries. For example, 
the Mm1ster mentioned France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany and also future agree-
ments with Brazil, the United Kingdom. Canada 
and Ireland. Japan was well aware that it could 
not limit itself to co-operation with industrial-
ised countries. It also had a role to play with 
regard to ASEAN countries with which private 
industry in Japan was now being actively encou-
raged to pursue research and development 
activities. 
.-l.rcas ofspecia/ mtercst 
37. The government realises that Japan needs 
to deal with other industrialised countries on a 
competitive basis. For this reason it has taken 
a special interest in a number of areas. 
However, one should remember that the govern-
mental sector is relatively small compared to the 
private sector as far as research and develop-
ment is concerned. But the government hopes 
that Japan can keep its position in the following 
fields: 
(i) nuclear fusion; 
(ii) developments in space: 
(iii) marine science development: 
(ir) the life sciences : 
( r) life in extreme conditions : 
( l'l) new materials ; 
( l'l i) electronic and data transmission 
research and development. 
The government recognises that basic know-how 
in these fields has to be promoted whereas 
applied technology should be left to private 
industry. 
Relations with western countries 
38. No difference is made between civil and 
military research because basic research is also 
of great importance for military research. On 
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the other hand, it is up to industry to find the 
necessary applications in the civil or military 
field. The type of relationship Japan wanted 
with the Western European countries was high-
lighted during President Mitterrand's visit to 
Japan. During this visit, it was agreed that 
Japanese-French co-operation would be estab-
lished for basic research. Second, biotechno-
logy would be studied jointly. Third, marine 
science development was considered of great 
importance and the French would send their 
deep-ocean submarines to collaborate with the 
Japanese. This, of course, was of great impor-
tance to Japan because of its practical signifi-
cance in the science of earthquakes and their 
prediction. Fourth, a joint development effort 
would be made on solar energy and other new 
sources of energy. Fifth, new materials research 
was also of importance to both countries, 
particularly new metals which would be strong, 
light and resistant to corrosion. 
39. There had been similar contacts with the 
Federal Republic of Germany and others were 
envisaged with the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and other European countries as 
well as with the EEC Commission. The joint 
study of communications, transportation, 
medicine and comparative educational systems 
with ASEAN countries was most important, and 
the government is considering sending a research 
mission to explore which would be the most 
suitable projects for collaboration. 
Rclatwns II'Jth the United States 
40. Japan is intent on maintaining a smooth 
collaborative policy with the United States. 
During recent years several Japanese prime 
ministers have visited the United States and its 
president and a front of solidarity and trust has 
been built up between the two countries. The 
mutal defence and security arrangements dating 
from the Mutual Defence Agreement of 1954 
can be maintained if there is general agreement 
between Japan and the United States. The 
government is constantly aware of the need to 
find agreements with the United States on many 
science and technology developments. 
The L'nitcd Nations and disarmament 
41. With regard to the United Nations. the 
Government of Japan believes that effective 
verification measures are essential for the imple-
mentation of arms control and disarmament 
agreements. Japan has contributed to the work 
of the United Nations and the Committee on 
Disarmament by submitting many working 
papers on the question of verification. It would 
be in favour of an international organisation for 
verifying these agreements. Any such agency 
should be formed in the framework of the 
United Nations. In view of the important role 
played by monitoring satellites in arms control 
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and disarmament, the Idea that the United 
Nations should own such satellites could be 
useful. In this connection, Japan hoped that 
the idea of establishing an international satellite 
monitoring agency proposed by France at the 
first special session of the General Assembly on 
disarmament in 1978 might help to solve the 
problem of verification. At the same time, 
howeYer, Japan considered that co-operation 
among major countries possessing monitoring 
satellites was essential if such an agency was to 
be set up and agreement should be reached 
among the countries concerned on the legal. 
financial and technical matters involved. 
Rclauons with Latm America 
42. Regarding Japan's relations with Latin 
America, there was traditional friendship 
through nearly one million Japanese immigrants 
and Latin Americans of Japanese descent. 
Latin America and Japan complemented each 
other in the economic field. There has never 
been a serious conflict between Japan and Latin 
America, either politically or economically. 
Japan considered that this traditional friendship 
should be preserved and it attached great 
importance to consistency and continuity in 
relations between Japan and the Latin American 
countries. 
Brccil 
43. Of special importance were the Japan-
Brazil relations which dated back to !885 when a 
treaty of friendship and commerce was signed 
between the two countries. Emmigration of 
Japanese to Brazil started in 1908, encouraging 
even closer relations and the Japanese people see 
Brazil as one of the more familiar countries. 
Nearly 800,000 Japanese immigrants and Japa-
nese Brazilians live in Brazil. During the 
second world war relations between the two 
countries were severed but as Japan recovered 
from the aftermath of the war economic rela-
tions between the two countries became closer. 
With regard to Japanese foreign investment. 
Brazil stands in first place and nearly 600 Japan-
ese enterprises are active in Brazil today. 
44. In 1982 trade between the two countries 
reached $2.65 billion, ofwhich Japanese imports 
from Brazil and its exports amounted to $1.603 
billion and $1.043 billion respectively. Main 
export articles are machines, electric appliances. 
steel and imports from Brazil are iron, coffee. 
cocoa. pulp in addition to industrial products 
which are gaining an increasing share. 
[,all· o(the sea 
45. In the framework of the law of the sea 
conference the government believed that the 
conventiOn overall would serve the long-term 
and comprehensive interests of Japan as a 
maritime nation as well as the general interests 
of the international community including the 
industrialised countries of the West. The deep-
sea mining regime as set out in the convention 
was not satisfactory from the point of view of 
the industrialised countries of the West, includ-
ing Japan: nor is the Government of Japan 
convinced of the workability of the regime in 
practice. Japan was prepared to explore ways 
and means of improving aspects of the regime 
through the future work of drafting the rules and 
regulations of deep-sea mining in the prepa-
ratory commission. 
46. With regard to the provision on marine 
mammals (whales), Article 65, Japan believed 
that this article should not be interpreted as 
intending to expand the competence of an inter-
national organisation but rather that due regard 
should be paid to the right of a coastal state in 
the functioning of an international organisation. 
As Japan has signed the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. it is in the 
basic position of supporting the convention and 
it believes that deep-sea mining activities should 
be carried out within the framework of the 
regime stipulated in the convention. It there-
fore finds it difficult to support the idea of estab-
lishing a different deep-sea mining regime out-
Side the framework of the convention. How-
ever. with regard to the problem of overlapping 
claims of mine-sites. Japan was prepared to 
continue to participate in the informal consulta-
tions initiated by the United States so as to 
resolve the problems of overlapping claims 
among the countries concerned, without prejudid-
ing the position of Japan as a signatory state to 
the convention. 
IV. The Japanese space programme 
4_7. . The Japanese space programme is very 
s1milar to the European programme in ESA. In 
Japan, money is earmarked for the whole plan 
and. if not available one year. is provided a year 
or two later. The unspent parts of the annual 
budget are carried forward and reserved to be 
used when the programme can start. The main 
subjects are communications, broadcasting, 
meteorology, a microgravity programme, space 
science and a remote-sensing programme. 
With regard to the latter, Japan is the only coun-
try to build land and sea application satellites in 
the framework of its remote-sensing programme. 
48. The space programme in Japan is exe-
cuted under the aegis of the Space Activities 
Commission (founded 1968) which is an organ 
under the Prime Minister. Following the pro-
posals of the supervising ministry, i.e. the 
Science and Technology Agency, and working 
on the advice of the commission, the Prime 
Minister decides the government's basic space 
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development programme and directs bodies 
concerned with research and development. The 
central body is the National Space Development 
Agency (NASDA) which was started in 1969 and 
undertakes the development of satellites and 
launch vehicles in the field of applications and 
the launching and tracking of satellites. 
49. As for the scientific space programme. the 
Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of 
the Ministry of Education undertakes the 
research and development of scientific satellites 
and their launch vehicles. 
50. Several mm1stries and agencies are 
concerned with space activities 1• In 1970, the 
budget for space activities was some $50 mil-
lion and $450 million in 1982. NASDA activ-
ities take 80%, the Institute of Space and Astro-
nautical Science 12% and other space activities 
some 8%. 
Launchers 
51. In order to acquire an independent launch 
capability, NASDA has developed the N-1 
launch vehicle which is capable of launching 
geostationary satellites. By the end of fiscal 
year I 982, NASDA had launched seven N-I 
vehicles and succeeded in six launches. To 
cope with the demand for launching large-scale 
satellites in the I 980s, NASDA has developed 
the N-2 launch vehicle which is capable of 
placing in geostationary orbit a satellite weighing 
about 350 kg. In a second phase, a new launch 
vehicle is to be developed - the so-called H-1. 
which will be able, from 1987 onwards, to 
launch geostationary satellites of approximately 
550 kg. 
52. The N-1 launch vehicle has been deve-
loped by combining technology introduced from 
the United States with that developed indepen-
dently by NASDA. The N-2 is also based, for 
some main parts, on United States technology 
but more and more Japanese technology is being 
introduced. The N-2 will be used as NASDA's 
main vehicle until the larger H-1 is operational. 
Satellites 
53. The demand for launching the third gener-
ation of geostationary satellites. after 1985, 
concerns a variety of fields such as meteorolo-
gical observations, communications. broadcast-
ing and navigational satellites, as well as satel-
lites for earth observations. In future years, up 
to 1985, the N-2 launch vehicle will put into 
orbit six applications satellites, communications. 
meteorological and broadcasting satellites and 
four engineering test satellites 2• NASDA will 
also participate in shuttle experiments with 
I. See Appendix II. 
2. Sec Appendix Ill. 
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material processing testing equipment and with 
life science experiments in the first spacelab 
programme. In 1988, Japan hopes to partici-
pate in a United States space station. 
A nc11· space programnzc under discussion 
54. Japan may embark on a national space 
programme aimed at developing a new launch 
vehicle and launching seventy-eight satellites in 
1984-2000. The programme will be submitted 
soon to the Japanese Government by the Japan 
Space Activities Commission which will ask for 
some of the funding in the fiscal 1984 budget. 
Officials said the programme will cost more than 
$10 billion. 
55. The new launch vehicle, tentatively desig-
nated the H-2, will cost $1-3 billion. The 
programmes call for a 5-10% increase m Japan's 
space budget every year for seventeen years. 
Japan has been spending $400-450 million a 
year. 
56. The launch vehicle will be designed to 
take a number of satellites into orbit on a single 
launch. Japanese launches are limited to two 
months a year at Kyushu Island - February and 
August - because of agreements made with the 
Japanese fishermen's union. Fishermen claim 
the launches. twentv-three so far, decrease their 
catches substantially. 
57. The long-term plan would be to offer 
launch services and to construct ground stations 
and develop software. 
58. The commission said the H-2 launch 
vehicle would have to be built at a cost competi-
tive at international level in terms of cost. 
performance and reliability. 
59. National developments proposed to the 
council include: 
- communication satellites for remote 
island and emergency communications. 
Under consideration is a large satel-
lite with a capacity of 100,000 to 
200,000 telephone circuits utilising 
multi-beam technology ~ 
- broadcasting satellites to cover wider 
areas. The broadcasting satellite, to be 
launched by an N-2 vehicle in 1984, is 
expected to improve television ser-
VIces ~ 
- navigation aids, rescue and inter-satel-
lite communications svstems to be 
developed for the Pacific region as part 
of a future worldwide network. The 
first would be launched in 1992 by an 
H-IA vehicle to aid aircraft and ships~ 
- earth observations, similar to the 
United States Landsat programme. 
starting with a marine observation sate!-
90 
lite launched by an H-IA vehicle m 
1986 as an experimental maritime satel-
lite prototype. An experimental earth-
resources satellite would be launched by 
an H-2 vehicle in 1990 ~ 
- meteorological observation satellites. 
Japan continues to share in the World 
Meteorological Organisation's World 
Weather Watch programme in launch-
ing these satellites into a geostationary 
orbit. The third satellite would be 
launched in 1984 to measure cloud and 
sea surface temperatures~ 
- ionospheric observation involving an 
electromagnetic environment survey 
satellite called Emeos to be launched in 
1993 ~ 
- space support satellite for assembly and 
repair of space stations if Japanese 
participation in the United States space 
vehicles materialises. First would be a 
1993 satellite called Ersat for experi-
mental work on use of robots in space ; 
- three engineering test satellites for com-
munications experiments with moving 
vehicles in 1987, multi-beam and digital 
three-axis controls in 1992, and another 
aimed at attitude control and research 
into lightweight structures. 
Co-operation with the United States and Western 
Europe 
60. The main international co-operation is 
with the United States. Japan and the United 
States are conducting eighteen joint projects 
under an agreement concluded between Japan's 
Space Activities Commission and NASA for the 
United States. 
61. Annual consultations are held with 
Europe (ESA) and information is exchanged on 
such matters as remote-sensing communication 
satellites and tracking. Still under discussion is 
the possibility of co-operation with Canada. 
62. The reason for lack of concrete co-opera-
tion up to now with ESA and with individual 
European countries has been inequality of tech-
nical competence. But Japan feels it has now 
caught up and practical co-operation can there-
fore start. Specialists are exchanged and there 
are conferences in Paris/Tokyo in alternating 
years. Papers on mutual use of scientific and 
communications satellites, on the spacelab and 
on electronic equipment are discussed for 
example. Agreement has been reached with 
NASA and ESA on wave frequencies, on a 1986 
launch by Japan of a marine observation satel-
lite and use of tracking sites in Guyana and 
Australia, on standardisation of electronic parts 
being developed in ESA and Japan, and with 
France on the tracking of the Spot satellite to be 
launched in 1985. It was emphasised that the 
NASDA law prohibits military activity in the 
Japanese space programme. 
63. Discussions on the space programmes of 
ESA and Japan certainly indicated a reinforced 
willingness to develop practical co-operation 
now that Japan feels it is technically equal. 
64. Japan is collaborating with other Asian 
and Pacific nations in the meteorological field 
and organises training courses on satellite com-
munications and remote-sensing data analysis. 
There is international co-operation in the United 
Nations, as mentioned earlier, and also in 
the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organisation (Intelsat) and the International 
Maritime Satellite Organisation (Inmarsat). 
Japan wishes to belong to international organisa-
tions which provide space services to use and 
test its products in an international environ-
ment. 
Tanegashima Spat'e Centre 
65. The committee visited the Tanegashima 
Space Centre which is the largest launch 
complex in Japan located on Tanegashima 
Island near the southern edge of Kiushu. Other 
major facilities include tracking and data acqui-
sition stations. Ten satellites have been laun-
ched from this site using the N-1 and N-2 
vehicles. The committee also visited the space 
exhibition hall where it saw models of various 
satellites and rockets which gave an overall view 
of the Japanese space effort. The main purpose 
is to achieve a system based on autonomous 
Japanese technology. Japan is not conducting 
anv militarv research in space. On that score 
they have ~omplete confidence in the United 
State~. Their own activities are conducted for 
peaceful purposes only. 
V. Industrial affairs 
,H!Tl 
66. One of the committee's first visits was to 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry for intensive 
technical briefing. MITI is responsible for 
Japan's Agency for Industrial Science and Tech-
nology with its subsidiary research institutes (e.g. 
on energy) 1• It was emphasised that Japan sees 
as very important an increase in international 
co-operation -e.g. in energy research as a meal!s 
of revitalising the whole economy. The Versail-
les summit decided upon, and the Williamsburg 
summit progressed in, about eighteen areas of 
co-operation, e.g. in advanced robotics. Co-
operation with the United States, Canada, West 
Germany. France and the United Kingdom is 
I. See Appendix IV. 
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particularly valued m projects concerning 
nuclear energy research, the environment and 
marine research. Japan is funding twenty-three 
joint research projects mainly with ASEAN 
countries as one means of assisting the third 
world. 
67. As far as expenditure in Japan on research 
and development is concerned, the committee 
was informed that it is estimated at 10% of the 
world expenditure, 75% of it being by the 
private sector, and the aim is to increase it to 
3% of national income. The 25% contributed 
by the government is compared with 44% to 
58% in the United States and larger Western 
European countries, when defence expenditure 
is included (32% to 4 7% when defence is 
excluded). 
68. Examples of industrial co-operation in-
volving a significant interchange of technology 
could be multiplied, but the table hereafter gives 
some indication of this increasing tendency. 
69. On 18th April 1983, the Japanese Minister 
of International Trade and Industry declared 
that one of the most important functions of the 
state was to facilitate economic development 
and to enhance welfare. Japan, like all other 
industrialised countries, is no exception in 
promoting industrial policy for welfare. The 
most important issue for industrial policy today 
is to encourage frontier technologies and pro-
mote positive industrial adjustments in indus-
tries which have lost their economic rationality. 
The main thrust of Japanese efforts to develop 
such frontier technologies is in the private sector 
and the government's role is restricted to areas 
where, despite strong social need, the long lead 
times, enormous funding requirements and the 
high risk nature of the work make it impossible 
to expect the private sector to undertake the 
necessary research. 
Computers 
70. One of the most interesting VISits the 
committee made was to the Fujitsu Atsugi labo-
ratories and the Fujitsu Numazu complex. 
There as well as at MITI, the committee learnt 
of the' Japanese proposal for long-range research 
projects in advanced computers. 
General policy 
71. Japan sees the growth of industrial com-
puters from 1970 and the years 1980 to 2000 as 
the era of sophistication and miniaturisation. 
Japanese industry plans to build revolutionary, 
artificial intelligence computers and supercom-
puters which are a thousand times faster tha_n 
today's machines. Supercomputer speed IS 
already being used commercially for aircraft 
design, oil and mineral exploration, weather-
forecasting and computer circuit design, all 
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Cases of industrial co-operation with some European countries 1 
Investment exchange 
In July 1982, Sanyo Electric Co. 
started productiOn of colour TV. 
In September 1982. NEC started 
production of I C. 
In October 1982, JVC started pro-
ductiOn ofVTR. 
Joint technolog1cal research 
and development 
In November 1982. Osaka Gas Co. 
and Bntish Gas Co. concluded an 
agreement for c1ty gas-makmg 
technology 
In April 1983, Hitach1 granted GEC 
a licence to manufacture industnal 
robots. 
In January 1983, Sanyo and In Apnl 1983, techmcal co-operation 
Mitsubishi dec1ded to manufacture between Honda and BL for the 
VTR. JOint development ofpassager cars. 
In January 1983. Hitachi Maxell 
dec1ded to manufacture video 
tapes. 
In March 1983, Fanuc established a 
joint venture with 600 groups for 
the manufacture and sales of 
robots in the United Kmgdom. 
In December 1983, Toray established 
a joint venture with Elf Aquitame 
for the manufacture of carbon 
fibre. 
In June 1983, Canon decided to 
manufacture photocopiers. 
In Apnl 1982, technical co-operatiOn 
between Honda and Cycles 
Peugeot for JOint development and 
productiOn of motorcycles. 
In January 1983. supply of techno-
logy by Hitach1 to Thomson to 
manufacture TV camera tubes. 
In April 1983, JVC transferred to 
Thomson Brandt technology to 
manufacture VTR. 
Co-operation m 
th1rd country markets 
In March 1982. Hitach1 Dosen and 
Dav) McKee accepted JOintly an 
alummmm plant m the Umted 
States. 
In November 1982. JGC and 
Technip accepted jomtly a residue 
desulfunsatwn plant m Ta1wan. 
In June 1983. M1tsui & Co .. Toshiba 
and Alsthom Atlant1que accepted 
JOintly a power station in Malaysia. 
In November 1982. Hitachi estab-
lished a company to manufacture 
VTR. 
In September 1981, N1ssan con- In November 1982. ITOH and 
eluded a contract to produce Mannesmann JOint acceptance of a 
Volkswagen passenger cars m wire rod plant m South Korea. 
In December 1982. Toshiba estab-
lished a company to manufacture 
semiconductors. 
In January 1983, Matsushita-Bosch 
started manufacturing VTR. 
In June 1981, Asah1 Glass Co. made 
a capital participation in a local 
company making glass sheet. 
In December 1980, a joint venture by 
Nissan and Alfa Romeo to make 
automobiles. 
In October 1981, a joint venture by 
YKK and Catera to manufacture 
marble construction materials. 
Japan. 
In November 1982. Damichl Se1ka 
Kogyo prov1ded technology to 
UCB to manufacture polyurethane 
emulswn. 
In April 1983, technology for the 
mcmeratwn of non-mflammable 
radwactive waste was supplied 
from Belgo-Nuclea1re et JGC. 
In September 1982, Mitsu1 Petro-
chemicals and Montedison (Italy) 
prov1ded !Cl (UK) with techno-
logy to manufacture catalysers for 
polypropylene production. 
l. For mdustnal co-operatiOn with the United States, see Append1x V. 
In August 198 L Marubem. MHI and 
Coppers accepted Jointly a fertiliser 
plan m the Philippines. 
In July 1982, Marubeni and Nuovo 
Pignore to co-operate m the 
Algenan LPG plant. 
of which require vast amounts of calculation. 
Supercomputers may soon be put to work in the 
automobile and shipbuilding industries, genetic 
engineering and economic forecasting, and futur-
istic laser weapon systems based in space. 
Before the end of this century, computer scien-
tists hope to develop machines that not only 
produce numbers in several hundred million 
operations per second but also exhibit artificial 
intelligence - computers that can think and 
reason somewhat like human beings and that 
can understand information conveyed by sight 
and voice. 
72. The Japanese Government has announced 
a two-point plan to develop advanced computer 
technologies. One project is the $100 million 
eight-year national superspeed computer project 
which aims at producing machines ten times 
faster than the advanced computer being built 
now. 
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Fifth generation computer 
73. The other, the $500 million ten-year so-
called fifth generation computer project, is 
focusing on artificial intelligence. To build the 
computers that will dominate the 1990s, both 
Japan and the United States are dependent on 
increasing technical advances in microelectro-
nics. In the last thirty-five years, as computers 
have become immensely more powerful, the 
basic scheme of their operation has not changed. 
To build the next generation of supercomputers, 
scientists are now experimenting with a variety 
of this science that will use all executing instruc-
tions simultaneously through two or more pro-
cesses and shared memories all executing the 
instructions simultaneously. A new architec-
ture for parallel processing is therefore required 
because devise speed has approached the limit 
for sequential processing. Also parallel proces-
sing should be realised and as current computer 
technology lacks the basic functions for non-
numeric processing of speech, text, graphic and 
patterns a fifth generation computer system 
should be developed. 
74. The Science and Technology Agency of 
the Japanese Government therefore concluded 
that it was meaningful to pursue research and 
development of the fifth generation computer 
system as an innovative information techno-
logy. The government helped to create the 
Institute for New Generation Computer Techno-
logy (ICOT) by co-operation among eight major 
companies, and the institute is guiding research 
on the fifth generation system. 
75. As to co-operation with other countries in 
this research, the committee was informed that 
Japan could see two possible forms. First, there 
could be exchange of information and research 
results. Second, there could be co-operation 
through "task sharing" - i.e. identifying specific 
fields in the complicated research needed and 
agreement on which countries would aim to 
specialise on the various concrete research 
projects. It appears that preliminary meetings 
to discuss such co-operation have taken place, 
but no official agreement has been reached so 
far. 
Integrated conference systems 
76. At the Fujitsu laboratories telephone 
video data have been combined into an inte-
grated system of data-processing and telecom-
munication services which could cover world-
wide conferences. Such a system will require 
integrated computers and communications net-
works. 
77. Of great importance is optical fibre com-
munications technology used for this service. 
Fujitsu is now endeavouring to make this tech-
nology feasible at much reduced cost for future 
communications networks. Fifth generation 
computers feature artificial intelligence, but this 
is not necessarily demanded of the networks. 
Fujitsu will need ten more years to make those 
computers feasible. It expects, on the other 
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hand, that optical fibre communications will 
prevail much earlier. 
78. The committee witnessed a demonstration 
of possibilities of holding international confer-
ences between people in different places such as 
the Philippines, Japan and California, thus 
avoiding travelling and having instant commu-
nication with different parts of the world. 
Fujitsu has already developed some integrated 
systems of data-processing and telecommunica-
tion services. At the Numazu complex, how-
ever, these systems have not yet been in use for 
practical purposes. The teleconference system 
utilised there at present is not combined with 
data-processing service. 
Numazu complex 
79. At the Numazu complex, the committee 
visited the plant responsible for the assembly 
and testing of Fujitsu's medium-, large- and very 
large-scale computer systems as well as for the 
development of operating systems. The main 
complex is divided into closely-affiliated hard-
ware and software plants, an arrangement which 
permits joint production of hardware and soft-
ware products based on an integrated design 
philosophy. The computerisation of all sec-
tions of the plant permits a comprehensive and 
systematic approach to software and hardware 
production. The committee was shown a 
Fujitsu supercomputer named FACOM VP-200, 
which will be used for scientific and engineering 
applications such as nuclear research and geo-
physical research. 
80. Fujitsu considers that the fifth generation 
computer system will be operational in 1992 at 
the earliest. They are now in the first stage and 
the second stage will start in two or three years' 
time. The testing stage will be reached in 
1989-90 and future improvements will, of 
course, be tested. The fifth generation com-
puter will be used inter alia for satellite applica-
tions; mention was also made of meteorological 
satellites. 
81. Some 460 employees work at the Fujitsu 
laboratories at Atsugi ; 30% of them are physi-
cists and 60% electronic engineers. The aver-
age age of the personnel is thirty-two years. 
Fujitsu has been investing a great deal in 
research and development activities and spends 
some 10% to 12% of its sales figure on these 
activities. The know-how of Fujitsu, as utilised 
now in the laboratories, is 98% original and 2% 
from outside affiliated firms. 
82. The main European partner of Fujitsu in 
the beginning was Siemens. However, Fujitsu 
now has a business association with Siemens 
and ICL and is also looking forward to the 
establishment of business associations with 
other major manufacturers in Western Europe. 
DOCUMENT 956 
83. In the medical field, the laboratories use 
the latest electronics technology to develop 
revolutionary new medical equipment. One 
example is the ultrasonic echo imaging equip-
ment for heart diagnosis. The development of 
other medical equipment in ultrasonic techno-
logy such as a Doppler blood flowmeter is also 
being pursued for faster and more accurate 
diagnosis. 
T1ukuba Sctence City 
84. During the discussions at the Fujitsu 
laboratories and plant it was pointed out that in 
the last twenty years the Japanese Government 
has constructed the Tsukuba Science City which 
includes two national universities. thirty-one 
government research institutes. seven other 
government facilities, six governmental enter-
prise facilities and seven private institutes. 
There were two main purposes behind the idea 
of building the Tsukuba Science City - one was 
to help relieve the excessive concentration of 
population in Tokyo, simultaneously it was 
thought that the Tsukuba Science City could help 
in the development of the Ibaraki prefecture -
one of Japan's underdeveloped areas. Another 
purpose was to provide new modern spaces and 
well-equipped research facilities to replace the 
antiquated facilities in Tokyo which were no 
longer appropriate for performing the type and 
scale of research and development that was 
becoming necessary for an increasingly high 
technology-based economy. By locating research 
facilities in one place the government also 
wanted to improve research co-ordination 
among laboratories of different government 
ministries and agencies. Tsukuba Science City 
population is over 130,000 of whom about 7,000 
are research workers at the institutes and univer-
sities. 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
85. Another aspect of Japanese industry 
which the committee was able to visit was the 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The company 
was established in 1870. Its wide range of 
operations encompasses all key industries from 
shipbuilding and steel structures to power 
systems, chemical plants. aircraft and special 
vehicles, environmental control equipment, 
industrial construction and precision machinery, 
industrial robots, engines and refrigerating and 
air-conditioning machinery. The total number 
of employees in 1983 was some 68,000, not 
including subsidiaries. 
Mitsubishi Nagoya aircraft works 
86. The committee discussed the aircraft 
industry when it visited MITI. Government 
expenditure was given as 440 billion yen per 
annum, 80% being for military use. The 
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Defence Council decides on requirements; 
MITI's job is to secure supply through competi-
tion among major manufacturers. 
87. In civil aircraft, it was emphasised that 
Japan was increasingly involved in and inter-
ested in international co-operation. The YS 
project, now terminated, had been accomplished 
by Japanese companies only, but the Boeing 767 
programme involved Japan (15%), Italy and the 
United States. The YXX project for a civil 
plane is in planning for the late 1980sjearly 
1990s. There have also been proposals for 
Japanese participation in development of the 
A-320 Airbus (from Airbus Industrie) and of the 
D-3300 McDonnell Douglas aircraft. As far as 
future engines are concerned, international co-
operation (involving Japan/United Kingdom/ 
Pratt and WhitneyjGermanyjltaly) seemed in-
evitable because of the huge development costs. 
88. In Nagoya the committee visited the 
Mitsubishi Nagoya aircraft works. The works 
are one of Japan's few large-scale aerospace 
manufacturing works for aircraft, engines, mis-
siles and space equipment. The most impor-
tant is aircraft manufacturing which accounts 
for 53% of the sales. The total number of 
employees at the Nagoya aircraft works is some 
6,500. The main products are F-15 jet fighters, 
F-1 support fighters, T-2 supersonic jet trainers 
and several types of helicopters. all for the 
Japanese Defence Agency. 
89. In the civil field, one of the most impor-
tant products is the business jet, Diamond, 
which is an executive jet plane developed wholly 
by Mitsubishi and which has received the 
approval ofthe United States federal administra-
tion and is being delivered to customers. Three 
companies - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., 
Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd. and Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries Ltd. - have agreed to sign a memo-
randum of understanding with Boeing Co. in the 
middle of this year on joint development of a 
new generation 150-seat passenger plane by the 
latter half of the decade. Agreement has been 
reached on the terms of joint development, 
distribution of profits, production and sales. A 
final agreement may be reached at the end of 
this year or the beginning of 1984. 
90. Other important products of Mitsubishi 
aircraft works are engines and silencers. hydrau-
lic equipment, hydraulic testing apparatus, air-to-
air and surface-to-air guided missiles and other 
weapons as well as test equipment for aircraft 
and rockets. Industrial robots are manufac-
tured at the Nagoya machinery works and torpe-
does at the Nagasaki shipyards and engine 
works. About 70-80 % of the material for these 
aircraft is made in Japan. Of this percentage, 
about half is built by Mitsubishi itself. The 
production of the Nagoya works is 20% civil and 
80% military. The committee inspected produc-
tion of jet fighters and a helicopter; the F-1 jet 
support fighter was developed by Mitsubishi 
from its T -2 supersonic jet trainer. It seems 
that the VTOL aircraft, much talked about ten 
years ago, is not now being developed. 
91. Mitsubishi is producing the N-2 rocket 
and the H-1 rocket for NASDA. 
92. Of great importance are research and 
development activities aimed at promoting the 
efficient development and manufacture of 
various products. Its personnel are engaged on 
practical application of digital control techno-
logy which results are applied to aircraft produc-
tion and many other products to improve their 
function and performance. Computers are used 
not only for engineering calculations but also 
for data-processing of test results. Complete 
research and development procedures are avail-
able under the integrated research system. 
93. After a discussion with the general man-
ager. the committee made a tour of the 
plant. 
VI. Energy 
.1/tcrnative energy sources 
94. One sector which the Japanese Govern-
ment clearly wants to promote is energy as was 
emphasised when the committee met with 
representatives of the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry. It was pointed out that 
Japan's level of dependence on oil was the 
highest amongst the industrialised nations. 
One of its most urgent tasks was therefore to 
promote the development and introduction of 
alternative energy sources in order to reduce 
excessive dependency on oiL secure a steady 
energy supply and fulfil Japan's international 
responsibilities. 
95. Current government projections anticipate 
the dependence on alternative energy to be 50% 
in fiscal year 1990. Alternative energy develop-
ment designed by the government such as the 
promotion and development of nuclear energy 
and the solar project. will be carried out as a 
priority and planned with maximum participa-
tion and understanding on the part of private 
industries. 
96. The government established for this pur-
pose the New Energy Development Organisation 
which is a governmental body operating with the 
assistance of the private sector to promote the 
general development of technology for the pur-
poses of commercialising alternative energy and 
developing alternative energy resources except 
for nuclear energy. It is the intention of the 
government to reduce dependency on oil from 
66% to 49%. The percentages for nuclear 
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energy are to grow from 5% to 11%. for natural 
gas from 6% to 12%. for coal from I 7% to 20%. 
for geothermal energy from 0 % to I %. for new 
energy resources from 0.2% to 3% and those for 
hydroelectric energy will fall from 5.6% to 5%. 
j\'uc/cur energy 
97. Japan's approach to the development of 
nuclear energy is laid down in the basic law on 
nuclear power and is in accordance with the 
spirit of the treaty on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Japan would strive to do its 
share in preventing nuclear proliferation and 
would steer its nuclear energy development 
efforts strongly towards peaceful purposes. The 
government will systematically pursue the deve-
lopment of nuclear power. taking into account 
necessary social and economic considerations. 
In I 982, the nuclear-power generating capacity 
was twenty-four commercial nuclear power sta-
tions with an aggregate capacity of 17. I 7 million 
kW in operation. Eleven nuclear power sta-
tions are under construction with a total capacity 
of I 0. 7 million kW. About 46 million kW will 
be available in fiscal year !990 rising to approxi-
mately 90 million kW by the year 2000. 
98. The light-water reactor will remain the 
nation's main vehicle for nuclear power genera-
tion for some considerable time. Its reliability 
and economic efficiency will be improved. The 
plutonium and uranium recovered from spent 
fuel will be treated as domestically-held energy 
resources, thereby contributing to the effective 
use of uranium resources and to the lessening of 
dependency on foreign fuel supplies in the 
nuclear power industry. With a view to ensur-
ing its freedom to use plutonium, Japan will in 
principle reprocess spent fuel on its own. The 
plutonium derived from reprocessing will be 
used in fast-breeder reactors which Japan hopes 
to develop on a commercial basis towards the 
year 2010. As a substantial quantity of pluto-
nium may be accumulated before and after the 
fast-breeder reactors become commercially oper-
ational, such plutonium will be used as fuel for 
thermal neutron reactors. 
99. The policy for nuclear research and 
development is based on the following prin-
ciple. Reseach and development relating to the 
light-water reactor will be undertaken primarily 
by private firms. In order to establish a viable 
nuclear fuel cycle, the government will extend 
appropriate assistance to the private firms and 
undertake research into the safety of nuclear 
power generation and the disposal of nuclear 
waste. With regard to advanced thermal reac-
tors, fast-breeder reactors and their nuclear fuel 
cycle, the government will conduct research and 
development aiming at early commercial appli-
cation. Research and development of nuclear 
fusion will be promoted intensively. Nuclear 
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technology developed independently in Japan 
will eventually be transferred to private firms for 
commercial application. The government will 
give the necessary assistance. 
I 00. The government has taken measures to 
ensure nuclear non-proliferation. Bilateral 
negotiations with nuclear fuel supplying coun-
tries have been held and the government is 
upgrading its safeguards and the physical protec-
tion of nuclear materials to a level which meets 
international expectations. Japan co-operates 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 
Vienna for improving the safeguard system and 
contributing to creating a new international 
framework for the control of plutonium and 
guaranteeing supplies of nuclear materials. In 
transferring nuclear materials and know-how to 
other countries, especially developing countries. 
Japan is studying the measures for making inter-
national co-operation compatible for nuclear 
non-proliferation. 
101. With regard to nuclear power generation, 
the government is promoting all sorts of safety 
measures, improving light-water reactor techno-
logy and has taken the necessary measures to 
remove discarded reactors. In 1981, there were 
thirty-six accidents and breakdowns and in 1982 
about twenty. There were, however, no injuries 
or radiation casualties. 
102. As the number of nuclear power facilities 
increases in the coming years, the need for 
tightening security will grow. The Japanese 
Government will therefore strengthen security 
measures for its own nuclear power facilities. 
For this purpose also it will co-operate with the 
IAEA in order to incorporate effective security 
devices. These have to be internationally-
accepted and the forum of the IAEA is therefore 
necessary. 
103. For the nuclear fuel cycle, the government 
strives to secure a supply of natural uranium. 
The enrichment of uranium will be based on the 
technology of the centrifugal separation method. 
For reprocessing spent fuel a reprocessing 
plant has been built with a yearly capacity of 
1,200 tons. In addition to the Tokai repro-
cessing plant of the Power Reactor and Nuclear 
Fuel Development Corporation, a private repro-
cessing plant is being planned for completion 
and commercial operation around 1990. Efforts 
have been made to reduce the volume of 
low-level radioactive waste. Its volume will be 
compressed and solidified for sea dumping or 
ground disposal. The government will build a 
pilot plant which is designed to start operation 
in the second half of the 1980s to test vitrifica-
tion, solidification and storage techniques and 
will conduct research into the techniques for 
underground disposal and similar methods for 
development at the earliest date possible after 
the year 2000. In order to secure a steady 
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supply of nuclear power, it is considered desir-
able to build a stockpile of uranium. The cost 
will be divided between the government and 
private firms. With regard to fast breeders, the 
government is building a prototype reactor 
which will become critical around 1990. This 
will be followed by a demonstration reactor, the 
construction of which is planned to start in the 
early 1990s. 
104. With regard to nuclear fusion, the govern-
ment believes that the condition for a critical 
plasma will be achieved in the second half of the 
1980s, thanks to the construction of the Toko-
mak critical plasma test facility. The next goal 
is to achieve a self-igniting condition and thus 
establish the technological viability of fusion in 
the second half of the 1 990s. 
105. It is the purpose of the government to 
strengthen the base of the nuclear power indus-
try. It wishes to establish the independence of 
this industry including an independent nuclear 
fuel cycle and to lay the basis for the export of 
nuclear power plants in the future. The indus-
try, in order to export, has to develop its own 
technology by accumulating experience in the 
construction of such plants by creating a service 
system for the nuclear fuel cycle and by studying 
financial measures. 
106. With regard to the development of nuclear 
power, financial requirements and especially the 
funds for research and development might be 
extremely high. It is foreseen that in the next 
ten years 5.4 trillion yen will be necessary, 
1. 9 trillion yen for developing advanced reactors 
and other nuclear power equipment, 1.9 trillion 
yen for developing the nuclear fuel cycle and 
1.6 trillion for developing nuclear fusion and for 
conducting other basic research. 
107. As far as personnel is concerned, by fiscal 
year 1990 the government research bodies will 
need approximately 66,000 nuclear energy 
engineers including about 40,000 for energy uti-
lisation fields and about 26,000 for radiation 
utilisation fields. A large number of technical 
personnel will have to be retrained in the private 
and public research organisation which special-
ises in nuclear energy development. 
108. The government is undertaking a number 
of measures for siting nuclear power facilities. 
For the moment there are twenty-four nuclear 
power plants in operation, eleven under con-
struction and six in preparation. Moreover, 
two research and development power plants are 
either in operation or under construction. 
Further new sources of energy 
I 09. With regard to new sources of energy, the 
government is developing the following projects: 
(i) coal energy (coal liquefaction. coal 
gasification); 
(11) solar energy (photovoltaic power 
generation; solar energy for industry, 
etc.); 
(iiz) geothermal energy (power-generatmg 
plant utilising hot water, etc.): 
(ir) others (fuel cells. wind energy, etc.). 
In fiscal year 1983, this will amount to some 
52.973 million yen. 
.'YClr Lnergy Derelopment Orgamsatzon 
110. The New Energy Development Organisa-
tion is governed by the law for the promotion of 
development and the introduction of alternative 
energy sources. The Minister of International 
Trade and Industry is responsible for the New 
Energy Development Organisation. The organ-
isation is in charge of: 
(1) new energy development. research 
and development for new energy 
technology, coal energy liquefaction 
and gasification. solar energy, geo-
thermal energy, advanced energy 
conversion and storage; 
(i z) assistance measures for overseas coal 
development and service, exploration 
and rationalisation of the domestic 
coal industry; 
(izi) the production of alcohol. 
Coal energy 
111. Research and development for new energy 
technology is concerned first of all with coal 
liquefaction. A large-scale pilot plant is being 
developed to accelerate the process development 
and to add the research necessary to commer-
cialise coal liquefaction as soon as possible. 
The technology seeks to produce clean fuel from 
coal under high pressures, under high tempera-
tures, and consequently to hydrogenate the coal 
directly. The techniques will have to be deve-
loped by 1990. For coal gasification. the tech-
nology exists for producing clean fuel gas from 
coal through different processes. 
112. With regard to the rationalisation of the 
domestic coal industry, this has become neces-
sary and the government encourages the deve-
lopment of a national policy for modern-
ising the domestic coal-mining industry and 
developing oil-alternative industries. 
113. As Japan has not enough coalfields of its 
own and is aware that there are extensive coal 
reserves in the world. great efforts are being 
made to promote the economical development 
of coal in other countries taking into account the 
demand situation. The organisation makes 
loans and guarantees bank loans for this purpose 
for private companies engaged in this business. 
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114. For Japanese engineers to participate in 
international projects to develop overseas coal 
for import. they must be able to work alongside 
engineers from other countries. Training 
schemes are therefore being conducted by the 
orgamsation. 
Solar and other neH'forms of energy 
115. With regard to solar energy, research and 
development funds are set aside for solar 
thermal electric power plants. photovoltaic 
power generation, solar thermal energy for 
industry and wind energy. The aim is to get 
costs of production per unit down to a competi-
tive level and to secure efficiency in operation. 
116. t\ nation-wide survey of geothermal 
resources has been undertaken and a basic map 
of the nation's geothermal resources had to 
be revised. It is estimated that there is a 
30,000,000 kW potential. 
117. A 100 kW pilot plant for wind power is 
planned. but strong enough winds are not 
common in the main islands of Japan for this to 
be a main alternative source. 
118. With regard to advanced energy conver-
sion and storage problems. research and deve-
lopment and demonstration programmes are 
being undertaken. Such a system will become 
feasible commercially in 1990. A key techno-
logy for energy conservation is to store surplus 
electric power and supply it during peak 
periods. This improves operating efficiency of 
power systems in addition to securing the power 
supply in peak periods. Combining the results 
of research and development, pilot plants of 
LOOO kW scale are planned for field tests of the 
advanced battery energy storage system. The 
same is true for a field test plant for fuel power 
generation with a capacity in the megawatt class 
which will be completed in the mid-1980s. 
Budget 
119. The budget for these activities in 1983 is 
180.1 billion yen compared to 166.1 billion yen 
in 1982. In order to obtain the maximum 
inputs from the private sector, experts in this 
sector have been integrated into the activities of 
the New Energy Development Organisation. 
Energy conservation 
120. In order to promote energy conservation 
in Japan, the government has established an 
energy conservation centre. In response to 
worldwide instability and the rising prices of 
energy supply. which are expected to continue 
long into the future, the object of the energy 
conservation policy is to reduce the increase in 
energy demand as much as possible without 
influencing unfavourably the long-term direction 
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of economic growth. Consequently. the energy 
conservation policy is to encourage people to 
avoid waste at each phase of energy consump-
tion and to use energy as efficiently as possible: 
for instance, in the industry sector, rationalisa-
tion of energy use by improving production 
facilities and manufacturing processes, etc.; in 
private homes, the introduction of heat-insulat-
ing structures, effective use of air-conditioning 
facilities for buildings, improvement of energy 
consumption efficiency of electric home applian-
ces: and in the transport sector, improvement of 
energy consumption efficiency of automobiles. 
121. Financial aid is given to energy conserva-
tion investment and tax concessions are made 
for energy conservation investment in large 
factories. An energy conservation law pushes 
industry towards manufacturing energy-efficient 
equipment, aiming at a 20% reduction in energy 
use in products. Already it seems that, particu-
larly through conservation, Japan has been able 
to economise up to as much as 30% of its energy 
requirement compared with a few years ago. 
Educational and publicity measures (e.g. one day 
per month with events to enhance conservation 
awareness) have proved particularly successful. 
VII. Marine de••e/opment in Japan 
J!artne SCience and Technolog.r Centre 
122. Because of its geographic surroundings. 
Japan has had marine-related activities for 
centuries. The Japan Marine Science and Tech-
nology Centre was established in 1971 based on 
the marine science and technology centre law 
and \vith the co-operation of public. academic 
and private circles. It was founded for promot-
ing the marine science and technology of 
Japan. Some fourteen government agencies 
and ministries are involved in marine science 
and technology developments. The most 
important are the Self-Defence Agency and the 
Science and Technology Agency. From the 
ministries. there are the Ministrv of Education. 
Science and Culture. the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Forestry and Fisheries, the Mimstry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry and the Mimstry of 
Tram port. 
123. In the private sector, there are some 120 
business organisations and private companies 
interested in the centre. The most important 
private circles are shipbuilding, electricity. steeL 
machinery, etc. 
124. The centre is the only comprehensive 
central organisation for the promotion of marine 
science and technology in Japan. The tasks of 
the centre are: 
(i) research and development of all 
marine-connected technologies; 
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(ii) to hold trammg courses on diving 
techniques and marine engineering 
for researchers and technicians: 
(iiz) actively to disseminate information 
on marine science and technology to 
interested agencies: 
(iv) to offer its large-scale testing facilities 
to the government, universities and 
private enterprises for research and 
development of marine science and 
technology. 
The total budget for marine science and tech-
nology was some 64, 154 million yen in 1982. 
125. Japan's exclusive economic zone ranks 
sixth in the world in terms of area. Thus 
Japan's area of administration has rapidly 
expanded since the era of exclusive economic 
zones. The area of marine development and 
exploration covers: (i) mineral resources. oil. gas 
and manganese nodules; (ii) development of 
living resources such as fish; (iii) the develop-
ment of sea-water resources, sea-water desalina-
tion and extraction of materials such as ura-
nium; (ir) development of marine energies, use 
of oceanic currents for power generation, wave 
power. etc.; (v) utilisation of marine spaces, 
ocean-based plants, airports and marine recrea-
tional centres; (vi) development of marine 
science and technologies. 
126. In order to develop and utilise minerals 
and biological resources, the centre is promoting 
the development of a deep-submergence research 
vehicle system which allows for direct viewing of 
the deep seabed by the human eye, acquisition 
samples and data as well as the installation and 
recovery of deep-sea measuring instruments. It 
has also developed unmanned deep-sea explora-
tion systems, remotely-operated vehicle systems 
and deep-sea cameras. The budget for deep-sea 
research is some 5. 78 billion yen for the year 
1983. 
127. The Science and Technology Agency is 
especially interested in the research and develop-
ment of manned and unmanned deep-sea work-
ing systems. Deep-sea research now reaches 
depths of 2,000 metres but if the necessarv 
budget allocations are provided it may reach 
6.000 metres. 
128. The Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry is especially interested in the develop-
ment of deep-sea mineral resources. the dewlop-
ment of the rccoverv of uranium from the 
ocean<>. seabed oil production. as well as basic 
research concerning oil and natural gas on the 
sea shelf around Japan. 
VIII. The visit to the National Diet 
129. The committee was received in the room 
of the chairmen of standing committees in the 
House of Representatives ofthe National Diet of 
Japan. The House of Representatives has 
eighteen standing committees each with twenty 
to fifty members and the House of Counsellors 
has sixteen standing committees each with ten to 
forty-five members. The committee met mem-
bers from the Science and Technology Commit-
tees ofboth houses ofthe Diet 1• 
Space 
130. After the introduction of members. a 
wide-ranging discussion was held on space ques-
tions. From the Japanese side. it was agreed 
that Japan was in a certain way behind Europe 
as regards launchers but it was mainly interested 
in building satellites and especially telecommu-
nications satellites. They had had many 
contacts with the American space agency 
(NASA) especially on communications satel-
lites. The purpose of the National Space Deve-
lopment Agency was solely civil. Japan was not 
involYed in any military use of satellites. Japan 
would be interested in United Nations satellites. 
especially for verification of disarmament 
measures. 
Employment problems 
131. Members of the committee discussed 
employment and re-employment with Japanese 
members of parliament. It was generally agreed 
that the introduction of electronics in factories 
might lead to fewer workers and could therefore 
lead to unemployment. On the other hand, the 
manufacturing of robots and other electronic 
instruments might lead to an expansion of total 
production. 
132. As long as productivity rises and the 
economy expands, the problems of employment 
and redeployment could be mastered. How-
ever, once production no longer rises and there 
is no further expansion it becomes extremely 
difficult to keep employment at the same level. 
Moreover, although workers are probably more 
flexible than in Western Europe, not all 
employees can be transferred to other jobs or to 
the service sector; nor is it possible to transfer 
workers of a certain age for retraining. This is 
also true of female workers who, after a certain 
period of family-raising and work, are too old to 
be usefully employed in factories. The results 
will therefore be that many younger people can 
be adapted to robotisation but older people and 
women who, for family reasons, have interrup-
ted their careers, will be much more difficult to 
redeploy. Partial employment is still being 
practised but it is no real solution for many 
people. Trade unions are becoming disquieted 
and want discussions before further robots are 
introduced. 
I. See Appendix VI. 
99 
DOCUMENT 956 
133. Once electronic production methods reach 
medium and small industries, there will be a 
sharp reduction in the workforce. Now already 
many high school pupils cannot find employ-
ment and are therefore swelling the ranks of 
university students. Because of the system of 
lifetime employment in Japan. new recruits are 
engaged with caution. 
Industrial aspects 
134. As far as Japanese industry is concerned. 
one should not forget that in Japan, for instance. 
the former highly developed chemical industry 
and the textile industry are greatly reduced due 
to the structural depression. 
135. Japan has an import promotion organisa-
tion to develop commerce with Europe and the 
United States. 
136. One factor responsible for the present 
world economic stagnation is the slow growth of 
investment in plant and equipment and low 
productivity due to slow technological innova-
tion. 
137. If the world economy is to be revitalised, 
it is imperative that this should be through 
industrial co-operation in both trade and capital 
investment and technological exchange. This 
should lead to much closer and stronger eco-
nomic ties between Japan. the United States and 
the European countries. Industrial co-opera-
tion means the exchange among advanced coun-
tries of capital and technology and know-how to 
foster mutual industrial activities. This would 
involYe joint ventures, direct investment to and 
from overseas. technical co-operation and joint 
technical research and development and joint 
construction of industrial plants in third coun-
tries. Betwe'en Japan and Europe many such 
cases of co-operation are being planned or are 
already in progress. Japan invests directly in 
electronics and technical co-operation in joint 
production of automobiles. machine tools. 
industrial robots. computers. as well as joint 
developments in the civil aircraft industry 1• 
IX. Conclusions 
138. The outside observer can but applaud and 
envy large parts of the Japanese miracle. On 
the one hand, and through various favourable 
circumstances and factors, the Japanese eco-
nomy, in applying the new technologies, has 
been able to acquire the seemingly unstoppable 
momentum and vitality - and flexibility - that 
characterised the major Western European eco-
nomies in the industrial revolution after it got 
under way two centuries ago, or the United 
States economy in the mid and late nineteenth 
I. See Appendix VII. 
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century. "Nothing succeeds like success" we 
can only ruefully reflect. The momentum is 
enabling Japan to take in its stride or simply to 
ignore influences that in recent years have 
seemed to cripple older industrial economies -
energy price rises, resultant inflationary tenden-
cies, budget deficits, negative development of 
worker power, or the need continuously to 
restructure. At the same time, the Japanese 
have been able to identify the mistakes of the 
"overmature" advanced economies - inade-
quate management techniques, lack of attention 
to key elements of cost efficiencv, confrontation 
with and poor motivation of th~ workforce, for 
example - and successfully, so far at least, to 
avoid them like the plague. The traditional 
strengths and cohesiveness of their society have 
endured through great changes and have facili-
tated and even assured the processes of growth 
and the transition to a fully industrialised 
society. It is a remarkable spectacle. 
139. Respect for this achievement need not 
blind us to obvious defects and concerns for the 
future. The social benefits in the European 
countries are still much more balanced and 
reach all levels of society. It is by no means 
certain that industrial peace will endure as the 
pressures of an anonymous industrial society 
push traditional values of Japanese society 
further into the past. Already young people are 
increasingly westernised and somewhat divorced 
from historic culture. Demand for leisure may 
eat away at the work ethic as increasing free time 
and personal pursuits become preferable to 
further material acquisition, and as the acquisi-
tive society becomes less palatable after a certain 
stage. Despite group decision-making in all its 
applications, and a substantial sense of equality 
in Japanese society, there could be a growing 
resentment against the vast power of a small 
number of entrepreneurs that make the main 
decisions and against a state machine that works 
so closely with them. Hard times or hostile 
world market conditions could shake a system 
so dependent on exports. Parts of the infra-
structure are poor or have been hideously 
de~orm~d by polluting industry. Rising expec-
tatiOns m respect of the environment or of social 
provisions could force a degree of social 
spending that can eat away at the incentives to 
private investment on a continuing scale. 
140. Nevertheless, we must realise the 
immense success of the Japanese economy, the 
~eed to live with it and to cope with its competi-
tive power, and the lessons we can learn. It is 
widely said that the twenty-first century will be 
the century of the Pacific zone - with Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, the emerging ASEAN countries 
and communist China setting the pace toge-
ther with the United States and Australia. 
Japan will, by the year 2000, be on level econo-
mic terms with the whole of the USSR, with the 
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EEC bloc. and almost with the output of the 
United States, dominating a large part of the 
world trade in new technologies - and all from 
nothing a few decades ago. Understanding 
Japan and Japanese wavs will be vital for 
Western Europe as we ru~ the danger of being 
mcreasmgly eclipsed. 
1·+1. It is in this context that we should look at 
education and experience of European execu-
tives. busmessmen and men of affairs in Japan-
ese studies: here is a deficiency. For European 
governments it could be useful for a study to be 
made of innovation practices in Japan. Why 
do new products reach the market in Japan so 
quickly after being invented whereas in Europe 
the process is so much slower? The European 
Community does have a programme which 
enables some executives and management to 
visit and study Japan. An executive training 
programme for young executives who have had, 
~ay, a minimum of two or three years in 
mdustry. offers thirty places for eighteen-month 
stays in Japan. including six months in industry. 
There is a mixed programme for special indus-
trial 5ectors - e.g. retailing or telecommunica-
tions -bringing groups of about twelve to Japan 
for experience of Japanese industry. Finally. 
there is a management secondment programme 
for 35 to 40-year-olds, to be started as a pilot 
scheme for about five people from middle man-
agement who will stay in Japan for, say, three 
months. These numbers need to be substan-
tially increased. Moreover. since WEU itself 
needs to co-operate more closely with Japan in 
technology, in space, in ocean exploration. and 
perhaps in special sectors like aircraft manu-
facture. the Council should examine whether 
WELT as such should sponsor both more inten-
sive Japanese training for special groups in the 
particular sectors, as well as for key personnel 
and officials in government departments 
concerned with the sectors in question. including 
defence. Your Rapporteur realises the diffi-
cultie5 of co-operating with the Japanese in the 
technological field where they have superior 
know-how and knowledge. but he is also con-
vinced that co-operation is possible. Europe 
should however speak with one voice and take 
the necessary steps jointly. Too often in the 
past national short-term interests have jeopar-
dised joint action. 
142. Although Japanese competition in mili-
tary h1gh technology is not just round the corner. 
one should be aware of its possibilities in the 
near future, in particular in electronics. The 
fifth generation computers, for instance, will 
certa1!1ly have implications in the military field, 
espeCially w1th regard to guidance instruments 
for aircraft and missiles. 
143. Throughout the VISit. your Rapporteur 
was impressed by the interest of Japanese offi-
cials, businessmen and politicians in intensified 
technological co-operation with Western Euro-
pean countries now that Japan has passed 
through its "catching up" phase and feels tech-
nically equal or ahead in crucial sectors. At the 
same time, Japan increasingly realises that it 
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must invest and produce in overseas countries. 
Examples of where the co-operation has been 
and could be developed have been given in 
various parts of this report, and we must hasten 
the contacts and the projects. 
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Sunday, 3rd July 
3p.m. 
Monday, 4th July 
Morning 
Afternoon 
APPENDIX I 
(a) Programme of the visit to Japan 
3rd to lOth July 1983 
Arrival at Narita international airport near Tokyo. 
Tokyo 
Visit to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Visit to the Ministry oflnternational Trade and Industry. 
N_agoya-Kagoshima 
APPENDIX I 
Tuesday, 5th July 
Morning Leave Tokyo central station for Nagoya by the Shinkansen super express 
train. 
Late afternoon 
Wednesday, 6th July 
Morning 
Afternoon 
Thursday, 7th July 
All day 
Friday. 8th July 
Morning 
Afternoon 
Saturday, 9th July 
Sunday, lOth Jul_v 
10.30 p.m. 
Visit to Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Nagoya aircraft works. 
Leave Nagoya by air for Kagoshima. 
Arrival at Kagoshima. 
Kagoshima- Tanegashima- Tokyo 
Arrival at Tanegashima. 
Visit the space centre. 
Return by air to Tokyo. 
Visit to Fujitsu laboratories and the Fijitsu Numazu complex. 
Visit to the parliamentary committees at the Diet. 
Visit to the Science and Technology Agency. 
Visit of Tokyo. 
Departure Narita international airport for Europe. 
(b) List of participants 
MM. A-\RTS 
ANTONI 
(Netherlands) 
(Italy) 
(Belgium) 
(Belgium) 
ADRIAENSENS 
BIEFNOT 
BOHM 
DE BoNDT 
FIANDROTTI 
FOURRE 
LAGORCE 
LENZER (Chairman) 
MARTINO 
McGuiRE 
Lord NORTHFIELD (Rapporteur) 
MM. ScHMIDT 
SPIES von BuLLESHEIM 
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS 
MM. VALLEIX 
WORRELL 
(Fed. Rep. of Germany) 
(Belgium) 
(Italy) 
(France) 
(France) 
(Fed. Rep. ofGermany) 
(Italy) 
(United Kingdom) 
(United Kingdom) 
(Fed. Rep. ofGermany) 
(Fed. Rep. ofGermany) 
(Belgium) 
(France) 
(Netherlands) 
Mr. HuiGENS 
Counsellor 
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(c) Questions for discussion in Japan 
General policy 
I. What are the general policy guidelines for 
science and technology in Japan in the 1980s 
and 1990s? 
2. How can the international political aims 
of Japan's scientific and technological program-
mes be defined ? 
3. How does Japanese policy fit in with the 
role of the United Nations in space and other-
wise? 
4. Would it be possible for the United 
Nations to have its own reconnaissance satellite 
to monitor the implementation of disarmament 
agreements? 
5. What is the government's position on 
collaboration with Western European countries 
in the near future in the scientific and techno-
logical field ? 
6. What is the government's view of the 
1985 exhibition at Nagoya? 
7. Can an estimate be given of Japanese 
investment in the Common Market countries as 
a whole and country by country? What is the 
present trade imbalance with the Common 
Market and the individual European countries ? 
8. What is the expected effect of relaxation of 
trade barriers between Japan and the WEU 
member countries and does this allow more 
important European exports to Japan? 
9. What relationship is there between Japan 
and the countries of South-East Asia in the 
scientific and technological field ? 
10. What relationship is there with the Latin-
American countries and especially Brazil ? 
11. Relations with the United States are the 
cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. What 
agreements link Japan and the United States? 
(Defence ? Others ?) 
12. In the framework of the law of the sea 
conference, will the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
give its opinion on the convention signed in 
1982 with regard to freedom on the high seas, 
fishery conservation (whales), resources of the 
continental shelf and deep-sea mining issues? 
13. What is its opinion on the United States 
proposal for an alternative regime for exploiting 
the seabed? 
Space activities 
14. What specific guidelines has the govern-
ment drawn up for Japan's long-range space 
activities? 
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15. How does the decision process work in 
Japan? In particular, what are the roles and 
influence of the Space Activities Committee, of 
the Science and Technology Agency, ofNASDA, 
ISAS {Institute of Space and Astronautical 
Sciences), and the MITI ? 
16. How big is the Japanese governmental 
budget for space activities and how is it broken 
down by the main agencies and ministries 
concerned (ST A, NASDA, ISAS, MPT, MITL 
etc.)? 
17. What are the Japanese programmes 
concernmg: 
- telecommunications ; 
- meteorology ; 
- earth resources ; 
- science (astrophysics through material 
sciences)? 
18. What is the situation concerning laun-
chers: 
- ISAS: the MU family and the 
Kagoshima launch centre ; 
- NASDA: theN and especially H family 
and the Tanegashima launch centre? 
19. What is the proportion between the 
financing of space activities and research and 
development by government as compared with 
that of industry and private organisations? 
20. How have the budgets evolved since 
1973? 
21. The Science and Technology Agency has 
received approval of $436.65 million for space 
development programmes including the CS-2 
and the CS-3 Satcoms, the BS-2 TV-Sat, the 
GMS-3 Metsat, the MOS-1 Marine Sat, the 
ETS-5 engineering Testsat and the H-lA launch 
vehicle. The agency also was allotted 
$22.5 million for development of the Kawasa-
ki C-1 transport-modified experimental STOL 
aircraft. Can details be given of these pro-
grammes? 
?? The total space budget is to be $2.4 
billion for fiscal year 1983. Apart from the 
abovementioned, can a breakdown of expen-
diture programme by programme be given? 
23. Will the industrial development of private 
satellite services be allowed? 
24. Will Japan build its own -shuttle? 
25. Would Japan be interested in participating 
in future spacelab developments ? 
26. Japanese industries such as Melco, 
Toshiba and Nee collaborate closely with Ameri-
can firms such as Hughes and Ford Aerospace. 
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To what extent is Japanese space industry 
dependent on United States industry? 
27. Apart from communications, which other 
domains would private industry wish to be 
responsible for in space services ? 
28. What are the latest developments in the 
field of co-operation in space between Japan and 
the United States ? 
29. What is the role of the joint commission 
for science and technology ? 
30. Has Japan concluded special agreements 
with the United States for the reception of 
Landsat and other remote-sensing satellite data ? 
31. How does Japan consider international 
co-operation in space? 
32. What is the role played by Japan in 
Intelsat? What roles does Japan play m 
Inmarsat? 
33. Does Japan participate in other inter-
national space-oriented organisations ? 
Industrial aspects 
34. What leadership is still given by trading 
companies in product definition before indus-
trial capacity is built up? 
35. Transport infrastructure is of great impor-
tance and it would be most interesting to receive 
information on the further construction of 
advanced high-speed rail systems. Are new 
lines to be opened ? 
36. What is the financial position of the 
Japanese national railways? If it is true that the 
financial position is not sound, what measures 
are planned to rectify this situation ? 
37. Are new super high-speed railways or 
other systems of conveyance being built ? 
38. Motor vehicle transport is still being 
developed. What measures has the government 
taken to stop traffic congestion on main roads 
with due account being taken of environmental 
considerations and alternative means of trans-
port? 
39. What are the results of the work of the 
Traffic Safety and Nuisance Research Institute 
of the Ministry of Transport and the Mechanical 
Engineering Laboratory of the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry ? 
40. In 1973 electric cars and small electric 
trucks were considered a feasibility. What are 
their chances now ? 
41. Japan's aerospace industry, employing 
over 25,000 workers is growing at about 15% 
annually. What are its main products and what 
goals has the government set for this industry ? 
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42. What is the breakdown between civil and 
military production ? 
43. With which European aircraft companies 
is Japanese industry collaborating on airframes, 
aero-engines, helicopters and other aerospace 
products? 
44. The Japanese aerospace industry is colla-
borating with Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in 
the United States. What collaborative ventures 
are being implemented and what new ones are 
planned? 
45. What are the aerospace products which 
Japan produces, what are the criteria for their 
selection and what are the Japanese Govern-
ment's objectives? 
46. What types offully Japanese made aircraft 
are being planned for the second half of the 
1980sandthe 1990s? 
47. Regarding computers, government and 
industry are pursuing a fifth generation compu-
ter project which will involve some $500 mil-
lion. What are the aims of government and 
industry in developing this project ? What is 
the timetable and what results are to be 
expected? 
48. What kind of leadership does MITI give 
to individual big companies with regard to 
industrial production for the world market ? 
49. What growth is considered possible for 
industrial production once the market in office 
and household appliances is saturated ? Will 
miniaturisation provide a solution? 
50. According to the Herald Tribune of 7th 
June 1983, Japan will hold a strong lead in the 
next generation of computer memory chips. 
What is the governmental and industrial opinion 
on this? How large a part will it play in Japanese 
production? 
51. What part will be played by robotisation 
in Japanese industry and what will be its conse-
quences on employment? 
Energy 
52. Has Japan established a national nuclear 
industry based on national technology ? 
53. Nuclear research and development is of 
great significance. What percentage of the 
national research and development effort is 
connected with nuclear energy ? 
54. What is being done on uranium enrich-
ment, plutonium fuel and fast-breeder reactors 
for which Japan developed sodium-cooled reac-
tors as a national product ? When is commer-
cial utilisation offast-breeder reactors expected? 
55. What stage has been reached in the 
development of advanced thermal reactors using 
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various kinds of fuel, such as slightly enriched 
uranium and natural uranium mixed with 
plutonium? 
56. What is the state of the fusion reactors in 
Japan now being studied by the Japan Atomic 
Energy Research Institute ? 
57. What enrichment facilities have been 
installed in Japan? 
58. What measures are taken for nuclear 
reactor waste disposal ? 
59. Can science and technology in Japan play 
a role in avoiding a crisis between energy 
requirements and various forms of environ-
mental pollution? Would this mean a change in 
the present pattern of Japan's industrial struc-
ture? 
60. What percentage of the total electricity 
generating capacity comes from nuclear resour-
ces? 
61. How much of the capacity of nuclear 
generators of electricity is under construction or 
in operation? 
62. Which utilities are ordering, constructing 
and operating nuclear power stations ? 
63. Which companies, consortia or groups 
are the main constructors of nuclear power 
stations? 
64. Is research being carried out on new 
sources of energy - solar energy, wind, biomass 
and geothermal ? 
65. How is the energy conservation pro-
gramme developing ? How does it relate to the 
rise in world oil prices ? 
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66. Most European electricity boards consider 
it of great importance to be in the same technical 
community and this is one of the main reasons 
why all European countries have ordered light-
water reactors. Do you agree with this 
approach? 
67. Could you give your views on the future 
of: 
(a) the advanced gas-cooled reactor; 
(b) the liquid metal-cooled reactor; 
(c) th.e high-temperature reactor; 
(d) the steam-generating heavy-water 
reactor? 
Marine developments 
68. What are the main projects of the Council 
for Ocean Development and in which direction 
will Japan extend its marine activities for the 
effective use of its marine resources? 
69. What are the main projects regarding the 
continental shelf around Japan ? 
70. What are the activities of the Japan 
Marine Science and Technology Centre ? 
71. What is its budget and what are the main 
activities of this centre? 
72. What are the main research goals of the 
underwater habitation project, Seatopia, and the 
deep-sea submersibles ? 
73. What are the goals in deep-sea mining? 
74. What is the share of government agencies 
and of private industry in research and develop-
ment? 
I 
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Cabinet ~ 
APPENDIX 11 
Chart of the national organisation of space activities 
I ~I Space Activities Commission 11 
ri. Prime Minister's Office I 
~ National Police Agency 
~ Science and Technology Agency [_ _________________ 1 National Aerospace Laboratory 
I 
National Space Development I 
,-------- Agency of Japan (NASDA) 
Y Environment Agency 
----1 Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
----1 Ministry of Education Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) 
I 
Ministry of Agriculture, H I - Fisheries Agency I Forestry and Fisheries I 
I 
I 
I 
H I Ministry of International Agency of Industrial I Mechanical Engineering - Trade and Industry Science and Technology I Laboratory I 
I 
I 
I ~ Electrotechnical Laboratory I I 
I 
I 
.------------------------~ Electronic Navigation I 
I Research Institute I 
----1 Ministry of Transport f ----1 Maritime Safety Agency 
----1 
----1 
y 
Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications 
Ministry of Construction 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
Keidanren 
(Federation of 
Economic Organisations) 
----1 Japan Meteorological 
Agency 
Meteorological Satellite 
Centre 
~----------------- ------- -- Radio Research Laboratories 
r· I 
I 
I 
I Telecommunications Satellite 
•--------------------------------- Corporation of Japan 
Geographical Survey Institute 
Fire Defence Agency 
U Space Activities L J Member Companies and 
li.__P_r...co_m_o_t_io_n_C_o_u_n_c_i 1_---'lt-------il Trade Associations I 
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Satellite 
Engineering Test Satellite- IV 
(ETS-IV) "KIKU-3" 
Geostationary Meteorological 
Satellite-2 (GMS-2) '"HIMA-
WARI-2" 
Communications Satellite-2 
(CS-2a) 
Communications Satellite-2 
(CS-2b) 
Man ne Observation Satellite 
(MOS-1) 
Broadcasting Satellite-2 (BS-2a) 
Broadcasting Satellite-2 (BS-2b) 
Geostationary Meteorological 
Satellite-3 (GMS-3) 
APPENDIX Ill 
Satellites programmes 
Satellites ofN-2 programme 
Mt~Sl011 
Confirmation of launchmg performance 
of N-2 vehicle, acquisition of data on 
launching environment as well as tech-
nologies for production and manage-
ment of large-scale satellites, and test 
of functions of equipments on board 
the satellite. 
Improvement of meteorological service 
in Japan, and development of meteo-
rological satellite technology. Almost 
the same performance as "HIMA-
WARI". 
Development of communication satellite 
technology in accordance with increas-
ing demands for satellite communica-
tions. Its performance is comparable 
to "SAKURA". 
On orbit spare of CS-2a. assuming the 
same mission as above. 
Observation of marine phenomena, espe-
cially colours and surface temperature 
of the sea, and establishment of the 
fundamental technology of earth obser-
vation satellites. 
Elimination of the poor TV reception 
areas, and development of technology 
for broadcasting satellites. having a 
performance comparable to ""YURI". 
On orbit spare of BS-2a. assuming the 
same mission as above. 
Improvement of meteorological service 
in Japan, and development of meteo-
rological satellite technology. Almost 
the same performance as ""HIMA-
WARI-2". 
Note: Electromc Navigation Research Institute, Mimstry of Transport 
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Launch datc/Ychtclc 
11th February 1981 
N-2 
11th August 1981 
N-2 
January to February 
1983 
N-2 
August to September 
1983 
N-2 
FY 1986 
N-2 (2 stage) 
FY 1983 
N-2 
FY 1985 
N-2 
FY 1984 
N-2 
DOCUMENT 956 APPENDIX Ill 
Satellites of H-1 programme 
Satellite Mission Launch date/Vehicle 
Payload for the test flight. Confirmation oflaunch capability of H-1 FY 1985 
and development of technology for ETV-11 
geodetic satellites. 
ETS-V After 1987 
CS-3a 
CS-3b 
* Note: Geographical Survey Institute, Ministry of ConstructiOn. 
Space experiment programme 
Mission name Principal purposes Launch date 
First Material Processing Test To conduct experiments on material pro- FY 1987 
(FMPT) cessing and life science using space (TBD) 
shuttlejspacelab, and develop manned 
support technology needed for human 
activities in space. 
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APPENDIX IV 
(a) The present state of science and technology in Japan 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Investment in research and development 
(R & D) (1981): 
- 5,360 billion yen ($24 billion) 
one-tenth of world R & D expenditure 
75% by private sectors. 
Number of researchers (as of April1982): 
- 330,000 persons. 
Primary objectives of science and techno-
logy (S & T): 
- increase of R & D investment to 3 % of 
national income ; 
- reinforcement of creativity and origina-
lity in R & D; 
- enhancement of effective co-operation 
among the industrial, academic and 
government sectors ; 
- further development of international 
co-operation. 
Administrative organisations (cf. chart): 
- Council for Science and Technology 
5. 
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the top consultative organ in the admi-
nistration of S & T in Japan for formu-
lating basic policies concerning all areas 
ofS& T. 
- Science and Technology Agency 
an overall co-ordination agency among 
various ministries and agencies (exclu-
ding universities). 
Government budget forS & T (1982): 
Yen $ (billion) (million) 
- Nuclear energy: 290 1,200 
- Other energy: 93 390 
- Space development: 109 450 
- Ocean development: 60 250 
- Disaster prevention: 28 120 
- Universities: 657 2,740 
- Government budget 
forS & T: 1,448 6,000 
$1 = 240 yen 
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(b) Administrative structure of science and technology 
Cabinet 
Council for Science and Technology 
I 
Prime Minister's ~- Atomic Energy Commission 
Office 1 
r -------------------------- -r +- Nuclear Safety Commission 
I 
~. Space Activities Commission 
I 
Council for Ocean Development 
n Tsukuba Centre for Institutes I 
_l_j Science and Technology Ll__ 
-n
1 
Agency I :H National Research Institute I 
'----------------1 for Metals and 5 others 
f-1 Environment Agency \t---_._---l\ 2 National Research Institutes J 
---------------------------J 
-{ Universities I 
APPENDIX IV 
Japan Atomic Energy Research 
Institute 
Power Reactor and Nuclear 
Fuel Development Corporation 
Institute of Physical and 
Chemical Research 
National Space Development 
Agency of Japan and 4 other 
Statutory Corporations 
H Ministry of Education 11-----------H\ 9 Common-use Organisations for Universities J 
~ 4 National Research Institutes 
rl Ministry of Health and Welfare lt-------i~ 10 National Research Institutes 
~-----------------~ 
H Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries ~-- 1 i Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Research Council l 30 National Research Institutes 
I 
I 
I 
I 
H Ministry of International I Agency of Industrial I I Electrotechnical Laboratory I .__T_r_a_d_e_a_n_d_l_n_d_us_t_ry ______ ___,~t------ll Science and Technology lt-----ll,__a_nd_1_5_o_t_h_e_rs ______ _. 
H Ministry of Transport :1-----------------j[ 9 National Research Institutes I 
-{ 
Ministry of Posts and I I I Telecommunications ll--------------l1 1 National Research Institute 
~----------------1 
H Ministry of Labour [t--------------l[ 2 National Research Institutes I 
Y Ministry of Construction ft---------------11 3 National Research Institutes I 
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APPENDIX V 
Cases of industrial co-operation between Japan 
and the United States 
Automobile 
Honda Motor built a passenger car factory 
in the state of Ohio. Construction started in 
1981. Went into production at the end of 1982. 
Nissan Motor built a truck factory in the 
state of Tennessee. Production commenced in 
1983. 
Toyota started the feasibility study of joint 
production with GM in March 1982. 
Steel 
Sumitomo Metal Industries provided 
technology to US Steel's Baytown plant of 
integrated manufacturing of large-diameter 
pipes. Actual guidance started in 1980. 
Nippon Steel examined the Armco's 
Houston plant with regard to the improvement 
of operation. This was commenced in August 
1980. 
Semiconductor 
Hitachi established a semiconductor plant 
in the state ofTexas in 1978. 
Nippon Electric took over a semiconduc-
tor plant in California in 1978. 
Toko and Motorola agreed to establish a 
company jointly to manufacture and sell semi-
conductor. setting up a plant at Aizu, Japan. 
Completed in October 1980. 
Toshiba took over a semiconductor plant 
in California in April 1980. 
Fujitsu set up a semiconductor plant in 
California. Construction commenced in 1979. 
and production in 1980. 
Hitachi provided technology to Hewlett-
Packard to manufacture 64KDRAM in March 
1982. 
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Toshiba and Zailog entered into a techni-
cal co-operation agreement for production 
technology of 16KSRAM and micro-computer 
in April 1982. 
Machine tool 
Makino Milling Machine made a capital 
participation in Leprond in Ohio, acquiring 51 o/o 
of its stock, provided MC production technology 
and gave it the rights to sell Makino's products. 
Hitachi Seiki constructed a NC lathe plant 
in the state of New York. Production began in 
May 1981. 
Fujitsu Fanuc established a joint company 
in Michigan jointly with GM in March 1982 for 
the purpose of developing, manufacturing and 
selling industrial robots. 
Mitsubishi Electric supplied welding 
robots to Westinghouse (OEM ordinary equip-
ment) in March 1982. 
Electronics 
Leading manufacturers of electronic 
equipment in Japan invested in many states. 
Civil aircraft 
Joint project for development of YX by 
Japan Civil Air Transport Development Asso-
ciation, Boeing (USA) and Alitalia (Italy). 
Scheduled to be commissioned at the end of 
1982. 
Proposal for joint development project 
with Boeing for YXX, the !50-passenger aircraft. 
Proposal for joint development project for 
YXX with McDonnell Douglas. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Members of the Science and Technology Committees 
House of Representatil·es 
Mr. R. Nagata (LOP) 
Mr. J. Komiyama (LOP) 
Mr. K. Yosano (LOP) 
Mr. F. Kishida (LOP) 
Mr. S. Kusakawa (Komeito Party) 
Mr. Y. Yoshida (Democratic Socialist Party) 
Mr. K. Yamahara (Communist Party) 
House of Counsellors 
Mr. A. Nakano (Komeito Party) 
Mr. M. Goto (LOP) 
Mr. M. Yoshida (Japanese Socialist Party) 
Mr. A. Ota (Komeito Party) 
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APPENDIX VII 
Current situation of Economic Community-Japan industrial co-operation 
I. Investment exchange 
(i) Japan's direct znvestment in the Economzc 
Community for mam{(acturing (tota/119) 
A. Trends by country: 
No. 1 West Germany 
No. 2 United Kingdom 
No. 3 France 
N 4 ~Belgium o. ~ Netherlands 
N 6 ~Italy o. ~Ireland 
No. 8 Greece 
N 9 ~ Luxembourg o. ~Denmark 
28 
23 
17 
13 
13 
10 
10 
3 
1 
1 
N.B.: Numbers include projects which are just after decision 
stage. 
B. Trends by decade: 
1960s - 12 - z1pper, stationery, motorbike, 
TV, etc.; 
1970s - 67 - bearings, plastics, lens, colour 
TV, etc.; 
1980s - 40 - colour TV, automobiles, IC, 
VTR, robots, etc. 
(ii) Economic Community's direct investment in 
Japan for manufacturing 
The Economic Community's investment 
in Japan is not brisk when compared with the 
Japanese investment in the Economic Commun-
ity. Main fields of Economic Community 
investment are oil refinery, chemicals, rubber 
products, pharmaceuticals, machinery and elec-
tric machinery. 
(iii) Japan-Economic Commumty-United States 
cross investments 
Cross direct investment between Japan 
and the Economic Community has been 
increasing, but is still far behind the level of 
cross investment between the Economic 
Community and the United States. 
$15,191 m 
(63.6) 
$80,492 m 
(100) 
$4,534 m 
(5.6) 
N.B.: As of end March 1982. Figures of cross investments 
between Economic Community and Umted States are 
as of end 1981. Figures m brackets are percentages 
of the figure of the investment from the U mted States 
to the Economic Community. 
2. Technology exchange 
As for the technical co-operation extended 
by Japanese enterprises to the Economic 
Community, notable is an increase in the fields 
of automobiles, electronics and robots. 
Technical co-operation extended to the 
Japanese in recent years is notable in the fields 
of chemicals, aircraft, nuclear power, public 
utilities (electricity and gas), etc. 
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3. Co-operation in third countries 
West Germany and France are major 
partners for joint construction of industrial 
plants in third countries. Main fields are steel 
mill, power plant, oil refinery and cement 
production plant. 
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Africa's role in a European security policy - Chad 
REPORT 1 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Africa's role in a European security policy- Chad 
The Assembly, 
(I) Condemning the invasion of Chad by Libyan armed forces as a threat to peace in an area which 
is of particular interest to the Western European countries~ 
(ti) Comidering that Libya is far better armed than the states of Central and West Africa as a whole: 
(iit) Considering that France's sending a military force to Chad at the request of its government and 
with the approval of a large number of African states is likely to discourage Libyan intervention: 
(tl') Considering that the respect of internationally-recognised frontiers is essential for the main-
tenance of peace on the African continent; 
( 1') Approving the measures taken by France at the request of the Government of Chad to help to 
restore peace in Chad: 
(1'!) Considering that the WEU member countries cannot disregard the maintenance of peace in 
Africa or the redeployment of a member's armed forces~ 
(l'ii) Regretting that no member invoked Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to call for rele-
vant consultations between the signatories, 
RECOMMENDS TH".T THE CouNCIL 
l. Ensure that France's partners are kept informed of the political and military measures taken as a 
result ofthe invasion of Chad by Libya: 
,., Express the solidarity of the member countries in regard to the measures taken by France in 
Chad~ 
3. Examine the possible political and military consequences of these measures~ 
4. Express its desire for the early restoration of unity. integrity and peace in Chad. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Muller, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In December 1979, your Rapporteur was 
asked to present a report on Africa's role in a 
European security policy. This report was 
adopted by the committee but referred back to it 
on 20th June 1979 since the Assembly could not 
adopt the recommendation for lack of a 
quorum. On 17th October 1979. the General 
Affairs Committee agreed not to ask for this 
report to be included in the already particularly 
full agenda ofthe December 1979 session but, on 
5th December 1979. it confirmed your Rappor-
teur's appointment. His report has not yet been 
included in the agenda of any subsequent ses-
sion. However, on 21st September 1983. the 
Presidential Committee instructed the General 
Affairs Committee to submit a text on Chad at 
the December 1983 session and Mr. Michel. 
Chairman of the committee, considered that pre-
paration of the corresponding report came 
within the terms of reference given to your 
Rapporteur on 5th December 1979. 
2. Chad was certainly not one of your Rap-
porteur's main concerns in 1979 and the present 
document is quite different from the draft report 
referred back to committee in June 1979. How-
ever. the reason why the General Affairs Com-
mittee has not asked for that report to be 
reincluded in the agenda of a session in the last 
four years is that during that period other 
regions of the world have moved into the lime-
light. while Africa remained calm, although only 
relatively. At least, Europe's security did not 
seem threatened by events in that part of the 
world. 
3. In summer 1983. however. the invasion of 
northern Chad by forces rebelling against the 
government in office, backed by armed forces 
from a foreign power. Libya. jeopardised the 
maintenance of balance and stability in Africa. 
A European power. France. to which the 
Government of Chad had appealed for assis-
tance. sent a strong force to that country. an 
action which was inevitably of interest to 
France's European allies. This is the reason for 
the Presidential Committee's decis10n to ask the 
General Affairs Committee to present a report 
on Chad at the December 1983 session. 
II. Chad 
4. Chad is a vast territoty between latitudes 
r and 24° north with an area of more than I 
million sq. km., i.e. twice the size of France. the 
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largest country in Western Europe. More than 
three-quarters of the country is Saharan desert. 
while the remaining quarter in the south and 
south-east has a more humid tropical climate 
and is more fertile round the water courses. 
Nature has not been very generous to Chad: it 
has few mineral resources and its agriculture is 
confined to a few oases in the north and the 
south-eastern part of the country. It now has 
more than 4 million inhabitants but they are far 
from homogeneous. The north of the country 
is dominated by white nomads. with black popu-
lations descended from former slaves in the rare 
oases. The population in this area is very 
sparse and has never shown much respect for the 
state or for the law it would impose. In the 
south. on the contrary. there is a sedentary. rela-
tively concentrated black population with far 
more peaceful traditions. 
5. As in all areas in the southern Sahara. the 
nomads have constantly tried to dominate the 
sedentary population and to set up vast and 
always short-lived empires. France colonised 
Chad in the last decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Colonisation was mainly military and 
administrative and provided protection for the 
work of catholic missionaries who converted a 
large part of the black population in the south. 
while Islam spread throughout the nomads in 
the north of the country. No Europeans settled 
there and means of communication remained 
rudimentary throughout this vast territory. 
6. However. Chad occupies a particularly 
important geographical position since it links 
Moslem North Africa with Equatorial Africa and 
West -\frica with Sudan. It is this position 
more than the country's natural resources that 
has made it a state in international relations and 
which. together with the lack of unity. explains 
the turbulent historv of Chad since it became 
independent. · 
7. The limits of the present report do not 
allow your Rapporteur to go into the intricacies 
of this history: he will merely recall the principal 
stages smce independence was proclaimed on 
11th -\ugust 1960. Mr. Francois Tombalbaye. 
from the south, was then elected President of the 
Republic. The new state made a peaceful start 
and, at the request of the National Assemblv of 
Chad. the French force stationed in the cou~trv 
was withdrawn in April 1964. · 
8. In November 1965. trouble began 111 the 
north of the country. accompanied by the crea-
tion of a Chad National Liberation Front in 
Sudan. Recalled in 1968 by President Tombal-
baye to fight the rebellion in the north, French 
forces stayed there until June 1971, while Libya 
afforded Frolinat growing military assistance. 
In 1973, Libya occupied a fringe of Chad terri-
tory along its frontier, more than a hundred kilo-
metres wide. the Aozou Strip. to which it laid 
claim. Was its aim to take control of possible 
uranium resources? It is not certain: it must be 
borne in mind that Saharan frontiers have little 
meaning geographically and that nomad tribes 
cross them in every direction. uncontrolled by 
the frontier states. 
9. After the assassination of President Tom-
balba) e on 13th April 197 5. the army placed 
General Malloum in charge and in 1977 he again 
called for French logistic support in putting 
down the rebellion. He failed and. on 31st 
August 1978. had to call on one of the leaders of 
the Toubou rebellion. Mr. Hissene Habre. to 
become his Prime Minister. 
I 0. This agreement lasted only a few months 
and in February 1979 hostilities broke out bet-
ween the head of state and the Prime Mimster. 
It wa<> solved only through the intervention of 
neighbouring African countries which. under the 
agreement signed in Kano (Nigeria) on 23rd 
March 1979. obtained the resignation of General 
Malloum and of Mr. Hissene Habre. A transi-
tional national union government. grouping the 
eleven tendencies in Chad and presided over by 
the leader of Frolinat. Mr. Goukouni Oueddei. 
took charge of the country's destiny. But in 
March 1980. Mr. Hissene Habre again stirred up 
the north of the countrv. Libva came to the 
help of the government ~md its ·forces occupied 
N'Djamena from December 1980 to November 
1981. The government also had the support of 
the Organisation of African Unity. and a contin-
gent from Za1re. the first unit of an mtra-African 
force. took over from the Libyan army in N'Dja-
mena. It did not prevent Mr. Hissene Habre 
retaking the capital on 7th June 1982 and Mr. 
Goukouni Ouedde1 took refuge in Cameroon. 
Just when the Organisation of African Unity. at 
its nmeteenth summit meeting in Addis Ababa 
on 9th June 1983. recognised Mr. Hissene 
Habrc's government. a revolt broke out again in 
the north in the name of the transitional natio-
nal union government under Mr. Goukouni 
Oueddei. with the participation of land and air 
forces supplied by Libya. On 24th June, the 
insurgents took the principal oasis in the north. 
Faya-Largeau, lost it on 30th July and took it 
back on 1Oth August. Mr. Hissene Habre. with 
the support ofthe OAU. then appealed to France 
which. after sending defence equipment. began 
on lOth August to send forces. in principle inten-
ded to train the Chad army. At the end of 
August. a French force of about 2.500 men and 
some ten combat aircraft were deployed m 
Chad. to the rear of the operational zone. and at 
the time of writing the troops have not yet inter-
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vened directly in the fighting. In fact. the fight-
ing has calmed down somewhat since the begin-
ning of September. apart from the failure of a 
transitional national union government offen-
sive beyond Faya-Largeau. not far from the 
Sudanese frontier at Oum Chalouba on about 
15th September and limited operations by 
government forces to the north of that locality. 
11. The indications are that positions have 
now become stabilised and unless something 
unforeseen happens it will be a long time before 
they change. The security line. known as the 
red line. to the south of which the French forces 
are deployed. could be crossed only with diffi-
culty b) transitional national union government 
forces because this would take them beyond the 
range of action of the combat aircraft deployed 
on Libyan territory and they would thus be 
deprived of reliable air support. The govern-
ment forces for their part. thanks to the presence 
of French aircraft. have air superiority only up 
to that line. 
12. Thus. in September 1983. there was a de 
facto partition of Chad between two powers. one 
in the north. with Libyan support. the other in 
the south. armed by France. assisted directly by 
forces from Za~re and indirectly by the presence 
of some 2.500 French troops intended to deter a 
further offensive from the north rather than to 
wage battle. However. if this situation were to 
last. Libya would be able to repair and re-equip 
the landing strips it is occupying in northern 
Chad and consequently move closer to the red 
line and shift it further south. 
13. The ten aircraft which France is deploying 
in N'Djamena might then be no match for 
Libva's 550 modern combat aircraft. even if 
thc(r crews do not seem to be backed up by ade-
quate ground facilities and the Libyan air force 
consequently is far less to be feared than the 
number of its aircraft might indicate. 
Ill. African aspects 
14. It is difficult to discern clear-cut political 
differences between Mr. Hissene Habre and Mr. 
Goukouni Oueddei. Both derive most of their 
support from the north and north-east of the 
country and the people in the south seem 
favourablv inclined towards whichever one is 
installed ·m the capital. It is obviously not 
because of their respective merits that the OAU 
and France have taken an interest in the conflict. 
15. On the other hand the intervention of 
Libvan forces is of serious concern to many Afri-
can· states. In the first place. Libya. although 
sparsely populated with a population of little 
more than 3 million. is militarily one of the 
most powerful African countries. Much of its 
oil income has been spent on building up extre-
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mely well equipped armed forces. They num-
ber only 65.000 men. of which 55.000 in the 
army. but they have about 3.000 modern tanks 
of Soviet origin and 550 combat aircraft of 
French or Soviet origin. The technical ability 
of its troops may be doubtful but many merce-
naries have been recruited who may be very well 
trained. It is admittedly unlikely that it has the 
means to maintain. service and repair its equip-
ment. but it is difficult to assess just how much 
is usable immediatelv. Even with half this 
equipment Libya would easily outclass the forces 
of most African countries. 
16. In the second place. the strict Islamism of 
Colonel Kadhafi. Libya's head of state. makes 
him a charismatic leader in the Moslem world 
and the hero of the more revolutionary sections 
of Islam. Islam is the dominant religion 
throughout northern and western Africa and the 
leaders of the African states fear that the estab-
lishment of Libyan forces at the heart of the 
continent mav cause serious trouble in their 
countries. Libya is known to be supplying arms 
and monev to Frolinat in Chad. to the Sarahouis 
revolting ~gainst Morocco in the former Rio de 
Oro and to many subversive movements in 
Africa. Although it may be wondered how far it 
is encouraged and assisted by the Soviet Union. 
there is no clear answer to this. 
I 7. Thirdly. the de facto annexation of the 
Aozou strip. then the occupation of N'Djamena 
in 1981 followed by halfthe territory of Chad in 
1983 indicate that Libya is pursuing an expan-
sionist policy aimed at modifying the colonial 
frontiers to its own advantage. However debat-
able these frontiers may be. the Organisation of 
African Unity decided from the very outset to 
keep them and defend them because all African 
states know that to question them would upset 
the balance and peace throughout the African 
continent for many years. 
18. These are probably the reasons why the 
OAU has always recognised and supported 
whatever government was in office in N'Dja-
mena. Its support has been expressed on the 
one hand by twice sending forces from Zaire to 
confront the Libyan invader and on the other by 
several African countries such as Cameroon. 
Gabon and Senegal appealing to France to main-
tain military units on their territory and. if 
necessary. to use their territory as a base to send 
assistance to Chad. 
19. It would certainly be desirable for the 
OAU itself to ensure peace and order on the 
African continent since any European interven-
tion may revive accusations of neo-colonialism. 
However. most African countries do not have 
enough armed forces to be able to take part in 
such operations. These countries have been 
wise enough to devote most of their efforts to 
trying to solve difficult economic and soCial 
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problems and. although they are often among 
the poorest countries in the world. they are also 
among those which spend the smallest propor-
tion of their GNP on defence. For instance. 
most of them have no modern combat aircraft. 
the largest. Nigeria and Zaire. having 30 and 
17 respectively. None of them is capable of 
standing up to Libyan power. Even combined. 
they would not be able to do so. 
20. This is obviously a reason why man) 
former French colonies which became indepen-
dent in 1960 concluded treaties of alliance with 
France. which thus continued to contribute to 
their security. Chad concluded a new agree-
ment with France in 1976 providing for the 
assistance of French forces in training the Chad 
army. French personnel would have Chad mili-
tarv status. but the Government of Chad could 
not have them take part in war operations or the 
maintenance of order. This agreement also 
implied that the Government of Chad. respons-
ible for the logistic support of its units. benefited 
for this purpose from supplies of French equip-
ment '' on a paying or. exceptionally. non-paying 
basis ". Strictly speaking. it was not therefore 
an alliance but a co-operation agreement which 
left France free to decide on the type of military 
assistance it should give Chad or whether it 
should intervene on its behalf. 
21. However. once a power such as Libya 
intervened militarilv in Chad at the side of the 
rebels. France had to take account of the reac-
tions of the member countries of the OAU 
because to let Libya gain a foothold in Chad 
would endanger the security of many of its Afri-
can allies. 
,..,,.., The way the French intervention was 
conducted was emphasised subsequently with 
great care by President Mitterrand in an inter-
view published in Le Afondc on 26th August 
1983. First. France had waited for an appeal 
from the government in N'Djamena and the 
OAU before sending forces to Chad. Second. 
these forces. of which there are less than 3.000. 
have not yet taken part in any fighting but are 
deployed so that the attackers would quickly run 
up against them if they pursued their advance on 
Chad territory. In other words. they play a 
deterrent rather than an active role and Presi-
dent Mitterrand let it be clearly understood that 
they would take no part in winning back the 
north of the countrv. Thirdlv. France has 
shown that it would ·not folio~ up American 
suggestions to pursue the operation further and 
take advantage of the Chad problem to put an 
end to Colonel Kadhafi's regime in Libya. 
Finally. France has tried to bring the two Chad 
factions to the negotiating table and has sounded 
the Libyan Government with a view to restoring 
peace. It cannot be said that it has yet achieved 
its objecti vcs. 
23. It is not for your Rapporteur to express an 
opinion on the appropriateness of the strategy 
adopted. Some observers have held that an ear-
lier and more determined operation might have 
inflicted a fatal blow on Libya. Others, such as 
Mr. Hissene Habre. stress that France. by caus-
ing the red line to be formed. made too many 
concessions to Libya by preparing for a partition 
of Chad which would quickly become perma-
nent. Others. on the contrarv. fear that France 
mav have become involved i"n another African 
vei{ture from which it will be difficult to extn-
cate itself and it will not have any real chance of 
bringing about a valid agreement between the 
two sides in Chad or between itself and Libya. 
2.f. This is criticism of the military aspects of 
the French intervention and not of its political 
aspects which nevertheless seem the more 
important. Insofar as the French Government 
took all the precautions which have just been 
recalled. its intentions cannot be suspected of 
ambiguity and Mr. Hissene Habre's protests 
have 5hown that it has not placed itself at his 
service. It now has to succeed in restonng 
peace and unity in Chad before Libya acquires 
air superiority in the area. 
IV. Europe, France and Chad 
25. France's European allies are not parties to 
its African alliances. They have never tried to 
be and do not have the means. No one has 
asked them. Moreover. the French Govern-
ment seems hardly to have informed them and 
certainly did not consult them. 
211. However, for several reasons this matter is 
not of no concern to them. 
27. (i) France. which also has forces in other 
African or Oceaman territories as well as in 
Lebanon. had to withdraw forces if not from the 
central front at least from mainland Europe in 
order to send them to Chad. There are not very 
man) of them but they are professional troops 
and in fact a significant part of the French army 
has been removed from the European theatre. 
This obviously concerns the countries which 
ensure the joint security of Western Europe side 
by side with France. 
28. Information published by the French 
authorities shows that there are just under 
15.000 French troops actually deployed over-
seas. In view of the need to rotate troops thus 
deployed. it may be deduced that all these 
commitments correspond to about the limit of 
French availabilities. which are about 20.000 
men. and this level can hardly be raised since the 
French Government cannot use conscripts for 
operations abroad without a vote in parliament. 
apart from volunteers, and such troops require 
considerable professional support. 
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29. These considerations may have played a 
major role in the French Government's decision 
to set up a special force of 45.000 men part!) 
drawn from French forces in Germany for 
deployment depending on requirements on the 
mainland of Europe. i.e. mainly in the Federal 
Republic. or overseas. This decision clearl) 
shows the close link between the defence of 
Europe and France's use of forces overseas. 
The same is true for the United Kingdom and 
for the rapid deployment force being built up by 
the United States which would also. if necessary. 
call on forces deployed on the European 
continent. 
30. (ti) Article VII of the modified Brussels 
Treat) stipulates that '"The high contracting 
parties declare. each so far as he is concerned. 
that none of the international engagements now 
in force between him and any other of the high 
contracting parties or any third state is in 
conflict with the provisions of the present 
treaty". which obviously implies that member 
states should not subsequently enter into any 
engagement contrary to the treaty provisions 
and also that member states are entitled. in the 
framework of the WEU CounciL to put forward 
any objections they may have to one or other 
treat:- signed by one of them. As far as your 
Rapporteur knows. no member country has ever 
objected to the treaties concluded between 
France and African states. Thev cannot there-
fore criticise France for fulfilli~g its commit-
ments and. to a certain extent. without being 
committed to join France, they owe it diploma-
tic support as for the United Kingdom during its 
war with Argentina in 1982. particularly as 
Libva's actions constitute a far more serious 
thr~at for Europe than the attack on an archipel-
ago in the Atlantic by a South American state. 
31. (iti) However cautious the French Govern-
ment may have been in deploying its forces in 
Chad and however concerned it mav be to 
achieve a negotiated settlement. the danger of 
the conflict worsening and spreading remains. 
The differences of views between France and the 
United States in August which led the United 
States to withdraw the observation aircraft it had 
sent to Africa to gather information about the 
militarv situation in Chad show that the Atlantic 
Allianc-e may feel the back-lash of such differen-
ces. It is of course normal that the decisions 
should be taken by the country whose forces are 
involved and none of its allies should dictate the 
military and political conduct it should adopt. 
To saY the least, Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty implies consultations which do 
not yet appear to have been held any more than 
they were in 1982 during the Anglo-Argentine 
conflict. 
32. (ir) However this may be. France's partners 
in the European Community are involved in a 
form of African policy because of the develop-
DOCUMENT 957 
ment of economic co-operation between the EEC 
and a large number of developing countries, 
many of which are African, under the Lome 
agreements, the second renewal of which is now 
being negotiated. Although this co-operation is 
purely economic. its aim is not only to ensure 
outlets and satisfactory prices for the products of 
signatory developing countries, including Chad. 
but also to help to maintain peace within these 
countries and at international level. The two 
aims are closely linked and the Community 
could not and should not afford direct or indi-
rect assistance to countries which would use it to 
disturb the peace. In fact, the small amount 
spent by most African states on their defence is a 
success for Community policy in economic co-
operation. But this means that the EEC must 
not disregard the security of the co-operating 
countries. 
33. (1') Insofar as the Soviet Union pursues a 
policy of destabilisation in Africa and affords 
assistance. advice and armaments to Libya, the 
situation in Chad cannot be isolated from the 
overall international balance and the members 
of WEU have to take account of the very serious 
disturbances and effects on the balance which 
might result from Chad being occupied by 
Libya. 
34. ( l'i) Libya's actions have several times 
endangered international peace and the internal 
order of states in various areas close to Europe 
in which the WEU countries have major inte-
rests. They cannot therefore remain indifferent 
to an operation designed to halt the dangerous 
agitation fostered by Libya. 
35. For all these reasons, the French operation 
in Chad cannot leave France's European allies 
indifferent and they must, in the most appro-
priate framework, including that of WEU for 
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everything relating to Europe's security, examine 
together the developments in Chad. the nature 
and consequences of the deployment of French 
forces in Chad and measures to be taken jointly 
should the situation deteriorate. 
V. Conclusions 
36. A very large majority of the General 
Affairs Committee expressed its approval of the 
presence of French forces in Africa and the 
assignment of a large contingent to Chad. Your 
Rapporteur has tried to analyse the reasons as 
objectively as possible and to point to the conse-
quences for Europe's security by showing that all 
questions raised by the crisis in Chad and b) 
France's participation in the search for a solu-
tion acceptable to the people of that country, to 
the African states and to the West concern 
France's WEU partners to a high degree. In 
this matter, they can offer France their sympa-
thy. understanding and diplomatic support. 
3 7. To respond to this concern at the present 
time, the French Government should keep its 
allies informed and they should exchange views 
m application of Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. In the longer term, the increas-
ing number of challenges to international peace 
outside Europe has led France, the United King-
dom and the United States to envisage or even 
begin redeploying their armed forces. This 
forces the allies to reassess the implications of 
the new dcployments and your Rapporteur is 
not convinced that the national authorities of 
certain countries gave their allies enough infor-
mation about the decisions they took nor has 
there been a joint study of thcu implications for 
the overall system of western alliances to which 
WEU belongs. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on economic relations with the Sm•iet Union 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that for several decades the development of the Soviet economy has given priority to 
the armaments effort and that in many sectors these armaments now exceed those of the countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Considering that Soviet military power is being developed at the expense of the standard of living 
of the population and that it is helping to keep several countries in a state of dependence; 
(iii) Hoping that the opening or continuation of various international negotiations on the limitation 
of armaments will allow the Soviet Union to apply new guidelines for its economic development; 
(iv) Regretting that the members of the Atlantic Alliance have not managed to define a common code 
of conduct for their trade with the eastern countries or to apply sufficiently-concerted economic 
sanctions in response to instances of Soviet abuse of military power; 
(v) Noting that the shooting down by Soviet military aircraft of a South Korean civil aircraft 
together with its crew and passengers on 1st September 1983 is an unacceptable violation of inter-
national law; 
(vi) Considering the allegations that forced labour was used for the construction of the Siberian gas 
pipeline to Western Europe, 
RECOMMENDS THA.T THE COUNCIL 
1. Promote consultations between all democratic countries with a view to working out jointly the 
limits they would accept to ensure that their trade with the eastern countries does not help those 
countries to accumulate armaments and inter alia: 
(a) to ban all exports of advanced technology which might be used for armaments purposes; 
(b) to avoid long-term contracts making western signatories economically dependent on eastern 
countries; 
(c) to avoid undue promotion of Soviet resources at the expense of those of the West or the third 
world; 
(d) to avoid granting over-favourable credit terms to the eastern countries and not to tolerate 
their incurring too great a burden of debts; 
(e) to refuse the principle of countertrade; 
2. Adapt these principles acc~rdingly in the light of results obtained in international negotiations on 
the limitation of armaments; 
3. Urge the preparation, in the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, of new 
international air navigation regulations to make a repetition of an incident such as occurred on 
1st September 1983 impossible; 
4. Investigate and report on all evidence of forced labour used on the Siberian gas pipeline. 
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Explanatory Afemorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. When your Rapporteur suggested that the 
General Affairs Committee should prepare a 
report on various aspects concerning trading 
relations between the western alliance and the 
Soviet bloc. he particularly had in mind the 
crisis which the alliance faced a year ago when 
the United States attempted to apply sanctions 
on western firms which were supplying techno-
logy for the Siberian gas pipeline. 
2. This action by President Reagan, although 
he did not make it particularly clear at the time. 
was an indirect retaliatory measure against the 
Kremlin for the imposition of martial law and 
the suspension - later the outlawing - of 
Solidarity in Poland. 
3. Also concerning the United States at the 
time was the generous use of western credit to 
defaulting Comecon countries. the unhealthy 
influence which the Soviet Union would have on 
those European countries which had contracted 
for Siberian gas, and the use of"slave labour" on 
the pipeline. 
4. At the same time. President Reagan 
avoided damage to his own political base and to 
American farmers by refusing to apply a grain 
embargo which President Carter had done in 
retaliation for the Soviet occupation of Afghan-
istan. Subsequently the United States has 
signed a new five-year contract for the sale of 
American grain to the Soviet Union and the 
European Community continues to make up for 
Soviet food deficiencies in other areas. And in 
July this year West Germany granted a massive 
new loan to East Germany negotiated by no less 
than Mr. Franz-JosefStrauss. 
5. All this could be said to represent a crisis 
of confidence within the alliance and in parti-
cular wide differences of opinion on the use of 
trade as a weapon in diplomacy. That such 
differences remain to be solved has been shown 
most recently by western reaction to the 
shooting down of the Korean B-747. 
6. Clearly for a so-called alliance to be 
meaningful beyond its. hopefully never-to-be-
tested, raison d'etre of mutual defence and for its 
specialist activities such as Cocom to be effec-
tive. there is today a pressing and crucial need to 
arrive at a convergence of philosophy on the part 
of its members on the need to meet the Soviet 
threat. 
7. Without the evidence of a greater con-
sensus and unity of purpose and action by all 
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members of the alliance. the Kremlin will know 
that it can continue to risk imposing its might on 
Poland, Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
8. Beyond these recent events there exists a 
wider and more historic background to this 
report. The years of Ostpolztik in the sixties, of 
detente in the seventies which led to the 
Helsinki final act in 1975 encouraged a new 
climate of peaceful coexistence ("the Kissinger 
years") during which East-West trade increased, 
encouraged and subsidised by generous western 
credit. western technology was transferred to 
the Soviet Union by fair means and foul, and 
the western alliance allowed itself to be lulled 
into a sense of false security whilst the Kremlin 
maintained its own relentless aim - set by 
Khrushchev following the Cuban crisis - to 
secure superiority in arms. 
9. It was in 1978 that the West woke up to 
these realities, when the Helsinki review confer-
ence in Belgrade showed that the Soviet 
Union had no intention of implementing the 
final act. when NATO decided to modernise its 
defences and when the Kremlin made its 
decision to invade Afghanistan and to reactivate 
the world peace movement in an attempt to 
undermine anticipated western retaliation and 
rearmament. 
10. It is your Rapporteur's hope that the 
report will draw some lessons from these events 
and will contribute to policies which will avoid 
such damaging crises occurring within the 
western alliance again. 
11. Economic relations and western security 
11. The latest edition of " Soviet Military 
Power··. produced by the Pentagon. gives a 
picture of Soviet military efforts during the 
period 1974-83. This picture is largely confir-
med by the comparison given on pages 132 
and 133 of the London International Institute 
for Strategic Studies' publication "The Military 
Balance 1982-83 " between the means available 
to NATO and to the Warsaw Pact. The balance 
is shown to be strongly in favour of the Soviet 
Union in almost all areas except the navy. and 
particularly in conventional armaments. 
12. According to the Pentagon, the Soviet 
Union has built three times as many tanks as the 
United States in the last decade, twice as many 
tactical combat aircraft, six times as many inter-
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continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and about 
sixteen times as many nuclear submarines. 
This growth of Soviet military power far exceeds 
the requirements of a policy which is purely 
defensive. The Soviet Union has built far more 
ICBMs than it could need for retaliation, and its 
arsenal of these weapons exceeds that of the 
Americans as was already admitted in the SALT 
I agreements. It has acquired a missile replace-
ment capability not available to the United 
States. It has also considerably increased the 
accuracy of its missiles with the assistance of 
technology largely imported from the United 
States. It is now able to destroy a high percen-
tage of American surface-based missiles in a first 
strike. 
13. The Warsaw Pact conventional forces, 
which were for long considered inferior to those 
of the West in mobility and other technical 
aspects, are being modernised, trained and 
equipped for rapid deployment outside their 
own frontiers and sometimes over considerable 
distances. Through negotiations or other 
means these countries have signed many secu-
rity and co-operation agreements with Afri-
can, Latin American, Middle East and East 
Asian countries. They have obtained bases, 
overflying rights and the right to set up naval 
bases and they are distributing arms to the third 
world on a massive scale, in fact twice the 
quantities supplied by the United States between 
1977 and 1981. The effects can be seen inter 
alia in the present war in Lebanon where the 
power of artillery and armoured vehicles 
supplied by the Soviet Union to Syria have 
played a major role in intensifying and interna-
tionalising the hostilities. 
14. Faced with these facts it is clear that 
economic problems cannot be handled in 
complete isolation from security problems. 
15. East-West economic relations were estab-
lished and developed at a time when there was 
a balance of forces which might have been 
expected to remain relatively stable. As a 
result, they facilitated massive rearmament by 
the Soviet Union which in the last ten years has 
significantly changed the strategic and conven-
tional military balance in its favour. Now as in 
the past the development of such relations 
involves a potential danger for our security. 
16. To what extent does the expansion of 
East-West relations in trade, technology transfer, 
investment and credit help to develop and 
strengthen the Soviet Union's strategic infra-
structure or to build up its military poten-
tial? Again, does it bring economic advantages 
for the West? What is the probability of 
technology acquired in the West directly pro-
moting the Soviet military potential ? When 
western technical know-how acquired for peace-
ful purposes filters into the defence sector, 
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to what extent does this make a significant 
contribution to the development of Soviet mili-
tary power ? What risks are involved in 
exploiting Siberian gas and distributing it in 
Western Europe ? Are there alternatives for 
guaranteeing Europe the energy resources it 
needs? Is it not true that the credits granted to 
the Soviet· Union and acceptance of the principle 
of compensatory trade constitute a premium for 
Soviet military power? 
17. Admittedly, as several committee mem-
bers have rightly underlined, the development of 
trade is in itself a positive factor in several 
respects. It helps to consolidate peace and gives 
substance to a policy of detente in international 
relations which would amount to little if it were 
based only on declarations of intention and good 
will. It also plays a sometimes decisive role in 
each of the partners' economies. which is of 
particular importance at a time when the 
western countries are desperately trying to break 
out of an economic recession which has lasted 
for almost ten years. Moreover, it is to be 
hoped that if the Eastern European countries 
agreed to open their frontiers wider and develop 
trade with the West this might encourage their 
societies to move towards greater freedom in all 
areas. 
18. However, trade should not be developed 
no matter what the cost lest the drawbacks 
outweigh the advantages, particularly if it merely 
helped to strengthen Soviet military power or 
Soviet domination over its satellites. 
19. Since the 194 7 split which affected both 
economic and political East-West relations, the 
points of view of the eastern countries, Western 
Europe and the United States about economic 
relations between the two blocs have changed 
and one of the aims of the present report is to 
ascertain on what bases it would be possible to 
work out a common doctrine for the whole 
western world in these matters. So far the 
Atlantic Alliance has not managed to define a 
valid strategy for its members' economic rela-
tions with the eastern countries. It has only just 
managed to draw up a list of so-called strategic 
products which its members agreed not to 
deliver to the Soviet Union and its allies. But 
many countries now query certain items on this 
list and it is not clear to which countries the ban 
should apply, as instanced by the West's trade 
with the People's Republic of China. 
20. However, nothing positive can be gained 
from a clash between Europe and the United 
States on this question. Public opinion must 
not be given the impression, because of unila-
teral initiatives, that there are serious differences 
among the members of the alliance in this 
connection. In view of the Soviet threat, it has 
been necessary for a long time, and now more 
than ever, to strengthen allied solidarity by 
defining conditions for grantmg credit to the 
Soviet Union and its associates, by improving 
the system for controlling exports of high 
technology products and by re-examining the 
allies' energy requirements and how to meet 
them without accepting compensatory trade. It 
is similarly necessary to make an overall redefi-
nition of the principles which should underly 
economic relations between all the western 
countries and the East. The fact that in the 
next few months East-West economic relations 
will be on the agenda of various bodies (NATO, 
OECD, Cocom) shows how highly topical this 
question is. 
Ill. Detente and East- West trade 
I. The economic rift between East and West 
21. The formation of the Kominform and 
certain striking events such as the Prague coup 
in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade a few 
months later were considered by the western 
countries to be definite proof that the Soviet 
Union was pursuing an expansionist policy. The 
West reacted by forming the Atlantic Alliance 
which opened a gaping political rift between East 
and West. 
22. The West's economic retaliation to Soviet 
political and military expansionism was the 
adoption by the United States in February 1949 
of the Export Control Act and the creation in 
November of the same year of a committee for 
co-ordinating trade between East and West 
(Cocom). The aim was to prevent the export of 
products which might help to strengthen the 
military potential of the eastern bloc countries. 
23. But in fact the economic division of the 
world can be traced back to the Soviet Union's 
refusal to join the International Monetary Fund, 
set up in July 1944 at the Bretton Woods confer-
ence. It was confirmed in 1948 when the 
Soviet Union refused to join, or to authorise its 
allies to join, the Marshall Plan and the Organis-
ation for European Economic Co-operation 
whose task was to allocate American credits. 
The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE). set up in March 194 7 to establish 
and promote East-West economic co-operation, 
had no means of averting this division. 
24. The creation of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), also called 
Comecon, in January 1949 marked the official 
adoption by the Soviet Union of a policy 
intended to make it economically independent 
of the West by setting up an economic bloc of 
eastern countries. A planning system similar to 
the Soviet system was set up in the CMEA. 
25. In all these countries the state has a 
monopoly of all internal or external transactions 
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and western firms wishing to negotiate with 
eastern firms have to go through the body which 
has the monopoly of external trade, which allows 
the latter to derive the maximum advan-
tage from competition between western firms. 
26. Only later did some eastern countries 
begin to join a few international economic 
organisations. Although Czechoslovakia was a 
founder member of GATT in 1947, Poland 
became a member only at the beginning of 1967, 
followed by Romania and Hungary in 1971 and 
1973 respectively. Bulgaria has had observer 
status since 1967. The Soviet Union and the 
German Democratic Republic have not joined 
GATT and show little interest in doing so. The 
eastern countries' economies were in fact based 
on state management of firms, which brought 
about a discriminatory situation with regard to 
foreign firms and made it difficult if not 
impossible to apply the principles on which 
GATT was based. The fact that some of these 
countries nevertheless joined GATT was a sign 
that they wished to improve economic relations 
with the West and adapt their trade structure 
accordingly. 
2. Recourse by eastern countries to external trade 
27. The CMEA was a response to the 
Marshall Plan which was accused of jeopardising 
the sovereignty and interests of the Soviet Union 
and of the countries of Europe. Its aim was to 
establish wider economic co-operation between 
the peoples' democracies and the Soviet Union. 
Soviet political and economic pressure res-
tricted the Eastern European countries to deve-
loping their trade relations among themselves 
and with the Soviet Union. This restruc-
turing of trade imposed on the Eastern European 
countries by the Soviet Union did not have the 
same effects on trade relations with the West for 
the Soviet Union as for the Eastern European 
countries. While in 1946 the European socialist 
countries already absorbed 55% of Soviet trade 
as a whole, two years later their share had 
reached 60%. At the same time these countries 
to varying degrees lost their former markets in 
the West : all in all, their exports to the West fell 
by 78% between 1950 and 1953 whereas Soviet 
exports to the West increased by 91% during the 
same period. Similarly, Eastern European 
imports of machinery and capital equipment 
from the West fell by 34% whereas the Soviet 
Union's imports increased by 23%. In relation 
to total trade by CMEA countries, trade with the 
West fell from 42% in 1948 to 14% in 1953. 
28. However, from 1953 onwards the CMEA's 
closed trade policy was increasingly contested in 
member countries. Before 1960 Polish and, a 
little later, Czechoslovak economists challenged 
the theory of certain aspects of the controlled 
economic system. This led to a reappraisal in 
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most eastern countries of the pros and cons of 
trade with the West. External trade began to be 
considered as an economic means of alleviating 
the slowing down in growth rates which was then 
being felt. 
29. At the same time and for similar reasons 
the Western European countries began to react 
very favourably to the prospect of new markets 
and adopted a more flexible attitude than the 
United States towards trade with the eastern 
countries. 
3. The growth of East- West trade 
30. East-West trade, still slight in terms of 
world trade, representing about 3% since 1973, 
increased significantly after 1960, while the 
increase in trade between CMEA countries 
during the period 1961-65 was the lowest in 
recent times: 55% compared with 71% for 
1956-60and85%for 1951-55. 
31. As from 1965, East-West trade picked 
up speed, particularly between 1972 and 1975. 
The reality or fiction of detente offered both 
West and East a political context for economic 
rapprochement 1• 
32. Unlike the eastern countries, which seem 
to have always given priority to economic consi-
derations in their efforts to develop trade with 
the West. the West pursued, and continues to 
pursue, objectives which were not the same at all 
times and in all cases. Western Europe has 
always been guided by its desire to have access 
to eastern markets. It therefore sought to 
establish closer trading links with the eastern 
countries while political considerations were 
relegated to second place. The case of the 
United States is a little different. Admittedly, 
economic interests and promises of trade profits 
were factors which led trading and industrial 
firms to intensify trade with the East. How-
ever, for the United States Government political 
considerations, over and above economic consi-
derations, were an essential, or even the main, 
reason for tightening trade relations with the 
East and particularly with the Soviet Union. It 
may even be considered that encouraging trade 
was often felt to be a card in negotiations whose 
final aim was to attain political goals such as 
slowing the arms race or improving the atmos-
phere of detente. 
4. The policy of detente: its significance and failure 
33. On the American side, detente was essen-
tially viewed as a means of slowing down the 
nuclear arms race. At political level, American 
leaders saw it as a means of turning the 
communist world in certain directions. The 
I. Cf. Table I. 
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detente objective gave the United States means 
of pressure with which it hoped to tie down the 
Soviet Union through trade and technology and 
multiply the disadvantages ensuing from any 
attempt to break the links of detente. That is 
why one of the major aims of the policy of 
East-West detente as conceived by the United 
States Government under the presidencies of 
Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ford was rapid expansion 
of trade relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European 
countries. It was thus hoped to induce the 
Soviet Union to put a brake on its policy of mili-
tary intervention in order to obtain imports of 
products such as wheat and also the technology 
it needed to ensure the country's internal deve-
lopment. Trade, and above all technology 
transfers, seemed appropriate means of encou-
raging moderation. 
34. The basic assumption of the policy of 
detente was that even if the expansion of 
economic relations involving a massive transfer 
of American technology to the Soviet Union 
presented new and potentially dangerous 
dimensions American diplomacy could never-
theless derive some gain. The process of 
integrating the Soviet economy, planned by the 
central authorities, into a world-scale market 
economy would, it was believed, set in motion 
irreversible forces leading to no less irreversible 
changes which would, in turn, promote the 
interdependence of nations and international 
stability. 
35. Massive rearmament by the Soviet Union 
and the proof it has given that it is pursuing a 
policy of expansion and domination by every 
means leave no doubt about its application of 
the western technology it has acquired nor about 
its conversion to true international interde-
pendence. 
36. That is why relations with the Soviet 
Union and the eastern bloc, whether viewed 
from the standpoint of trade or of military impli-
cations, have considerable disadvantages for the 
West without affording any advantages other 
than those which may be derived from the 
transaction itself. There must be no illusion 
about the possibilities of achieving any signi-
ficant change in Soviet policy, at least in the 
short and medium term. 
IV. Economic implications of East- West trade 
1. General economic developments 
37. Looking back, western economies had one 
of their most difficult years since the second 
world war in 1981-82. The second oil shock in 
1979-80 contributed to what was in effect a 
recession in most industrialised countries with a 
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TABLE I 
Trend of trade between Comecon countries and the OECD 
E:-.ports 1 Imports 1 
Comecon countnes 
1970 1979 1980 1981 1970 1979 1980 1981 
(in '000 million transferable roubles) c 
Bulgaria .................... 0.26 0.93 1.15 1.13 0.32 0.88 1.10 1.50 
Czechoslovakia 3 •••••••••••• 0.70 1. 79 2.21 2.18 0.82 2.30 2.53 2.40 
GDR ...................... 0.90 2.34 2.96 3.94 1.17 3.74 4.13 4.18 
Poland ..................... 0.91 3.53 4.04 2.96 0.84 4.56 4.51 3.30 
Romania ................... 0.54 2.49 3.03 2.70 0.70 2.64 2.78 2.32 
Hungary . 0. 0 ••••••••••••• 0. 0.59 1.72 1.99 1.89 0.67 2.18 2.43 2.64 
Comecon (six-power) ........ 3.90 12.80 15.39 14.80 4.52 16.28 17.48 16.34 
Soviet Union ............... 2.21 12.80 16.19 17.57 2.57 13.34 15.83 18.24 
Total Comecon (seven-power) 6.11 25.60 31.58 32.37 7.09 29.62 33.31 34.58 
Annual growth rate(%) 
Bulgaria .................... + 10.1 + 76.6 + 23.7 - 1.7 + 38.0 + 10.5 + 25.0 + 36.4 
Czechoslovakia ............. + 9.4 + 20.9 + 23.5 - 1.5 + 26.0 + 15.4 + 10.0 - 5.2 
GDR ...................... + 7.8 + 19.8 + 27.0 + 32.7 + 32.1 + 34.7 + 11.0 + 1.1 
Poland ..................... + 19.2 + 12.2 + 14.5 -26.4 + 4.2 - 1.0 - 1.0 -27.0 
Romania ................... + 20.2 + 33.7 + 21.7 - 10.9 + 5.1 + 10.9 + 5.3 - 16.6 
Hungary •••••••••••••••• 0 •• + 22.5 + 30.0 + 15.7 - 4.8 + 42.2 + 1.0 + 11.5 + 8.7 
Comecon (six-power) ........ + 20.8 + 24.4 + 20.2 - 3.8 + 19.0 + 10.8 + 7.4 - 6.5 
Soviet Union ............... + 4.7 + 45.6 + 26.5 + 8.5 + 11.5 + 18.7 + 18.5 + 15.2 
Total Comecon (seven-power) + 14.4 + 34.2 + 23.4 + 2.5 + 16.2 + 14.3 + 12.4 + 3.8 
Share of trade with OECD 
(Total exports or imports= 100) 
Bulgaria .................... 14.2 15.8 16.8 14.9 19.1 15.5 17.2 19.9 
Czechoslovakia ............. 20.4 20.4 22.0 19.8 24.9 24.3 24.8 22.2 
GDR ...................... 22.1 20.8 24.2 29.1 26.7 31.0 30.7 29.1 
Poland ..................... 28.4 31.2 34.6 29.5 25.9 37.3 34.4 28.2 
Romania ................... 32.3 38.1 37.5 30.0 40.4 36.1 31.4 28.3 
Hungary ••••••• 0. 0 ••• 0 0. 0 0 0 28.4 24.2 25.0 21.2 29.6 28.3 29.3 29.2 
Comecon (six-power) ........ 24.0 25.2 27.1 26.0 27.2 29.9 29.0 26.5 
Soviet Union ............... 19.1 30.2 32.6 30.8 24.3 35.2 35.6 34.7 
Total Comecon (seven-power) 22.0 27.5 29.7 27.5 26.1 32.1 31.8 30.2 
For 1981, provisiOnal figures. 
I. FOB value. For Hungary: CAF Imports. ClassificatiOn by buying country and sellmg country except for the Soviet 
Umon and Hungary as from 1975: country of ongin and country of destmation. 
2. The transferable rouble IS a monetary umt common to the Comecon states: m 1970. it was equal to$ 1.11. in 1975 $ 1.39. in 
1978 $ 1.47. m 1979 and 1980 $ 1.53 and m 1981 $ 1.39. 
3. In this case, trade with so-called capitalist mdustnalised countnes (forming a smgle category). 
Source. Comecon external trade statistics. 
consequential fall in the gross national product, 
continued high inflation. a dramatic rise in 
unemployment. enormous balance-of-payments 
deficits and a fall in demand and investment. 
All the economic indicators show a very 
depressed economic situation, which has consi-
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derably reduced governments' margins of 
manoeuvre in their policies for mamtaining 
social benefits and in their search for appropriate 
means of relaunching the economy, stabilising 
prices. ensuring employment and stimulating a 
resumption of investment. 
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38. The Soviet Union and its Eastern Euro-
pean allies also have serious economic diffi-
culties as instanced by the virtual collapse of the 
Polish economy, the economic and financial 
crisis in Romania and both countries' inability 
to pay their debts. In all the eastern countries 
too growth rates have fallen sharply. The price 
system governing trade in the CMEA is not 
operating effectively and a number of eastern 
countries are having great difficulty in obtaining 
the raw materials they need. Balance-of-
payments deficits and the smaller countries' 
debts to the Soviet Union and to the West 
have increased dramatically. Thus, there are 
three CMEA countries among the thirteen coun-
tries with the highest external debts: Poland, 
with $27,000 million, the Soviet Union 
with $17,000 million and Romania with 
$10,000 million. 
2. Trade 
39. On average, trade with the East represents 
only a relatively small proportion of the total 
volume of trade by OECD countries. Hence it 
is not likely to play a decisive role in improving 
the general economic situation although in 
certain cases economic considerations may 
encourage the establishment of closer trade 
relations with the East. For commercial firms 
co-operation may offer promise of profits. 
From the standpoint of national policies co-
operation may seem desirable for various 
reasons : some countries, such as Canada, view 
co-operation as a means of diversifying their 
external trade. For Japan, co-operation is a 
means of ensuring its supplies of raw materials 
and oil products. Like the Western European 
countries. it began long before the United States 
to call for a more liberal policy towards trade 
with the East. 
40. The slogan " if we don't do it, someone 
else will " therefore met a favourable response in 
American Government circles. Little conside-
ration seems to have been given to the possibi-
lity that, thanks to trade, the eastern countries 
and particularly the Soviet Union might become 
competitors. 
41. Nevertheless, fear of competition has 
become particularly strong recently among firms 
specialising in chemical products and plastics. 
Regarding competition in durable consumer 
goods or industrial raw materials, it is generally 
felt among heads of firms that the Soviet Union 
might soon be able to use manufacturing techno-
logy imported in recent years. 
42. The Soviet Union's ability to reproduce 
imported technology is in fact feared by western 
industrialists, as is its ability to set up after-sales 
service networks in industrialised countries. 
Finally, certain heads of industry also fear Soviet 
competition on third world markets for the 
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products of slow growth technologies and also 
advanced-technology items. 
43. Your Rapporteur believes trade with the 
Soviet Union or between East and West have 
only a slight effect on the growth of western 
economies and the idea that they can but benefit 
from the development of trade with the East is 
merely a sign of impatience in some quarters to 
reduce western balance-of-payments deficits 
quickly by relying, sometimes naively, on the 
existence of vast new markets. Markets might 
well prove far narrower than expected. Diffi-
culties in concluding business might be more 
serious and conditions of payment often doubt-
ful. 
44. Advocates of a more flexible trade policy 
towards the CMEA countries believe on the 
contrary in the prospect of a favourable trend of 
employment through increased trade with the 
East. In any event, any benefits derived would 
be quite minor. In the United States, workers' 
unions have asserted that liberalisation of trade, 
opening the door to an increase in America's 
imports. would lead to large-scale dismissals and 
a sharp fall in production, which is probably 
highly exaggerated. 
3. Economic consequences of East- West trade 
45. There is at present keen discussion about 
whether closer East-West economic relations: 
(i) will or will not make the eastern countries 
more dependent on the West and in the end lead 
to a readjustment of the Soviet Union's econo-
mic priorities; (ii) will or will not change 
the basic characteristics of the eastern countries' 
societies and regimes. 
46. Every aspect of the economic and political 
behaviour of the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
European countries shows that their aim is to 
rely purely on themselves. The Soviet Union 
and all the other CMEA countries are and will 
probably remain determined to retain their 
freedom of action and to avoid all economic and 
technical dependence. The commercial or poli-
tical price which the West may hope to set in 
exchange for its technology is not very high and 
the vision of a closely-interdependent inter-
national economic entity consisting of indus-
trially-advanced states is very remote from the 
actual situation arising from the trend of trade 
relations with the eastern countries : the latter 
are still firmly attached to the CMEA both 
because of Soviet requirements and because, in 
the short and medium term, they have only very 
limited means of reorganising their economies in 
order to try to expand their trade with the 
West. Moreover, following their bitter expe-
rience of fluctuating prices and supplies on the 
world market since 1973 they appreciate more 
than ever the advantages of the stability afforded 
by the trade agreements concluded in the 
framework of the CMEA. The fact that the East 
has only occasionally asked the western coun-
tries for special conditions very probably indi-
cates that the Soviet Union's aim in its 
economic relations with the West is to obtain 
economic advantages rather than consider 
detente as an end in itself. Soviet leaders seem 
very firmly attached to the idea of their 
country's economic independence. and their 
industrial policy explicitly excludes economic 
integration with the West. Soviet and other 
eastern authorities have on several occasions 
declared that the principle of intra-industrial 
specialisation implied that trade between coun-
tries can develop without requiring substan-
tial changes in the partners' internal production 
structure. 
47. The East's support for the notion of 
international division of work is also subject to 
reservations : economic and social systems are 
intrinsically different ; consequently, a common 
socio-economic base cannot be created even if 
significant progress can be made in sharing 
work. 
48. Moreover, the fragility of East-West rela-
tions, which have always been directly affected 
by political events. may justify some degree of 
scepticism as to the possibility in the long 
term of establishing a stable relationship of 
interdependence. Furthermore, since an 
increase in Soviet imports of western products in 
the long term means an increase in Soviet 
exports to the West. the insufficiency of Soviet 
export capacity has always kept the level of trade 
between the socialist countries and the West 
within narrow limits. 
49. Certain American businessmen consider 
that the co-operation agreements concluded 
between private American firms and the state 
commission for science and technology are used 
by the Soviet Union as a means of importing 
technology while limiting the impact of external 
contacts on the internal system. Thus, it has 
been seen that Soviet research institutes are now 
being watched more closely by their governing 
bodies. For the Soviet authorities, it is a matter 
of maintaining the continuity of science's subor-
dination to the political system and the party's 
control of research workers and technicians. 
Hence the East considers the development of 
economic and technical relations with the West 
as an alternative to economic reforms which it is 
considered would involve too many political 
drawbacks and dangers and. in any event, it is a 
means of improving the growth rate. 
4. Soviet economic priorities 
50. Until now, the Soviet authorities have 
given almost total priority to pursuing a conti-
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nuous. general and massive armaments effort 
and the economy, designed to back this up, has 
done its best to provide the material and 
technical basis needed for this effort whose scale 
seems to have met with hardly any opposition in 
government circles or. of course, in military 
circles. Everything indicates that there is very 
wide agreement on this priority. Consumers. 
i.e. also the workers, have obviously had to pay 
the price of this option, but although certain 
signs of discontent have sometimes been 
discerned there is no reason to think that this 
will soon lead to social or economic disturbances 
or, a fortiori, to a social upheaval. 
51. For about twenty years Soviet statisticians 
have given only a minimum of information on 
the structure of national expenditure. Never-
theless, Soviet plans are an excellent instrument 
for analysing Soviet economic intentions thanks 
to the figures they give. Those given in the 
eleventh five-year plan (1981-85) show, although 
not absolutely explicitly. that options have been 
taken in favour of the armaments industry sector 
about which the plan says very little. But one 
interesting part of the eleventh plan is the abrupt 
slow-down in the development of gross invest-
ment expenditure ; its average annual growth 
rate is expected to be about 2.1 %. In view of 
the Soviet Union's need to modernise its equip-
ment. particularly through replacements, net 
investment will certainly increase even more 
slowly than gross investment. Yet the expected 
progression of national income is higher : 
3.4%. A comparison of these two indicators 
shows that the proportion of GNP earmarked 
for investment will have to fall very sharply. 
52. If one tries to draw up a list of heads likely 
to benefit from the resources diverted from 
investment. consumer goods of course have to 
be considered first. Admittedly, this category is 
not sacrificed in the eleventh plan since the 
party cannot openly neglect consumers in view 
of its concern for economic security. As in any 
other country. everyday life concerns the popu-
lation directly and in the long run determines 
their attitude towards the government. It was 
probably for this reason that Leonid Brezhnev 
proposed increasing the share of this category in 
net national expenditure from 75.3% in 1980 to 
77.3% in 1985. At first sight, such an increase 
offers an acceptable explanation for falling 
investment. However, Soviet commentators 
on the eleventh plan have indicated that the 
combined share of consumer and non-
productive investment in 1985 will remain 
similar to the present figure. i.e. slightly more 
than 80%. 
53. This is therefore a very considerable slow-
down in non-productive investment. Never-
theless, it affects productive programmes even 
more. Which sector therefore is to benefit from 
the drop in investment as a whole and where 
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will increased consumption come from in the 
eleventh plan ? 
54. The most plausible answer to this twofold 
question would be found in the assumption that 
priority was to be given to developing arma-
ments industries. i.e. by admitting that the 
true priority in the eleventh plan was to be given 
to the development of armaments industries to 
the detriment of equipment industries. even if 
this conversion were used to offer the consumer 
more spin-off from this armaments policy. 
55. State reserves, mainly represented by the 
procurement of military equipment, are the real 
beneficiary of the eleventh five-year plan and the 
development of industries able to bring in 
income for the state is probably also an expla-
nation for the leaders' views on consumption. 
This is quite clear from an examination of the 
indicators given in the plan for the industrial 
sectors and their output. For consumer goods. 
the highest growth rates are proposed for 
industries producing for defence. 
56. The probability of an increase in the 
armaments effort is confirmed by a few facts 
relating to the Soviet economic system and to 
the way the eleventh plan is balanced. 
57. (a) In view of the structure of the system 
of production, appropriations may be trans-
ferred most easily between the heads for 
investment and armaments. 
58. (b) The systematic CIA analysis of Soviet 
military expenditure draws attention to the 
rigidity of its growth. Hence difficulties in 
economic growth can have only a marginal effect 
on the implementation of military programmes. 
It is not therefore necessary for Soviet military 
expenditure to increase very quickly to under-
stand the options of the eleventh plan. It is 
sufficient to note that they stem from the wish to 
maintain steady progress in the military effort as 
compared with general economic growth which 
is now too low to be able to keep pace. 
59. (c) The increase in armaments expen-
diture and the reduction in investments can be 
explained by the official Soviet assessment ofthe 
international situation - of which the party 
makes no secret - as a basis of its economic 
policy. This assessment implies a stabilisation 
of economic relations and a cooling of political 
relations with the West. The reduction in 
purchases of equipment from the West explains 
the slow-down in net investment, very depen-
dent in the last twenty years on imports of 
western equipment. The cooling of political 
relations with the West also forces the Soviet 
Union to make a further armaments effort for 
which the way is clear because of the reduction 
in the rate of investment. The apparent role of 
the military in running the country makes such a 
theory even more plausible. 
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60. Examination of certain internal adjust-
ments to the draft plan clearly shows the leading 
role given to the armaments industnes. At the 
same plenum in October 1980, when he referred 
to the participation of armaments industries in 
consumption, Leonid Brezhnev explicitly asked 
these industries' research and development 
services to join in the production of civil 
equipment to improve their technological capa-
bilitie~. Moreover. the same may be said 
for the industrialisation goals set for the various 
Soviet republics. 
61. Frequent references by leaders to the 
positive spin-off for the Soviet civilian popu-
lation of armaments production are probably 
intended to reassure the Soviet people in view of 
the fearful handicap this priority constitutes for 
a growth potential which is already very limited 
by an unfavourable demographic situation, a 
major increase m the cost of raw materials and 
stagnating productivity. 
62. This inflation of armaments expenditure 
can but make a large hole in Soviet investment 
capacity and thus even further limit the possi-
bilities of expansion of other economic sectors. 
If therefore it should be confirmed and continue 
for very long. one might wonder whether it 
might not eventually slow down the expansion 
of the military sector too. But this remark 
probably does not apply in the short and 
medium term. In any event. in view of the 
importance of investment for the country's 
industrial future the planned rate of investment 
will probably not allow Soviet firms to achieve 
any great increase in national production. 
63. With the eleventh plan, the planned 
progression of employment becomes very low in 
the Soviet Union. Admittedly, the planners set 
very high goals for the progress of labour 
productivity but it seems unlikely that they will 
be reached. The draft plan notes that society 
can share only what has been produced and asks 
the people to make a further productivity effort, 
even if the type of consumption imposed on 
them is unlikely to be strong encouragement. 
Only official propaganda plays such a role. In 
reality workers are asked to compensate for the 
low level of investment by their eagerness to 
work in the ultimate hope of thus improving 
their standard ofliving. 
64. In fact, for a country which has reached 
the level of industrial development of the Soviet 
Union, capital formation is the only major 
factor of its growth. A slow-down in this 
formation in the Soviet Union is not a new 
tendency. It was already very clear during the 
tenth plan. Nevertheless. everything indicates 
that the Soviet economy has a difficult period 
ahead after a decade of reduced investment. and 
once again the sectors directly linked with 
consumption may have to bear the brunt of 
inadequate investment. This means that unless 
there is a radical change in economic policy in 
the coming years rationing will have to be 
extended to ever wider sectors of consumption, 
thus seriously compromising the whole material 
basis of Soviet strength. 
65. It can therefore now be predicted that 
when the twelfth ( 1986-90) plan starts the Soviet 
Union may have a crisis on its hands: first, an 
exhausted economy, a discontented population 
and an international environment probably no 
more amenable than today ; second, power 
decimated by age, bureaucracies fighting over 
the meagre surpluses of collective resources and 
an over-blown military apparatus. 
66. This is not necessarily a reassuring picture 
for the West. Rather than admit itself beaten in 
the armaments race, the Soviet Union might be 
induced to accept the risk of war before its 
economy becomes asphyxiated. The alterna-
tive would be to conclude meaningful agree-
ments with the United States on the limita-
tion of armaments and particularly nuclear 
armaments. It is clear that Soviet initiatives in 
the disarmament field depend on both internal 
and international considerations although to 
what extent it is difficult to say. This means, 
on the one hand, that the West can count on the 
Soviet Union wishing to achieve some degree of 
success in the Geneva negotiations and, on the 
other. that if the negotiations do not succeed 
nothing could avert the threat of ill-considered 
decisions being taken by the Soviets with all the 
inherent dangers for world peace. It should be 
added that uncertainty about the devolution of 
power in the Soviet Union is not reassuring, 
although it may encourage the Soviet leaders to 
pay more attention to the wishes of consumers. 
V. Technology transfers 
1. Their share of East- West trade 
67. External trade seems to be playing a larger 
part in the Soviet economy, particularly if 
account is taken of the value of imported 
products in terms of Soviet currency. The 
proportion of imports in the net national 
product rose from 8.3% in 1960 to about 17% 
in 1980, while the corresponding percentage for 
exports rose from 3. 7% to 7.1 %. With parti-
cular regard to investment, the proportion of 
imported equipment is believed to be about 
25%, of which 5% to 6% for machinery. 
68. In order to assess the amount of transfers, 
it is essential to specify what we mean by 
technology transfer. It is a process by which 
inventions, whether new products or new 
technologies, the work of one country are trans-
mitted to another for use there. It consists 
131 
DOCUMENT 958 
essentially of transm1ttmg know-how, which 
implies an active role by both exporter and 
importer. The share of advanced technology in 
total exports from the fifteen most industrialised 
nations to the eastern countries did not vary 
much between 1972 and 1977. Five groups of 
products alone accounted for some 70% of the 
value of technology exports by these countries to 
the countries of Eastern Europe in 1976 and 
1977 : machine tools for metal-working, pumps 
and turbines, electric machinery and apparatus, 
taps, cocks and fittings, and electric measuring 
and control apparatus. 
69. But at the same time the Soviet Union 
and the peoples' democracies are increasingly 
becoming exporters of capital equipment, parti-
cularly towards underdeveloped countries, 
whose imports of machinery and transport 
equipment from the eastern countries are 
comparable to those from the OECD coun-
tries. The Soviet Union even supplies a higher 
percentage of machinery whereas in trade with 
the OECD countries the quantity of machinery 
imported by the Soviet Union is particularly 
high. 
70. So far. technology transfers have been 
almost entirely from the advanced western 
countries, i.e. the OECD countries, to the eastern 
countries. The level of imports from the 
eastern countries has not been constant and at 
times there has been wariness of the possible 
effects of dependence on imports of technology 
from countries against which the Soviet Union is 
waging an ideological war. However, there has 
always been a strong demand for western 
technology in the East because the Soviet Union 
has always considered it essential for its own 
economic development. 
71. Paradoxically, it was when transfers were 
on the decline that the invasion of Afghanistan 
and the establishment of martial law in Poland 
led the West to impose limits, noting that they 
had made a significant contribution to moder-
nising Soviet military strength by their sales of 
advanced technology. Transfers slowed down 
from 1975 onwards, particularly for machinery, 
whereas the share of food products in the West's 
exports to the Soviet Union and its allies increa-
sed. Weighed down by debts and affected by 
the world crisis which slowed down their 
exports, the eastern countries had to limit their 
imports under the eleventh Soviet five-year plan 
although they had been considered crucial in 
1971. 
2. Industrial co-operation 
72. Little is generally known about the 
number and content of agreements signed 
between western firms and their Eastern Euro-
pean partners because they are veiled in 
secrecy on both sides. But available infor-
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mation indicates that industrial co-operation is 
coj1centrated m the so-called advanced 
industries. 
73. The most widespread form of industrial 
co-operation is specialisation by the partners 
with a view to eo-production. In 1978, the 
proportion of this form of co-operation 
amounted to 45.2% of total East-West co-
operation agreements and to 57.4% in the 
case of agreements with the Soviet Union. 
74. In second place come deliveries of facto-
ries. Their share fell between 1976 and 1978 
and amounted to only 17.4% of the total in 1978 
for the seven CMEA countries. 71.4% of 
deliveries were to the GDR, 27.2% to the Soviet 
Union and 24.1% to Poland. 
75. The share of contracts for the transfer of 
licences in exchange for products manufactured 
in factories with the assistance of equipment and 
licences amounted to 28.2% in 1972, 17.1% in 
1976 and 6.1% in 1978 for the seven CMEA 
countries. But it must be borne in mind that a 
large part of licence transfers is effected in the 
framework of major contracts for the delivery of 
factories or eo-production projects and is not 
shown separately in statistics. Consequently, 
such transfers certainly represent a much higher 
proportion than the figures appear to indicate in 
technology transfers to the eastern countries. 
76. Other forms of East-West industrial co-
operation play only a secondary role. However. 
the recent increase in tripartite co-operation 
agreements associating at least one western 
country, one eastern country and one third 
world country should be pointed out. 
3. Military implications and controls 
77. Western experts who do not believe the 
Soviet military potential has been enhanced 
significantly by Soviet access to western techno-
logy base their opinion on a number of 
hypotheses which all count on the inefficiency of 
Soviet management : 
(1) that the separation between firms 
working in the civil sector and those 
working for defence in the Soviet 
Union prevents the latter using the 
know-how of the former ; 
(1i) that the independence and above all 
the technological progress of military 
production is such that it does not 
have to call on technology acquired 
for civil purposes ; 
(iii) that Soviet bureaucracy is incapable 
of developing the country's innova-
tive capability and is consequently. 
by its own weight, paralysing any 
attempt to catch up with the West. 
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78. The validity of these hypotheses is very 
doubtful. After the world strategic and military 
balance tipped in favour of the Soviet Union in 
about 1970 there can no longer be any doubt 
about the use the latter has made of western 
technology. Faced with this evidence, it is no 
longer possible to deny that anything which 
delays Soviet production capability helps to 
ensure the West's security. Moreover. the 
distance between the technological level of the 
eastern countries and that of the western 
countries has shrunk considerably in the last 
decade. The first conclusion from these obser-
vations is that the transfer of technology 
becomes significant as soon as there are fewer 
sales of equipment and more of technology. 
The second is that it is essentiaL in order to 
protect the western advance, to exercise strict 
control over exports of technology. 
79. But to achieve this result a number of 
obstacles must first be overcome. The first of 
these is probably the difficulty of finding 
common ground when national interests. as 
understood by governments. clash with firms' 
specific interests. But the main obstacle stems 
from disagreement about what is meant by 
" strategic potential " or " maintaining the mili-
tary balance ''. Such disagreement has weighed 
heavily on efforts to define a concept of strategic 
items in practical terms to serve as a basis for a 
system of controls of exports to the eastern 
countries. It comes clearly to the fore when 
lists of such items are drawn up or periodically 
reviewed. 
80. In 1 949 Cocom was an economic response 
to the Soviet threat: it is an informal inter-
governmental body. Without legal status. it 
exists only insofar as the partners of the United 
States accept regulations which the United States 
imposes on itself. Participants co-ordinate their 
efforts to avoid exporting to the Soviet Union 
and its allies weapons and other irreplaceable 
military equipment as well as products and 
technology which might increase their military 
power. Cocom includes all the NATO coun-
tries except Iceland, plus Japan. The perma-
nent team works in Paris and is assisted 
by officials of the embassies of participating 
countries in Paris. It holds frequent meetings 
to study the problems raised by the inter-
pretation of the lists of items whose export to 
communist countries is banned by Cocom and 
by any exceptions which may be made. All 
decisions relating to the preparation of these 
lists, their interpretation and the exceptions have 
to be taken unanimously and consequently any 
country may exercise its right of veto. Cocom 
has no executive powers. It is therefore the 
responsibility of each member country to apply 
its decisions. No high-level meeting was held 
before that of ministers' deputies in Paris on 
19th and 20th January 1982. At the beginning 
of October 1982, representatives of member 
countries began to revise Cocom lists to adapt 
them to new technology. In Paris in April 1983 
a high-level meeting dealt in particular with the 
need to limit exports of technology relating to oil 
and natural gas. 
81. Cocom lists cover three fields: 
(a) nuclear material: 
(b) munitions; 
(c) industrial and commercial items. 
82. Whereas goods covered by the first two 
lists are defined relatively clearly for their 
military and strategic implications and conse-
quently the technology subject to embargo, the 
third category includes all items which may have 
a dual use concerning which western policies for 
transferring technology have had different 
approaches in the past. It is well known that 
opinions differ between the United States and 
Western Europe about what constitutes a stra-
tegic item. Until the adoption of the United 
States Export Administration Act in 1969 the 
United States maintained that the word strategic 
applied to items of great economic importance 
whereas the Western European countries would 
not agree to the inclusion in these lists of certain 
products if based only on an intention to slow 
down the economic growth of the communist 
countries. Many Western European leaders felt 
the Americans attached too much importance to 
the control of exports of products liable to be 
used for military purposes and they considered 
trade was a justification in itself, in purely 
economic terms. Further, they persisted in 
including China among the communist countries 
concerned by the Cocom lists, whereas the 
European members of the alliance wished it to 
be excluded. 
83. From the Soviet point of view there are 
enormous advantages in exploiting the West's 
advanced technology: considerable savings, a 
gain of several years' research, avoidance of trial 
and error, guaranteed reliability and knowledge 
of the weak points of industries and products. 
84. Moreover, the list of technology for 
military use purchased in the West is very long. 
It includes high-speed computers used for the 
design of weapons systems, signal processing, 
data command, control and storage, processes 
for producing semi-conductors allowing the 
Soviet Union to produce more reliable and more 
accurate weapons, guidance technology for air-
craft ships, submarines and missiles, and 
equipment allowing Soviet military industries to 
be improved, be it high-precision machine tools 
or technology for industrial processes. 
85. The fact that the Soviet Union manages to 
ilcquire such products bears witness to the 
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weaknesses of the western control system and 
shows that in spite of the lists and in spite of the 
embargoes the Soviet Union can in one way or 
another obtain anything it needs. Cocom 
controls have not prevented products of consi-
derable strategic importance being exported 
legally to the Soviet Union. 
86. The United States Government is now 
calling for a stricter limit on supplies of 
advanced technology to the eastern bloc. It is 
insisting that Cocom strengthen its control of 
technology transfers in the form of licences, 
plans and technical information so as to 
complete existing controls of the sale of end 
items. This raises the question of whether the 
time is not ripe to work out a true western 
economic strategy and whether the existing 
institutions can pave the way. It is not merely 
a matter of making the lists and controls more 
effective but above all of defining a western 
policy for economic and technical relations with 
the Soviet Union and its allies. 
87. Finally, as one committee member 
pointed out a sufficiently-precise limit for 
products considered to be usable in armaments 
industries should be fixed so that the European 
members of the alliance are not, as has been the 
case in recent years, given the feeling that the 
lists of products whose export to the Soviet 
Union and its allies is banned do not vary 
according to the ups and downs of the American 
economy. This view seems to have been widely 
shared by committee members. 
88. This does not mean that committee 
members considered practising a restrictive 
policy towards exports to the Soviet Union by 
the European members of the alliance alone. 
Such an attitude would be pointless and lead to 
its own downfalL but there should be more logic 
in American policy, which certain committee 
members considered had been especially illogical 
recently. Thus, to quote an example given by 
one committee member, the question of how far 
satellites are connected with military technology 
brings Europeans, who have no military satel-
lites, into conflict with the United States 
which uses them for military purposes, as does 
the Soviet Union. 
VI. Energy 
89. The prominence assumed by energy prob-
lems in the world economy since 1973 has 
perforce made them of particular importance to 
the Soviet Government and to western leaders. 
A matter such as the invasion of Afghanistan 
in December 1979 is closely linked with Soviet 
energy policy, just as Europe's energy supplies 
are a question on which the western allies differ 
most. A brief analysis of the main points 
should therefore be made. 
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I. Afghanistan 
90. The present absence of satisfactory statis-
tics conceals from foreign observers most of the 
transformations now under way in the Afghan 
economy and prevents an assessment being 
made of the consequences of the war in that 
country. It is possible to discern awkward 
attempts to assist a poor, backward country. 
CMEA 's interest in Afghanistan is strategic 
rather than for its potential economic resources 
or the possibilities of trade. 
91. Nevertheless, it seems that the expression 
" plundering the natural resources of the third 
world countries ", frequently used by Soviet 
analysts, cannot be applied only to those they 
call the western imperialists. 
92. The Soviet Union is by far the country 
with the world's largest natural gas reserves: 
35% approximately according to the latest data. 
However, since 1967 it has been exploiting gas 
in Afghanistan after having prospected for pro-
ductive fields, in the framework of assistance to 
poor countries. 
93. The first gasfield, believed to contain 
reserves of 15.000 to 20,000 million cu.m., 
came into service in 1967 near Shibirgan. at 
Y etimdagh. Output rose rapidly. attaining 
342 million cu.m. in 1967-68 and steadily rising 
to 2.583 million cu.m. in 1970-71. It marked 
time from 1970 to 1979 but research has given it 
new vigour since 1980. 
94. From the outset. this gas was exported to 
the Soviet Union. Work was started on a gas 
pipeline in 1967 to carry the gas to Kelift on the 
frontier and then on to Bukhara. But it was not 
until 1975 that 55 million cu.m., i.e. 1.98% of 
that year's production, was used in Afghanistan 
itself to run the Mazar i Sharif thermal power 
station, also built with Soviet assistance. There 
were successive plans for building a chemical 
fertiliser factory, also at Mazar i Sharif. which 
would have consumed on the spot 200 million 
cu.m. per year. There is no proof of its coming 
into service nor even of its existence. 
95. Two facts confirm that the exploitation of 
Afghan gasfields was intended to repay the 
Soviet Union for its efforts to develop Afghan-
istan, whether on a civil or on a military basis: 
(i) Gas output has been continuously 
increasing since 1971. A new deposit 
came on stream in 1971 at Jarkuduq 
and as from 1974 produced 
2,000 million cu.m. each year. Up 
to the end of 1979, annual production 
was about 2,500 million cu.m. and 
Soviet geologists have prospected 
methodically for new deposits. In 
1980, the Afghan state announced that 
output would rise to 3,500 million 
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cu.m. per year. The 1981 Soviet-
Afghan agreements then provided for 
exports to the Soviet Union to 
increase to 5,000 million cu.m. per 
year. 
(ii) In 1980, the Mazar i Sharif thermal 
power station was transformed to run 
on coal. This coal, mined in Afghan-
istan itself, is not worth exporting 
and there is no other market for it in 
the country. No factories run on gas 
in Afghanistan. 
96. One can understand a country agreeing to 
mortgage one of its natural resources completely 
in order to ensure its economic "take-off", but 
in the present case, although the mortgage is 
reaL since the 120,000 million cu.m. known 
reserves, extracted at the rate of 5,000 million 
per year, will last only twenty-four years, the 
take-off is uncertain, whereas compared with the 
Soviet output of 385.000 million cu.m. of gas 
Afghanistan produces very little. 
97. To understand the Soviet Union's interest 
in the exploitation of Afghan gas, it is therefore 
necessary to go beyond the simple matter of 
repaying expenses in that country. A compa-
rison between the trend of Afghan and Soviet gas 
prices and of world rates is instructive, particu-
larly if it is borne in mind that the Soviet Union 
sells a large part of its gas to western countries. 
98. The table of gas prices throughout the 
world shows clearly the Soviet Union's interest 
in increasing Afghan output as much as possible. 
Soviet gas, the most expensive on the market, 
is paid for by the West in foreign currency at 
$180 per 1,000 cu.m. whereas Afghanistan is 
paid nothing for its gas because it is deducted 
from its debts and is, moreover, calculated at 
half the price of Soviet gas. Western currency 
may therefore be indirectly financing the Soviet 
army and its war effort in Afghanistan. In such 
conditions. one may wonder about the feeling 
expressed by certain committee members that 
helping the Soviet Union to exploit its resources 
is a contribution to peace. 
2. Gas agreements 
99. More than half the energy consumed in 
Europe is imported although the degree of 
dependence on imports varies considerably from 
one country to another. Belgium and Luxem-
bourg import more than 93% of their energy 
requirements, France 92%, Italy 83%, the 
Federal Republic 60%, the United Kingdom 
17% and the Netherlands 8%. 
100. Oil represented 51% of Europe's energy 
consumption in 1981 compared with 61% in 
1973. This led to a fall in imports due to 
the economic crisis, energy-saving measures, 
increased national output the exploitation of 
North Sea oil and recourse to other sources of 
energy. Since 1973, while the price of oil 
rose twelvefold the western countries' consump-
tion fell by about l 0% and the principal 
European oil companies are seriously thinking of 
reducing their refinery capacity. One may now 
wonder whether, after the oil decade, the world 
is preparing to enter a decade in which gas will 
be an essential energy stake for the old world. 
Demand for gas for domestic. commercial and 
industrial use has increased very rapidly since 
1973. At a time when energy consumers and 
governments were trying to limit their oil 
requirements. it was hoped that large-scale gas 
projects could reduce dependence on oil and 
strengthen energy security. The development 
of new techniques for laying pipelines and of 
complex transport and distribution systems 
encouraged gas consumption. 
l 0 l. Thus the Soviet project for building a gas 
pipeline linking the principal gasfields of the 
northern Soviet Union with Western Europe 
interested several European countries. which 
were prepared to help to build this pipeline 
which should come into service in 1986 and. for 
at least twenty-five years. provide Europe with 
large quantities of gas. 
102. There is every indication that in present 
circumstances the conclusion of such contracts 
involves high risks for the western countries. 
Even though the countries which have signed 
contracts do not plan to meet more than 7% of 
their energy needs in this way. their decision 
means converting some of their industries to 
operate with this form of energy, investing large 
sums for transport and distribution and, above 
all, makes them unduly dependent on Soviet 
energy. For one reason or another, the Soviet 
Union is in a position to cut off supplies from 
one day to the next and therefore exercise 
economic and political pressure which is very 
dangerous for Atlantic cohesion. A German 
committee member said the possibility of the 
Federal Republic becoming dependent on the 
Soviet Union had been carefully examined by 
the Bundestag when the gas pipeline agreement 
was ratified but it had been concluded that in the 
long run the proportion of energy the Federal 
Republic would thus obtain would not place it at 
the mercy of Soviet blackmail. 
103. However, not only do the contracts signed 
allow the Soviet Union to acquire equipment for 
the research. exploitation and transport of 
natural gas which are the results of advanced 
technology without giving anything of substance 
in exchange but, because they provide for the 
acquisition of Soviet gas for a period of twenty-
five years. they thus provide the Soviet Union 
with currency which frees resources for military 
use. Furthermore, these investments for the 
benefit of the Soviet Union. generally granted at 
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interest rates much lower than the market rate, 
or even at the rate of devaluation of western 
currencies. make it highly unlikely that signatory 
countries would take part in any policy of econo-
mic sanctions against the Soviet Union and its 
allies and divert large sums of money from 
western domestic investments. 
104. Proof of this is the difficulty oil companies 
are having in finding the sums necessary for 
opening up the vast reserves of natural gas 
recently discovered in the North Sea in areas 
under the jurisdiction of NATO member coun-
tries such as Denmark. the Netherlands. Norway 
and the United Kingdom. 
105. Countries having signed contracts for the 
Siberian gas pipeline could have invested in 
prospecting, extracting, transporting and distri-
buting offshore natural gas. As far as is known 
at present. this gas could cover more than thirty 
years' natural gas consumption throughout 
Western Europe if the appropriate investments 
were made. 
106. The United States for its part said it was 
prepared to supply Europe with the gas it might 
need during the period 1982-85 until the 
investments made bore fruit. 
107. The Assembly already adopted a posi-
tion on this point of view when, on 2nd Decem-
ber 1982. it adopted the recommendation in 
the report submitted by Mr. Bassinet on behalf 
of the Committee on Scientific. Technological 
and Aerospace Questions on energy require-
ments and the security of Europe - Norway's 
contribution to meeting these requirements 
(Document 930). which reads: 
" One of the most useful means of 
reducing such risks would be for all the 
European countries concerned to take co-
ordinated measures, particularly the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
energy-exporting countries, which should 
agree to take part in a general network of 
intra-European gas pipelines. In this 
respect, the building of new pipelines to 
bring Norwegian gas from such new 
deposits as Sleipner and Troll to Western 
Europe should be studied ... 
... However, it assumes that the British 
and European networks will be connected 
up by means of an extension of the 
Scottish network towards the continent. " 
108. Several committee members raised the 
question of the extent to which the Siberian gas 
pipeline was being built with forced labour. 
3. Forced labour on the Siberian gas pipeline 
109. The Soviet Union has in fact often been 
accused of using cheap prisoner labour for its 
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construction, among whom are human and civil 
rights campaigners, prisoners of conscience and 
victims of religous persecution. including 
women. 
110. Should such an allegation be substan-
tiated, it would mean that Western European 
countries, including member states of WEU, 
have been guilty to being party to the exploi-
tation of forced labourers. thus violating 
Article 4 (on slavery and servitude) of the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
convention (on forced labour), and ignoring the 
Nuremberg condemnation of the use of concen-
tration camp prisoners as forced labour. 
Ill. Soviet authorities have dismissed the 
reports of slave labour on the pipeline as " filthy 
lies ", yet western journalists have persistently 
been refused permission to visit sites on the 
pipeline where the initial stages of construction 
took place. It is known that many prison 
labour camps line the routes of both the 
Urengoy and Komi Assr pipelines to Europe. 
112. As a result of a letter from the Interna-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
about such reports, the ILO sought a Soviet 
invitation to send representatives to an on-site 
inspection of construction sites. However, a 
United States State Department report to 
Congress this year says that the ILO delegation 
only inspected a 180-mile section of the project, 
mainly by helicopter. The ILO has since 
denied that such a visit took place at all. 
113. The State Department report refers to 
more than 10,000 of the forced labour work-
force being political or religious prisoners, and to 
the employment of about 11,000 Vietnamese 
" volunteers" on the project whose wages were 
reduced to pay Vietnamese debts to the Soviet 
Union. 
114. It was to attempt to substantiate the 
several reports that forced labour was used in the 
difficult and dangerous site preparation and 
other preliminary work related to the pipeline, 
and to separate fact from fiction, that the Inter-
national Society for Human Rights (ISHR), 
Frankfurt, in co-operation with the International 
Sakharov Committee, Copenhagen, held an 
international hearing in Bonn on 18th and 19th 
November last year (1982). 
115. A prestigious group of panelists presided 
over by Mr. Alfred Coste-Floret, a joint prose-
cutor for France at the Nuremberg trials, 
questioned a wide range of expert witnesses and 
analysed the testimony and documents of former 
Soviet prisoners. 
116. The Commission concluded that: 
(i) the USSR continues the deplorable 
practice of forced labour in manufac-
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turing and construction projects, 
including the Siberian gas pipeline: 
(ii) prisoners, including political prisoners 
and those imprisoned for their reli-
gious beliefs. among them women 
and children, are forced to work 
under conditions of extreme hardship, 
including malnutrition. inadequate 
shelter and clothing and severe disci-
pline. Many prisoners have died. 
117. The ISHR called upon the Soviet Union 
to end the vicious practice of forced labour and 
upon all nations and enterprises for support of 
its conclusions. It stated: ''We have presented 
the truth to the world and no one can say: I did 
not know." 
118. A brief account of the international 
hearing is provided at appendix to this report. 
119. From the foregoing, it must be obvious to 
the governments of WEU member states that to 
ignore such allegations is to turn a blind eye to 
one of the most serious crimes against humanity 
since the use of concentration camp labour in 
Nazi Germany. Hence your Rapporteur's 
recommendations. 
VII. Financial aspects 
I. Access to the western capital market 
120. The debts contracted by the CMEA 
countries are part and parcel of the eastern coun-
tries' growth policy and of the western coun-
tries' search for markets. The process however 
is disquieting for western lenders. The socialist 
countries, which owe more than $80.000 million 
to the West, including some $60,000 million for 
Eastern European countries other than the 
TABLE II 
Bank loans contracted in 1979-81 
(medium and long term) 
Borrowmg countr} 1979 1980 
Bulgaria ........ 201.8 -
Hungary ........ 950.0 550.0 
Poland ......... 861.1 736.0 
GDR ........... 656.0 397.1 
Romania ....... 280.0 457.6 
Czechoslovakia .. 450.0 475.0 
Soviet Union .... 320.0 50.0 
CMEA banks .... - -
TonL ........... 3,718.9 2,665. 7 
Suurcc OECD. 
($million) 
1981 
-
550.0 
-
497.0 
337.0 
-
25.0 
100.0 
1,509.0 
Soviet Union, are now on the high risk list of 
western creditors. 
121. Past and present restrictions in socialist 
countries on imports from the West in an 
attempt to rectify the situation are accompanied 
by more restricted access to international credit. 
particularly on the private capital market which 
has become cautious with the Polish case. 
122. According to OECD statistics (cf. 
Table Il), the CMEA had medium- and long-
term bank loans amounting to $1.500 million in 
1981 as compared with $2,660 million in 1980 
and $3,720 million in 1979. 
123. This declining trend in external loans has 
since been confirmed, particularly because of the 
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higher cost of credit in 1982. Not without 
difficulty, the OECD countries adopted a com-
promise, the arrangement on guidelines for offi-
cially supported export credits. presented by 
Mr. Wallen, Swedish Chairman of the OECD's 
Export Credits Working Party on 30th June 
1982, making variable increases in minimum 
rates for official export credits and partly 
abolishing subsidies. The Soviet Union, the 
GDR and Czechoslovakia were included among 
the wealthy countries (whose GNP exceeded 
$4,000 per head in 1979, according to the World 
Bank) for which minimum interest rates were 
increased by 1.15% in every case. For Bulgaria, 
Hungary. Poland and Romania, considered to be 
intermediary countries, the increase was 0.35% 
( cf Table III). 
TABLE Ill 
Interest rates for official credits 
November 1980 to November 1981: 
2-5 years .................................. 
5-8.5 years ................................ 
After 15th November 1981: 
2-5 years .................................. 
5-8.5 years ................................ 
For 30th June 1982 to 30th April 1983: 
2-5 years .................................. 
5-8.5 years ................................ 
Source East West (fortnightly bulletm). 9th July 1982. page 6. 
124. For the wealthy and intermediary coun-
tries no official credits will be granted for any 
period exceeding 8.5 years. 
125. This compromise does not apply to the 
financing of the Urengoy pipeline which will 
benefit from the rates in force before November 
1981. 
126. In the opinion of those who signed this 
compromise. the international political and 
financial situation is in the end as important as a 
consensus on rates and to all intents and 
purposes the OECD countries will be hardly 
inclined to depart from the agreed rates. 
127. But it might be appropriate to establish 
quotas for credits guaranteed to the Soviet 
Union even if. by reducing the gap between 
interest rates for official export credits and those 
for commercial credits. the Eastern European 
countries can no longer hope to keep the level of 
interest to be paid at its present level, by using 
mainly official credits. 
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Wealthy Intermediary Poor 
countne5 countries countnes 
(%) (%) (%) 
8.00 8.00 7.50 
8.75 8.50 7.75 
11.00 10.50 10.00 
11.25 11.00 10.00 
12.15 10.85 10.00 
12.40 11.35 10.00 
128. The hopes of the debtor countries are 
clear: they wish to develop their exports to the 
West and obtain satisfactory conditions of 
payment and further credit allowing them to 
resume their imports. 
129. Although in 1981 the Soviet Union was 
again in deficit in its exchange of services with 
the West. its balance of current payments 
remained in surplus thanks to the sale of 200 to 
250 tons of gold compared with 90 tons in 1980 
as well as to sales of arms. In spite of every-
thing, as shown by highly different estimates of 
its debt, in 1981 the Soviet Union had consider-
able financial requirements. Greater recourse 
to unguaranteed credits, short-term commercial 
credits and even publicly supported export 
credits are proof of this. Variations recorded 
by the Bank of International Settlements in 
currency reserves are further proof 
130. If it is considered that all credits. whether 
or not at privileged rates. are a premium for 
Soviet military power, as shown in the present 
DOCUMENT 958 
report, the West should stop rescheduling the 
external debt of the Soviet Union and its allies. 
allowing them to benefit from particularly 
advantageous interest rates and encouraging 
their investments by granting export credits. 
That is why your Rapporteur sincerely hopes the 
allies can achieve continuing consultation and a 
concerted position on conditions for granting 
credit to the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc 
countries. It is admittedly possible to consider 
that the pursuit and development of trade which 
is beneficial to all the partners justifies the 
granting of credits to those countries but nothing 
can explain why preferential rates, which in the 
end make the West pay for Soviet military 
expenditure, are granted or why credits are 
granted which the countries concerned cannot 
repay nor even pay the interest. The present 
situation in Poland shows that neither borrowers 
nor lenders benefit in the end from an unduly 
lax approach to such questions. 
2. Countertrade 
131. The eastern countries wish to make 
compensation - i.e. the seller buys goods of 
equal market value from the purchaser - a 
permanent factor in their trade relations with the 
West so as to avoid paying for their purchases 
in currency. This practice is increasingly wide-
spread. 
132. The often exaggerated figures quoted by 
the media in the eastern countries on the 
amount of such trade shows a tendency to have 
it assume greater importance in the future. 
Furthermore, there has recently been increased 
pressure by the eastern countries to obtain 
commercial compensation more systematically. 
At the same time, their conditions have been 
hardened. The proportion of their purchases 
for which they request and obtain promises from 
the sellers to take their products has increased 
everywhere and they have obtained higher finan-
cial penalties in the event of default. 
133. The eastern countries' interest in compen-
sation is due first to their aim of balancing their 
trade. A secondary reason is their difficulty in 
producing and marketing products which are 
competitive on the world market. 
134. The specific situation of the Soviet Union 
is a little different from that of the other eastern 
countries. Its problem is not so much how to 
finance its current purchases in the West but 
rather to be able to make large-scale investment 
in certain key sectors. It still requires consider-
able amounts of western equipment to develop 
some of its resources and to improve the produc-
tivity of its industry by making it more econo-
mical as regards labour. The Soviet Union is 
therefore more interested in signing new import 
contracts than in compensation. 
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135. The share of compensatory operations in 
East-West trade is difficult to ascertain accur-
ately. It probably represents no more than 15% 
or 20% of East-West trade as a whole in the case 
of bilateral relations where the practice of 
compensation is the most widespread. In all 
other cases, the figure is over 10%. T rans-
actions accompanied by compensation seem to 
be concentrated in trade in certain categories of 
products, for instance sales of industrial pro-
ducts, where the percentages are far higher. 
136. Whatever the figures, attention should be 
paid to the extension of these trade practices for 
two reasons. First, the upper limits of such 
practices should be examined. Second. the 
conditions governing compensatory operations 
are fixed unilaterally by the eastern countries but 
there is no agreed standard nor are they 
discussed multilaterally. 
13 7. Can the western countries therefore 
remain passive towards a trend whose pace they 
cannot control and which might in the long run 
strengthen the trade position of the eastern 
countries without adequate reciprocity? 
138. Consideration should be given to the 
unequal treatment to the East's advantage which 
these practices involve such as, for instance, the 
unbalanced negotiating ability of western firms 
compared with the position of the purchasing 
body in the East. The advantages of coun-
tertrade for western firms are very limited. It is 
mainly the eastern countries that benefit from 
this type of trade which helps them to elude 
deficiencies in their production and trade. 
Furthermore. this type of trade allows a method 
of management which satisfies their taste for 
bilateral balance at all levels, while being 
compatible with their bureaucratic structures 
and planning system. 
139. Western exporters should be more 
demanding for their own purchases. As a 
general rule. they are favourably inclined 
towards contracts for supplying equipment in 
exchange for long-term supplies of energy or 
primary products. Compensation makes it pos-
sible to avoid the impossibility of transferring 
and investing capital in eastern countries in 
order to develop useful sources of supply. 
140. This being so. industrial compensation 
agreements must be judged case by case. There 
can be no question of being systematically in 
favour of them nor of considering them as a 
model of industrial co-operation. as the eastern 
countries wish. In particular. attention should 
be paid to the kind of products imported from 
the East. The eastern countries. which wish to 
develop their exports of manufactured products, 
are anxious to conclude agreements which allow 
them to export end-products. In certain cases. 
the agreements lead to a division of work wh1ch 
makes the western industries subcontractors to 
eastern countries' industries. In other cases, 
these contracts may imply imports of large 
quantities of finished or semi-finished products, 
agreed upon several years beforehand, whereas it 
is very difficult in present circumstances to 
foresee market trends. It can therefore be seen 
that one way or another the disadvantages of the 
compensatory system largely outweigh the 
advantages. The disadvantages may affect the 
general trade interests of the OECD countries, 
the interests of exporting firms or the interests of 
the eastern countries themselves. 
141. From the point of view of the OECD 
countries. whose interest is to defend an open, 
non-discriminatory and dynamic trading system, 
the development of compensation might well 
introduce a factor of instability and regression 
into East-West trade, since East-West trade 
relations would be largely based on ill-defined. 
unnegotiable and statistically-undefinable practi-
ces, the price of counterpart products being 
fixed in the light of criteria which have no link 
with the market, thus considerably increasing 
the risk of distortion or disturbance. 
142. When buying back the products of eastern 
countries is imposed, as one might say, the 
interest of the partners in maintaining trade 
relations is not the same for all. Economically 
strong firms with diversified activities have a 
very clear advantage. Thus, the practice of 
compensation can but lead to a contraction of 
trade flows and induce western governments to 
intervene more directly in the negotiation of 
contracts. 
143. The major danger of developing compen-
sation therefore emerges: increased bilateralism 
in East-West trade, making it more like trade 
between the CMEA countries. From the point 
of view of western firms, it is particularly 
awkward to have to conduct two parallel 
negotiations, one generally relating to a matter 
outside its province. The subsequent obligation 
to conduct import and distribution operations 
diverts a firm from its main aims and may be a 
source of risk, error and expense. 
144. On a more practical level, western firms 
which accept the compensation principle 
encounter difficulties in implementing it because 
of procedure imposed by the eastern countries. 
145. (a) First, the western firm is uncertain 
about the scale of compensation which will, in 
the end, be fixed in the contract. The eastern 
countries do not publish directives which are in 
all probability imposed on the appropriate 
external trade bodies by the technical ministries. 
The amount of compensation required varies 
widely according to country and sector. It is 
always negotiable but the margin of the western 
negotiator is difficult to determine beforehand. 
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146. (b) The second uncertainty for the export-
ing firm is the nature and specifications of the 
product it will have to acquire. In the system 
set up by the eastern countries, the foreign 
purchaser is almost wholly without freedom of 
choice and contact with the source of the 
products, which would allow him to verify 
whether he finds their quality acceptable. To 
that must be added the various restrictions the 
eastern partner may impose on the resale by 
western firms of the products imported on a 
compensatory basis. These provisions illustrate 
the effort made by the Soviet Union and its 
allies to control, or at least to supervise, the 
distribution of their products in the West and 
thus recover some of the power they lose by not 
effecting the operation themselves. 
147. Western exporters might legitimately call 
for official directives to be published, regarding 
lowest rates, for instance. This would at 
least have the advantage of placing competing 
western firms on an equal footing. But assum-
ing that the eastern countries accepted, this 
operation would not be without drawbacks. 
particularly as it would legitimise the practice of 
asking almost systematically for compensation, 
and it would allow a fixed, non-negotiable rate 
to be imposed unilaterally. 
148. The above leads to the conclusion that the 
principle of countertrade should be clearly 
opposed and not only the procedure. The West 
gains nothing from such trade and is merely 
playing the game of Soviet and eastern bloc 
interests by encouraging their growth, produc-
tion and trade and, consequently, their political 
system and military strength. 
VIII. Sanctions and the South Korean Boeing 
incident 
149. At its meeting on 21st September 1983, 
the Presidential Committee of the Assembly 
discussed the problem raised by the shooting 
down of a South Korean civil aircraft by a Soviet 
fighter on 1st September. It instructed the 
President of the Assembly to issue a press 
communique immediately expressing the indig-
nation of European opinion regarding this inci-
dent and asked the General Affairs Committee 
to instruct your Rapporteur to refer to this 
matter although it is not linked directly with the 
subject of the report. It is nevertheless linked 
indirectly since the question of possible econo-
mic sanctions against the Soviet Union has been 
raised. 
150. During the night of 31st August to 
1st September 1983, a South Korean civil 
aircraft on a regular flight between the United 
States and Korea with 269 persons aboard was 
shot down by a Soviet fighter aircraft over the 
Sea of Japan near the island of Sakhalin. All 
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the passengers and crew perished. The aircraft 
was well off course and should not have had to 
fly over Soviet territory. Passing first over 
Kamchatka and then Sakhalin, it penetrated 
sectors banned to all non-Soviet aircraft. It was 
quite clearly infringing Soviet legislation. 
151. However. an infringement of this kind 
cannot in any event justify what amounts to the 
assassination of a large number ofpeople. Such 
infringements occur frequently in many coun-
tries and if the authorities decide to intervene it 
is generally to call to order the aircraft which has 
left its flight path. In more serious cases, it is 
forced to land at the nearest airport for verifi-
cation, particularly if it is suspected of having 
obtained information illicitly. 
152. At the time of writing, some elements 
relating to the circumstances of the incident are 
still missing, including the aircraft's black box 
which has been detected but not yet recovered. 
However. the broad lines are known from 
information published on the basis of Japanese 
and American monitoring: 
153. (i) It is not known exactly why the 
South Korean aircraft deviated by a slight angle 
from its route which, after several hours' flight, 
left it several hundred kilometres west of its 
correct position. 
154. (ii) Not the slightest proof has been given 
of Soviet accusations that the crew of the aircraft 
had been spying. 
155. (iii) The Korean civil aircraft had been 
intercepted and followed for more than two 
hours by Soviet fighter aircraft, which do not 
appear to have managed to transmit orders to 
land by radio, but apparently after having seen 
optical signals the South Korean aircraft had 
begun to descend. 
156. (iv) Obeying orders from Soviet military 
authorities based in Siberia, one of the Soviet 
fighters apparently then used missiles to bring 
down the South Korean aircraft. This is in any 
case the explanation given by the Soviet 
Government. 
157. (r) The American authorities admitted 
that one of their RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft 
had been on a monitoring operation off Kam-
chatka, but it is believed to have been more 
than 1,000 km from the South Korean aircraft 
at the time of the incident. It has never been 
suggested that it penetrated Soviet air space. 
158. (vi) The Soviet fighters were very close to 
the aircraft they destroyed and could not 
therefore not know that it was a civil aircraft of a 
type quite different from the RC-135. 
159. (vii) The Soviet authorities gave tardy 
and contradictory explanations of the drama, all 
aimed at imputing responsibility to the Ameri-
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cans. Several of these explanations were subse-
quently contradicted by the decoding of radio 
communications between the Soviet aircraft and 
their base. particularly the argument that the 
Korean aircraft had not been showing regula-
tion lights. 
160. ( viii) While recognising the substantial 
facts. the Soviet authorities treated the fighter 
pilot as a national hero and accepted no respon-
sibility for the incident. They have made no 
apologies, nor have they agreed to grant 
damages to the families of the victims. 
161. The conclusion to be drawn from these 
facts is that the Soviet military authorities shot 
down a civil aircraft which they must have 
identified and thus killed a large number of 
persons for the sole reason that the aircraft had 
violated Soviet air space. Such action for 
reasons of state shows no regard for the most 
elementary humanitarian sentiments. It also 
shows. as avowed by the Soviet authorities, that 
local military authorities are able to assume 
responsibility for acts of this kind, which are, in 
effect, acts of war, with their government's 
concurrence, which tells much about the role of 
the military in the Soviet state. 
162. All the western governments have subse-
quently voiced their indignation. The United 
States Government considered taking sanctions 
against the Soviet Union but no effective 
measures have been taken. Most European 
governments refused to take any sanctions. 
Only the international federation of airline pilots 
associations decided on 13th September to 
cancel flights to the Soviet Union for a 
month. The resistance of certain governments 
and airlines to these measures, particularly in 
France. Greece, Spain and Turkey, will probably 
quickly be overcome in face of the firmness of 
the pilots. But there now seems to be little 
likelihood of any more energetic action by Euro-
pean governments. 
163. It is to be hoped that all western 
governments will agree that the 1944 Chicago 
Convention on civil air transport should be 
revised, since the responsibility of states for 
aircraft flying over their territory is not set out 
clearly enough. It is essential to revise the 
convention without delay so as to clarify the 
rights and duties of all parties and to assure 
passengers on civil aircraft that a navigational 
error will not condemn them to execution 
without appeal by the armed forces of a country 
which is supposed to be civilised. 
164. The question of applying economic sanc-
tions against the Soviet Union thus arose 
again. It was not part of your Rapporteur's 
study, which had been devoted to the permanent 
factors of the problems raised by East-West 
trade. However, the committee tackled the 
subject during its first reading of the present 
document on 11th July 1983. 
165. All who took part in that discussion 
expressed disappointment about the application 
of economic sanctions envisaged or agreed upon 
after the invasion of Afghanistan and the intro-
duction of a state of emergency in Poland. It 
was noted that even going back to before the 
war and to the boycott measures against 
Mussolini in 1936 when he attacked Ethiopia, 
history provided no insta~ce of significa~t 
political results being obtamed by econ?mic 
sanctions. Even the embargo effectively 
applied in the case of South Africa has brought 
no change in the policy of apartheid. 
166. Some members underlined that in their 
opinion any such measures against the So~iet 
Union might heighten international tenswn, 
make the Geneva negotiations on medium-range 
missiles more difficult and jeopardise detente of 
which the development of trade was an impor-
tant part. 
16 7. Finally, others recalled the difficulties. of 
having any collective economic measure apphed 
by all members of the Atlantic Alliance,. and that 
although, after the invasion of Afghamstan, the 
United States had proposed a ban on exports of 
certain products to the Soviet Union ~t ~ad 
excluded wheat, of which it was the pnnCipal 
seller, in order not to upset its farmers, although 
wheat was a product urgently needed by the 
Soviet Union and through which strong pressure 
could have been brought to bear on its govern-
ment. It is quite clear that there can be no 
understanding between Europeans and Ameri-
cans on such bases. i.e. giving priority to the 
internal political concerns of one member of ~he 
alliance. 
168. Your Rapporteur fears that as matters 
now stand it may be very difficult to reach 
agreement to apply a boycott effect~v~ly. <?nly 
the international federation of mrlme pilots 
associations has managed to apply fairly satisfac-
torily the boycott of Soviet airports after _the 
shooting down of the South Korean Boemg. 
Other cases in which economic sanctions were 
desirable did not involve professional groups so 
aware of their responsibilities and organised for 
international action. Although other measures, 
such as reduced contacts with representatives of 
Poland in all the western capitals, without 
having very obvious results, continue to remind 
the Polish authorities that the West has not 
accepted their repressive measures ag~ins_t ~rade 
unions nor their infringement of mdividual 
freedom, these were not economic measures 
and, however reluctant, the same wester~ coun-
tries have had to agree at the same time to 
reschedule Poland's debts. 
169. If, one way or another, the western 
countries could manage to draw up and apply 
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certain rules of conduct in their trade with the 
East, eliminating, for instance, over-generous 
credit terms, dumping as practised by the EEC 
for certain agricultural products including butter 
(some of which is apparently re-exported at a 
higher price by the Soviet Union), transfers of 
advanced technology without adequate com-
pensation and contracts involving undue depen-
dence on their eastern partners, it would be 
easier for them to change these rules if necessary 
in order to apply sanctions. 
IX. Conclusions 
170. In recent years, East-West trade has 
indubitably and significantly favoured the eco-
nomic growth of the Soviet Union and con~e­
quently, directly or indirectly, the growth of I~s 
military capability. This is why the str~teg1c 
and military balance, which was the basis on 
which increased East-West trade had been based, 
swung in favour of the Soviet Union with effect 
from 1973. Faced with massive and conti-
nuous rearmament by the Soviet Union and its 
aggressiveness, international co-operation 
between western countries is necessary for 
security reasons. 
171. Competition between Europe and the 
United States can bring nothing positive in this 
field. Apart from improving the effectiveness 
of Cocom and its lists, a permanent code of 
conduct should be worked out for economic 
relations with the East. This code should 
naturally be thoroughly revised as soon as it 
appears that the development of East-West 
trade, instead of favouring the Soviet armaments 
effort, is helping to improve the well-being of the 
people and fostering really productive invest-
ments. In this respect, some committee mem-
bers stressed that they considered the success of 
the Geneva negotiations on medium-range 
nuclear weapons would be a decisive test. The 
aims of a policy for trade with the Soviet Union 
might be defined at western summit meetings, as 
was done at Williamsburg for certain matters 
relating to western solidarity, and the OECD 
might be made responsible for implementing it. 
172. Following interallied misunderstanding 
after the Versailles and Bonn summit meetings, 
the meeting at La Sapiniere, the seven-power 
talks and the raising of sanctions announced 
by the President of the United States o~ 
13th November 1982, the western summit 
meeting at Williamsburg and the European 
summit meeting in Stuttgart in 1983, it is now 
mainly a matter of finding a new con~ensus for _a 
joint approach to East-West relatiOns,_ parti-
cularly in economic and trade matters, wit~ due 
regard for the general policital context. It 1s not 
possible to act as though nothing ~ad happen~d 
in Afghanistan or Poland or to Ignore Soviet 
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rearmament. Western policy must take account 
of the economic aspect of the Soviet Union's 
challenge which it has never concealed but 
which it has made the justification for peaceful 
coexistence, whose sense it has always consi-
dered to mean a shifting of its permanent 
class struggle with the capitalist countries to the 
economic field. Moreover, this choice will not 
prevent it from reverting to a more aggressive 
policy towards the West the day it considers a 
reversal of the balance of forces which it is now 
bringing about will allow it to win by the threat 
or use of force. 
173. For the member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance, several decisions are at present pos-
sible. They might include: 
(a) a restrictive policy for exports of 
advanced technology to the East; 
(b) avoiding the West and particularly the 
Europeans being dependent on raw 
materials and above all energy sup-
plies from the Soviet Union; 
(c) not promoting Soviet resources at the 
expense of those of the West or the 
third world; 
(d) restricting western credits to the 
Soviet Union and other eastern coun-
tries; 
(c) not accepting the principle of counter-
trade. 
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174. Your Rapporteur is well aware that the 
free development of international trade is a 
factor of peace and prosperity and particularly 
important in a period of economic recession. 
He believes, however, that competition between 
western countries in trade with the eastern coun-
tries helps to distort free trade to the unilateral 
benefit of the country whose economy is the 
most closely directed and controlled by the 
political powers. He is not at all of the opinion 
that the West should be asked to deviate from 
its fundamental principles but merely that the 
democracies should be protected against the 
actions of a totalitarian country which exploits 
for political purposes all the advantages it may 
derive from its external trade and makes use of 
its economic monolithism to sow trouble among 
the democracies. He is not advocating hostile 
action against the Soviet Union but adapting 
western policies to the realities of trade with the 
East. 
175. At the present international juncture, the 
Soviet military threat is serious and is steadily 
spreading. It cannot be hoped to guarantee 
peace by demonstrations against the deployment 
of nuclear weapons in the West, but rather by 
pursuing a policy which. although not claiming 
to prevent the Soviet Union from pursuing its 
military deployment. at least ensures that the 
West stops contributing to it on the economic, 
technological and financial levels. Should it 
appear that the Soviet Union was using advan-
tages it derives from trade with the West 
in a new manner. it might be possible to be more 
flexible in encouraging such trade. 
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APPENDIX 
The Siberian gas pipeline 
I. Brief account of the proceedings 
of the International Hearing concerning the use 
of forced labour on the Siberian gas pipeline 
held at Stadthalle, Bonn/Bad Godesberg on 18th 
and 19th November 1982 
The purpose of the hearing was to exa-
mine witness accounts concerning the use of 
forced labour on the Siberian gas pipeline 
network. It was pointed out at the hearing, that 
contrary to reports from bodies such as the 
CIA. the initial heavy excavation work for 
laying a pipeline does not have to be carried out 
by skilled labour. Furthermore, as one of the 
witnesses stressed there are many skilled workers 
imprisoned in the USSR who have the technical 
knowledge required to construct and maintain a 
gas pipeline. 
Throughout the course of their testimo-
nies all the witnesses. with the exception of 
Mr. Gasko, discussed at some length the poor 
conditions of their imprisonment, for example, 
constant hunger, lack of warm clothing and 
extremely long working hours (up to sixteen 
hours a day). Although Mr. Gasko had never 
been a prisoner he had worked closely with 
many prisoners in the construction of pipelines 
and supported the witnesses' reports of the poor 
living conditions suffered by the prisoners. 
Mrs. Wosnessenskaja also gave the Commission 
an insight into the physical abuse suffered by 
female prisoners. from the age of about sixteen 
years. and added that the appalling conditions 
of imprisonment frequently led to permanent 
infertility. 
Mrs. Wosnessenskaja did not work on the 
pipeline herself but she testified that many of her 
fellow inmates had done so. 
Mr. Kulmagambetov had worked for 
some time in compressor stations along the 
pipeline, and finally in October/November 1979 
he had visited Ukhta where. at construction site 
KS-10, conditionally released prisoners were still 
working. Mr. Kulmagambetov presented to the 
Commission his Soviet labour book, which 
documented his work on the construction of gas 
pipelines in the USSR. 
Mr. Bergmann testified that in 1974 he 
was shown technical films about laying pipes 
and he said that he knows of many Russian 
prisoners of German origin working on the 
Siberian gas pipeline. He added that the pri-
soners know the destination of the gas pipeline 
because the pipes are made by the German 
company Mannesmann. 
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Mr. Belov gave evidence on behalf of 
Vladimir Grigorjewitsch Titov, who is at present 
in a psychiatric institution in Kaluga. Mr. Titov 
was identified as Mr. P.S. in the report on 
the use of forced labour. Mr. Titov worked on 
the pipeline in 1980 and 1981. 
Mr. Paustian testified that as a condition-
ally released prisoner he was transferred to work 
on the gas pipeline in September 1974. 
Mr. Makarenko testified that he had not 
worked on the pipeline himself but since he left 
the Soviet Union four years ago he has collected 
material on the use of forced labour in the 
USSR, which he has presented to the ILO. 
Finally, confusion arose regarding what 
was meant by the " new" gas pipeline. Mr. Kul-
magambetov said that there is no reason to 
believe that the "new" gas pipeline to Western 
Europe has only been under construction since 
1980 and he had in his possession an article 
from "Socialist Industry" (27th July 1976) 
which discussed the Siberian gas pipeline. 
He also added that the pipeline supplying gas 
to the West is not a single pipeline but a network 
of pipes which have been under construction for 
ten to fifteen years, and he referred to an article 
in Pravda (4th October 1982) which states that 
two pipelines will meet at Ushgorod, to take gas 
to the West. 
11. Statement of the International Commission 
on Human Rights in conclusion of the hearing 
"Forced Labour- Siberian pipeline" 
in Bonn/Bad Godesberg (Stadthalle) 
on 18th and 19th November 1982 
The hearing was arranged by the Inter-
national Society for Human Rights (ISHR), 
Frankfurt, in co-operation with the International 
Sakharov Committee, Copenhagen. Presiding 
was Mr. Alfred Coste Floret, a joint prosecutor 
for France at the Nuremburg trials. 
Based upon the testimony of expert 
witnesses and upon the testimony and docu-
ments of former Soviet prisoners, the Commis-
sion finds: 
1. The USSR continues the deplorable prac-
tice of forced labour in manufacturing and 
construction projects including the Siberian gas 
pipeline. 
2. Prisoners, including political prisoners 
and those imprisoned for their religious beliefs. 
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among them women and children, are forced to 
work under conditions of extreme hardship, 
including malnutrition, inadequate shelter and 
clothing and severe discipline. Many prisoners 
have died. 
The Commission calls upon the Soviet 
Union to end the vicious practice of forced 
labour and upon all nations and enterprises for 
support of our conclusion. 
We have presented the truth to the world 
and no one can say: " I did not know ". 
Members: 
Alfred Coste Floret, President of the 
Commission, France; 
Marcel Aeschbacher, Landesverband 
Freier Schweizer Arbeitnehmer, Swit-
zerland; 
Senator William L. Armstrong, USA; 
Jim Baker, AFL/CIO, USA; 
Professor Felix Ermacora, Ph. D., 
Austrian representative in the UN 
Commission for Economic, Social, Poli-
tical and Civil Rights, Austria; 
Hans Graf Huyn, MdB, member of the 
CDU/CSU parliamentarian group in 
the Deutscher Bundestag, West Ger-
many; 
Detlef Lutz, Vice-Chairman of Christliche 
Gewerkschaft Bergbau - Chemie -
Energie, West Germany; 
Ludwig Martin, State Attorney General 
(retired), West Germany; 
Carlo Ripa di Meana, MEP, member of 
the Socialist Parliamentarian Group in 
the European Parliament, Italy; 
Victor Sparre, Author, Norway. 
Since the publication of the report by the 
International Society for Human Rights (ISHR) 
on the use of forced labour on the Siberian gas 
pipeline (August 1982) two main and several 
minor facts have emerged. Two events have 
taken place which have given the allegations 
made in the ISHR report substance. 
1. A CIA report has been issued which says 
that the Soviet Union has some four million 
prisoners - including 10,000 political prisoners -
employed on arduous tasks ranging from logging 
and mining to road building and farming. " An 
estimated 3% of the work force in the USSR 
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consists of prisoners compelled to perform jobs 
for the state", says the report. 
2. On 18th and 19th November the ISHR 
held an international hearing (a summary is 
enclosed) which separated fact from fiction. A 
prestigious group of panelists questioned a wide 
range of witnesses and concluded that: " the 
Soviet Union continues the deplorable practice 
of forced labour in manufacturing and construc-
tion projects including the Siberian gas pipe-
line". 
The following facts have also now been 
established: 
(a) Starting from the Yamal Peninsula, forced 
labour concentration camps are located along 
the line Urengoi, Surgut, Punga, Tavada, as well 
as along the Salekhard-Vuktylline. 
(b) Construction of the pipeline uses the 
labour of prisoners (mainly for hard manual 
labour in clearing the route) from a number of 
main camps (i.e. those located directly along the 
route of the pipeline). Labour is also used from 
subsidiary camps (i.e. these are the camps which 
tend to specialise in specific areas such as brick-
making, road building, woodwork or sewing 
overalls). 
(c) Both the main and subsidiary camps are 
located primarily in the Komi ASSR, the Volo-
gda district, and the Perm, Tumen, Kirov, 
Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk districts. 
(d) The sewing of overalls and other special 
garments for the prisoners in the camps along 
the pipeline route, including for prisoners who 
are engaged in the construction work, is con-
ducted primarily by female prisoners in the 
following camps: in the workers settlement of 
Zuyevka, Kirov district, Dobriye V ody and 
Kopychilit~ki, Perm district and in the town of 
Nizhniy Tagil. In each of these camps between 
800-2,000 women are held. 
(e) Between Khalmer-U and the town of 
Siktivkar, Komi ASSR, there are 36 concen-
tration camps with 500-1,000 inmates in each, 
"Workers" from these camps have been used 
on the pipeline. The camps in this area are 
located in the following settlements: Kochma, 
Promishlenniy, Yeletskiy, Knyazhpogost, Abez, 
Makarikha, Mylva, Mutniy, Materik, Mikun, 
Ust'-Vym, Mordino, and Kobra. 
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Amendment 1 
Economic relations with the Soviet Union 
AMENDMENT 1 
tabled by Mr. Galley 
30th November 1983 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (e). 
1. See 9th sitting, 30th November 1983 (amendment negatived). 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
7th Apri/1983- SHAPE, Casteau 
Major General Tabary, Belgian Army, ACOS Logistics: 
Mr. Jonathan Stoddart, Minister, Special Assistant for International Affairs: 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Terry, RAF, Deputy SACEUR: 
Lieutenant General Cacciola, DCOS Logistics: 
Colonel Fox, USAF, DCOS Intelligence: 
Mr. Pozzi, Italian civilian, strategic analyst: 
Air Vice· Marshal J. Gilbert, RAF, ACOS Policy. 
8th Apri/1983- NATO, Brussels 
General Lewis Melner, United States Army, Deputy Chairman, Military Committee; 
H.E. Mr. Tapley Bennett, Ambassador, United States Permanent Representative: Mr. Savage; 
Dr. Joseph Luns, Secretary-General; 
H.E. Sir John Graham, Ambassador, United Kingdom Permanent Representative; Mr. Colin Bal-
mer; Admiral Sir Anthony Morton, United Kingdom Military Representative; 
H.E. Dr. H. Wieck, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many; Dr. A. Bocker, Minister; 
H.E. Mr. Jean-Marie Merillon, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France. 
11th Apri/1983- Bonn 
Ministry of Defence: 
Mr. Manfred Worner, Minister of Defence; 
Mr. Lothar Riihl, Minister of State for Defence; 
General Tandecki, Fiihrungsstab Ill; Colonel Rode: Colonel Weige; Colonel Wieland; Colonel 
Flasse: Colonel Ertmann: Colonel Siebert: Colonel Lingan: Colonel Vorwerck. 
Ministryfor Foreign Affairs: 
Dr. W. Hofmann, Director of Atlantic Alliance and Defence Affairs. 
12th Apri/1983- Ministry of Defence, London 
Mr. David Fisher, DSI; 
Mr. David Wilson, OS 12. 
19th Apri/1983- Headquarters CINCH AN and COMEASTLANT. Northwood 
Rear Admiral Propper, Royal Netherlands Navy, Chief of Staff; 
Captain Morin, Belgian Navy. 
The committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on Monday, 14th February 
1983, when it discussed a draft outline of the present report. 
It met subsequently in the United States from 21st to 30th March where, in the United Nations, 
New York, it was briefed by Mr. Jan Martenson, United Nations Under-Secretary General. Depart-
ment for Disarmament; Mr. Brian Urquhart, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Political 
Affairs; Mr. Charles Lichtenstein, United States Deputy Representative to the Security Council. In 
Washington it met with Mr. Gerard Smith, former Director of the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and Chief Negotiator for SALT I; Mr. George Kennan, former United States 
Ambassador to Moscow; Mr. Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defence. In the State Depart-· 
ment it was briefed by Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Burt, 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, Director for Politico-Military 
Affairs; Mr. Richard N. Haass, Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs; in the Department of 
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Defence it was briefed by Dr. William E. Hoehn Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence 
for International Security Policy: Mr. Franklin C. Miller, Office of the Secretary of Defence, 
Director for Strategic Policy; Mr. Abram Shulsky, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Director for 
Strategic Arms Control Policy; Mr. George W. Heiser, Office of the Secretary of Defence, Theatre 
Nuclear Policy; Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Hamilton, Joint Chiefs of Staff. International 
Negotiations: Major General Earl G. Peck, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Policy), Director for 
Intelligence and Space Policy; Colonel Kent Montavon, Office of the Secretary of Defence (Inter-
national Security Policy), Director for NATO Affairs; Colonel James L. Gould, Office of the 
Secretary of Defence (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics). Director for Mobilisation Plans and 
Operations; Mr. James W. Morrison. Office of the Secretary of Defence (International Security 
Policy), Director for European Policy. 
The committee then met with Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee; and with Mr. Joseph Addabbo, Chairman of the Defence Sub-
committee of the House Appropriations Committee, and the following members of the subcommittee: 
Mr. Les AuCoin; Mr. Norman D. Dicks; Mr. W.G. Hefner; Mr. John P. Murtha; Mr. J. Kenneth 
Robinson. 
In the White House Executive Building the committee was briefed by Mr. Sven Kraemer and 
Colonel Mayer of the National Security Staff. The committee then visited the Patuxent Naval Air 
Test Centre, where it was briefed by the Commander, Rear Admiral E.J. Hogan, and saw the AV-8, 
F/A-18, SH-60B, E2 and P3 aircraft. The committee then visited the Lockheed-California Com-
pany, Los Angeles, where it was briefed by Mr. Ed Cortright, President, and Mr. Ben Rich, in par-
ticular on the TR -1 and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. It visited Hughes Aircraft Company and was 
briefed by Mr. George E. Todd, Senior Vice-President, International; Mr. David M. Snyder, Asso-
ciate Director, Middle East and Africa; Mr. Paul H. Kennard, Vice-President and Manager, Advan-
ced Projects Division; Mr. Louis E. Greenbaum, Manager, Communications Systems Division, 
Ground Systems Group; Mr. Leonard Gross. Vice-President, Electro-Optical and Data Systems 
Group; and Mr. Robert L. Roderick, Vice-President, Missile Systems Group, on various aspects of 
the company's activities; visited the Douglas Aircraft Company where it was briefed by Mr. E. Cur-
tis, Senior Vice-President, Fiscal Management; Colonel John Patterson, United States Air Force Plant 
Representative: Mr. L.J. Colapietro, Manager, Government Customer Relations; Mr. E.A. Chambers, 
Manager, Government Marketing, and Mr. D.C. Caldwell, Programme Manager, T -45TS Pro-
gramme, in particular on the VTXTS, C-17 and KC-1 0. 
At the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, the committee was received by the 
Superintendant, Major General Robert E. Kelley, and Captain Crowley, USAF. The committee 
then visited NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex, where it was received by Lieutenenant General 
Kenneth Thorneycroft, Canadian Forces, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and briefed by Major Bob 
Tracy, Major Don Read, Lieutenant Colonel Dick Farkas. and Captain Rick Kniseley. 
The committee then met in the Sala del Consiglio, Pisa. on 3rd May where it discussed a draft of 
the present report, and also visited the Italian Parachute Training School where it was received by 
Colonel Valdimiro Rossi, Commandant. On 4th May it visited the Oto Melara works in La Spezia, 
where it was received by Mr. Fiaccavento, Mr. Ricci, and Mr. Ferrari, and then visited the NATO 
SACLANT ASW Research Centre where it was briefed by the Director Dr. Rolf Goodman and staff. 
The committee met in Brussels on 17th May for a joint meeting with the Council under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, and on 18th May when it 
discussed and adopted the first version of the report (Document 947) which the Assembly referred back 
to the committee on 7th June 1983. 
The committee then met in Paris on 12th September to discuss the reference back to the 
committee, when it was agreed that the parts of the report on nuclear weapons. burden-sharing and 
Europe would be updated. On 13th September the committee visited the nuclear ballistic missile 
submarine base on lie Longue, Brittany, and was briefed by Vice-Admiral Jacques Bonnemaison. 
Commander of the Force Oceanique Strategique, and Vice-Admiral Christian Brac de la Perriere, 
Maritime Prefect, Commander-in-Chief. Atlantic. 
The committee then met in Madrid from 19th to 21st October. In the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. Madrid, the committee was briefed by Mr. Carlos Fernandez Espeso, Director General for 
Security QuestiOns. It visited the CASA aircraft factory, where 1t was received by Mr. Fernando 
Caralt. Director General, and Mr. Carlos Navarro Cantero. Deputy Director. Programmes. The 
committee met with the bureaux and party spokesmen of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees 
of the Congress of Deputies. with Mr. Manuel Medina Ortega, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, in the chair. It then met to discuss the draft revised report. On 21st October the 
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committee was received by General Santos Peralba, Secretary of State for Defence Policy, in the 
Spanish Ministry of Defence, and was briefed by Colonel Narciso Carreras Matas, Spanish Marines. on 
Spanish defence policy. 
The committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 7th November when it adopted 
the present revised report. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of Congress. 
officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the committee and 
replied to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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(i) Aware of the manifold difficulties of comparing national defence efforts but concluding 
that the European allies for the most part now carry a very reasonable share of the agreed burden, a 
share which has increased from 24% to 38% in the last twenty-five years, and increased most 
significantly in the decade of the 1970s; recognising that because of its substantial strategic nuclear 
deterrent and world role, the United States spends a higher proportion of its national wealth on defence 
than its European allies: but believing that certain specific improvements in defence efforts are 
required; 
(it) Noting the existence of the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom; 
(iu) Considering that an important factor in the continuing burden-sharing debate arises from the 
differing approaches of the European allies and the United States administration to relations with the 
Soviet Union, and consequently from the different views on the necessary size and composition of the 
allied defence effort: 
(iv) Believing that these differences call for increased consultation between the European aJlies on 
strategic policies and defence issues: 
(l') Convinced that within the alliance the political relationship between the European members and 
the United States should reflect more fully their economic, political and defence contributions to the 
security of Western Europe in the fullest sense: 
(n) Aware that isolationism in the United States is likely to grow to the detriment of western security 
unless the European members of the alliance can convince American public opinion and Congress of 
the adequacy of the European contribution to the NATO defence effort, and unless European public 
opinion and parliaments show reciprocal appreciation of all aspects of the United States contribution to 
allied defence; 
(l'ii) Welcoming therefore the annual report to Congress by the United States Secretary of Defence on 
allied contributions to the common defence : proposals by WEU : and statements by Eurogroup which 
identify the size of the European contribution: 
(l'lll) Believing that allied defence plans and commitments entered into in the Brussels Treaty must 
take account of the possible consequences of developments beyond the NATO area, and that in the case 
of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the 
alliance, the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States 
deployments beyond the area; 
(ix) Recalling that problems of common defence and the support of public opinion for national 
defence projects cannot be isolated from the quality of economic. political and monetary relations 
between the United States and the members ofWEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
A. Urge the WEU member governments concerned to define jointly for the attention of the North 
Atlantic Council the measures necessary : 
1. To maintain and in the following specific cases improve their defence efforts : 
(a) by maintaining collectively the NATO target of an increase in defence expenditure in real 
terms as long as the Soviet military build-up continues, and by adhering to the biennial force 
goals approved by the nations; 
(b) by augmenting the combat sustainability of the alliance by providing a minimum of thirty 
days' stocks offuel, ammunition, spare parts and consumables and by improving the capacity 
of reserve forces: 
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(c) by maximising conventional firepower and rmsmg the nuclear threshold through the 
progressive introduction of proven systems incorporating emerging technologies jointly 
developed and produced on an equitable Atlantic-wide basis: 
(d) by improving the flexibility, mobility, effectiveness and readiness of European intervention 
forces, both to improve national contributions to ACE Mobile Force and, in a crisis in 
Europe, to compensate as far as possible for any diversion outside the area of United States 
reinforcements destined for Europe; 
2. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area affecting their vital interests: 
(a) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment offorces of any NATO 
country beyond the area ; 
(b) in the case of those WEU member countries with appropriate military capability to parti-
cipate in such deployments ; 
3. To lend vigorous united support to the United States efforts on behalf of the alliance to secure 
satisfactory balanced and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union in the field of both 
strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and, failing the latter by the end of 1983, to apply the 
decisions taken on 12th December 1979 by the NATO member countries concerning the deployment 
ofGLCM and Pershing 11 missiles; 
4. (a) To deepen and improve European defence deliberations within the WEU Council and the 
informal consultations in Eurogroup and arrange for the European position to be expounded clearly in 
the United States, especially to Congress committees and staffs, through a public information effort 
co-ordinated by the Washington embassies of those countries which provide the Eurogroup secretariat 
and Chairman-in-Office ; 
(b) To undertake a similar effort with the assistance of the Assembly of WEU to explain to the 
European public and parliaments the contribution which the United States makes to allied defence: 
B. Consider and report to the Assembly on : 
I. The expansion and deepening of the European defence activities of the CounciL last defined in 
1957; 
2. The obligation to invite all members of WEU to contribute to strengthening the European pillar 
of the western alliance. 
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Reaffirming its role as the only European parliamentary assembly empowered by treaty to 
discuss defence matters ; 
Stressing the need for the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to be strengthened through 
agreement between all European allies on the basic principles of alliance defence policy and strategy : 
Recalling its Resolution 15, 
CALLS on the parliaments of the European NATO countries not members of WEU to appoint 
observers to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to participate in the preparation of 
its forthcoming report on the state of European security ; 
DECIDES that such observers shall have the right to speak. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. Under the original terms of reference of 
this report as submitted to the first part of the 
session in June, it was to examine European and 
American contributions to common defence in 
the alliance, and the fair sharing of the burden, 
under the title" Burden-sharing in the alliance". 
As, however, the Assembly referred the report 
back to the committee, it has been judged neces-
sary to broaden the scope. in particular to cover 
in more detail the problem of nuclear weapons 
as the deadline for the possible initial 
deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles 
approaches. The revised report submitted to 
the second part of the session is accordingly 
entitled "European security and burden-sharing 
in the alliance". In revising the report. the 
opportunity has, of course, been taken to 
improve certain sections and to bring it up to 
date in the light of developments since the 
committee adopted the original version on 
18th May 1983. 
1.2. A collective security system including 
Western European Union and the Atlantic 
Alliance must be founded upon the principle of 
equitable participation in a common defence. 
Since an attack upon one member is, under the 
terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, to be 
regarded as an attack upon all the members of 
the alliance, the interdependence of the signa-
tories is not in doubt. The national defence 
provisions of the Brussels Treaty are even more 
binding and the commitment of the WEU 
nations to each other's defence lies at the heart 
ofWestern Europe's security. 
1.3. Every national contribution, whether poli-
tical, financial, military, industrial, in man-
power or materiel, contributes towards a shar-
ing of the joint burden of defence in the west-
ern alliance. However, certain fundamental 
concepts should underlie the efforts that are 
made: 
(a) alliance nations must pursue an 
agreed strategy - in the case of 
NATO of forward defence and flex-
ible response underpinned by the 
availability of nuclear weapons to 
assure deterrence; 
(b) the burden of the military and econo-
mic efforts to implement this strategy 
must be distributed in a manner 
which all members of the alliance can 
accept as fair. 
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1.4. Implementing these concepts is not 
easy. A free association of independent states 
has few sanctions it can realistically apply on 
those members whom the majority of the alli-
ance believe to be in default of a reasonable 
and realistically attainable contribution to their 
common defence. A too intense debate over 
the criteria to be applied to achieve a fair 
assessment of national obligations can all too 
easily prejudice political willingness to pursue 
national security objectives in an alliance 
context. 
1.5. An objective assessment, therefore, of 
burden-sharing must be very comprehensive 
and take into account as wide a range of factors 
as possible if the political susceptibilities of 
member countries are not to be dangerously 
aroused. Such factors should include: 
(a) what outlays are required to meet 
multilaterally-recognised force goals; 
(b) the contributions of each nation both 
in input (expenditure and manpower) 
and in output (forces and equipment) 
terms; 
(c) what a fair share of the effort required 
for every individual country actually 
is on a consensus basis; 
(d) how the burdens can be redistributed 
to match national circumstances and 
capabilities and the strategic impera-
tives recognised by the alliance as a 
whole. 
1.6. Coalition defence between wholly sove-
reign states has inherent stresses and inner ten-
sions which can only by surmounted through a 
recognition that the interests of the alliance as 
a whole transcend those of its individual mem-
bers. This is particularly so when, as in the 
case of NATO, there is great geostrategic, topo-
graphical, economic, historical and political 
diversity within it. A constant effort of poli-
tical magnanimity, imagination and goodwill is 
required to overcome those potentially fissi-
parous qualities within the alliance. 
I. 7. The NATO collective security system 
evolved in the aftermath of World War II out of 
an evident necessity to harness preponderant 
American power to redress a military imbalance 
in Europe. A relationship of virtual American 
protectorate, perhaps symbolised by the NATO 
military doctrine of the conventional force 
tripwire guaranteed by the strategy of massive 
United States nuclear retaliation which charac-
terised the 19 50s, has evolved to the point 
today where diminishing nuclear advantage at a 
strategic level and unfavourable nuclear and 
conventional balance at a theatre level call in 
question the ultimate American security gua-
rantee which Western Europeans have con-
veniently taken for granted for so long. 
1.8. At the same time, this relationship of 
strategic dependency upon the United States, 
which the European members of the alliance 
still assume, does not any longer correspond to 
the economic relationship between the United 
States and Western Europe, or to the respective 
parties' physical involvement in and economic 
dependence upon strategic developments in the 
wide areas of the world outside the area of res-
ponsibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nisation. The institutional and consultative 
mechanism must evolve so that the Europeans 
assert collectively their growing political autho-
rity within the alliance more effectively. 
1.9. In short, there is a temptation on the part 
of the Europeans in NATO to continue to dis-
play the military dispositions of client states 
while adopting the independent-minded poli-
tical postures commensurate with their new-
found economic power. Understandably, pub-
lic opinion in the United States, with the pers-
pective of a people with global responsibilities, 
does not understand why certain West European 
countries, where the standard of living is cer-
tainly higher than in America, should spend 
little more than half the proportion of the 
national product expended by the United 
States, much of whose military budget goes to 
defending the more affiuent Europeans. The 
argument can all too easily become simplistic 
and dangerously emotive unless it is clearly 
borne in mind that some of the deepest dis-
agreements between members of the western 
alliance have very fundamental causes. One of 
the most obvious is a difference of view about 
the military threat and hence what is militarily 
required to meet it. 
1.10. Geography, history and economic cir-
cumstances all play their part in influencing 
perceptions of the threat. Concern to preserve 
the unique relationship with fellow Germans in 
the German Democratic Republic and to 
maintain West Germany's traditional trade with 
Central Europe must influence the Federal 
Republic's perception of the threat and modify 
the Bonn Government's formulation of security 
policy in the widest sense. Likewise, the Nor-
dic balance concept of Norway and Denmark is 
evolved in response to the neutralist foreign 
policy of Sweden and Finland and not just to 
the Soviet threat to the north flank of NATO. 
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1.11. Following the collapse of the European 
Defence Community in 1954 and notwithstand-
ing the political consultation within WEU; the 
Eurogroup; and the process of European poli-
tical consultation among the Ten, there are 
bound to be variations in foreign policy, threat 
analysis and diplomacy between the individual 
European members of the alliance let alone bet-
ween the West Europeans and the United Sta-
tes. Issues such as East-West relations, trade 
with the Soviet bloc, linkage with human rights 
questions, financial credits, food aid and tech-
nology transfers to Eastern Europe, arms 
control and the implementation of the Helsinki 
final act often receive markedly different treat-
ment by governments within the western 
alliance. 
1.12. This foreign policy diversity explains 
why the greatest care must be exercised before 
reaching definitive conclusions about burden-
sharing. Not only are political assumptions 
often misleading, but a universally acceptable 
statistical basis of comparison is almost impos-
sible to attain. In the words of a NATO 
Financial and Economic Board report written 
as long ago as 1 9 51 : 
" A final decision as to what constitutes 
an equitable distribution can never be 
derived from the mechanical use of any 
purely statistical formula. Even if the 
statistics available to the board were 
wholly comparable, no mechanical for-
mula could be devised or take account of 
the varying circumstances and peculiar 
problems of each country. Differences 
in size, population, economic structure 
and stage of development of the various 
countries make simple comparisons 
impossible. " 
1.13. Since then, to quote from the United 
States Secretary of Defence's report to the Uni-
ted States Congress on allied contributions to 
the common defence, March 1962: " despite 
many efforts and agreement that there is a need 
for burden-sharing, NATO has been unable to 
agree on an acceptable definition of the burden 
or how to measure it". 
1.14. An objective definition of the guidelines 
for fairer burden-sharing within NATO is easier 
to achieve than a consensus among the indivi-
dual nations within the alliance as to whether 
their own contributions are equitable. Coun-
tries with low living standards or economic prob-
lems argue that a sound economy is a pre-
requisite for an effective defence. Countries with 
strong peace movements or a strong ethical 
tradition in the conduct of foreign affairs will 
stress the importance of carrying public support 
for national defence policy. Countries with a 
weak balance of payments may be reluctant to 
incur the foreign exchange costs of stationing 
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forces overseas or of purchasing defence equip-
ment abroad. 
1.15. As recorded in the introductory note this 
report draws on information derived from the 
visit of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments to the United States in March 
1983 and particularly from the briefings and 
discussions at the State Department, Pentagon, 
National Security Council, on Capitol Hill and 
from industry and the United States air force. 
In Europe information was derived at SHAPE, 
NATO, CINCHAN and from national defence 
ministries. 
11. The concept of allied defence 
2.1. The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was the first 
collective security agreement after World War 
11 which was directed against the growing 
Soviet threat. Its provisions as modified by the 
Paris Protocols of 19 54 form the basis of 
Western European Union and bind the signa-
tories to mutual assistance in the event of 
external attack in Europe I. There is no 
geographic limitation to the applicability of 
the treaty for consultation purposes 2 and its 
unambiguous nature ensures that regardless of 
political developments among NATO countries 
in either Northern or Southern Europe and 
regardless of political developments in North 
America, there will be a Western European 
inner security zone among the seven nations of 
WEU. 
2.2. Although by contrast there is a stricter 
geographic limitation to the applicability of 
mutual defence under the North Atlantic 
Treaty, this should not inhibit alliance consul-
tation and co-operation in response to threats 
to the interests of member countries outside the 
NATO area. Even so, following the collapse 
of the southern and eastern tiers of Foster Dul-
les' alliance system created to contain commu-
nist expansion (CENTO and SEATO), the 
NATO nations did very little to concert their 
security policies to protect their joint interests 
in the Middle East, Arab/Iranian Gulf, South-
West and South-East Asia and Indian Ocean. 
Indeed, the Government of the United King-
dom compounded western problems by closing 
military bases east of Suez even when in 1971 
I. Article VI: " If any of the High Contracting Parties 
should be the object of an armed attack m Europe, the 
other High Contracting Parties Will, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the 
party so attacked all the military and other aid and assis-
tance in their power". 
2. Article VIII.3: "At the request of any of the High 
Contractmg Parties the Council shall be immediately con-
vened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any 
situation which may constitute a threat to peace, m what-
ever area thzs threat should arise, or a danger to economic 
stability ". 
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the rulers of the Gulf sheikhdoms still wanted 
the British to stay. 
2.3. Soviet support for the Marxist regimes in 
Ethiopia and South Yemen and Vietnam at 
each extremity of the large area of instability 
along the southern edge of the Eurasian land-
mass together with the Iranian revolution and 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the heart of 
the highly volatile region bordering on the oil-
rich Arab/Iranian Gulf convinced the Govern-
ment of the United States that it must be pre-
pared militarily to fill an alarming power 
vacuum in an area of huge oil reserves and 
great strategic importance to the West. 
2.4. The United States has now created a new 
South-West Asian Command autonomous of 
SACEUR and has earmarked a rapid deploy-
ment force of up to six divisions to be assigned 
to it. Base facilities at Diego Garcia, Mashi-
rah Island and elsewhere around the littoral 
of the Indian Ocean have been built up. The 
United States navy was already overstretched in 
view of the Soviet naval challenge worldwide, 
and with the redeployment of assets from the 
Mediterranean fleet and elsewhere to the Indian 
Ocean is almost a four-fleet navy. 
2.5. The determination of the United States 
Administration not to afford to the Soviet 
Union a monopoly in underpinning the global 
competition for political influence and econo-
mic advantage by military means was heigh-
tened by the two shocks towards the end of Mr. 
Carter's presidency of Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan and the failure of the United States 
mission to rescue the American hostages from 
the United States Embassy in Iran. 
2.6. The European members of the alliance 
may or may not agree with the new military 
role which the United States has assumed in 
South-West Asia but an urgent accommodation 
on their part with the practical consequences to 
them of growing American commitments 
beyond the NATO area is required. Open dis-
agreement with the Americans over their mili-
tary strategy in South-West Asia would deepen 
the misunderstanding that already exists within 
the alliance. Quiet emphasis on the merits of 
a grand strategy involving diplomacy, aid, poli-
tical and economic support to complement 
military preparedness and deployment would 
be a valuable contribution in terms of Euro-
pean expertise in ensuring the formulation of 
an effective alliance security policy for a noto-
riously unstable region where geography affords 
to the Soviet Union great advantages in any 
power struggle which might arise. 
2.7. Mutual defence arrangements under the 
North Atlantic Treaty are of course limited to 
the Atlantic Treaty area defined in Article 6, 
but the treaty imposes no geographical limit-
ation on consultation under Article 4 when-
ever the security of any party is threatened. 
Nevertheless, discussion of out-of-area defence 
matters has evolved only slowly in NATO, the 
most recent statement of the position being in 
the texts adopted by the sixteen members at the 
Bonn NATO summit on lOth June 1982: 
"All of us have an interest in peace and 
security in other regions of the world. 
We will consult together as appropriate 
on events in these regions which may 
have implications for our security, taking 
into account our commonly-identified 
objectives. Those of us who are in a posi-
tion to do so will endeavour to respond 
to requests for assistance from sovereign 
states whose security and independence is 
threatened. " 
The document on integrated defence adopted 
by representatives of the countries contributing 
to the integrated military structure contains the 
following paragraph : 
"Noting that developments beyond the 
NATO area may threaten our vital inte-
rests, we reaffirm the need to consult 
with a view to sharing assessments and 
identifying common objectives, taking 
full account of the effect on NATO secu-
rity and defence capability, as well as of 
the national interests of member coun-
tries. Recognising that the policies 
which nations adopt in this field are a 
matter for national decision, we agree to 
examine collectively in the appropriate 
NATO bodies the requirements which 
may arise for the defence of the NATO 
area as a result of deployments by indi-
vidual member states outside that 
area. Steps which may be taken by indi-
vidual allies in the light of such consul-
tations to facilitate possible military 
deployments beyond the NATO area can 
represent an important contribution to 
western security. " 
It is considered in NATO that " developments 
beyond the NATO area " which " may threaten 
our vital interests " are only events involving a 
risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or its 
allies. 
2.8. There are two responses which the Euro-
pean members of the alliance must make in the 
event of United States out-of-area deploy-
ments. First, they have to be prepared to com-
pensate from their own resources not only for 
any United States redeployments from the 
NATO theatre to South-West Asia but also to 
make contingency plans for a situation where, 
in the event of a simultaneous military threat in 
Europe, United States reinforcements currently 
scheduled for rapid deployment to Europe were 
diverted instead to South-West Asia. Not-
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withstanding American assurances that the 
defence of Europe will remain the highest prio-
rity of the United States, the danger of a 
confrontation on two fronts, and of a Soviet 
feint or diversionary move to tie down United 
States forces in the Middle East or South-West 
Asia must be recognis.ed. It can be met prima-
rily by the provision of some additional forces 
by the Europeans themselves, although the 
intervention forces of some European nations, 
notably France and the United Kingdom, are 
by no means negligible and can have a valuable 
role to play out of the NATO area as their res-
pective deployments in recent years to Chad, 
Zai"re, Zimbabwe and the Falkland Islands have 
shown. 
2.9. Secondly, where under the Boon arrange-
ments quoted above NATO collectively recog-
nises that some specific " development beyond 
the NATO area " does indeed " threaten our 
vital interests", the European allies must be 
prepared to facilitate by action within the 
NATO area movements of United States forces, 
or indeed the forces of any other NATO coun-
try, passing through the NATO area. Over-
flying, staging and refuelling and port facilities 
of all sorts may be involved. The United 
States on the other hand cannot expect to 
secure, as it appears to be requesting, open 
ended agreements from its European allies to 
facilitate any future United States troop move-
ments for whatever purpose they may be under-
taken. 
2.1 0. There is a third response which only cer-
tain European allies are in a position to offer. 
Often the early despatch of a very highly 
trained experienced force early in a crisis can 
prevent its development into a full-scale emer-
gency. For this certain European airmobile or 
amphibious units, such as British marines, and 
French paratroops, would be particularly 
appropriate. Certainly an exercised and pre-
planned determination by some European 
countries to bear if only a small part of Ame-
rican out-of-area burdens would greatly 
enhance mutual understanding in the alliance. 
So would improved host-nation support, logis-
tic infrastructure, refuelling, docking and main-
tenance facilities in Europe, not just for 
United States forces assigned to NATO but also 
for United States forces en route to South-West 
Asia. 
2.11. Within the NATO area there is un-
doubtedly potential for increased role speciali-
sation but this is politically a highly sensitive 
issue since defence impinges upon national sus-
ceptibilities on sovereignty in a direct way. 
Few countries are prepared for example totally 
to assign to other nations the protection of their 
air space or the defence of their territory. 
However, the United Kingdom could rationally 
specialise more in naval, air and intervention 
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forces but this could only be at the expense of 
its Brussels Treaty commitment on the conti-
nent in Germany which would be politically 
unwelcome to its allies. The Netherlands 
could logically concentrate its naval forces 
more in the North Sea and Channel, but that 
country understandably sets great store by its 
blue water anti-submarine role in the North 
Atlantic. The Federal Republic could at a cost 
increase still further its land and air forces in 
Central Europe although for demographic rea-
sons it would be difficult and would have 
implications for inner-German relations. France 
in its latest defence plans has already decided to 
modernise the whole spectrum of its nuclear 
capability and Italy with its deployments to the 
peacekeeping forces in Sinai and Lebanon has 
demonstrated its intervention capability and 
concern for security within the Mediterranean 
basin as a whole. 
2.12. In short, geography, history, manpower, 
industrial and economic potential already dic-
tate a substantial degree of national speciali-
sation. Only France and the United Kingdom 
in Europe maintain independent nuclear deter-
rents. Likewise, only Britain and France main-
tain balanced forces in all three services 
together with a substantial overseas intervention 
capability. The Federal Republic of Germany 
is the dominant European nation on the central 
front. The Netherlands concentrates on the 
larger naval vessels which appertain to an ocea-
nic role at sea. The maritime role of Belgium 
is primarily coastal. In air defence there is a 
worrying tendency for Belgium to downgrade its 
air defence commitments, particularly as 
regards its contribution to modernising its sec-
tion of the Hawk SAM belt. Denmark and 
Norway have evolved the concept of total 
defence and have large home guards. Italy 
plays a key role in all three services on the 
southern flank. 
2.13. There is little prospect therefore of any 
dramatic initiative to achieve either a more 
equitable sharing of the burdens or a more cost 
effective defence by means of a rationalisation 
of national roles and responsibilities. Modest 
progress can always be achieved but bold radi-
cal changes would be politically fraught with 
danger. It has to be borne in mind that for an 
alliance committed to deterrence its cohesion 
and unity in peacetime is no less important 
than its combat capability in war. Of course it 
would be logical for the British to do more at 
sea and to concentrate more on intervention 
forces than on the central front, but with the 
German armed forces already fully stretched 
and in view of the alliance strategy of a forward 
defence reliant upon substantial in-place allied 
force contributions, there is no immediate pros-
pect of such a change in allied roles. Never-
theless for the defence of Central Europe there 
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are good military and economic reasons why 
the seven WEU nations at least should better 
co-ordinate their defence policies. Franco-
German military co-operation is valuable for 
European security as is the integration of 
French air defence forces with the NATO early 
warning system. The security of the United 
Kingdom Air Defence Region and Eastern 
Atlantic and Channel Command areas are vital 
for the reinforcement of Europe. It would, 
therefore, be better if national initiatives like 
the United Kingdom defence review of 1981 
and the French defence review of 1983 were the 
subject of prior consultation within at least the 
WEU Council and preferably the Eurogroup 
Council to facilitate appropriate readjustments 
within the alliance. 
2.14. Although the preponderance of the 
Warsaw Pact in both armour and manpower on 
the central front puts a premium on the value 
of mobility, manoeuvre and concentrating 
defence firepower at the decisive point, there is 
such a narrow defence depth available in West 
Germany that the Federal Republic's total com-
mitment to forward defence has been inevitably 
espoused by the alliance as a whole. 
2.15. SACEUR's proposals for the use of emer-
ging technology to develop new land/air tactical 
doctrines to interdict the battlefield more effec-
tively and to prevent the follow-through of 
second echelon Warsaw Pact formations are 
promising but they are no panacea. They will 
be costly and should be regarded as part of the 
evolutionary process of improving the combat 
effectiveness of NATO as and when new 
weapons systems become available. Certainly 
they should increase the confidence of western 
public opinion as these doctrines would appre-
ciably raise the nuclear threshold: But to satisfy 
Western European public opinion the procure-
ment of the new intelligent weaponry and 
precision munitions essential to enhance 
NA TO's air/land capability to offset Warsaw 
Pact armoured preponderance on the central 
front must be achieved on an equitable basis, 
and it should not distort further in the United 
States' favour the alliance defence equipment 
market. 
Ill. Measuring and comparing the defence 
effort 
(a) General 
3 .1. Measuring a country's " defence effort " 
as a general concept is not a simple task; defini-
tions are needed before measurements can be 
made. It is still more difficult to compare the 
defence effort of one NATO country with that 
of another because of different national views of 
the requirements of defence resulting partly 
from social, economic and geographical diffe-
rences, and partly from different political atti-
tudes to defence. Furthermore, financial com-
parisons involving currency conversion may be 
distorted when exchange rates do not closely 
reflect purchasing power. But at least the 
NATO countries can be compared in terms of a 
market economy; comparisons between NATO 
countries and the Warsaw Pact countries with 
their centrally-directed communist economies 
are more conjecturaL not only because of the 
incomplete disclosure of defence expenditure in 
the official Soviet defence budget, but also 
because of the difficulty of assigning com-
parable prices to articles in a communist 
economy. 
3.2. In the 1983 report to Congress on allied 
contributions to the common defence, the 
United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Wein-
berger. points out that ''NATO has not 
developed a precise definition of the burden, nor 
a methodology for measuring it". Recalling 
that "burden-sharing is not a simple compa-
rison of expenditures but must somehow 
translate into equitable sacrifice relative to a 
nation's capability", he quotes from a recent 
NATO report to the effect that: 
" In the last analvsis our assessment and 
comparison of bll'rdens required a collec-
tive act of judgment which cannot be 
substituted by any mechanical principle ... " 
[What should be] "aimed at is an 
assessment of the reasonableness of the 
defence effort of each country, having 
regard to its overall economic position as 
shown by a series of economic indicators. 
This reasonableness would involve a 
broad equality of sacrifice which takes 
into account each country's capacity. " 
Mr. Weinberger continues that "what might be 
added is that the political burden should also be 
considered, as well as offsetting benefits, such as 
industrial contracts and jobs, technological 
fallout. foreign military sales, and political 
freedom of action". 
(b) Defence expenditure 
3.3. Defence effort is usually assessed in terms 
of defence expenditure and in terms of man-
power in the armed services - the so-called 
defence inputs. It is more difficult to assess the 
defence capacity which can be produced from 
those resources. Countries differ in the items 
which they include in their defence budgets, 
and one of the earliest tasks undertaken by the 
NATO international staff, in the framework of 
the annual review, was to draw up a common 
definition of" defence expenditure " for NATO 
purposes. This (unpublished) definition adop-
ted in 1952 is known to include government 
payments to service pension funds, and costs of 
internal security forces that would serve under 
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military command in war. In general, defence 
budgets to NATO definition tend to be slightly 
higher than national defence budgets submitted 
to parliament, largely because it was easier to 
agree on a common NATO definition by includ-
ing items already included in the defence bud-
get of at least one NATO country, rather than 
by excluding items not included in the national 
definitions of a majority of countries. Still 
excluded from the NATO definition, however, 
are items which certain NATO countries would 
consider defence-related. These include actual 
payments of service pensions, war damage, civil 
defence, strategic stockpiling of industrial war 
materials, and, in the case of Germany, major 
host-country support costs, economic assistance 
to Berlin and Turkey. Figures of defence expen-
diture at Appendix I are given to NATO defini-
tion and have been published regularly in com-
mittee reports each year for more than twenty 
years. The European countries today provide 
about 38 % of total NATO defence expenditure 
compared with 24% in 1958 when the com-
mittee first published these statistics. 
3.4. It should be noted that defence effort 
measured in this wav is the total defence effort 
of every NATO country, irrespective of the 
tasks to which particular elements of the armed 
forces may be assigned. Not all defence tasks 
assumed by certain NATO countries would be 
recognised by a majority of the allies as being 
" NA TO-related " defence tasks. In fact no 
attempt has been made to assess defence effort 
in terms of " NA TO-related " defence, partly 
because of the flexibility of defence forces 
which, for example, recently permitted the Uni-
ted Kingdom to repossess the Falkland Islands 
in an operation which most NATO countries 
would not regard as " NA TO-related ", whereas 
the bulk of the forces concerned normally ope-
rate within the NATO area where they are allo-
cated very much to NATO-related tasks. 
Similar examples can be cited in the case of 
military operations conducted in recent years 
by several NATO countries 
(c) Manpower contribution 
3.5. Appendix LB. compares the present man-
power contribution of the NATO countries to 
the armed forces. The European countries col-
lectively provide 60 % of total NATO military 
manpower. The 1983 Weinberger report 
referred to above draws attention to recent 
trends in armed forces manpower - United 
States manpower declined by 19 % between 
1971 and 1981, while non-United States NATO 
manpower declined by about 5 % between 1974 
and 197 5, partly because of reductions in British, 
Italian and Portuguese forces which more than 
offset increases in Turkish manpower. OveralL 
the United States share of the allied total 
(NATO plus Japan in the United States report) 
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fell from 45.9 %in 1971 to 41.7 %in 1981. As 
the European countries except Luxembourg and 
the United Kingdom rely on conscription, 
whereas the United States has purely regular 
forces, there are further hidden defence 
advantages and economic costs of lost oppor-
tunity in the European contribution. The 
defence advantage is the large pool of trained 
reserve manpower which conscription automa-
tically leaves in the population at large after 
completion of compulsory service. This can be 
particularly impressive and important as in the 
case of the Federal Republic of Germany which 
can mobilise its Landwehr rapidly, and in the 
case of Denmark and Norway which have large 
home guards and a concept of" total defence ". 
3.6. The hidden opportunity costs of con-
scripting manpower can be assessed in various 
ways. " If allied manpower costs for 1979 are 
computed at United States pay rates, the value 
of non-United States NATO total defence 
would increase relatively to the United States 
by approximately 20 % reaching a total 
approximately equal to that of the United Sta-
tes. As a result, several countries such as 
Canada, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 
whose average pay and allowances are higher 
than in the United States, would have their 
defence expenditures adjusted downwards; 
others, notably Turkey, Italy, Portugal and 
France, would see theirs increased. " 1 
(tf) Ability to contribute and comparison between 
NATO countries 
3. 7. Defence expenditure statistics published 
by NATO (Appendix I) include some measures 
of ability to contribute - gross domestic pro-
duct; population; and gross domestic product 
per capita - and derive from these comparative 
statistics of national contributions to allied 
defence. The most widely quoted are defence 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and armed 
forces as a percentage of the active population 
because international comparison between these 
figures is not distorted by conversion of natio-
nal currencies. Defence expenditure itself, and 
defence expenditure per capita can only be 
compared when converted to a single currency 
with the reservations noted above. 
3.8. The are, however, limitations in mea-
suring defence expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP. Not all countries can be expected to 
devote the same percentage of their domestic 
product to defence - countries with the lowest 
per capita domestic product will be expected to 
make a prior claim on it to provide basic living 
I. United States Secretary of Defence report to Congress 
on allied contributions to the common defence, March 
1982. 
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standards for the population before making any 
significant contribution to allied defence 
beyond a local domestic defence effort. The 
"wealthier " countries in terms of GDP per 
capita can be expected to have a larger "avail-
able " GDP after basic living standards have 
been met, part of which can then reasonably be 
devoted to allied defence. The graph at 
Appendix 11, therefore, shows defence expendi-
ture as a percentage of GDP plotted against 
GDP per capita. Surprisingly, this graph 
shows a very significant defence effort on the 
part of the three poorest countries of the 
alliance - Turkey, Portugal and Greece - and a 
below average defence effort among some of the 
wealthier countries - Norway, Canada, Den-
mark and Luxembourg. 
3.9. The comparative prosperity of countries 
as measured by GDP per capita, converted to 
dollars at current exchange rates, shows a rela-
tive decline in the position of the United States 
compared with the other allies over the last 
decade. At $11,348 per head for 1980, the 
United States came only seventh among NATO 
countries, among which Norway led with 
$13,766. This perception of ability to contri-
bute has bedevilled the transatlantic argument 
on burden-sharing which is discussed in the fol-
lowing section. It has, however, been pointed 
out that the exchange rates used in this calcula-
tion, and inflation rates assumed for constant 
price comparisons over a period of years, do 
not accurately reflect the purchasing power of 
national currencies. When conversions are 
carried out using purchasing power parity 
instead of fluctuating exchange rates, the 
United States remains a significantly wealthier 
country measured by GDP per capita ($11 ,348 
in 1980) than any other member of the alliance. 
Luxembourg, the second in this table, had only 
$9,430 1• 
3.1 0. Since March 1981, in response to the 
amendment introduced by Senator Levin to the 
fiscal year 1981 Defence Authorisation Act, the 
Secretary of Defence has submitted an annual 
report to Congress on allied commitments to 
defence spending (1981) and allied contribu-
tions to the common defence ( 1982 and 
1983). This report goes into burden-sharing in 
considerable statistical detail. In particular it 
has investigated other possible measures of 
ability to contribute than those mentioned 
above. The most original feature is a " pros-
perity index " which is derived for each country 
first by multiplying that country's percentage 
share of the total allied GDP by its per capita 
GDP expressed as a percentage of the highest per 
capita GDP of any NATO country (Denmark). 
I. Sharing the defence burden, Rainer W. Rupp, Econo-
mic Directorate of the NATO International Staff in NATO 
Review, December 1982. 
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NATO countries' gross domestic product per head 
in 1980, in US$ 
Based on exchange rates Based on purchasing power panty 
Country Index 
US$ NATO= 
100.0 
(0) (I) (2) 
Germany 13,306 137.1 
Denmark 12,957 133.5 
France 12,136 125.0 
Belgium 12,084 124.5 
Luxembourg 12,059 124.2 
Netherlands 11,851 122.1 
United States ll ,348 116.9 
United Kingdom 9,344 96.3 
Italy 6,906 71.1 
Spain 5,648 58.2 
Greece 4,236 43.6 
Portugal 2,423 25.0 
Other NATO 
countries (•) 5,082 52.3 
ToTAL NATO 9,708 100.0 
(•) Canada, Iceland, Norway. Turkey. 
The resultant product is totalled for all NATO 
countries and an individual country " prosperity 
index" is expressed as its percentage share of the 
allied total (" allied " is taken in the Secretary of 
Defence's report as the total for NATO plus 
Japan). Other indicators of ability to contri-
bute contained in the report are : percentage 
share of total allied GDP; percentage share of 
total allied population; per capita GDP as a 
percent of the highest nation. 
3.11. The same report lists seven selected indi-
cators of defence contribution: defence spend-
ing as a share of total allied expenditure; 
defence spending as a percentage increase since 
1971; percentage share of total allied defence 
manpower; percentage increase in defence man-
power since 1971; total active and reserve 
defence manpower share of the allied total; 
ground forces as a percentage share of total 
allied ground forces (expressed in armoured 
division equivalents); and tactical combat air-
craft as a percentage share of the allied total. 
Selected indicators from this report, comparing 
contribution with ability to contribute, are 
reproduced at Appendix Ill. 
3.12. Mr. Weinberger's 1983 report referred to 
above points out that : 
" There are several economic factors 
which contribute to a full understanding 
of the burden actually borne by NATO 
members in their collective defence. The 
nation's particular economic situation 
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Rank 
(3) 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ll 
12 
X 
X 
Index 
US$ NATO= Rank 
100.0 
(4) (5) (6) 
9,411 106.3 3 
9,094 102.7 4 
9,046 102.2 5 
8,924 100.8 6 
9,430 106.5 2 
8,599 97.1 7 
ll ,348 128.2 l 
7,622 86.1 8 
7,205 81.4 9 
5,843 66.0 10 
4,713 53.2 ll 
3,675 41.5 12 
5,508 62.2 X 
8,852 100.0 X 
and its balance of payments position are 
important short-term determinants of the 
assets a nation will find it feasible to make 
available for its defence. A nation's stage 
of economic development is a longer-term 
and less tractable limit on a nation's 
potential commitment. Other more or 
less indirect contributions should also be 
taken into account : resource transfers to 
less developed countries, both official and 
private ; contributions in kind, e.g. land, 
buildings and facilities; lost tax revenue; 
and lost commercial opportunities. Non-
NA TO defence expenses, such as the 
German Government's defence of Berlin, 
must also be considered in order to round 
out the total expenditure picture. " 
(e) Trends of defence expenditure 
3.13. Figures for defence expenditure for a 
single year are less informative than the trend 
of defence expenditure over a number of years, 
partly because with some countries expenditure 
in a single year may be distorted through the 
costs of some equipment procurement pro-
gramme falling particularly heavily in one 
year. Also in 1977 NATO defence ministers 
agreed to increase defence spending " in the 
region of 3 % per annum in real terms " over 
the planning period 1979 to 1984, reaffirmed in 
1980 for the period up to 1986. The extent to 
which countries have fulfilled this commitment 
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can be seen from the table of annual defence 
expenditure, if expressed in constant prices (to 
allow for inflation). NATO, however, has not 
yet been able to reach agreement on the defla-
tors to be applied to defence expenditure in the 
different countries in order to produce a fair 
statement of expenditure at constant prices. 
As a consequence of this, the official NATO 
defence expenditure statistics published each 
December do not include a series of country 
expenditures at constant prices. Curiously, 
however, for the last few years these statistics 
have included figures of defence expenditure 
per capita for six successive years expressed at 
constant prices. These can only have been 
produced through the use of some provisional 
deflator by the NATO staff, and by multiplying 
by the populations concerned it is possible to 
deduce from these figures a table of total 
defence expenditure at constant prices. This 
is shown at Appendix IV. Annual percentage 
increases in real terms actually achieved by 
member countries from 1978 to 1982 have 
fluctuated widely between one year and 
another, and between different countries, 
Greece showing a decrease of 8.8 % between 
1979 and 1980, while Luxembourg recorded the 
largest increase of 16.3% from 1979 to 1980. 
(j) NATO- Warsaw Pact comparisons 
3.14. It is instructive to extend the foregoing 
methodology for international comparison of 
defence inputs to a comparison of the defence 
efforts of the NATO and Warsaw Pact coun-
tries. Most publicity is attracted to East-West 
comparisons of defence output - assessments of 
the defence capability the inputs produce. As 
pointed out in paragraph 3.1, however, to make 
input comparisons an attempt has to be made 
to assign values to the Soviet defence effort in 
terms of western market economies. It is of 
course widely accepted that the officially 
published Soviet defence budget records only 
part of defence expenditure, and is known to 
exclude the large amount spent on research and 
development. 
3.15. For the past fourteen years, the United 
States Government has published annually esti-
mates of Soviet and Warsaw Pact defence 
expenditure in the ACDA series "World Mili-
tary Expenditures and Arms Transfers". Figu-
res for defence expenditure in dollars given in 
this publication are calculated by the CIA on 
the " building block " method whereby separate 
estimates are made of the value of research and 
development (nearly a quarter of the total); 
procurement of equipment and construction 
(about one-halt); and operating costs (a little 
over one-quarter, of which 60 % is personnel 
costs). These official United States estimates 
for NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the United States 
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and the Soviet Union are shown at Appendix 
V. The March 1981 version of World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, quoting 
constant 1977 prices, shows NATO as a whole 
to have outspent the Warsaw Pact in defence 
spending in every year from 1970 to 1978 - the 
last covered in the publication. The March 
1982 version, however. using constant 1978 
prices, shows total Warsaw Pact expenditure 
slightly exceeding that of NATO for the years 
1976 to 1978 inclusive, while NATO again 
overtook the Warsaw Pact in 1979. What, of 
course, is more disturbing for the United States 
authorities was the trend of Soviet defence 
expenditure in these calculations which from 
being less than that of the United States up to 
1970, significantly overtook it in the years 1971 
to 1979 - the last quoted in the 1982 edition. 
Press reports on 7th April of the 1983 edition 
referred to an estimate for Soviet expenditure of 
$188 billion in 1980 compared with United 
States expenditure of $131 billion. However, 
the press one month earlier 1 reported that the 
CIA estimates on which the WMEA T figures 
were based had been revised for the year 1981 
to show Soviet expenditure of $160 billion 
compared with United States $154 billion. 
The basis of the reduction was CIA intelligence 
analysis that the Soviet Union had produced 
less military equipment than predicted, leading 
the CIA to revise downwards its estimate of 
annual increase in Soviet defence expenditure 
from 3 or 4 % to 2 %. Accepted by the State 
Department, the CIA findings had been dispu-
ted by the United States Defence Intelligence 
Agency which had suggested that original esti-
mates of expenditure were correct, but that 
higher costs had led to less equipment being 
produced. 
3.16. Independent academic comparisons of 
Soviet and United States, and of Warsaw Pact 
and NATO expenditure claim that the CIA 
dollar estimates of the components of the Soviet 
defence effort, particularly the research and 
development and manpower costs, are over-
stated. The following bar chart shows two offi-
cial and three independent academic compari-
sons for 1978 which show an excess of NATO 
over Warsaw Pact expenditure ranging from 
about 40% to 5% (excluding of course the 
Warsaw Pact estimate). 
3.17. Estimates of numbers in the armed forces 
are not subject to the uncertainties involved in 
cost comparisons between the unlike economies 
of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The 
United States ACDA WMEAT reports referred 
to above show total NATO armed forces for 
1979 (the latest year available in that publi-
cation) of 5.29 million compared with 6.16 mil-
I. International Herald Tribune, Guard1an. 4th March 
1983. 
lion for the Warsaw Pact. The IISS Military 
Balance estimate for that year is 4.88 million 
for NATO compared with 4.76 million for the 
Warsaw Pact; the difference is unexplained. 
The latest IISS estimates for 1982 are NATO 
5.35 million; Warsaw Pact 4.82 million. 
Military expenditures of the major 
alliances, 1978- five 1•iews 
~ill1on dollars 
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2. US Arms Control and D1sarmament Agency, World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1969-78. 
3. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Mili-
tary Balance, I 979-80, (IISS has since discontinued publi-
cation of an estimate for USSR). 
4. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SJPRI Yearbook 1981. 
5. Thts publication, Table Il. 
Source World Military and Social Expenditures 
1981. Ruth Leger Sivard. Pubhsher World Priorities Inc. 
Burden-sharing in NATO compared with the Warsaw Pact 
Defence effort 
Man- Ex pen-
power dtturc 
United States ............. 40% 62% 
Rest ofNATO ............ 60% 38% 
Soviet Union ••••• 0 ••••• 0. 81% 93% 
Rest of Warsaw Pact ....... 19% 7% 
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3.18. As far as burden-sharing within the 
Warsaw Pact is concerned, it should of course be 
pointed out that the allies of the Soviet Union 
contribute a far smaller percentage of the total 
Warsaw Pact effort than the Europeans contri-
bute to NATO, a situation that reflects the 
disparity in populations and national products 
of the countries concerned. 
IV. The transatlantic debate 
4.1. The burden-sharing debate at the present 
time has arisen largely through United States, 
especially Congressional, perceptions of sup-
posed shortcomings on the part of the European 
allies. These include inadequate European 
contributions to what the United States believes 
the allied defence effort should be, or failure of 
the European allies to follow United States 
policy in economic and political relations with 
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. 
Typical of some attitudes in Congress, seeking 
reductions in public spending yet believing that 
United States superiority in naval and air 
power was its chief guarantee of protection 
from the Soviet Union, was the enactment by 
the Senate last autumn requiring the level of 
United States troops stationed ashore in Europe 
by the end of fiscal year 1983 (30th September) 
not to exceed their real levels at September 
1982 (315,600). The move led by Senator Ste-
vens, Chairman of the Defence Subcommittee 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, had 
originally sought a freeze at the lower level of 
March 1980. 
4.2. The United States Administration itself 
has to face both ways - at times assuring 
Congress that the European allies make a large 
proportionate contribution to the total allied 
defence effort, at others exhorting the Euro-
peans to make a bigger effort, or to align them-
selves more closely with United States policy 
towards the Soviet Union. 
4.3. Typical of the first is evidence given by 
Mr. Eagleburger, Under-Secretary of State. to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on 26th 
March 1982 on " the critical importance of 
maintaining the United States military presence 
in Europe". Noting that over the thirty years 
since the creation of NATO "the United 
States-Soviet balance has moved from United 
States superiority to, at best, a precarious 
balance, with powerful adverse trends", he 
asserted that " we are now running hard to 
make up for nearly a generation of neglect in 
our military programmes. The allies in 
contrast, have turned in a remarkably steady 
performance. Roughly speaking they have sus-
tained an increase of between 2 and 3 % for 
more than a decade. " 
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4.4. The Secretary of Defence's annual 
reports to Congress referred to above 1, submit-
ted in accordance with the Levin amendment to 
the 1981 Defence Authorisation Act, provide a 
systematic, objective, and on the whole opti-
mistic assessment of the European contribu-
tion. In the words of the 1981 report : 
"There is no question that the United 
States and its allies can provide the forces 
necessary to meet the Soviet threat and to 
execute agreed NATO strategy. Collec-
tively we have more than adequate 
resources - human, industrial, technolo-
gical and financial - to provide a reason-
able margin of security ... 
The NATO allies maintain on active 
duty about three million men and women 
compared with about two million for the 
United States and 250,000 for Japan. If 
we include reserves... the allied total is 
over six million compared with about 
three million for the United States. If 
we add civilian defence manpower ... the 
totals come to just under eight million for 
the allies and just over four million for 
the United States. The GDP of all the 
non-United States NATO nations combi-
ned represents around 45 % of the NATO 
and Japan total. Our NATO allies 
account for over 60 % of total NATO 
and Japan ground combat capability, 
around 55 % of the tactical air force com-
bat aircraft and around 50 % of the total 
tonnage of naval surface combatants and 
submarines. " 
4.5. "... We have devised for the purposes 
of this report a number of indices of 
burden-sharing and have developed an 
overall assessment. We believe this 
approach - while imperfect and certainly 
not agreed by the allies - can give a 
better perspective of burden-sharing than 
any one individual indicator. Using this 
formulation, the aggregated NATO allies 
appear to be shouldering their fair share 
of the total NATO and Japan defence 
burden." 
4.6. The 1983 report finds similar percentages 
for the non-United States contribution to the 
forces of NATO and Japan combined. Measur-
ing ground forces in armoured division 
equivalents, this shows a contribution by Europe 
and Canada combined of 56% of all ground 
forces available to NATO plus Japan, compared 
with less than 40% provided by the United 
States. Measuring navies by tonnage, the 
corresponding percentages are 33% compared 
I. On allied commitments to defence spending, March 
1981; and on allied contributions to the common defence, 
March 1982. 
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with 64 % for the United States; or, when 
measured in terms of principal combat ships, 
over 40% provided by Europe plus Canada 
compared with 50% by the United States. For 
totals of combat aircraft the figures are 48% each 
for the United States and Europe. If the 
Japanese percentage is subtracted from the totals 
concerned, the corresponding contributions 
work out as follows: 
European 
NATO 
+ Canada 
United 
States ... 
NATO .. 
Percentage contributions 
(recalculated to exclude Japan) 
Ground Naval forces 
forces 
(as by pnna!Xll 
armoured by 
surface division tonnage 
eqwvalents) combatant 
58 34 45 
42 66 55 
100 100 100 
Tact1cal 
a1rcraft 
50 
50 
100 
Mr. Weinberger's 1983 report concludes, as 
previous reports have done, that " based on the 
major quantifiable measures examined for this 
report. the United States appears to be doing 
somewhat more than its fair share of the NATO 
and Japan total", but recognises that: "The 
allies might argue: (1) that the United States is 
getting full value for the extra effort it appears to 
be expending and (2) that its leadership role 
obligates it to do more than simply achieve a 
statistically computed fair share . " It recognises 
that " the non-United States NATO allies appear 
to be shouldering roughly their fair share of the 
NATO and Japan defence burden ... '' but 
"among the non-United States NATO nations 
there are wide differences regarding the amount 
of burden shared, with some countries doing far 
less than seems equitable. " 
4. 7. The informal meeting of defence minis-
ters of all European NATO countries, except 
France but now including Spain, known as 
Eurogroup regularly publishes its assessment of 
the European contribution to defence within 
the alliance. The last communique of 29th 
November 1982 noted a more favourable Euro-
pean share than did the foregoing reports : 
"4. Within the NATO partnership, Euro-
group countries participating in NA TO's 
integrated military structure make a sub-
stantial and significant contribution to 
the alliance's military forces. Their act-
ive armed forces total some two-and-a-
half million and they provide approxima-
tely 75% of NATO's readily available 
ground forces in Europe, 7 5 % of the 
tanks, 65% of the air forces and 60% of 
the warships ... " 
A list of new military equipment being intro-
duced by the Eurogroup countries was appen-
ded. The percentages would of course be 
increased if account were taken of French 
forces. 
4.8. In the light of the foregoing authoritative 
assessments, and the Rapporteur's extensive dis-
cussio~s in NATO, SHAPE, and Bonn, the 
committee concludes that on the whole the 
European countries are providing a very rea-
sonable share of the allied defence burden. 
Required improvements in the European effort 
call for a long-term commitment to steady 
enhancement, particularly in " sustainability " 
of the conventional forces - the ability to offer 
sustained resistance beyond the first few days of 
any possible attack. This requires an improve-
ment in the ammunition stockpiles of many 
countries and in rapidly available reserves to 
relieve the combat fatigue of forward troops, 
although there is more insistence in some 
quarters on the need to be able to "re-establish 
deterrence " if the forward defences were in 
danger of being overrun. Certainly a 4 % 
increase in real terms in defence budgets called 
for by SACEUR to provide new generations of 
conventional equipment and weapons to permit 
detailed reconnaissance, target acquisition and 
selective attack on the second echelon of Soviet 
forces will not be forthcoming; the need is 
rather for steady investment in new weapons 
technology as proven weapon systems become 
available. Mr. Weinberger's emerging techno-
logy on which he has reported to NATO can be 
incorporated only progressively into the NATO 
armoury. 
4.9. With the present United States Admin-
istration there have been significant failures of 
allied consultation. President Reagan's address 
to the National Association of Evangelicals on 
8th March 1983- dubbed the" Darth Vaders" 
speech by the Washington establishment -
portraying the Soviet Union as an implacably 
hostile power reveals an outlook not shared by 
European, governments. His proposal for 
research on new ABM systems in his television 
address of 23rd March - dubbed the "Star 
Wars" speech was not conveyed by 
Mr. Weinberger attending the Nuclear Plan-
ning Group of NATO defence ministers in 
Portugal a few hours earlier the same day. 
Mr. Weinberger was either himself unaware 
that the proposal would be made, or still 
hoping that President Reagan would heed the 
advice of Department of Defence advisers not 
to make the proposal. It is a lesser failure of 
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communication that the otherwise valuable 
briefings given to the committee in the Pen-
tagon only a few hours before the Presidential 
speech should have contained no inkling of the 
ABM proposal. 
4.10. Differences between the present United 
States Administration and European govern-
ments in general policy issues related to defence 
are frankly recognised in the Secretary of State's 
1982 and 1983 reports on allied contributions to 
the common defence already quoted in the 
burden-sharing context above : 
" Emphasising social and economic viabi-
lity as their first priority, many Euro-
peans continue to view the Soviet threat 
less seriously than the United States. 
Moreover, United States and European 
views of how best to counter the Soviet 
threat remain divergent, in spite of major 
United States efforts over the past year to 
portray the threat graphically for Euro-
pean elites and publics... Europeans 
believe Soviet policy can be moderated 
through traditional forms of social, eco-
nomic and political contact. They are 
less enthusiastic than the United States 
about the build-up of military force as a 
counter to the Soviet challenge. " 
Referring to foregone economic benefits of 
defence contributions, the report continues : 
" Occasionally however the common 
interest is overridden. An especially 
painful example occurred during 1981 
and early 1982 when several allies opted 
in favour of economic expediency rather 
than defence interests in agreeing to the 
West Siberian pipeline despite strong 
opposition by the United States. In this 
case some NATO countries chose to 
place the interests of their domestic 
industry ahead of national security consi-
derations. This occurred even though it 
was far from clear that the cost of deli-
vered natural gas would be economical, 
given the hidden charges in the long-
term bargain struck with the Soviet 
Union. In addition, despite the projec-
ted massive dependency on Soviet gas of 
western areas such as Bavaria, no safe-
guards have been planned by the allies to 
offset the danger of a gas cut-off. This 
is a very critical development in the 
alliance and it may have serious conse-
quences in the future. " 
4.11. The 1983 report of the Secretary of State is 
a substantially longer document which, in taking 
fuller account of many political considerations. 
is more moderate in its criticism of United 
States allies but still attempts to prescribe 
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policies for allied countries with the single-
minded aim of improving allied defence: 
" While many of the solutions advanced 
by the peace movements of the last several 
years would, in fact, undermine the 
prospects for lasting stability and security 
in Europe and worldwide, these move-
ments do reflect many deeply felt concerns 
of free citizens in our western democracies 
about key issues of survival and security 
and human decency. The United States 
and allied governments must deal serious-
ly and forthrightly with these concerns, 
making their policies and the sacrifices 
needed to implement those policies intel-
ligible and supportable by the citizenry. 
Examining the record sheet against the 
backdrop of these political and politico-
economic constraints, it is clear that 
despite shortfalls between targets and 
achievements there is much concrete 
evidence that our partners are taking 
seriously the principle of burden-sharing. 
- In almost all cases. defence spending 
was accorded a degree of priority over 
social spending, i.e. while the defence 
budgets may not have increased in most 
cases at the target 3%, social spending 
was similarly restrained. or even decrea-
sed in real terms. 
- The allies are moving forward steadily 
on bilateral arrangements for expanded 
wartime host nation support, much of 
which is committed on a non-reim-
bursable or on a ' cost ' basis. Thev 
are also making further efforts to reduc~ 
United States costs in improving United 
States force facilities and the quality of life 
for United States personnel abroad. 
- Over the past several years. the allies 
have agreed on expanded construction 
programmes financed by common funding 
under the NATO infrastructure programme. 
In response to United States concerns, 
criteria were broadened to permit fin-
ancing of certain types of projects (e.g. 
storage sites for United States forces) 
previously funded entirely by the United 
States. By decision of the Defence 
Ministers in December 1982. NATO now 
has under study the question of further 
augmentation of the infrastructure 
programme. 
- NA TO's evaluation and planning pro-
cedures have been steadily improved to 
assure more rational and effective alloca-
tion of resources to assigned missions. 
- In terms of political burden-sharing, the 
allies are holding firm, despite the Soviet 
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· peace offensive · and elements of organ-
ised domestic opposition, in their basic 
support of NA TO's 1979 decision on 
intermediate-range nuclear force moderni-
sation and arms control efforts. 
- Our NATO partners have formally 
recognised that certain out-of-area 
developments can impact on vitai western 
interest. that individual alliance members 
may have to take actions to protect those 
interests and that other partners can 
contribute to the common cause by faci-
litating such actions, while all take appro-
priate compensating measures to assure 
the maintenance of an adequate defence 
posture in Europe. 
- While divergencies of policy have 
received major media and popular atten-
tion, there has, in fact, been a con-
siderable degree of consensus on responses 
to such developments as Poland and 
Afghanistan, and a significant degree of 
allied co-operation and co-ordination, 
both with respect to national measures 
and to actions in multilateral fora. " 
4.12. The 1983 report goes into some detail 
concerning support by NATO allies for United 
States "out of (NATO) area" activities, 
referring in particular to South-West Asia: 
"NATO ministerial communiques in the 
spring and fall of 1982, as well as the 
NATO summit declaration of June 1982, 
make clear allied recognition of the impor-
tance of out-of-area developments to the 
alliance. During 1982, we worked closely 
with our NATO allies in the development 
of specific steps which they can take to 
assist in the defence of vital western 
interests in South-West Asia. One of the 
most significant contributions the allies 
can make is to compensate for United 
States forces which might be diverted 
from the defence of NATO to deal with 
a South-West Asian contingency. The 
NATO military authorities are in the 
process of developing their recommenda-
tions for compensatory measures. We 
expect these to form the basis for specific 
compensatory measures to be included in 
the national force goals of the allies. 
Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in December 1979, the allies have taken a 
number of actions in connection with 
South-West Asia. These include: 
(1) Following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, NATO developed a series of 
measures to improve alliance defence and 
give a clear signal of alliance resolve to the 
Soviets. For the most part, these 
measures called for the acceleration of 
measures already in the 1981-86 NATO 
force goals and in the long-term defence 
programme. They included such areas as 
acceleration of the introduction of major 
equipment. readiness. reinforcement, 
reserve mobilisation, war reserve stocks. 
maritime measures, air defence. host 
nation support, communications, electro-
nic warfare, and aid to Portugal and 
Turkey. Many of these measures were 
implemented and most NATO nations 
participated in their implementation. 
(2) The United Kingdom and France, and 
more recently Italy, have contributed 
directly to stability in the SW A area 
through deployment of forces to the 
rcg10n. 
(3) Some NATO allies maintain con-
tinuing security relationships in SW A : 
The United Kingdom maintains close ties 
and provides advisors in Oman. France 
maintains a close security relationship 
with Djibouti and maintains forces there. 
(4) The United Kingdom has provided 
support through arrangements for United 
States use for Diego Garcia. 
(5) Eight nations have contributed to 
United States RDJTF annual exercises in 
South-West Asia in 1980, 81 and 82. 
through provision of overflight rights and 
en route access and support for deploying 
United States forces. 
(6) Ten NATO nations with suitable 
vessels have contributed to the com-
mitment of 600 allied commercial ships 
to supplement United States shipping in 
the reinforcement of NATO-Europe. 
These ship commitments would make 
possible a greater United States effort in 
South-West Asia should a SWA action 
and the need for reinforcement of Europe 
become simultaneous. 
(7) Nine NATO nations with suitable 
aircraft have committed allied civil long-
range cargo aircraft and arc in process of 
committing civil wide-body passenger 
aircraft to supplement United States 
aircraft in the reinforcement of NATO-
Europe. These European aircraft also 
provide the United States greater flexi-
bility with respect to a SW A deployment. " 
4.13. The tendency of the present United 
States Administration to assume that its 
approach to East-West relations is the correct 
one for the alliance as a whole has led to an 
increase in consultation on defence and security 
issues among the European countries indepen-
dently of the United States, and for calls for 
further improvement in such arrangements -
discussed in the next chapter. 
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V. The European pillar 
(a) General 
5.1. There is a growing feeling today among 
European members of NATO, reflected strongly 
among members of the committee, that the 
European members of the alliance must concert 
their views, on the main principles of allied 
defence policy and strategy as they affect Euro-
peans. 
5.2. Lord Carrington, in the 1983 Alistair 
Buchan Memorial lecture, delivered in London 
on 21st April 1983, called for a more confident 
approach to East-West relations, stressing the 
existing military strength ofthe West: 
·· Today we are entitled to approach our 
problems. and particularly those of East-
West relations, with more confidence. 
We are now in a position of considerable 
strength, not only militarily, but econo-
mically and politically too... It is a plain. 
simple fact that, for a third of a century. 
the alliance has succeeded in this primary 
aim of deterring an attack on Western 
Europe. This has been achieved by a 
combination of military strength and 
political will... Do not let us overlook 
the size of existing nuclear forces in the 
West. not to speak of their accuracy. 
Look too at the quality of our conven-
tional forces and take into account the 
advantages enjoyed by the armies of a 
free alliance. compared with the conscrip-
ted countries of the Warsaw Pact... It is 
my view that one of the reasons for the 
upsurge of nuclear debate in the West is 
that this mood of sobriety and calm 
resolution has not always been encouraged 
by western governments... We must also 
breed a mood of sober and responsible 
self-confidence about the military balance. 
We must know ourselves when enough is 
enough, and we must have the patience as 
well as the power to dissuade the Russians 
from their antiquated habits of over-
insurance. And finally. we must make 
absolutely clear our belief that arms 
control is in everybody's self-interest, not 
only economically but in terms of real 
security... Our own tradition must be for 
the peaceful resolution of potential 
conflict through energetic and forceful 
dialogue. The notion that we should face 
the Russians down in a silent war of 
nerves, broken only by bursts of 
megaphone diplomacy, is based on a 
misconception of our own values, of 
Soviet behaviour, and of the anxious 
aspirations of our own peoples... There 
arc those who regard dialogue itself as 
dangerous - and so it might be if we were 
talking from a clear position of weakness. 
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But armed as we are, and with the long-
term structural advantages the West 
enjoys, who can possibly claim that this 
was the case ?" 
5.3. Lord Carrington also stressed the role of 
Europe: 
"The United States was among the prime 
movers towards European unity after the 
war. There were some suggestions last 
year that, economically as well as poli-
tically the Americans might be having 
some regrets... The political integration 
of Europe does not threaten the alliance ... 
indeed, it is a major contribution to its 
cohesion... Nor can there any longer be 
any serious suspicion about domination : 
' one free people cannot govern another 
free people ' ... but the increased weight of 
Europe in the alliance brings increased 
responsibilities... I can think of three 
areas where much could be done at 
minimal cost. The first is in the rationa-
lisation of a production of arms... the 
second is in a more rational division of 
labour between major European members 
of the alliance... the third area where 
Europe can pull its weight more effectively 
lies in what I would call national security 
consciousness... Like the French, we 
would do well to think of defence in more 
national terms. If we do, we come 
inescapably to the conclusion that nation-
ally we can do little to augment the 
combined power of the alliance apart from 
fulfilling our NATO obligations ; but that 
collectively in Europe we could do much. 
Over the past few years, we have devel-
oped a new political consciousness m 
Europe through the mechanisms of 
political co-operation. We now need to 
build, equally cautiously, but equally 
purposefully, a European security cons-
ciousness too. Not as an alternative to 
the Atlantic partnership, but as a comple-
ment to it. " 
5.4. Mr. Mauroy, the French Prime Minister, 
in his traditional address to the French Institut 
des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale on 
20th September 1983, devoted half his speech to 
French loyalty to its alliances and its contri-
bution to reducing tension and crises in the 
world. While stressing the autonomy of French 
decision, he affirmed that "France has always 
asserted its loyalty to the objectives of the 
Atlantic Alliance and has known how to 
demonstrate it. " He recalled the French links 
with NATO and the existence of staff agree-
ments with NATO commands for the possible 
effective operation of French forces. But" ifwe 
feel very much at ease within the Atlantic 
Alliance, we do not want to develop over the 
years an alliance with different speeds" ... which 
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would happen " if our integrated partners were 
to accept for themselves additional obligations 
which do not appear in the signed treaties and 
which, for our part, we would refuse... From 
the American side over the last ten years the 
trend has been towards a 'globalisation ' of all 
terms of the threat. Consequently, in their eyes, 
the response also should be 'globalised '. This 
is true in particular in the economic field. 
Some would like to see East-West economic 
relations integrated into the security strategy of 
the alliance... France, for its part, does not 
share this analysis. To embark upon a logic of 
economic blockade is to embark on the logic of 
war .... the alliance must not take this road. It 
must not go outside its 'subject'." Similarly, 
Mr. Mauroy was opposed to a geographical 
enlargement of the zone of the alliance which 
was limited to the Atlantic area, north of the 
Tropic of Cancer : " Considering that the Soviet 
threat has become worldwide, the temptation 
has arisen for an equally worldwide response. 
This is not the French view. Extending beyond 
the Atlantic region, an East-West area of 
confrontation, in fact, faces third countries with 
a Manichean choice... Moreover, we have 
specifically refused this, both in Central America 
as well as for Chad or the Middle East. " 
Mr. Mauroy did not, however, exclude South-
West Asia, where French contribution to 
stability and security relationships has been 
welcomed by the United States 1 and 
Mr. Mauroy recognised that " problems outside 
the North Atlantic area can be the subject of an 
exchange of views between allies, but they 
remain matters for purely national decision. " 
5.5. Like Lord Carrington, Mr. Mauroy then 
turned for a while to security in Europe. "At 
the beginning of this address I made a precise 
analysis of our links with our partners in the 
Atlantic Alliance, since everyone can see they 
are decisive. But France endeavours to main-
tain other links, in Western European Union, for 
instance. This European organisation is the 
only one which can tackle matters relating to 
defence and securitv... France considers that 
European solidaritv enhances Atlantic solidaritv 
without being merged with zt. The similarity ~I 
the geo-strategic problems facing the European 
countries should lead them to take speczfic 
common decisions. In this respect, WEU can.be 
a privileged forum for reflection. " 2 Here, 
Mr. Mauroy appeared to echo a suggestion 
made by a former French Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Jobert, who said to the WEU Assembly in 
November 1973: "If all its members were in 
agreement, WEU could constitute a valid 
framework for the dialogue and reflection which 
I have just suggested. " Mr. Mauroy then 
recalled that WEU was also the only European 
I. See paragraph 4.12 above. 
2. Rapporteur's Italics. 
body where elected representatives could discuss 
defence. He continued : " In the years to come 
we must devote our efforts to developing the 
means of Europe's independence without sacri-
ficing what has, for the past thirty years, been 
the independent guarantee of our security ... 
The notion of the defence of Europe must be 
distinguished from that of European defence. 
The idea of European defence implies an 
integrated collective organisation which could be 
set up only if a single political authority 
existed. Conversely, the European public's 
awareness of the imbalances which have 
emerged in the East-West ratio of forces makes 
the idea of the ' defence of Europe ' particularly 
topical. " Mr. Mauroy's practical suggestions 
which followed included a reference to the new 
emphasis given to the military provisions of the 
Franco-German treaty of 1963, and the need for 
a concerted armaments production policy in 
Europe, a concept which France appears to be 
promoting through the recent tripartite meeting 
ofthe defence ministers of France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom. 
5.6. The European pillar of the alliance must 
be strengthened. That observation has been 
made many times before. The question on 
which there is less agreement is on what 
topics and to what extent should the Europeans 
consult independently, and in what institutional 
framework ? Several are available and are 
considered separately below. 
(b) Western European Union 
5.7. Western European Union is primarily a 
defence organisation as Article V of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty makes clear. After signa-
ture of the treaty by the original five members 
in 1948, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, as 
WEU was then known, created its own Western 
Union Defence Organisation and established 
the first post-war allied headquarters at Fon-
tainebleau. But even in the eyes of the five 
signatories WUDO was a stop-gap, awaiting the 
signature of the North Atlantic Treaty which 
took place the following year. Once the NATO 
integrated military structure was in place the 
BTO dissolved its own defence organisation as 
superfluous and transferred its existing military 
headquarters and infrastructure programme to 
NATO. The relevant resolution of the Council 
of 20th September 1950 is worth quoting: 
" Resolution by the Consultative Council 
of the Brussels Treaty Organisation of 
20th December 1950 on the fiaure of 
the organisation of western defence in 
the light of the creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation military 
structure 1 
I. Reproduced previously in Document 29, 3rd October 
1956, and Document 557, 16th November 1971. 
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l. The Consultative Council have consi-
dered the suggestion of the North 
Atlantic Council that the Brussels Treaty 
powers should review the status of the 
Western Union Defence Organisation in 
the light of the establishment of an 
overall North Atlantic Treaty Command 
Organisation. 
2. The Consultative Council have 
noted: 
(i) that it has been decided to 
dissolve the existing European 
Regional Planning Groups with 
their Regional Chiefs-of-Staff and 
principal Staff Officers Commit-
tees; 
(ii) the view of the North Atlantic 
Council that, when the new 
NATO Command Organisation 
is established, it will be unneces-
sary and undesirable to have a 
parallel Western Union Com-
mand and that the new Head-
quarters suggested for Western 
Europe should be directly under 
SHAPE and should not be res-
ponsible to the Western Union 
Defence Committee. 
3. The Council agree that, in the light 
of this re-organisation, the continued 
existence of the Western Union Defence 
Organisation in its present form is no 
longer necessary. They accordingly 
instruct the Permanent Commission to 
consider in consultation with the Western 
Union Military Committee, acting on the 
instructions of the Defence Ministers, 
how the proposed re-organisation can 
best be effected and what military machi-
nery, if any, needs to be retained under 
the Brussels Treaty. 
4. The Council affirm that these new 
arrangements will in no way affect the 
obligations assumed towards each other 
by the signatory powers under the Brus-
sels Treaty. In particular, the Consult-
ative Council established under Arti-
cle VII, including the non-military 
organs set up under the Council, will 
continue to function, and the reorganisa-
tion of the military machinery shall not 
affect the right of the Western Union 
Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff to 
meet as they please to consider matters of 
mutual concern to the Brussels Treaty 
powers." 
It will be noted in particular that under para-
graph 4 of the resolution the new arrangements 
"shall not affect the right of the Western Union 
defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff to meet as 
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they please to consider matters of mutual 
concern to the Brussels Treaty powers". 
5.8. However, since that date defence min-
isters and chiefs-of-staff have not met in the 
Brussels Treaty framework, and when the treaty 
was modified in 19 54 to create the seven 
member WEU the 1950 resolution was in effect 
confirmed in the new Article IV of the modi-
fied treaty which expressly provides that NATO 
military bodies will not be duplicated : 
"In the execution of the treaty, the high 
contracting parties and any organs estab-
lished by them under the treaty shall 
work in close co-operation with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Recognising the undesirability of dupli-
cating the military staffs of NATO, the 
Council and its Agency will rely on the 
appropriate military authorities of NATO 
for information and advice on military 
matters." 
In fact, under the terms of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty the military provisions concerning 
levels of forces and control of armaments incor-
porated in Protocols Nos. 11, Ill and IV, are 
inextricably linked to the integrated military 
structure of NATO which is made responsible 
in part for implementation of some of the WEU 
treaty obligations. 
5.9. While the Council recognises that its 
defence responszbihties - notably under Art-
icles V and VIII of the treaty - are not dimi-
nished by post-1950 arrangements, the desirable 
extent of the Council's defence activities has 
been the subject of debate between the Council 
and the Assembly ever since the latter was estab-
lished under the same 19 54 modifications. 
As a consequence of this debate the Council 
was led in 19 57 to define formally the scope of 
its residual defence and related activities. The 
seven governments considered that the activities 
of the Council in the field of defence questions 
and armaments should relate only to : 
"(a) matters which the contracting par-
ties wish to raise, especially under 
Article VIII; 
(b) the level of forces of member states; 
(c) the maintenance of certain United 
Kingdom forces on the continent; 
(d) the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments; 
(e) the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee. " 1 
l. Second annual report of the Council. Document 3 7. 
25th February 1957. 
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Since then it is understood that no government 
has in fact raised any matter under Article VIII 
of the treaty, so that Council defence activities 
have been limited to discussion of force level 
limitations, arms control and Standing Arma-
ments Committee matters disc-ussed in another 
report by the committee 1• As the committee 
points out in that report. on the basis of e.'\ten-
sive quotations from ministers of member coun-
tries who have addressed the Assembly, 
although member governments today are unani-
mous in stressing the importance of the Assem-
bly's functions as a contribution to public 
debate on defence issues, no WEU government 
has proposed that the defence activities of the 
WEU Council should be increased; indeed, 
Mr. Cheysson, Minister for External Relations 
of France, reporting to the French National 
Assembly on 6th June 1982 on his earlier 
address to the WEU Assembly, commented 
specifically on the lack of any great future for 
the executive of WEU : 
"The other day, on behalf of the French 
Government, I addressed the Assembly of 
WEU, not because the executive of WEU 
seems to have a very great future but 
because the Assembly is an elected one ... 
competent to handle these [defence] mat-
ters, which must be discussed among 
members of parliament... " 
The French Prime Minister, Mr. Mauroy, on 
the other hand. has recently referred to WEU as 
a possible " privileged forum for reflection" (see 
paragraph 5.5. above). 
5.1 0. The fact that despite intermittent urging 
by the Assembly over the last twenty-five years 
the Council since 1950 has chosen not to dis-
cuss allied defence planning, is not in itself a 
reason why it should not do so at the present 
time. It should be noted that. on 21st Septem-
ber 1983, the WEU Council at Permanent 
Representative level issued a press release in 
which it " strongly condemned the destruction of 
a civil airliner of the Korean Airlines on 
31st August 1983. They deeply deplored this 
action caused by Soviet military aircraft which 
resulted in the tragic loss of a great number of 
human lives ... ''. This appears to have been the 
first political statement by the WEU Council to 
have been made public since April 1970, and 
was partly motivated by the failure of the 
European polit1cal co-operation machinery 
under Greek chairmanship to issue any similar 
condemnation. The committee believes that 
without seeking to replace the organs of NATO 
concerned with detailed allied defence planning, 
and taking full account of member states' 
obligations to NATO, the Council of WEU 
I. ApplicatiOn of the Brussels Treaty - repl) to the 
twenty-eighth annual report of the Council. Document 948. 
should today deepen and improve its defence 
deliberations. The advantages of reviving 
Brussels Treaty defence activities in this way are 
obvious: the seven member countries collect-
ively provide the great bulk of the European 
defence contribution to NATO : their forces man 
the vital central front: they include all the most 
important defence production industries in 
Europe : they include all the countries on whose 
territory it is proposed to deploy a new 
generation of intermediate-range nuclear mis-
siles if the INF talks fail. Most important, 
France, which has withdrawn its forces from the 
integrated military structure of NATO. remains a 
full member of WEU as does the only other 
European nuclear power. the United Kingdom. 
5.11. There is. of course. a political disadvan-
tage in discussing collective defence policy 
among only an inner nucleus of European 
allies. Your Rapporteur was made very much 
aware of it during his extensive discussions in 
preparing the present report, and it has 
obviously inhibited member governements in 
making any such use of WEU since 1950. Any 
proposal for a "caucus" meeting of European 
countries within NATO is a delicate matter 
because of the obvious exclusion of the United 
States and Canada from such discussions. Anv 
inner caucus meeting of seven countries within 
the fourteen European allies will be particularly 
resented by the remaining seven just as much as 
suggestions for defence meetings of a " big 
three " or " big four" - put forward occasionally 
in the past have been bitterly resented by other 
members of WEU. As it happens the peri-
pheral European members of NATO, although 
the defence efforts of some of them may appear 
smaller than the average contribution of 
European countries, all make a vital contri-
bution to allied defence through the strategic 
location of their mainland and island territories 
which almost completely block sea and air 
access of Soviet forces to the open oceans, or 
provide important naval bases, maritime patrol 
bases and submarine listenmg posts. Norway 
and Turkey alone among NATO countries have 
common frontiers with the Soviet Union itself. 
5.12. For the foregoing reasons many members 
of the committee feel that in any attempt to 
agree on a European approach to the main 
principles of allied defence strategy it is essen-
tial to ensure the participation of all European 
members of NATO. On a number of occa-
sions in the past the Assembly has recommen-
ded that other European NATO countries 
should be invited to join WEU 1; the Council 
has never agreed to extend such invitations 
knowing that they would not be taken up as 
was once made clear by one of the countries 
I. Recommendation 41 of 3rd December 1959: Recom-
mendation 3 72 of I st December 1981. 
171 
DOCUMENT 959 
concerned 1 • The political obstacles to acce~­
sion to the modified Brussels Treatv bv other 
European allies are several: first ·the- treaty 
embodies many outdated restrictions on force 
ceilings and internal arms control: secondly 
accession at the present late stage could be seen 
as a vote of no-confidence in NATO and in the 
United States commitment which is particularly 
important to the countries of the periphery. 
Lastly, some European allies may not wish to 
subscribe to the terms of the mutual defence 
obligations in Article V of the Brussels Treaty 
which are more constraining than the corres-
ponding Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
5.13. For all these reasons the draft recommen-
dation proposes in paragraph B.l that the 
Council should consider and report to the 
Assembly on the expansion and deepening of its 
European defence activities. The defence 
activities of the WEU Assemb!v remain uncon-
troversial. The draft resolution included in this 
report recalls the earlier Resolution 15 of 
the Assembly adopted on 18th June 1959, on a 
report from the Presidential Committee' 
whereby the Assembly considered the interests 
"of member states of NATO which are not 
members of WEU " and decided that the 
committee could invite observers from any 
NATO country to attend its meetings with the 
right to speak. In implementation of that reso-
lution. the committee did in fact invite 
parliamentary observers from Denmark and 
Norway, some of whom duly attended meetings 
at that time, but the practice appears to have 
fallen into abeyance. The draft resolution now 
proposed would specifically invite parliamentary 
observers from all European NATO countries 
not members of WEU to participate with the 
right to speak in meetings of the committee 
which will be concerned with the preparation of 
the forthcoming report on the state of European 
security. In paragraph 4 (b) of the draft 
recommendation the committee also proposes 
that the Assembly should assist governments in 
explaining to the European public and 
parliaments the contribution which the United 
States makes to allied defence. 
(c) Eurogroup 
5.14. Eurogroup describes itself as " an infor-
mal association of defence ministers of Euro-
pean member governments within the frame-
work of NATO ... " open to all European mem-
bers of the alliance. It was founded in 1968 at 
the suggestion of Mr. Denis Healey (the then 
United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence) 
" as a means of responding to a widespread 
desire for closer European co-operation within 
l. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 41. 
1 Text at Appendix IX. 
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the alliance " 1• In particular, the Eurogroup 
" provides an informal forum for an exchange 
of views by defence ministers on major poli-
tical/strategic questions affecting the common 
defence". 
5.15. Originally an informal dinner of defence 
ministers in 1968, discussion among partici-
pants today continues between the Permanent 
Representatives to NATO of the participating 
countries and their staffs. Participation in 
Eurogroup has extended progressively and now 
includes all European members of NATO with 
the exception of France. Significantly Spain, 
which does not yet participate in the integrated 
military structure of NATO, took part in 
the ministerial Eurogroup meeting on 29th 
November 1982. Eurogroup has no interna-
tional staff, or formal structure. Secretarial 
services are provided by the staffs of the various 
participating delegations. Meetings are held in 
the NATO headquarters. Eurogroup also aims 
at co-ordinating more closely the defence efforts 
of participating countries and for this purpose 
has established some nine subgroups which 
have had varying degrees of success. 
5.16. It is as an informal forum for discussion 
of political and strategic questions affecting 
common defence that Eurogroup activity 
appears to have increased during the last two 
years, as the European NATO countries have 
increasingly felt the need to co-ordinate the 
European attitude to the United States within 
NATO. Such " caucussing " within the 
NATO framework is of course a politically sen-
sitive matter, but Eurogroup provides a flexible 
and discreet framework because meetings bet-
ween officials within the NATO headquarters 
need not attract publicity. 
5.17. France does not participate in the Euro-
group ; the then French Minister of Defence, 
Mr. Debre, took some weeks to consider the 
invitation to attend the first Eurogroup dinner 
of defence ministers in 1968. One factor at 
that time was that the British initiative was 
suspected of being a " back door " to British 
membership of the European Community then 
being negotiated. The other factor undoub-
tedly was the link with NATO. 
5.18. The first of these obstacles to French par-
ticipation in Eurogroup disappeared in 1973 
with British accession to the European Commu-
nity. As for the second, it can be said that 
Eurogroup as such has no closer links to 
NATO than France which, despite the 1966 
withdrawal from the integrated military struc-
ture, has always remained a fuller part;cipant in 
NATO as a whole than is generally recognised. 
France, of course, is a full participant in the 
I. Quotations from " The Eurogroup " pamphlet pub-
lished by Eurogroup, issued by NATO information service. 
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North Atlantic CounciL as it is now in such 
NATO bodies as the new Air Defence Commit-
tee. in the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors, as well as in the three NATO mili-
tary agencies based in France. Some French 
nationals remain in the NATO International 
Staff. chiefly in the economic and political sec-
tions; French military missions are of course 
appointed to the NATO Military Committee 
and to all military headquarters. On balance it 
would seem that the political obstacles in the 
way of French participation in Eurogroup are 
fewer than those in the way of the accession of 
six or seven European NATO countries to 
WEU. It was noted at the time of the NATO 
summit meeting in Bonn in June 1982 that the 
attendance of President Mitterrand at the 
concluding formal dinner was a precedent. It 
could not be a greater precedent for a French 
Defence Minister to attend the next Eurogroup 
dinner of defence ministers - it is understood 
that an invitation was extended on one recent 
occasion. 
5.19. The committee suggests in paragraph B.2 
of the draft recommendation that the Council 
consider and report to the Assembly on the 
obligation to invite all members of WEU to 
contribute to strengthening the European pillar 
of the western alliance. Many members believe 
that Eurogroup, where all European members of 
NATO except France are already present, 
remains the most flexible and appropriate 
method of concerting European positions on 
NATO-related defence issues, without having a 
disruptive effect on allied defence planning. 
There is a case for strengthening the ability of 
Eurogroup to make its position better known in 
the United States, particularly to members of 
Congress. This can be co-ordinated through the 
United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, as 
that country provides the permanent secretariat 
to Eurogroup, and additionally through the 
Washington Embassy of the country which for 
the time being is chairman-in-office of the 
Eurogroup as happened during a recent tour by 
Eurogroup officials and senior officers to the 
United States as a public relations exercise. 
(d) European political co-operation 
5.20. European political co-operation among 
the ten countries of the Community has been 
increasingly successful on a number of issues 
including Middle East policy. It is now agreed 
among the ten foreign ministers that " secu-
rity " policy can be discussed in that frame-
work. The Falklands is a recent example of 
very rapid decision-making by the Ten in this 
framework in a resolution condemning the 
Argentine invasion. Other " security " matters 
discussed by the Ten include the European 
position in the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe and aspects of disarma-
ment usually considered in the United Nations 
framework. 
5.21. European political co-operation is a 
largely informal arrangement although the func-
tions of the " presidency " have developed 
around the three ministers comprising the 
foreign minister who is chairman-in-office for 
six months, associated with his immediate pre-
decessor and successor. In the foreign ministry 
of the chairman-in-office room is provided for 
one official from each of the two other coun-
tries associated with the " presidency " for the 
time being. However, European political co-
operation remains outside the framework of the 
European Community treaties themselves, and 
two or three member countries at least have 
reservations about extending the defence func-
tions of this institution at the present time. 
The neutral position of Ireland remains a pro-
blem. 
(e) Independent European Programme Group 
5.22. The IEPG is yet another informal group-
ing, without treaty or international staff, in 
which all European NATO countries parti-
cipate. Concerned with European armaments 
production, and co-ordination with the NATO 
Conference of National Armaments Directors 
in pursuance of a two-way street in defence 
equipment between Europe and the United 
States, this is not a body which is likely to 
become involved in discussing more general 
aspects of European defence policy. 
VI. Defence production 
6.1. In measuring progress on the concept of a 
two-way street in defence equipment between 
the United States and its European allies, 
a concept formally adopted by the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee in May 1975, it is 
useful to compare the attitudes of the Carter 
and Reagan administrations. 
(a) The Carter administration 
6.2. A few days before Ronald Reagan arrived 
at the White House on 20th January 1981, 
a report on rationalisation/standardisation 
within NATO (report to the United States 
Congress, January 1981) by Mr. Harold Brown 
of the Carter administration, outgoing Secretary 
of Defence, was published. According to this 
report, the United States expects each NATO 
nation to do its fair share in support of the col-
lective defence of the West, but joint European 
defence production is considered to be the best 
means of improving the two-way street. The 
3% formula goes hand in hand with a recom-
mendation that Europeans place their industries 
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on a "united and collective basis". Yet 
Europe and North America are the two richest, 
most technologically advanced industrial econo-
mies in the world. Together we have a combi-
ned GNP more than twice that of the Warsaw 
Pact. If we were to pool our resources and 
efforts and pull together, we could produce a 
credible and capable coalition defence, without 
economic strain. In his address to the NATO 
summit in London in May 1977, President 
Carter emphasised that: 
" A common European defence produc-
tion effort would help to achieve econo-
mies of a scale beyond the reach of 
national programmes. A strengthened 
defence production base in Europe would 
enlarge the opportunities for two-way 
transatlantic traffic in defence equipment, 
while adding to the overall capabilities of 
the alliance. 
The Europeans have sought the econo-
mic benefits Uobs and technological pride 
and progress) of developing, producing 
and selling weapons to the United States 
in order to earn the foreign exchange 
needed to buy weapons from the United 
States. But here we confront a structural 
problem within Europe itself that com-
pounds the problems already mentioned. 
Only Britain and France (and in some 
areas, Germany) can produce weapons 
to a continental scale. No country in 
Europe can produce to an interconti-
nental scale. Thus the economies of 
scale in the alliance needs - and the 
benefits the Europeans seek - cannot 
be fully realised until (in the words of the 
Culver-Nunn Legislation) the European 
nations organise their defence procure-
ment on 'a united and collective basis'. 
Europe's fragmented defence industrial 
base also makes it difficult for its indus-
tries to develop and produce weapons 
competitive in quality, quantity and 
price with those produced in the United 
States. " 
6.3. The attitude towards the IEPG is not 
negative either: 
" As a result of the Eurogroup initiatives, 
the European members of the alliance 
established the Independent European 
Programme Group (IEPG) in February 
1976 with France as a full member. The 
Congress, in the Culver-Nunn Legislation 
of July 19 7 5, encouraged the European 
governments to accelerate their efforts to 
achieve European armaments collabora-
tion. President Carter at the London 
NATO summit in June 1977 also encou-
raged these collective European defence 
industrial efforts, and pledged to work 
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with the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group as it gathered strength 
and cohesion. The United States has 
participated in a transatlantic dialogue 
with the IEPG in a series of meetings 
sponsored by the alliance as a whole. 
However, the IEPG has not developed 
into a strong device for co-ordinating 
European contributions to alliance arma-
ments development. " 
6.4. According to Mr. Brown's report, stan-
dardisation and interoperability are essential: 
" The challenges to standardisation and 
interoperability are many. In meeting 
them, we have had a number of impor-
tant successes in the past year. In our 
triad of rationalisation, standardisation 
and interoperability (RSI) initiatives, we 
signed the first memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) for a family of weapons, 
culminating two years of negotiations. 
We also made substantial progress 
towards a second family. We signed two 
more bilateral general reciprocal procure-
ment MOUs. Dual production of many 
major systems continues and is planned 
for others. The periodic armaments 
planning system (PAPS) and the NATO 
armaments planning review (NAPR) pro-
grammes have started, marking a major 
step toward an integrated and unified 
NATO arms planning system. The 
NATO airborne early warning and 
control programme is moving from plan-
ning to operational status. The alliance 
Conference of National Armaments 
Directors (CNAD) has become increas-
ingly active and effective in its support of 
arms co-operation programmes. The 
European national armaments directors 
and defence ministers strongly expressed 
their sense of progress and commitment 
to NATO co-operative programmes at 
their fall 1980 meetings. We also conti-
nue to revise DoD directives so that the 
principles of standardisation and inter-
operability are reflected in our internal 
standard operating procedures. More-
over, we are undertaking two major new 
initiatives: (1) reviewing the feasibility of 
establishing a second source in Europe 
for selected systems and (2) examining 
our foreign ownership, control or influ-
ence regulations and procedures and how 
they affect cross-national investment in 
arms industries. 
Meeting challenges to standardisation/ 
interoperability 
To meet the challenges we have outlined, 
the United States has continued to take 
three primary approaches for increasing 
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defence co-operation with allies: (1) reci-
procal procurement agreements, (2) dual 
production of weapons systems which 
have already been developed, and (3) 
sharing development of next-generation 
families of weapons. In addition, we are 
pursuing efforts at developing a NATO-
wide acquisition process, have continued 
to work on the NATO AEW &C pro-
gramme, and are working toward produc-
tion of a multiple-launch rocket system. 
We have also begun a programme by 
which DoD evaluates weapons and tech-
nologies of our allies in terms of potential 
utilisation in the United States in order 
to save research and development funds. 
Finally, the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors (CNAD) has been 
extremely active in the past year. We 
continued to make substantial progress in 
all of these areas. " 
6.5. Mr. Brown considers results achieved in 
1980 to be satisfactory: 
" The past year has been one of great 
success in NATO standardisation and 
interoperability. The momentum that 
has been building for several years has 
resulted in a rapid movement forward. 
Under the triad of initiatives, we have 
signed our first family of weapons MOU 
and have almost completed all of the 
reciprocal general procurement MOUs. 
Dual production of systems has proven 
most valuable. The CNAD has been 
extremely active with PAPS and NAPR 
now activated. The NATO AEW &C 
programme is nearing operational status 
and other new initiatives are under way. 
Congress has provided important support 
for United States and alliance efforts at 
standardisation and interoperability. In 
sum, 1980 was a year in which many of 
our efforts came to fruition and others 
are being refined and/or are nearing ful-
filment. " 
6.6. Where armaments co-operation is concer-
ned, Mr. Brown's analysis lays greater emphasis 
on progress accomplished than on the imba-
lance of trade between the United States and 
Europe: 
" The alliance has made significant pro-
gress toward greater co-operation in ar-
maments. The Conference of National 
Armaments Directors has become a 
much stronger organisation which is now 
working on major co-operative program-
mes for the future. Under its auspices, 
the family of weapons concept promises a 
more efficient division of effort in the 
field of weapons development. The first 
family of weapons agreement signed in 
August 1980 covers air-to-air missiles 
and provides for the Europeans to deve-
lop an advanced short-range missile while 
the United States develops an advanced 
medium-range missile. Thus. the family 
of weapons has moved from concept to 
reality within four years. Also, the 
United States has negotiated bilateral 
MOUs for reciprocal procurement of 
defence equipment with individual allies 
(eleven have been signed, and one is 
pending). These agreements are designed 
to improve open competition in systems 
acquisition by waiving buy-national and 
other restrictive provisions. Ongoing or 
pending co-operative programmes include: 
(A) Dual production m the United 
States: Roland air defence system, 
MAG-58 armour machine gun, 120 mm 
tank gun. CFM engine (KC-135 re-engin-
ing), squad automatic weapon. 
(B) Dual production in Europe: F-16, 
MOD Flir, M483, improved conventional 
munition; Stinger man-portable air defence 
system, AIM-9L improved short-range 
air-to-air missile, Patriot. 
(C) Co-operative programmes: NATO 
AWACS, multiple-launch rocket systems 
(MLRS). rolling air frame missile (RAM). 
NATO small arms ammunition. 
6. 7. Mr. Brown therefore asks for the support 
of Congress: 
" The Department of Defence appreciates 
the support Congress has given NATO 
rationalisation I standardisation I inter-
operability. Our efforts in this regard 
continue to be bolstered by the Congres-
sional affirmation in the FY 77 Defence 
Appropriation Act that it is United States 
policy for equipment procured by the 
United States for use in NATO to be 
standardised or at least interoperable with 
that of our allies and that progress toward 
realisation of standardisationlinteropera-
bility objectives would be enhanced by 
expanded inter-allied procurement of 
arms and equipment within NATO and 
greater reliance on licensing and copro-
duction." 
(b) The Reagan administration 
6.8. With the Reagan administration the Uni-
ted States seems not only to be keeping up 
the transatlantic dialogue but also wishing to 
strengthen it, recognising its political import-
ance for the Atlantic Alliance. This was affir-
med by Mr. Richard DeLauer, United States 
Under-Secretarv of Defence, at the CNAD 
meeting in Brussels on 5th May 1981. The 
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Reagan administration strongly supports United 
States and NATO arms co-operation program-
mes but apparently, unlike the Carter adminis-
tration, lays greater stress on the fact that 
industry must play a more active role in the 
process of armaments co-operation than on the 
need for widespread intra-European co-opera-
tion so that Europe may become a real 
competitor for the United States. 
6.9. The programme of the symposium on 
industrial co-operation with NATO. held in 
Brussels in April 1983, also offers a number of 
ideas, for instance: 
"(a) review of mandatory DoD contract 
clauses and subcontract flow-down 
provisions to delete those which are 
inapplicable or unnecessary for 
contractors/subcontractors located 
outside the United States; 
(b) negotiation of · contract adminis-
tration' and • pricing/auditing' an-
nexes to general MOUs to pro-
vide for reciprocal exchange of 
government services 
- audit agreements exist for France 
and United Kingdom 
- first contract administration an-
nex signed with the Netherlands 
in April 1982 ; 
(c) strong emphasis on 'industry-to-
industry ' seminars to explore mu-
tual business opportunities ; 
(d) defence acqms1t10n circular 
no. 76-25, issued on 31st October 
1980 
- first major change to section VI 
' Foreign acquisitions ' in over 
20 years 
- includes all NATO general 
MO Us 
- creates new part 14 · Purchases 
from NATO participating sour-
ces' 
- waives 'Buy American Act'; cus-
toms duties etc. 
- stresses open subcontracting with 
NATO sources." 
6.10. Mr. Weinberger, United States Secretary 
of Defence, in his report on the allied contribu-
tion to the common defence (Department of 
Defence, March 1982) considers that NATO 
has developed major programmes for improving 
the alliance's defence capability: 
" These are the coproduction, dual pro-
duction and families of weapons pro-
grammes. These programmes provide 
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for the sharing of development and pro-
duction costs and can produce substantial 
savings in R&D expenditures. Such 
savings can improve the industrial base 
in the United States, Canada and Europe 
and assist technology transfer within the 
alliance. These transfers take place in 
both directions - from Europe to the 
United States and from the United States 
to Europe. " 
Major examples quoted by Mr. Weinberger are 
United States procurement of the MAG-58 
machine gun and the I20 mm smooth bore 
tank gun. He underlines that Europeans have 
derived benefits from coproduction in the 
framework of the F -16 aircraft programme: 
" Both sides may benefit from future air-
to-air missile weapons families. Dual 
production, coproduction and the family 
of weapons programmes enable industry 
to distribute large R&D costs, to reap the 
benefits of economies of scale and to 
share in advanced technology. " 
6.11. Unlike Mr. Brown, he also stresses the 
problem caused by the imbalance in the equip-
ment trade between the United States and its 
partners: 
" In I980, eight major NATO trading 
partners (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway 
and the United Kingdom) accepted Uni-
ted States manufactured defence equip-
ment deliveries amounting to $I.85b. In 
contrast, the United States accepted deli-
veries on only $0.20b from those same 
NATO countries - a ratio of 9.4: I 
favouring the United States. The com-
parable ratio was 5.3:1 in I977 and has 
been increasing consistently since then in 
favour of the United States. " 
The I983 report on allied contributions to the 
common defence, however, finds only a 6: I 
ratio: 
" In defence equipment trade, the balance 
is still well in the United States' favour. 
In dollar terms we sell approximately 
six times more equipment to Europe than 
they buy from us. This may be partly 
explained by the preponderance of big 
ticket items (warplanes) we sell to Europe, 
but the trade situation might be healthier 
if the 6:1 ratio could be lowered. " 
6.12. In the report standardisation of equip-
ment within NATO (report to the United States 
Congress, January 1983), Mr. Weinberger com-
ments on the efforts of the Department of 
Defence and NATO allies to standardise, or at 
least make interoperable, equipment (including 
weapons systems, ammunition and fuel) of 
allied forces committed to NATO. Mr. Wein-
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berger considers progress has been made in the 
effort to strengthen alliance conventional forces 
and to adapt the alliance defence posture to the 
changing needs of the 1980s: 
" Improvements in NATO planning pro-
cedures are contributing to the process of 
improving standardisation and interoper-
ability within NATO. NATO has 
agreed to explore urgently ways to 
improve its conventional defence by 
taking advantage of emerging technolo-
gies. " 
6.13. Mr. Weinberger considers it necessary to: 
" ... improve NA TO's efforts to allocate 
development of related weapon types to 
specific allies under the family of wea-
pons concept. Artificial barriers to trade 
in defence equipment must be removed 
under the reciprocal memoranda of 
understanding that we have with our 
allies. 
Coproduction may be selectively 
employed to provide industrial parti-
cipation to allies who agree to adopt 
standardised systems. 
Finally, the two-way street/armaments 
co-operation must be made a reality 
through increased trade in defence equip-
ment in both directions across the Atlan-
tic resulting in benefits to NATO as a 
whole." 
6.14. Another difference between Mr. Wein-
berger's approach (see abovementioned text) 
and that of Mr. Brown is the emphasis he 
places on the need for a major leadership role 
for industry (in this process) and his desire to 
see a reduction in obstacles to direct industry-
to-industry agreements. 
6.15. In the United States, it has been decided 
that the determination of allied governments is 
not enough. It is also necessary to obtain Uni-
ted States Congress backing and ensure a will 
on the part of American industry to carry out 
European projects jointly. Anxiety about 
unemployment also carries great weight in this 
analysis. Mr. Weinberger concludes the intro-
duction to the abovementioned report with 
remarks about Congress's attitude: 
"We welcome the positive statement of 
the Congress for greater co-operation 
with our allies as expressed in the FY 
1983 Defence Authorisation Act. 
We will intensify consultations to meet 
these objectives. At the same time we 
solicit the assistance of Congress in elimi-
nation of obstacles to co-operation, e.g. 
specialty metals legislation which is 
seriously undermining NA TO's arms co-
operation efforts. " 
6.16. Nevertheless the rhetoric exceeds tenfold 
the practical progress made towards achieving 
an equitable two-way street. True there are 
notable examples of European equipment's 
being accepted for the United States armed for-
ces but primarily where the European produce 
was outstanding such as the Harrier for the 
United States Marine Corps, the Hawk for the 
United States navy and the CF-56 powerplant 
for the KC-135 tankers of Strategic Air Com-
mand. 
6.17. Surprisingly, amendments in favour of 
NATO industrial co-operation like the Roth-
Glenn-Nunn Amendment (Appendix VI) can 
be passed by the Senate and yet amendments 
like the Speciality Metals Amendments and the 
Defence Appropriations Bill are carried which 
do immense damage to the prospects of the 
procurement of European equipment by the 
United States armed forces and to transatlantic 
relations. 
6.18. The Europeans do not help their own 
cause by their slow progress towards interopera-
bility, standardisation, and joint development 
and procurement. The IEPG has had great 
difficulty, inevitably, in harmonising national 
operational requirements and procurement 
time-scales. Some promising examples exist of 
greater co-operation such as the Tornado pro-
gramme or the new generation of collaborative 
anti-tank guided weapons. Others such as the 
tortoise-like progress towards a new European 
combat aircraft for the Italian air force, Luft-
waffe and Royal Air Force show how hard 
it is even for the Europeans to concert their 
procurement among themselves let alone with 
the United States. 
(c) Conclusions 
6.19. Both the democratic and republican 
administrations placed and are placing empha-
sis on the need for standardisation and/or at 
least interoperability of allied equipment. Both 
show interest in the principle of the two-way 
street, considered to be essential for enhancing 
the defence capability of the alliance itself. 
6.20. However, there are differences of tone or 
rather of emphasis in the two approaches. 
Mr. Carter's administration underlined the idea 
that large-scale intra-European co-operation 
could have been a means of making Europe a 
true competitor for the United States. The 3% 
formula goes hand in hand with this idea. The 
Reagan administration makes more direct refer-
ence to the imbalance of trade between the 
United States and Europe but in its strong 
desire to pursue cross-Atlantic industrial team-
ing does not mention the expediency of 
intra-European co-operation (at least in the 
reports examined by your Rapporteur) and, 
although on the one hand it proposes to repeal 
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the Buy American Act, on the other hand it 
vigorously asserts the need for a " major lea-
dership role for industry " and a reduction in 
"obstacles to direct industry-to-industry agree-
ments". 
VII. Forces of WEU countries 
(a) General 
7 .I. This section briefly summarises the forces 
which the WEU countries make available for 
allied defence. There are of course other 
important forces in Europe: those of the United 
States and of the other European NATO coun-
tries - Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and Turkey. 
(b) Belgium 
7.2. Most Belgian forces are available to 
NATO, the greater part are either under NATO 
command m peacetime - all offensive and 
defensive air force units, the Hawk units of 1 
(BE) Corps and one warship - or assigned - all 
the active units of 1 (BE) Corps and most naval 
craft, four frigates, seven minehunter/sweepers, 
one logistics support ship. 
7.3. Certain units are deployed in the Federal 
Republic of Germany : two improved Hawk 
battalions in the extreme east (in the forward 
interception area), reconnaissance units of 1 
(BE) Corps to provide cover, a division with one 
armoured infantry brigade and one armoured 
brigade, corps support troops for logistic support 
on both sides of the Rhine and Nike surface-to-
air missile units. 
7 .4. The main task of ground forces carried out 
by the intervention force (chiefly 1 (BE) Corps) 
is in forward defence. The army assigns a 
strengthened parachute commando battalion to 
the ACE Mobile Force: internal forces ensure the 
military defence of the territory. 
7.5. The army has 359 main battle tanks 
(334 Leopard, 25 M-47), 133 Scorpion light 
tanks, 153 Scimitar armoured combat vehicles, 
1,123 armoured troop carriers, anti-tank 
missiles such as Milan and Swingfire, surface-to-
surface missiles, short-range anti-aircraft artillery 
with Gepard. 
7.6. Some army and air force units have a 
nuclear capability: two 155 mm howitzer batta-
lions, two 8 inch howitzer batteries, one Lance 
surface-to-surface missile battalion, ADM 
(atomic demolition mine) detachments, two 
F-16 flights, one of which is still being trans-
formed, and six Nike SAM flights up to NSP 
(NAMSA support plan) standards. 
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7. 7. The air force has three commands. The 
tactical air force command groups all combat 
units. i.e. a total of 144 assigned combat aircraft 
(F-16 and Mirage V), twenty-four transport 
aircraft (including C-130). eight search and 
rescue helicopters, and eight Nike surface-to-au· 
defence missile flights (reduced to six as from 1st 
July 1983). 
7.8. The Channel, the North Sea and their 
approaches are the area of action of the navy 
which has three main tasks : anti-submarine 
warfare in the Channel. the Atlantic approaches 
and the North Sea, protecting merchant shipping 
and convoys in the same area, and minesweep-
ing in the Channel and the North Sea. The 
Belgian navy is highly specialised in mine 
counter-measures. It set up a mine warfare 
school which is now commanded and operated 
jointly by Belgium and the Netherlands. It has 
some forty ships. including four frigates, some 
thirty minesweepers and hunters and two logistic 
support ships. 
7.9. As far as NATO is concerned. the most 
controversial aspect of current Belgian defence 
plans concerns air defence missiles. The 
obsolescent Nike is being gradually phased out 
before any decision has been taken to procure 
the proposed successor - the American Patriot 
which is not yet available in any case - and 
Belgium plans to remove its shorter-range Hawk 
missiles from the forward NATO screen in 
Germany to protect areas in Belgium at present 
covered bv Nike. This would leave a vulner-
able gap in forward NATO air defences. 
(c) France 
7 .I 0. France, although a member of the NATO 
alliance, does not assign forces to NATO and 
does not participate in the integrated military 
structure. although elements of these forces 
participate from time to time on a bilateral basis 
in military exercises outside the NATO area 
with allied nations. 
7.11. France has a 50,000 strong army in the 
Federal Republic, with three armoured divisions 
(soon to be strengthened by about a hundred 
additional tanks) and a two-regiment garrison of 
2,700 men in Berlin. It also has contingents in 
the Middle East: in Sinai: as part of the multina-
tional observer force, in southern Lebanon with 
the United Nations force and in Beirut as part of 
the multinational security force. 
7.12. It also has 16,500 troops stationed in 
dependencies in the West Indies, Guyana, 
Polynesia, the southern Indian Ocean and New 
Caledonia, and a further 7,200 in Africa: the 
Republic of Djibouti, Cape Verde (support 
base), Gabon and the Ivory Coast. in accordance 
with military agreements concluded between 
France and the country concerned. 1 
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7.13. French strategic nuclear forces consist of 
three complementary systems : thirty-six 
manned bombers (six Mirage IV squadrons). 
eighteen S-3 surface-to-surface ballistic missiles 
on the Plateau d'Albion and five nuclear missile-
launching submarines, each with sixteen M-20 
missiles. Tactical nuclear weapons are the 
same for all three forces: the AN-52 bomb. 
whether carried on the army's Pluton missiles or 
by the air force's Mirage IIIEs and Jaguars and 
the navy's Super-Etendards. 
7.14. For their modernisation. the 1984-88 
programme law confirms the introduction in 
1985 of the sixth nuclear missile-launching 
submarine, the Inflexible, which will be armed 
with sixteen M-4 multiple-warhead missiles. 
Four of the present five other submarines of this 
class will subsequently be refitted for 
M-4 missiles and their equipment will be 
modernised. The law also provides for a new-
generation nuclear missile-launching submarine 
to be ordered, the first for entry into service in 
1994. Eighteen Mirage IVs will be transformed 
to take the medium-range air-to-surface missile 
as from 1987. The Mirage IV and S-3 missiles 
of the Plateau d'Albion will be replaced in 1996 
by a new mobile SX missile. There are three 
programmes for the tactical nuclear forces : an 
order for seventy Mirage 2000N s which will 
carry air-to-surface medium-range missiles, the 
transformation of fifteen Super-Etendards which 
will be equipped with the same missile and the 
development of the Hades system (which will 
have a longer range than the Pluton). No deci-
sion has yet been taken on the production of the 
enhanced radiation weapon. 
7.15. The French army has U40 AMX-30 and 
30 30B-2 battle tanks, I ,0 I 0 AMX-13 light tanks, 
620 AMX-1 OP motorised infantry combat 
vehicles, 65 AMX-IORCs, 250 Panhard EBR 
motorised armoured vehicles, 500 AML light 
armoured cars, some 4.000 combat vehicles and 
armoured troop carriers. There are six heli-
copter regiments with some 600 helicopters, 
some equipped with Hot. The army also has 
surface-to-air weapons systems (Hawk and 
Roland) and anti-tank guided weapons (Milan, 
Hot, Entac). Plans for reorganisation give 
priority to helicopters for all-weather flight and 
night-firing and for the modernisation of 
AMX-30 tanks. 
7.16. The navy has 18 attack submarines 
(including one nuclear-propelled), 19 destroyers 
equipped with ASW surface-to-surface missiles 
(Exocet, Malafon) and surface-to-air missiles 
(Masurca. Tartar) and Lynx helicopters. 
23 frigates (some of which are equipped with 
Exocet). The naval air force has one helicopter-
carrier and two full-sized aircraft-carriers and air 
units of 36 Super-Etendards (single jet-engine 
assault and interception aircraft with AN-52 
nuclear weapons), 16 Crusader (single jet-engine 
all-weather interception aircraft) and 16 moder-
nised Alize (ASW single turboprop engine). 
Maritime reconnaissance capability is provided 
by four squadrons with 27 Atlantics and one 
squadron with six Neptunes. plus a squadron 
with eight Etendard IVPs. Amphibious capa-
bility includes two assault ships. five tank 
landing craft and two light carriers. In the 
1984-88 programme law. the maritime patrol 
aircraft programme is given priority over orders 
for nuclear attack submarines. 
7.17. The French air force has 700 combat 
aircraft and some 300 transport and liaison 
aircraft. The air defence command has six 
interceptor squadrons (one in Djibouti with 
30 Mirage IIICs), of which 120 Mirage F-lCs 
and 15 Mirage F-1 Bs. I 0 squadrons equipped 
with surface-to-air missiles. with 21 Crotales. 
I 04 anti-aircraft batteries with 20 mm guns 
and R-530. Super-530, R-550 Magic and Side-
winder air-to-air missiles. The tactical 
command has five strike squadrons with 
45 Jaguars. 30 Mirage IIIEs (with the AN-52). 
12 fighter-ground attack squadrons (with 
75 Mirage IIIEs. 30 Mirage 5Fs, 75 Jaguar As) 
and three reconnaissance squadrons with 
45 Mirage IIIR/RDs (of which two are to be 
replaced by Mirage F-ICRs). It has air-to-air 
and air-to-surface missiles (Sidewinder. R-550 
Magic. R-530. AS-30/30L, AS-37 Martel) and 
uses mobile detection and control means. The 
programme law provides for the order of 
165 Mirage 2000s (in either nuclear or mr 
defence version) and the procurement of 
airborne early warning aircraft. 
7.18. The three tasks of the French army 
- national defence ; allied defence ; and 
assistance to other friendly countries - are not 
kept separate. The rapid action force (FAR) 1 
whose creation is an important part of the 
reorganisation now under way thanks to the 
1984-88 programme law, passed on 23rd June 
1983, could be deployed with those of its allies if 
France so decides (not being part of the NATO 
integrated military structure means that its 
commitment would not be automatic) but it can 
also act alone, particularly overseas. The 
1984-88 programme law also provides for a new 
overall deployment of units of the first army 
beyond the Rhine and between the plains of 
Flanders and Alsace, the establishment of a 
Hades tactical nuclear force command and the 
assignment of territorial operational defence to 
the police forces of each department. The law 
concentrates on equipment rather than on the 
number of men (it provides for a cutback of 
22.000 men) and maintains the priority given to 
nuclear forces which allow the weak to defend 
themselves against the strong thanks to the stra-
tegy of deterrence. 
I. Currently of three, shortly to be of five, div1sions. 
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(d) Federal Republic of Germany 
7.19. Almost without exception, the armed 
forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
which include conscripts, are based in the 
Federal Republic. The army, however. has a 
training facility in Canada and the United 
Kingdom for tank formations and the air force. 
until recently, has maintained an F-1 04 pilot 
training facility in the United States which will 
be closed due to the establishment of a new faci-
lity in the United Kingdom for training Tornado 
pilots at RAF Cottesmore for aircrews of the 
Luftwaffe. German naval air arm. Italian air 
force and RAF. 
7 .20. The white paper 1979 on the security of 
the Federal Republic makes clear that : 
"The air defence forces are under NATO 
command in peacetime. Most of the 
German formations are either assigned to 
NATO or earmarked for such assign-
ment. In a given phase of the NATO 
alert system. territorial army formations 
remain under national command. " 
7.21. For the defence of the Federal Republic's 
eastern frontier, the land forces place an army 
corps size formation under Northern Army 
Group and two army corps under the command 
of the Central Army Group. A further 
formation operates in the Jutland area under the 
command of Allied Forces Northern Europe. 
Reserve formations are assembled during 
developing situations to reinforce NATO and to 
protect lines of communication. 
7.22. The field army assigned to NATO 
compnses six armoured divisions. four 
armoured infantry, one mountain and one 
airborne division. It is equipped with some 580 
Leopard-2, 2,500 Leopard-!, and 1,200 older 
M-48 main battle tanks. After deployment of 
Leopard-2s in replacement of the M-48s has 
been completed. the army will have in its units 
and in reserve 4,887 main battle tanks compared 
with some 4,000 today. Anti-tank weapons 
include some 2,000 Milans. 350 Tows and 
300 Hots. Air defence includes some 400 Ge-
pard SP guns. 100 Roland SAMs and Redeyes. 
Nuclear support is provided by 26 Lance 
missiles and nuclear-capable 203 mm and 
155 mm artillery - warheads for all of these 
being in United States custody. 
7.23. German naval forces include some 
24 conventional submarines, 14 destroyers and 
frigates equipped with Tartar and Exocet 
surface-to-surface missile launchers and Sea 
Sparrow surface-to-air missile launchers, 30 fast 
attack ships equipped with missiles, 18 Lindau 
(anti-mine counter-measures) and 39 coastal 
minesweepers. The German navy has the 
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support of three attack squadrons (with 
54 F-1 04Gs and seven Tornadoes), one recon-
naissance squadron (with 27 RF-104Gs), t\\o 
mant1me reconnaissance squadrons (with 
14 Atlantics and five Elint Atlantics), one search 
and rescue helicopter squadron and one 
squadron of ASW helicopters (with Sea Lynx 
MK-88s). The white paper stresses that the 
principal areas of operation of the navy are the 
Baltic Sea, the Baltic approaches and the North 
Sea, which call for different types of operation 
and different means of naval warfare. Priority 
in recent years has been given to the improve-
ment of the defence capability in the Baltic 
Sea and the Baltic approaches through the 
commissioning of 18 type 206 submarines and 
30 type 148 and 143 fast patrol boats. 
7.24. The air force has some 500 combat 
aircraft. The tactical command consists of 
nineteen fighter ground attack squadrons (with 
some 100 F-104Gs, 60 F-4Fs and 30 Torna-
does). seven squadrons of light fighter aircraft 
(with some 160 Alpha-Jets). four squadrons of 
interceptors (with 59 F-4Fs) and four squadrons 
of reconnaissance aircraft (with 60 RF-4Es). 
eight squadrons equipped with 72 Pershing-IA 
surface-to-surface missiles (216 Nike Hercules 
launchers and 216 improved Hawks). 
(e) Luxembourg 
7.25. Luxembourg, which like the United 
Kingdom has no conscription, maintains one 
under-strength regimental combat team, with an 
infantry battalion only 350 strong, normally 
assigned to NATO for ACE Mobile Force (see 
below). It is equipped with Tow anti-tank 
weapons. It may be mentioned that the NATO 
jointly-owned early warning aircraft E-3A are 
legally registered in Luxembourg. Two are now 
operational and a further fourteen are on order. 
(f) Italy 
7.26. All three services of the Italian armed 
forces are largely committed to NATO, deployed 
in Italy. In recent years Italy has concluded a 
number of bilateral agreements with other Medi-
terranean countries and the United States : e.g. 
Italian guarantees for Malta's neutrality and 
military co-operation with Tunisia, Lebanon, 
Sudan and Somalia. 
7.27. Italy's present doctrine of defence 
according to the 1977 normative as set out in 
publication "900 ". is that defence must be 
conducted in the framework of the strategy of 
flexible response, " as far forward as possible " 
and cover the Gorizia gap. Of the twenty-four 
brigades making up the army, five (one alpme, 
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two mechanised, one armoured. one motorised) 
are deployed in the north-western sector, four 
(one parachute, two motorised and one mecha-
nised) in central Italy, one (mechanised) between 
Puglia and Campania and one (motorised) in 
Sicily. The other thirteen (four alpine, four 
Armoured, five mechanised) are deployed in the 
north-eastern sector, which includes the three 
Venezias, Emilia Romagna and the provinces of 
Bergamo and Brescia. 
7.28. There is some discussion about the need 
to reorient defence - including land forces -
towards the south of the country, through the 
creation of operational defence of the territory as 
in France, the United Kingdom and Germany. 
Where equipment is concerned, the aim of 
the reorganisation decided upon in 1975-76 was 
to ensure full mechanisation of forces intended 
for the defence of the eastern frontier by increas-
ing the strength of armoured forces, field 
artillery. engineers, light aviation and communi-
cations. In the five sectors covered by the 
programme, good results have been achieved, 
particularly with the procurement of systems for 
unit command and control and for the man-
agement of equipment as well as in increased 
tactical and logistic mobility. 
7.29. Apart from 550 M-47 main battle tanks 
(which came into service in 1953). 300 M-60Ais 
(in 1965) and 910 Leopard-Is (in 1970), the 
Italian army has 4,200 armoured troop carriers. 
including M-113s which came into service in 
1962. Artillery and anti-tank weapons are 
being modernised through the procurement of 
400 Tows, 1,330 Milans, 1,370 Folgores and 
60 A-129 armed attack helicopters. There are 
40 SAM Hawk and nuclear support is provided 
by Lance and nuclear-capable artillery (warheads 
in United States custody). 
7.30. The air force includes six fighter-ground 
attack squadrons (with 18 Tornadoes, 54 
F-104Ss and 36 G-91Ys) three squadrons of 
light attack/reconnaissance aircraft (with 
54 G-91s), six interceptor squadrons (with 
72 F-104Ss), two reconnaissance squadrons 
(with 24 F/RF-104Gs), one electronic counter-
measure/reconnaissance squadron (with 12 
G-222s and six PD-808s). and two maritime 
reconnaissance squadrons (with 14 Atlantics 
assigned to the navy). With the Spada/ Aspide 
surface-to-air missile system. operational testing 
of which is currently proceeding at Grosseto, the 
air force will for the first time have a modern air 
defence system (against the low-altitude threat of 
the eighties) for its bases and possibly for other 
major installations. 
7.31. The navy has nine submarines, one 
helicopter-carrier, two cruisers, four guided-
missile destroyers, one Impetuoso class 
destroyer, eleven frigates (equipped with surface-
to-air and surface-to-surface missile launchers 
(Aspide, Sea Sparrow, Otomat), eight corvettes, 
four fast attack craft (two of which equipped 
with Sea Killer SSMs) and some thirty-two 
minehunterjsweepers. It is supported by five 
anti-submarine helicopter squadrons. 
7.32. The commander-in-chief of the fleet 
(consisting at operational level of four naval 
divisions and submarine command) is also 
NATO Commander, Central Mediterranean 
(COMEDCENT). At present, Italy provides 
contingents for the ACE Mobile Force which are 
transported by its own aircraft and takes part in 
the United Nations peacekeeping force in 
Lebanon and in the Sinai observer force. The 
creation of a standing, institutionalised inter-
vention force is still an open question. 
(g) Netherlands 
7.33. The Netherlands armed forces are largely 
committed to NATO, with one armoured 
brigade and support elements stationed in 
Germany and one destroyer, usually stationed in 
the Dutch West Indies together with one amphi-
bious unit and two F-27 MPA (maritime patrol 
aircraft) for coastal surveillance. 
7.34. The army, assigned for forward defence in 
the framework of the flexible response strategy, 
comprises two armoured brigades and four 
mechanised infantry brigades equipped with 
811 main battle tanks (468 Leopard-Is, 105 
Leopard-2s and 342 Centurions), 126 AMX-13 
light tanks. 1,600 armoured combat vehicles and 
1,051 YPR-765 armoured lorries. It has six 
Lance surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear-
capable artillery (warheads in United States 
custody), 350 Dragon and Tow anti-tank guided 
weapons and 95 Gepard SP-AA guns. Orders 
have been placed for a further 340 Leopard-2s. 
850 YPR-765s. 464 Stinger surface-to-air 
missiles and 37 M-110A2 203 mm self-propelled 
howitzers. 
7.35. The navy's main theatre of operations is 
the Eastern Atlantic, Channel and North Sea and 
it assigns units to the Atlantic and Channel 
standing forces and carries out minesweeping 
operations jointly with Belgium. 
7.36. The fleet has six submarines, two Tromp 
destroyers with guided weapons (eight Harpoon 
surface-to-missiles, nine surface-to-air missiles. 
one Standard and eight Sea Sparrow). Twelve 
frigates with guided missiles, six Wolf corvettes, 
five large patrol boats and two Poolster (fast 
support craft) and thirty-one minehunters/swee-
pers. The navy is supported by two maritime 
reconnaissance squadrons (with six SP-13A 
Atlantics, seven P-3C Orions, two F-27MPAs), 
two anti-submarine helicopter squadrons (with 
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seventeen Lynx HAS-27s) and one SAR heli-
copter squadron (with six Lynx HAS 25s). 
7.37. The air force, almost entirely under 
NATO command, has four fighter ground attack 
squadrons (with 54 NF-5As and 18 F-104Gs, 
which are being replaced by F-16s), three 
fighter/interceptor squadrons (with 54 F-16s). 
one reconnaissance squadron (with eighteen 
RF-1 04s), 12 F-27 transport aircraft and four 
Alouette-III helicopters for the SAR. The air 
force has AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. 
66 improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles (some 
of which are in Germany), 16 Nike Hercules, 
25 Shorad/Flycatchers and 40 L-70 anti-aircraft 
systems. 
(h) United Kingdom 
7.38. The latest British white paper, "Statement 
on the defence estimates 1983 ", recalls the four 
roles played by British armed forces committed 
to the alliance's collective deterrence: " ( 1) the 
provision of independent strategic and theatre 
nuclear forces committed to the alliance: 
(2) direct defence ofthe United Kingdom home-
land : (3) a major land and air contribution on 
the European mainland; (4) the deployment of 
a major maritime capability in the Eastern 
Atlantic and the Channel. " 
7.39. The white paper also recalls that the 
United Kingdom has large-scale military acti-
vities outside Europe. In addition to garrisons 
in Cyprus. Hong Kong, the Falklands and Belize, 
it takes part in peace-keeping operations, in 
Lebanon and Sinm for instance, through deploy-
ment, manoeuvres, the loan of personnel and 
training teams and after-sales assistance. 
7.40. The United Kingdom strategic nuclear 
deterrent force now comprises four ballistic 
missile nuclear-propelled submarines, each 
carrying sixteen Polaris A-3 missiles with three 
warheads (not independent) which are being 
modified with the Chevaline system. This force 
is to be modernised by the construction of four 
new nuclear-propelled submarines and the 
procurement from the United States of Trident 
D-5 missiles with which they will be armed. 
The new force will begin to enter service in the 
mid-1990s. The Vulcan bombers have been 
phased out. British theatre nuclear forces are 
based on dual capable Tornado, Buccaneer and 
Jaguar aircraft equipped with British nuclear 
bombs. Two Tornado squadrons are now 
based in the United Kingdom and in the future 
seven will be based in Germany in the dual 
nuclear/conventional role in place of the present 
Jaguar and Buccaneer squadrons. The United 
Kingdom also has its own nuclear anti-sub-
marine weapons for helicopters. 
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7.41. The British army comprises three 
armoured divisions in Germany and an infantry 
brigade in Berlin. There are a further infantry 
division, twelve armoured regiments. seven 
reconnaissance regiments. forty-seven infantry 
battalions and three parachute battalions. There 
are a further six Gurkha battalions. These 
forces arc divided between UKLF (Umted 
Kingdom Land Forces), UKMF (United King-
dom Mobile Force) and headquarters Northern 
Ireland and other overseas posts. Equipment 
includes 70 Challengers, 900 Chieftain main 
battle tanks (60 in reserve). 271 Scorpion light 
battle tanks. and over 5,000 other armoured 
vehicles, some 240 helicopters, Rapier/Blindfire 
and Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles and Milan, 
Swingfire and Tow guided anti-tank weapons. 
Nuclear support is provided by 12 Lance 
missiles and artillery for all of which warheads 
remain in United States custody. 
7.42. The Royal Navy - mostly earmarked for 
NATO - has 27 attack submarines (of which 
11 nuclear), three ASW aircraft-carriers, 13 des-
troyers with guided weapons, 44 multipurpose 
frigates, and smaller craft. It is supported by 
three fighter aircraft squadrons (with 15 Sea 
Harrier FRS-ls), eight ASW helicopter squa-
drons (with 41 Sea King HAS-2/5s and eight 
Lynx HAS-2s), two assault command squadrons 
(with eight Sea King HU-4s and 18 Wessex 
HU-5s). seven SAR and training helicopter 
squadrons and three helicopter flights with Wasp 
(hydrography /reconnaissance). 
7.43. The Royal Air Force - largely assigned to 
NATO with United Kingdom air defence under 
NATO command in peacetime - includes an 
operational home command (strike command) 
responsible for the United Kingdom air defence 
region and the Near and Far East. and one over-
seas command (RAF Germany). It has thirteen 
strike/attack squadrons (with some 26 Tornado 
GR-ls, 45 Buccaneer S-2A/Bs. 72 Jaguar 
GR-1 s), three ground attack squadrons with 
44 Harriers, nine interceptor squadrons (two 
with Lightning F-6/F-3s, seven with 87 Phan-
toms), three reconnaissance squadrons (two with 
24 Jaguar GR-ls, one with 20 Canberra PR-9s), 
one AEW squadron (with six Shackleton 
AEK-2s, five being in reserve), four maritime 
reconnaissance squadrons (with 28 Nimrods). 
seven helicopter squadrons (with 102 Wessex, 
Puma HC-ls, CH-47 Chinooks, Sea Kings) and 
training units. There are Sidewinder. Sparrow, 
Red Top. Firestreak and Sky Flash air-to-air 
missiles, Martel and Harpoon air-to-surface 
missiles and Bloodhound and Rapier surface-to-
air missiles. 
7.44. When the Tornado G-Rl squadrons have 
been formed in the United Kingdom and RAF 
Germany, Jaguar will remain in service for 
ground attack and tactical reconnaissance for 
operations on NA TO's flanks. 
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7.45. The improvement in UKADGE (United 
Kingdom Air Defence Ground Environment). 
with the order being passed for 22 transportable 
three-dimensional air defence systems. seeks to 
enhance the Royal Air Force's detection capa-
bilitv. The first of the 11 Nimrod MK-3 
airborne advanced warning aircraft should 
become operational next year and the air 
defence version ofthe Tornado F-2 should come 
into service in mid-decade. 
(i) ACE Mobile Force 
7.46. The committee has frequently drawn 
attention in the past to the political importance 
of Allied Command Europe Mobile Force 
(AMF) which. when activated. draws on 
specially trained and equipped units supplied by 
of WEU countries (except France), the United 
States and Canada. In a crisis it can be rapidly 
deployed by air to either NATO flank to provide 
a military demonstration of the political soli-
darity of the alliance. The force comprises a 
land component of brigade group size drawn 
from infantry battalions and support units 
supplied by Belgium. Canada. Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. and an air component of some 
four squadrons one of which is provided by the 
Netherlands. AMF is a tangible demonstration 
of burden-sharing in a joint allied force and it is 
essential that participating countries meet their 
commitments. At present the land component 
needs more local air defence, and the Luxem-
bourg infantry battalion - the only military unit 
which Luxembourg contributes to NATO - is at 
less than half strength. 
VIII. Nuclear weapons 
8.1. In view of the imminence of the deadline 
for implementing NA TO's decision of 1979 
concerning the deployment of cruise and 
Pershing missiles in Europe, in the absence of a 
satisfactory arms control agreement covering 
intermediate-range nuclear forces, this chapter 
deals with this category of nuclear weapons in 
particular detaiL and more briefly with others. 
(a) Current levels of nuclear weapons 
8.2. Current information on levels of nuclear 
weapons by category is given at Appendix VIII. 
(b) Intermediate-range nuclear forces 
(i) Hist01y of INF deployment 
8.3. The history of the deployment of inter-
mediate-range missiles goes back to the end of 
the 1950s when the Soviet Union began 
deployment of the liquid-fuelled SS-4 missile. 
followed by the longer-range SS-5 at the begin-
ning of the sixties. The NATO countries were 
simultaneously introducing comparable liquid-
fuelled missiles - 60 Thors in the United 
Kingdom. 30 Jupiters in Italy and 15 in 
Turkey. Until 1963 or 1964, the Soviet Union 
gave priority to deployment of this category of 
weapon system rather than to ICBMs capable of 
reaching United States territory. Its combined 
SS-4/SS-5 force reached its peak of some 700 at 
that time. while its ICBM force was only 100, 
compared with 424 United States ICBMs. 
8.4. By 1963. the United States and the United 
Kingdom (which had procured the Thor missiles 
from the United States and controlled them 
under a dual key system) had come to consider 
the liquid-fuelled missiles vulnerable and 
obsolete. They were phased out in that year. 
their targeting roles being taken over by the 
United States Polaris submarine-based force and 
Minuteman force. which were already opera-
tional. The Soviet Union which had deployed 
seven times as many intermediate-range missiles 
clearly continued to place considerable reliance 
upon them. The priority targets must have 
included forward bases for United States nuclear 
weapons systems. including the submarine bases 
in Holylock in the United Kingdom and Rota in 
Spain. as well as United States airforce bases in 
those countries. the British strategic bomber 
bases and. as it became operational in 1968, the 
British Polaris submarine base. 
8.5. In 1968, the Soviet Union initiated a 
replacement programme for some SS-4s and 
SS-5s by testing its SS-11 ICBM at intermediate 
ranges. By 1972. 300 SS-11 s had been deployed 
within the IRBM missile fields. and 100 SS-4s 
and SS-5s had been phased out, leaving only 600 
in service. The SS-11 was a more modern 
missile with a storable liquid fueL giving it a 
much shorter reaction time. In 1972, however. 
the Soviet Union halted its phasing out of SS-4s 
and 5s. In can be inferred that this was because 
the SS-11 (and its successor. the SS-19 ICBM 
which the Soviet Union has also tested and 
deployed at intermediate ranges in addition to 
the full intercontinental range) were included in 
the interim freeze agreement of SALT I in 1972 
and in the ceilings imposed by SALT II in 
1979 1 ; no doubt the more suitable solid-fuelled 
I. See "The Soviet SS-20 DecisiOn ", Raymond 
L. Garthoff, Survival, MayjJune 1983. 
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SS-20 with three warheads was already under 
development. and intermediate-range systems 
were not constrained in SALT agreements 
although. ironically, the Soviet Union had 
sought to have United States "forward-based" 
systems included in the negotiations. 
8.6. As deployment of the SS-20 began in 
1977. the SS-4 and SS-5 have been phased out in 
approximately equal numbers. the figures of the 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group communique of 
23rd March 1983 refer to 351 SS-20s and imply 
a further 231 SS-4s and SS-5s, making a total of 
582 missiles compared with 600 SS-4s and 
SS-5s alone in 1972. The number of warheads 
has of course nearly doubled from the original 
700 to 1,300. 
8. 7. The geographical distribution of the SS-20 
has. however, been more heavily weighted 
towards the Far East than was that of the SS-4 
and SS-5. 108 of the total of SS-20 missiles are 
now deployed at Novosibirsk and to the east of 
Lake Baikal, compared with 70 SS-4s and SS-5s 
deployed in the Far East before their replace-
ment with SS-11 s by 1970. A further 45 SS-20s 
are deployed in the area of Omsk to the east of 
the Urals and the remaining 198 in the European 
Soviet Union. 
8.8. The SS-20 has been tested up to a range of 
4,000 kilometres, which would bring the Novo-
sibirsk site just within range of north Norway 
and the very eastern part of Turkey, but not any 
other NATO territory. The United States has 
claimed that the missile would be capable of 
further development to a range of 5,000 kilo-
metres. which would bring the whole of Norway. 
Denmark and Turkey within range of the 
Novosibirsk site. 
(1i) The I\~4.TO decision ofDecember1979 
8. 9. The 1979 deployments of SS-20s came at 
a time when the Soviet Union had reached 
rough parity with the United States in strategic 
nuclear weapon systems on which NATO, since 
1963. had been relying in part to offset the 
Soviet IRBM monopoly which the western 
powers had permitted by default when they 
phased out Thor and Jupiter in 1963. The 
deployment of the modern. very accurate SS-20 
with three warheads each was perceived as a 
significant increase in Soviet nuclear capability 
threatening Western Europe. A high level 
group under United States chairmanship was 
established in NATO and considered NATO 
force improvement proposals ranging from 200 
to 600 missiles. In April 1979, NATO estab-
lished a similar special group to examine the 
arms control aspects of theatre nuclear forces. 
At the conclusion of these deliberations a special 
meeting of NATO foreign and defence ministers 
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announced the " dual track " decision on 12th 
December 1979 whereby NATO decided on the 
deployment in Europe of 572 United States 
nuclear missiles distributed as follows: 
Country GLCM Pershmg I/ Total 
Belgium 48 48 
48 Netherlands 48 
Germany 96 108 204 
Italy 112 
United Kingdom 160 
112 
160 
TOTAL 464 108 572 
8.1 0. The communique said : 
"As an integral part of TNF moderni-
sation, 1,000 United States nuclear war-
heads will be withdrawn from Europe 
as soon as feasible... The 572 LRTNF 
warheads should be accommodated 
within that reduced level. " 
8.11. The communique stressed the importance 
of arms control and supported the United States 
decision to negotiate LR TNF limitations with 
the Soviet Union along the following lines: 
"A. Any future limitations on United 
States systems principally designed for 
theatre missions should be accompanied 
by appropriate limitations on Soviet thea-
tre systems. 
B. Limitation on United States and 
Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems 
should be negotiated bilaterally in the 
SALT Ill framework in a step-by-step 
approach. 
C. The immediate objective of these 
negotiations should be the establishment 
of agreed limitations on United States 
and Soviet land-based long-range theatre 
nuclear missile systems. 
D. Any agreed limitations on these sys-
tems must be consistent with the prin-
ciple of equality between the sides. 
Therefore, the limitations should take the 
form of de jure equality in ceilings and in 
rights. 
E. Any agreed limitations must be ade-
quately verifiable. " 
8.12. The communique concluded: 
" 11. The ministers have decided to 
pursue these two parallel and comple-
mentary approaches in order to avert an 
arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet 
TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability 
of NA TO's strategy of deterrence and 
defence and thus maintain the security of 
its member states. 
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A. A modernisation decision, including a 
commitment to deployments is necessary 
to meet NA TO's deterrence and defence 
needs, to provide a credible response to 
unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and 
to provide the foundation for the pursuit 
of serious negotiations on TNF. 
B. Success of arms control in constrain-
ing the Soviet build-up can enhance 
alliance security, modify the scale of 
NA TO's TNF requirements, and pro-
mote stability and detente in Europe in 
consonance with NA TO's basic policy 
of deterrence, defence and detente as 
enunciated in the Harmel report. 
NA TO's TNF requirements will be exa-
mined in the light of concrete results 
reached through negotiations. " 
8.13. The communique stressed the Impor-
tance of arms control and SALT II : 
" 8. Ministers regard arms control as an 
integral part of the alliance's efforts to 
assure the undiminished security of its 
member states and to make the strategic 
situation between East and West more 
stable, more predictable, and more man-
ageable at lower levels of armaments on 
both sides. In this regard they welcomed 
the contribution which the SALT II 
Treaty makes towards achieving these 
objectives. " 
8.14. A fundamental premise of the December 
1979 decision - that the SALT II Treaty signed 
on 18th June 1979 after seven years of 
negotiations would very shortly enter into force, 
leading to the opening of SALT Ill talks for 
which it made provision - was subsequently 
undermined through the failure of the United 
States to ratify SALT I I. SALT Ill was to have 
provided a single forum for bilateral United 
States-Soviet Union negotiations on both stra-
tegic and long-range theatre nuclear systems. In 
its absence, bilateral talks between the United 
States and the Soviet Union limited to theatre 
nuclear forces were opened formally in Geneva 
towards the end of 1980 under the Carter 
administration, and then adjourned. It was not 
until 30th November 1981 under the Reagan 
administration - nearly two years after the 1979 
decision - that the INF talks got properly under 
way. 
(iiz) The INF negotiations 
8.15. The Geneva INF negotiatiOns are of 
course confidential, and although both sides 
have periodically made public, largely for public 
relations or propaganda purposes, the main 
points of their negotiating position, there must 
be many details, not least concerning veri-
fication and non-circumvention, which have not 
been publicly aired, but which are quite as 
important to any agreement as the more pub-
licly discussed issues concerning numbers of 
missiles or warheads. 
United States opening position 
8.16. President Reagan defined his initial" zero 
option " in a speech on 18th November 1981 : 
" The United States is prepared to cancel 
its deployment of Pershing 11 and ground-
launched cruise missiles if the Soviets will 
dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 
missiles. " 
The United States made it clear that the zero 
option would require the Soviet Union to 
dismantle all such missiles " globally '' - i.e. 
whether in range of Europe or based in the Far 
East in range of China or Japan. It is unlikely 
that such an offer could ever have been seriously 
considered by the Soviet Union which would 
have been required, in exchange for the non-
deployment of United States weapons over three 
or five years from 1984, to eliminate one of its 
major nuclear weapon systems which, in one 
form or another, had been continuously in 
service from 1960, and one-third of which since 
1977 had been deployed in the Far East where 
the Chinese nuclear force had increased from 
zero in 1960 to over 110 ground-based missiles 
and 12 submarine-based missiles today. 
The " walk in the woods " 
8.17. In July 1982, the United States negotiator, 
Mr. Nitze, and his Soviet counterpart, 
Mr. K vitsinsky, during informal talks while 
walking in the Jura, discussed possible grounds 
for compromise, apparently on their own initia-
tive, various differing reports of which appeared 
in the press only in January 1983. The follow-
ing approximate version has appeared more 
recently 1 : 
" Heading : ' This is a JOint exploratory 
package for the consideration of both 
governments ; it is not an offer or a propo-
sal by either government. ' 
I. The agreement covers medium-range 
nuclear systems based in Europe. Medium 
range means 1,000 kms-5,500 kms. 
2. Each side will be limited in Europe to 
75 land-based missile launchers. 
3. The Soviet 75 may be SS-20 launchers, 
each launcher carrying one missile. 
I. The Times, I st June 1983. 
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4. The eastern boundary of Europe is 
defined as the line of longitude 60 degrees 
east. However, because of the missile's 
range, the limit on the SS-20 applies over 
a wide area, the eastern boundary being 
longitude 80 degrees east. 
5. East of the 80 degree line, the Soviets 
will be permitted a further 90 SS-20 
launchers. 
6. No other SS-20 launchers will be 
deployed. 
7. The aircraft covered by this agreement 
will be, on the United States side, the 
F-111 s and, on the Soviet side, the 
Backfire, Blinder and Badger designated 
for land [as opposed to naval] missions. 
Neither side will deploy in Europe more 
than 150 of these aircraft. 
8. Missiles with ranges between 500 kms-
1 ,000 kms will be held to existing 
numbers and capabilities [i.e. no increase 
in range allowed; no increase in numbers; 
no MIRVing of warheads]. Subject to 
these restrictions they may be moder-
nised. [This covered the Soviet SS-22 
and arguably the SS-23. But it would 
allow NATO to upgrade its Pershing I to 
Pershing IB, which will have greater 
accuracy at the same range.] 
9. Deployment within the areas covered 
by this agreement of new land-based 
missiles with ranges between 1,000 kms-
5,500 kms is prohibited [i.e. no Euro-
pean deployment of Pershing 11]. 
1 0. To allow this preliminary agreement 
to be turned into a treaty immediately 
upon its acceptance by both sides there 
will be a three-month moratorium on 
preparations for further deployment of 
systems covered by this agreement. 
11. Immediately after this agreement has 
come into effect, both parties will promp-
tly sit down to negotiate further reduc-
tions. " 
Other press reports referred to the possibility of 
United States zero deployment in exchange for a 
reduction of Soviet INF missiles in range of 
Europe to 50 and the freezing of those in the Far 
East to the then level of 100. However, the 
proposal, which both negotiators took back to 
their respective capitals, was not endorsed by the 
Soviet Union and in the United States led to the 
dismissal of Mr. Eugene Rostow, the Director of 
the United States Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, to whom Mr. Nitze was directly 
responsible, and was followed by the virtual 
dismantling of part of that agency. 
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Sorict position of 21st December 1982 
8.18. Mr. Andropov made a public statement 
on 21st December 1982. key excepts from which 
are: 
" ... We have suggested an agreement 
renouncing all types of nuclear weapons 
- both medium-range and tactical -
designed to strike targets in Europe ... 
We have also suggested another variant: 
that the USSR and the NATO countries 
reduce their medium-range weaponry by 
more than two-thirds. So far the United 
States will not have it... It has submitted 
a proposal which, as if in mockery. is 
called a zero option. It envisages elimi-
nation of all Soviet medium-range 
missiles not only in the European, but also 
in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. 
while NA TO's arsenal of nuclear missiles 
in Europe is to remain intact and may 
even be increased... We ... will continue 
to work for an agreement on a basis that is 
fair to both sides. We are prepared, 
among other things. to agree that the 
Soviet Union should retain in Europe only 
as many missiles as are kept there by 
Britain and France - and not a single one 
more. This means that the Soviet Union 
would cut down by hundreds of missiles. 
including dozens of the latest missiles. 
known in the West as SS-20... If later the 
number of British and French missiles 
were scaled down, the number of Soviet 
ones would be additionally reduced by 
just as many. Along with this there 
must also be an accord on reducing to 
equal levels on both sides the number of 
medium-range nuclear-delivery aircraft 
stationed in this region by both the USSR 
and the NATO countries. " 
The Soviet Union's count of British and 
French missiles was 162, comprising the 
submarine-launched missiles of both countries 
plus the 18 French ground-based missiles. 
There was then no undertaking to destroy Soviet 
missiles in Europe in excess of 162. and the 
possibility appeared to remain open for the 
Soviet Union to remove such missiles to the Far 
East. 
United States interim offer of 30th March 1983 
8. I 9. On 30th March 1983. President Reagan. 
apparently responding to urgings from most 
European allies. announced that the United 
States had informed the Soviet Union in the 
INF talks in Geneva that the United States was 
" prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in 
which the United States would substantiallv 
reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II 
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and GLCM provtded the Soviet Union reduce 
the number of its warheads on longer-range INF 
missiles to an equal level on a global basis'', 
and had proposed that the talks. which had 
adjourned for Easter, resume on 17th May. 
The zero option remained on the table. Press 
reports had earlier suggested the proposals 
would imply an interim level of 300 INF 
warheads on each side. but the statement made 
no reference to numbers. nor did it link an 
interim agreement to Soviet acceptance of zero 
levels as the ultimate aim. By referring to " a 
global basis". the statement included all Soviet 
INF systems in the Far East as well as Europe. 
The proposal still included the deployment of 
Pershing 11 which the " walk in the woods " 
formula would have eliminated. 
President Andropov's interriews ll'ith Prarda of 
26th August and 27th October 1983 
8.20. In a speech in Moscow on 3rd May 
I 983 on the occasion of a visit by the East 
German leader. Mr. Honecker, Mr. Andropov 
had already said that the Soviet Union was 
prepared to count warheads as well as missiles in 
the INF negotiations. but a more significant 
statement came in answers to questions put by 
the newspaper Pravda and circulated by the 
Soviet news agency, Tass. on 26th August. He 
first summarised the previously known Soviet 
positions: 
"It was the Soviet Union that proposed a 
genuine. and not a false, zero solution for 
Europe : to destroy both medium-range 
and tactical nuclear systems in their 
entirety. The United States, however, does 
not even want to discuss the idea ... 
Since the West is not ready for such 
a radical solution. while we remain 
prepared for it, we have proposed another 
variant. which, though less radical, is also 
far-reaching : to forgo deployment in 
Europe of any new medium-range 
systems. whereas the existing ones would 
be reduced by approximately two-thirds, 
with the USSR and NATO each retaining 
for the time being 300 such systems. 
... We declared our readiness to retain 
after the reductions in Europe precisely as 
many medium-range missiles as Britain 
and France possess. Accordingly, both 
sides would also retain an equal number 
of medium-range nuclear delivery aircraft. 
Then certain people have mounted a 
new ' hobby-horse' by claiming that even 
with an equal number of missiles on both 
sides the Soviet Union would allegedly 
have an advantage in the aggregate 
number of warheads on its SS-20 missiles. 
But they could not ride that ' hobby-
horse' for a long time either, for the 
Soviet Union expressed its consent to 
reach agreement on equality both as 
regards the delivery vehicles (missiles and 
aircraft) and as regards the weapons on 
them. 
As a result, the Soviet Union would 
have in the European zone significantly 
fewer medium-range missiles and war-
heads on them than prior to 1976 
when we did not have any SS-20 missiles, 
which, according to the NATO version, 
were the spark that set the forest on 
fire ... " 
8.21. Mr. Andropov then added his significant 
new proposal to " liquidate " any missile surplus 
under an agreement including the SS-20 : 
" Should a mutually acceptable agreement 
be achieved, including renunciation by the 
United States of the deployment in 
Europe of new missiles. the Soviet Union, 
in reducing its medium-range missiles in 
the European part of the country to a level 
equal to the number of missiles of Britain 
and France, would liquidate all the 
missiles to be reduced. In this event a 
considerable number of the most modern 
missiles, known in the West as the SS-20s, 
would be liquidated as well . " 1 
In a similar interview published in Pravda of 
27th October 1983. Mr. Andropov declared: 
" ... in order to secure parity of missile 
warheads of the USSR on one hand and of 
Great Britain and France on the other... 
bearing in mind the number of warheads 
in British and French missiles at present, 
the USSR could have in Europe about 140 
launchers for the SS-20 missiles, i.e. 
notably less than the medium-range 
missile launchers now possessed by Great 
Britain and France. 
... in case an agreement be reached on the 
limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and 
as soon as it goes into operation, the 
deployment of SS-20 missiles in the 
eastern part of the USSR will also be 
stopped at that moment... provided that 
[no 2] tangible changes in the strategic 
I. Some United States sources have questioned whether 
Mr. Andropov really undertook to .. liquidate SS-20 
misstles " or only launchers. The text quoted above. 
refernng to misstles. is the official English version of the 
Pravda mtervtew contamed in "'Soviet News" of 31st 
August 1983. published by the Soviet Embassy in London. 
2 The negative appear~ 111 the Pra\da article. There 
appears to he an error m this English te/..t taken from the 
official Moscow News of 6th No\ em her 1983. 
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situation in Asia take place. This means, 
above all, that the United States would 
not deploy new medium-range nuclear 
weapons in areas from which they could 
reach the eastern part of the USSR 
territory. 
Sometimes it is said that our proposal that 
each side would have left, after reduction. 
no more than 300 carriers of medium-
range nuclear weapons, supposedly, ham-
strings too much the United States planes 
of corresponding range. 
In this case too we are prepared to express 
additional flexibility: to establish equal for 
the USSR and NATO levels of medium-
range plane carriers in mutually-
acceptable numerical range, which may be 
substantially different from the level we 
had previously proposed. The concrete 
numerical levels could be agreed upon and 
the types of the limitable plane carriers 
could also be finalised. 
... eighteen months ago the USSR intro-
duced a moratorium on the deployment of 
medium-range nuclear weapons in its 
European part. And this moratorium is 
being strictly observed... The additional 
deployment of missiles beyond the Urals. 
in areas from which they could reach 
Western Europe, was also stopped. 
Moreover, the USSR has discarded 
several dozens of its medium-range 
missiles in Europe, within the period that 
the talks are being held. To date. all the 
SS-5 missiles ... have been removed from 
our fighting strength. 
. .. if the United States gives up the deploy-
ment of its missiles in Europe within the 
announced period and thus would pro-
duce an opportunity to carry on talks and 
seek for mutually acceptable solutions. 
In that case we could start already now 
to reduce our SS-4 missiles (we have over 
200 of them) and complete their liquid-
ation in 1984-85. And if it were possible 
to reach an agreement on a just footing in 
Geneva about which we have spoken 
many times, then, naturally, a consi-
derable part of the new existing SS-20 
missiles would also be liquidated. " 
8.22. Clarification of Mr. Andropov's " liquid-
ate missiles" proposal was given by Marshal 
Akhromeyef, the Soviet First Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff. at a press conference in 
Moscow on 14th September: 
"As to the term 'scrapping', it implies 
the scrapping of both launchers and 
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missiles. A specific order of missile 
scrapping would be determined by the 
procedures which would be worked out 
during negotiations. Of course, the 
corresponding facilities and equipment 
which are being installed by the United 
States in Europe in preparation for the 
basing of Pershing and cruise missiles 
should also be subject to dismantling or 
elimination. " 1 
President Reagan 's proposals of 26th September 
1983 
8.23. The next public statement by the United 
States was made by President Reagan in his 
address to the United Nations General Assembly 
on 26th September, which described in outline 
detailed proposals tabled by the United States at 
the INF talks in Geneva a day or so earlier : 
"First the United States proposes a new 
initiative on global limits. If the Soviet 
Union agrees to reductions and limits on a 
global basis, the United States for its part 
will not offset the entire Soviet global 
missile deployment through United States 
deployments in Europe. We would, of 
course, retain the right to deploy missiles 
elsewhere. 
Second, the United States is prepared to 
be more flexible on the content of the 
current talks. The United States will 
consider mutually acceptable ways to 
address the Soviet desire that an agree-
ment should limit aircraft as well as 
missiles. 
Third, the United States will address the 
mix of missiles that would result from 
reductions. In the context of reductions 
to equal levels, we are prepared to reduce 
the number of Pershing 11 ballistic 
missiles as well as ground-launched cruise 
missiles. . .. We cannot, however, espe-
cially in light of recent events, compro-
mise on the necessity of effective verifi-
cation. " 
8.24. A fact sheet issued by the White House in 
Washington on the same day contained a basic 
criteria for any agreement : 
"- there must be equality of rights and 
limits between the United States and 
Soviet Union ; 
- there can be no negotiation of or 
compensation for third country 
forces: 
I. Official English text from "Soviet News", 21st Sep-
tember 1983. 
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- there must be global limits on LRINF 
missiles and no exportation of the 
security threat in Europe to other 
regions, such as the Far East : 
- there must be no adverse impact on 
NA TO's conventional defence capa-
bility; 
- there must be measures for effective 
verification. " 
8.25. The chief concession in the American 
position was to temper the insistence on 
" global " equality between the United States 
INF missiles and all Soviet INF missiles, 
whether in range of Europe or based in the Far 
East. While the right to global equality would 
be retained, if agreement on reductions in 
present Soviet levels were reached, the United 
States would not offset " the entire Soviet global 
LRINF missile deployment" by United States 
deployments of LRINF missiles in Europe, but 
would retain the right to deploy missiles 
elsewhere to reach the global ceilings. Agreed 
reductions on the NATO side would include 
reductions in the level of Pershing 11. Aircraft 
could be included in the agreement, as well as 
missiles. 
Summary of NATO position, 28th October 1983 
8.26. The communique of the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group, meeting in Canada on 
28th October 1983, summarised the NATO 
position: 
" [Ministers] also supported the United 
States determination in Geneva to explore 
every proposed solution for an INF arms 
control agreement that meets the legi-
timate security concerns of the alliance. 
The basic criteria of such an agreement 
are: significant reductions based on equal-
ity of rights and limits between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, no inclusion 
of or compensation for third-country 
systems, global limitations, no weakening 
of the United States contribution to 
NATO's conventional deterrence and 
defence, and effective verification. 
[Refusing to accept Soviet] insistence to 
take into account British and French 
forces and their refusal to accept the 
principle of equality in LRINF missile 
deployments .... 
... Ministers noted with attention the most 
recent Soviet proposals. The Soviets are 
invited to explain fully their proposals at 
the negotiating table. Ministers stated 
that NATO would continue to examine 
carefully all proposals in light of the 
alliance's agreed criteria described above. 
... Ministers stressed that the alliance 
commitment to negotiations would 
continue even after initial deployments 
and that they remain willing to reverse, 
halt or modify deployments - including 
the removal and dismantling of missiles 
already deployed - if and when a 
balanced, equitable and verifiable agree-
ment is achieved in Geneva. " 
Posttwn of China and Japan 
8.27. The Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Qian Qichen, informed the press before-
hand that at his meeting with the Soviet 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Ilyichev on 
6th October, he would be calling for the removal 
of the Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed in the Far 
East. The Chinese and Japanese Foreign 
Ministers had agreed at a meeting in New York 
in September to seek the removal of these 
missiles as a joint goal. On 5th October a 
Chinese news agency quoted a Japanese defence 
agency counsellor to the effect that the Soviet 
Union was preparing bases to increase the 
number of SS-20 missiles in the Far East of the 
Soviet Union from the present 108 to 135. 
(iv) Position of British and French nuclear forces 
8.28. From the outset of the INF negotiations 
the Soviet Union has insisted on counting 
British and French ballistic missiles - both 
submarine- and land-based, totalling 162 - as 
part of its perceived missile balance in Europe. 
The Andropov offer of 26th August to " liqui-
date " all Soviet intermediate-range missiles in 
Europe in excess of the number of British and 
French missiles, if his definition of" Europe" is 
to cover "missiles in range of Europe", would 
have involved the destruction of 24 7 obsolete 
SS-4 and 5 missiles, but also the destruction of a 
further 81 SS-20 missiles, to bring Soviet levels 
down to 162. 
8.29. The British and French Governments, 
fully supported by the United States, have stead-
fastly refused to accept the Soviet position, the 
chief grounds being that the French and British 
forces are national strategic forces of last resort, 
and that they each represent only a small 
fraction of the nuclear forces possessed by the 
superpowers. The countries concerned have 
recently reaffirmed their position on this issue in 
speeches to the United Nations General Assem-
bly. Both have commented on circumstances 
in which their nuclear forces could be the 
subject of negotiations. 
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8.30. On 28th September, President Mitterrand 
said: 
"The idea cannot be rejected that the five 
nuclear powers should discuss together, 
when the time comes, a lasting limitation 
of their strategic system. The conditions 
for an advance in this field should 
therefore be clearly stated. The first 
supposes that the fundamental difference 
in both kind and quantity which separates 
the armament of the Big Two from the 
others should be corrected, as well as the 
difference which separates a country 
which might use these armaments to 
bolster its power, from the country which 
might be obliged to use them to ensure its 
own survival. The second condition 
stems from the considerable gap between 
conventional forces, particularly in 
Europe. A gap which has been increased, 
I fear, by the existence of chemical and 
biological weapons, the manufacture and 
stockpiling of which should be absolutely 
forbidden by a convention. The third 
condition would require that an end be 
put to out-bidding in anti-missile, anti-
submarine and anti-satellite weapons. To 
make provision for the people against 
threats from space is another impera-
tive ... " 
8.31. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign 
Secretary, on 28th September said: 
" It would be absurd as things stand for us 
to seek to trade reductions with a super-
power. But we have never said, 'never'. 
On the contrary, we have made it clear 
that if the Soviet and United States' 
strategic arsenals were very substantially 
reduced, and if no significant changes had 
occurred in the Soviet defensive capabi-
lities, Britain would want to review her 
position and to consider how best she 
could contribute to arms control in the 
light of the reduced threat. " 
Unlike President Mitterrand, Sir Geoffrey made 
no proposals for five-power talks, and did not 
include rectifying the conventional imbalance 
among the preconditions. 
8.32. Remarks by Mr. George Bush, the United 
States Vice-President, at a luncheon on 
28th September attracted some attention. 
Without in any way contradicting the official 
United States, or indeed British or French 
positions, he was quoted as saying : 
"We can't negotiate for the British and 
the French. and we don't intend to dictate 
to them" 
but the idea of merging the negotiations on 
European missiles with the strategic START 
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talks had been " kicked around" within the 
administration. '' There has to be an answer 
found for the British and French missiles'' ... if 
the ... " idealistic goal of significant reductions " 
was to be achieved. Referring to the exclusion 
of British and French missiles from the INF 
negotiations, he said " someone has to come up 
with a better answer to that". 1 
(l') Unofficial proposals 
8.33. Opposition circles in the United States 
and some European countries have regarded the 
" zero-zero " option as unrealistic on the 
grounds that the Soviet Union has had 
600 intermediate-range missiles deployed since 
the early 1960s and cannot be expected to reduce 
these weapons to zero in exchange for the non-
deployment by NATO of weapons that do not 
yet exist. Mr. Paul Warnke, the former 
Director of United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, and negotiator of 
SALT II, has proposed that : 
" 1. all intermediate-range missiles be 
taken into account, regardless of nation-
ality or whether launched from the land 
or sea; and 
2. the United States would cancel the 
Pershing 11 and GLCM deployment if the 
Soviets reduced an equivalent number of 
warheads. " 2 
This would involve the dismantling by the 
Soviet Union of all 280 remaining obsolete SS-4 
and SS-5 missiles and about 100 of the SS-20 
missiles. " The result would be equilibrium 
between the Soviet land-based force of SS-20 
missiles and the western (British, French and 
American) sea-based missiles of intermediate 
range. The Soviets would have 215 SS-20 
missiles (I 00 of which would remain targeted 
only on China or Japan) carrying 645 warheads, 
and the West would have 184 missiles carrying 
544 warheads. (There are also eighteen land-
based French IRBMs and approximately thirty 
Soviet SS-N-5 SLBMs.)" Mr. Denis Healey, a 
former United Kingdom Secretary of Defence, 
in his address to the WEU Assembly Socialist 
Group in December 1982, specifically endorsed 
Mr. Warnke's proposals. 
( rz) Present position 
8.34. Reports of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on a number of occa-
sions have endorsed both aspects of the NATO 
I Guardl3n, 29th September 1983, from A.P. report. 
2. Source. Committee for National Security - statement 
released on 16th September 1982. 
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dual track decision of December 1979, but have 
stressed that any attempt to measure " nuclear 
balance" between East and West can only be 
done globally, taking account of all categories of 
nuclear weapons on both sides. because of the 
great complexity of defining categories of 
nuclear weapon which should be deemed " of 
interest" to the European theatre. Reports 
have similarly stressed that for deterrent 
purposes reliance must be placed on the whole 
range of nuclear weapons available to the West, 
so as to avoid any risk of "decoupling" the 
United States strategic deterrent through mis-
taken reliance on a supposed separate nuclear 
balance within Europe. Any agreement on the 
reduction of weapons on the other hand 
would almost certainly have to be limited to 
narrow categories of weapons systems. Reports 
have stressed that although there can be no 
question of France or the United Kingdom 
accepting reductions in the present relatively 
small levels of their nuclear weapons, while 
levels of Soviet and United States weapons 
remain very large, nevertheless existing numbers 
of British and French weapons are inevitably 
taken into account by the Soviet Union in its 
own assessment of the balance. 
8.35. The current round of INF talks in Geneva 
began on 6th September and is scheduled to end 
on 15th November. Expectations of substan-
tive agreement before then are fading, and the 
United States appears to be making final prepa-
rations for the deployment of the first 
41 missiles before the end of 1983 - 16 cruise 
missiles in Italy and the United Kingdom, and 
9 Pershing 11 missiles in Germany - as the first 
step in a continuous programme to deploy 
572 missiles over the next five years. 
8.36. The obvious crux of the INF negotiations 
is numbers of nuclear missiles in range of 
Europe. Although there is some doubt over the 
definition of "Europe", the Soviet Union in 
proposing to reduce its missiles in Europe to 162 
- the numbers of present British and French 
missiles - appears to be offering to dismantle 
328 Soviet missiles including at least 81 
SS-20s. In exchange the United States would 
have to forego any missile deployment in 
Europe. The United States. for its part. appears 
to have agreed to limit its actual missile deploy-
ment in Europe to whatever number of Soviet 
missiles remain in Europe after agreed 
reductions, but is insisting that the mix of 
United States missiles shall include Pershing 11. 
8.37. One feature of the abortive "walk in the 
woods " proposals was that NATO would forego 
Pershing II deployment, which it emerges the 
Soviet Union particularly objects to. A feature 
of Pershing II is that it is extremely accurate (a 
CEP of only 30 metres is quoted) and has a 
flight time of only 5 to 8 minutes. It is particu-
larly suitable for use against hardened targets 
including missile sites: 
" Potential Pershing ll targets include : 
hardened and soft missile sites : airfields ; 
naval bases : nuclear, biological and 
chemical storage sites ; command and 
control centres ; headquarters : rail yards ; 
road networks/choke points : ammunition 
and petroleum storage facilities ; troop 
concentrations and facilities ; and dams/ 
locks. Pershing 11 is particularly efTec-
tive against hard point and underground 
targets because of its high accuracy and 
the unique earth penetrator warhead 
capability." 1 
8.38. While numbers of missiles may appear the 
crux of the Geneva INF negotiations, it could 
still take a long time to reach agreement on 
many subsidiary but still very important issues 
including categories of aircraft which may or 
may not be included in any limitations. All 
such aircraft being dual-capable, any restric-
tions would have an immediate impact on 
the conventional balance in Europe ; as the 
different assessments of the INF balance at 
Appendix VII C shows, there is wide disagree-
ment concerning categories of aircraft to be 
counted. Other non-circumvention provisions 
will have to cover shorter-range nuclear systems. 
Finally, verification provisions seem hardly to 
have been touched upon as yet. 
(c) Shorter-range nuclear weapons 
8.39. The Soviet Union is simultaneously 
deploying a new generation of shorter-range 
nuclear missiles : the SS-21 of 120 km range 
(replacing the Frog of 80 km range). some now 
in service with Soviet forces in East Germany: 
the SS-23 of 500 km range (replacing the 
300 km Scud), about to come into service- the 
Scud is issued to the forces of most Warsaw Pact 
countries ; the SS-22 of 900 km range (replacing 
the SS-12). sited only on Soviet territory. but in 
range of Norway, Germany, Greece and Turkey. 
8.40. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, at 
its meeting in Canada on 27th and 28th October. 
announced its " Montebello Decision ": 
" ... the Nuclear Planning Group has 
decided on 27th October 1983 to with-
draw 1,400 warheads during the next 
several years. This Ministerial decision. 
taken together with the already accomp-
lished withdrawal of 1,000 warheads, will 
I. Tcst1mony of former Secretary of the Army, Chfford L. 
Alexander to the United States House Appropriations 
Committee. February 1979 " Department of Defence Appro-
priations for 1980" - quoted in " Targeting for Strateg1c 
Deterrence". Desmond Ball. Adelph1 Paper 185, IISS. 
summer 1983. 
191 
DOCUMENT 959 
bring to 2,400 the total number of 
warheads to be removed from Europe 
since 1979. Moreover. this reduction will 
not be affected by any deployment of 
longer-range INF (LRINF) since one 
warhead will be removed for each 
Pershing 11 or ground-launched cruise 
missile (GLCM) warhead deployed. 
The detailed implementation of this 
decision as to the precise composition of 
the stockpile is a matter for the respons-
ible military authorities to determine and 
a programme to effect this will be worked 
out and implemented over the next five to 
six years. In this context, appropriate 
consideration will be given to short-range 
systems .... 
Recognising that for this minimum level 
stockpile to make the most effective 
contribution to deterrence, both the deliv-
ery systems and the warheads must be 
survivable, responsive and effective, 
Ministers accordingly identified a range of 
possible improvements. Ministers estab-
lished broad criteria which will remain 
valid for the next decade, including the 
continuing importance of strengthening 
conventional forces. The alliance must, 
however. take account at all times of 
changes to Soviet capabilities during this 
period. 
Contrary to the impression that NATO 
has been fuelling an arms build-up by 
adding to its nuclear armoury, this sus-
tained programme of reductions will have 
reduced NA TO's nuclear stockpile to the 
lowest level in over 20 years. " 
(d) Strategic nuclear weapons 
8.41. As part of the United States strategic 
force modernisation programme the air-laun-
ched cruise missile became operational for the 
first time on 16th December 1982 when a 
squadron of fourteen specially marked B-52s 
were fitted with twelve ALCMs each, the first of 
201 B-52s earmarked to carry ALCMs of which 
4,348 have been ordered 1• The special mark-
ing of the B-52s in accordance with SALT II 
is to permit external verification. Plans for 
deployment of the controversial MX ICBM are 
still in abeyance pending further decisions on 
the basing mode. A bi-partisan Presidential 
Commission on Strategic Forces appointed by 
President Reagan, under the chairmanship of 
retired Air Force General Brent Scowcroft, 
I. Pres~ reports have suggested the existing ALCM will 
shortly become vulnerable to Sov1et AWACS and Improved 
defences. it will be replaced by a new model with small radar 
1mage. 
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reported on 12th April that the Soviet ability to 
destroy United States land-based missiles (as 
claimed by the Reagan administration) was 
theoretical only, because of "problems of ope-
ration accuracies" and " planning uncertain-
ties". The commission recognised that rea-
sonable survivability of ICBMs " may not out-
last this century", that the MX could not be 
invulnerable, but that 100 should be deployed 
in Minuteman silos, and that a new small 
mobile ICBM with only one warhead should be 
developed. On 17th December 1982 the forty-
eight British Vulcan bombers were withdrawn 
from service. 
8.42. The SALT 11 Treaty negotiated during 
the successive presidencies of Nixon, Ford and 
Carter, signed by the last on 18th June 1979, 
has not been ratified. The Reagan adminis-
tration has found it " fatally flawed " but decla-
red that it will not " undercut " it provided the 
Soviet Union does not do so either. SALT 11 
was signed on the assumption that negotiations 
on a SALT Ill, to include restrictions on thea-
tre or forward-based nuclear systems, would 
have started at once, and the attitude of the 
United States Administration to the protocol to 
SALT 11 is not clear. The protocol would 
have expired on the last day of 198I and for-
bids : (i) the deployment or testing of mobile 
ICBMs; (ii) the deployment of GLCMs or 
SLCMs with a range greater than 600 km; or 
the testing of such missiles with MlR Vs; 
(iii) the testing or deployment of air-to-surface 
ballistic missiles. 
8.43. United States proposals for reductions of 
strategic nuclear weapons in the START talks, 
proceeding parallel to the INF talks in Geneva, 
were announced by President Reagan on 9th 
May I982 in general terms, concentrating 
on a reduction in ICBMs, the category in which 
the Soviet Union is superior to the United 
States. Officials at that time said the proposal 
was for a common ceiling of 850 ballistic mis-
siles (SLBMs plus ICBMs) with a total of not 
more than 5,000 warheads, of which only 500 
warheads could be on ICBMs. This was said 
to involve a reduction of 1,500 Soviet missiles 
and I ,300 warheads compared with a reduction 
of 850 United States missiles and 2,200 war-
heads, the reductions to be carried out over ten 
years. 
8.44. Mr. Andropov, in his speech of 21st 
December 1982, proposed a 25% reduction in 
all strategic weapons of both sides, restrictions 
on improvements to nuclear weapons, and a 
freeze at present levels while negotiations were 
in progress. Comments in Pravda of 2nd 
January 1983 pointed out that this proposal 
amounted to a 25% reduction in the ceilings of 
SALT 11 to leave each side with a combined 
total of I ,800 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 
bombers by 1990. The Soviet Union has 
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proposed a total ban on all new types of 
~trategic weapon including ALCMs, GLCMs and 
SLCMs. 
8.45. On 4th October, prior to the resumption 
of the START talks in Geneva the following day, 
President Reagan announced that: 
"The United States will introduce a 
proposal for a mutual, guaranteed build-
down designed to encourage stabilising 
systems. The proposal will include 
specific provisions for building down 
ballistic missile warheads and, concur-
rently, for addressing a parallel build-
down on bombers. 
The White House issued a " Fact Sheet " on the 
talks: 
" ... initiatives, taken during the previous 
round IV ofSTART, included: 
- a relaxing of the proposal to limit the 
total number of ballistic missiles on 
each side to 850; 
- a shift from an approach which envi-
sioned two phases of negotiation, with 
the initial emphasis on ballistic missiles, 
to an approach embodied in a single 
phase agreement, with everything on 
the table; 
- the proposal of limits on the number of 
bombers on each side and limits on the 
number of cruise missiles permitted to 
be carried on each bomber which are 
below SALT 11 levels ; 
- an offer to explore alternative approaches 
to limiting the destructive capability of 
ballistic missiles. 
In addition, the United States increased 
its efforts to negotiate a number of confi-
dence-building measures involving the 
notification of ballistic missile launches 
and other activities that could be misinter-
preted in times of crisis ... " 
The President has instructed the United States 
Delegation to propose a number of new initia-
tives in START, specifically including a 
proposal for a mutual, guranteed build-down 
designed to encourage stabilising systems : 
" The build-down proposal will include : 
- a provision which links reductions to 
modernisation using variable ratios 
which identify how many existing 
nuclear warheads must be withdrawn as 
new warheads of various types are 
deployed; 
- a provision calling for a guaranteed 
annual percentage build-down (an 
approximately 5% mandatory build-
down per year); 
- a provision that ensures that the reduc-
tions would be paced by whichever 
above rule produces the greatest reduc-
tions. 
In addition, the United States Delegation 
will be prepared to : 
- address concurrently the build-down of 
bombers; 
- discuss additional limitations on the 
air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) 
carried by United States bombers; 
- negotiate trade-offs, taking into account 
Soviet advantages in missiles and 
United States advantages in bombers, 
in ways that provide each side maxi-
mum flexibility consistent with move-
ment towards a more stable balance of 
forces; 
- propose the establishment of a working 
group in START to discuss the United 
States build-down initiative in round 
V." 
IX. Conclusions 
9 .1. The present burden-sharing problem 
arises chiefly because of differences in the way 
that the European allies on the one hand and 
the present United States administration on the 
other approach relations with the Soviet Union, 
differences which lead to differing views as to 
the necessary size of the total allied defence 
effort. 
9.2. Because of these difficulties the com-
mittee fully recognises that there is a greater 
need for defence consultation between Euro-
pean allies and for a more equal political rela-
tionship between the European members and 
the United States. The relative merits of WEU 
and the Eurogroup as a forum for discussion 
among European allies are examined in Chap-
ter V above and the committee's conclu-
sions are presented in paragraphs A.4 and B of 
the draft recommendation and in the draft reso-
lution. There is a need for the European posi-
tion to be expounded clearly in the United 
States, especially to Congress committees and 
staffs, through a public relations effort co-
ordinated by the Washington embassies of the 
countries which provide the Eurogroup secre-
tariat and chairman-in-office. Reciprocally 
there is a need for European public opinion and 
parliaments to show greater appreciation of all 
aspects of the United States contribution to 
allied defence; WEU, especially the Assembly, 
has an important role to play in this connec-
tion. 
193 
DOCUMENT 959 
9.3. International comparisons between the 
defence efforts of different countries are difficult 
to make, both because of problems of metho-
dology discussed in Chapter Ill above, and 
because of differences in military manpower 
policy, geography, economic and industrial 
capacity, logistic infrastructure, political prior-
ities and perceptions of the threat. The com-
mittee concludes however that the European 
allies for the most part now carry a very 
reasonable share of the agreed burden, a share 
which has increased from 24 % to 38 % in the 
last twenty-five years, and has increased most 
significantly in the first eight years of the last 
decade during which the United States effort 
declined. 
9.4. It is important to maintain the collective 
commitment to an annual increase in de-
fence expenditure in real terms as long as the 
Soviet military build-up continues, and to meet 
the NATO biennial force goals as approved by 
nations on proposals from the supreme com-
manders. Certain specific improvements listed 
in paragraphs 1 (b), (c) and (d) of the draft 
recommendation are also required. 
9.5. Unilateral decisions by any allied country 
to opt out of a specific defence role which 
forms a part of collective allied defence plans 
can be particularly damaging. Despite its 
theoretical attraction the committee has not 
identified specific role-sharing opportunities 
that would permit any greater specialisation by 
member countries in specific military roles than 
exists at present. 
9.6. In the case of developments beyond the 
NATO area threatening their vital interests 
(discussed in paragraph 2. 7 above}, the ready 
assistance of all WEU countries must be forth-
coming within the area to facilitate deployments 
by the United States, or by any NATO country, 
beyond the area. Certain WEU countries, such 
as France and the United Kingdom, should be 
ready to participate in such deployments. 
9.7. The British and French independent 
nuclear forces constitute an additional centre of 
strategic decision and national riposte to poten-
tial Soviet aggression ; they must not be 
bargained away in any accommodation between 
the Soviet Union and United States over the 
balance of intermediate-range nuclear forces 
between them. 
9.8. The United States and its allies should 
seek to balance although not necessarily to 
match at every level the growing nuclear capa-
bilities of the Soviet Union. However, the 
deployment since the end of 1977 of some 350 
SS-20 ballistic missiles by the Soviet Union has 
had a seriously adverse effect upon the theatre 
nuclear balance in Europe, and unless this 
deployment is substantially reduced or coun-
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tered it could have a gravely intimidating 
impact upon the Soviet Union's neighbours 
around the Eurasian landmass. The first 
objective therefore of the " twin track " decision 
of 12th December 1979 remains a priority. If 
it cannot be met in verifiable manner there 
must be no departure from the agreed national 
commitments to deploy GLCMs or Pershing 11 
ballistic missiles. It is to be hoped that the 
deployment process would induce the Soviet 
Union to reach an accommodation with the 
United States over INF on a mutually-accep-
table basis of balance as a first step to reduc-
tions on both sides. 
9.9. Every effort should be made at all levels 
both politically, diplomatically and militarily to 
maintain trust and mutual confidence between 
the European and American components of the 
alliance. This can only be achieved in the 
long term if the Europeans show an under-
standing of America's concern over its world-
wide peacekeeping role in view of the emerging 
Soviet global threat and if the Europeans make 
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a financial and military contribution to the 
alliance commensurate with their economic 
potential. 
X. Opinion of the minority 
1 0.1. The revised report was adopted in 
committee by 12 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions. 
The minority opposed the report first because 
of a percei vcd acceptance of United States policy 
of global confrontation between two military 
blocs, which the minority held to be unsuited to 
a regional defensive alliance, and secondly 
because of the report's support for United States 
policy in the Geneva INF and START negoti-
ations which the minority would have criticised, 
recalling that the United States had not ratified 
SALT 11. Finally, the minority wished the 
report to deal with security and co-operation in 
Europe with reference to the Madrid and forth-
coming Stockholm conferences. 
APPENDIX l COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1978-1982 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
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--~--------- ----------,--------------------;-----------------------------------------,-----------------------, 
Country National currency unit Defence expenditure (national currency, 
current prices) 
Defence expenditure 
(current prices - US $ million) a 
GDP in purchasers' values 
(current prices - US $ million) a b Population (thousand) 
Defence expenditure as % of 
GDP in purchasers' values 
Defence expenditure per head 
(current prices - US$) a Defence expenditure as % of total WEU 
1978 i 1979 : 1980 
_____ (_0) _______ ----~ -~-----~----=-(~1_)~------~ll -c(-- 5) - 1 ----;(-----;4c-) -,---c(;----3;;-c)-
Belgium.................... Million B. Frs. 
France (c).................. Million F. Frs. 
Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million DM 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Milliard Lire 
Luxembourg................ Million L. Frs. 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million Guilders 
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . Million £ Sterling 
99,726 
85,175 
43,019 
5,301 
1,154 
9,146 
7,616 
1 06,472 115,754 
96,439 111,672 
45,415 48,518 
6,468 8,203 
1,242 1,534 
10,106 10,476 
9,029 11,510 
1981 I 
(-2) 
I 
125,689' 
129,708 
52,193 
9,868 
1, 715 
11,296 
12,154 
1982 f 1978 I 1979 
(-1) i (I) (2) 
127,9011--3-,-17-5 --3.-6-3; 
145,1551 18,874 22,668 
54,5531 21,417 24,778 
12,066 6,246 7, 785 
1,876 37 42 
11,932 4,228 5,038 
14,186 14,619 19,155 
1978 1979 1980 1981 I 1982 e 1978 1979 1 1980 1981 1982/ 1978 1979 1 1980 1981 1 1982/ 1978 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 07) j (!8) (19) c2o) (21) (22) 1 (23) (24) l-c=2=5)=--- 1-____,.,c2'""6),-----
l 
9,841 9,849 9,859 9,873 9,887 3.3 3.31 3.3 3.5 3.3 323 369 401 343 299 4.63 
53,277 53,478 53,713 53,962 54,124 4.o 4.o! 4.o 4.2 4.t 354 424 492 442 437 27.51 
1980 1-1-;-;98~1_ 1 1982 f 1978 I 1979 ' 1980 J 1981 1982 e (3) I (4) (5) ---,-(6,...)- --c(7cc-)- (8) (9) ~~  
_ ___:___ _ ----1----: ---- ----
3,958 3,385 2,958 97,251 111,127 119,327 97,369 90,259 
26,425 23,867 23,651 474,450 573,422 652,775 569,395 575,436 
59,409 59,454 59,667 59,763 59,850 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 361 417 447 386 386 31.22 
56,714 56,914 57,069 57,197 57,403 2.4 2.4 2.41 2.5 2.6 110 137 168 152 163 9.11 
362 364 365 365 365 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 102 115 142 126 liB 0.05 
13,942 14,038 14,150 14,246 14,280 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 303 359 372 318 321 6.16 
26,692 23,094 23,097 639,810 759,722 814,818 683,159 677,858 
9,578 8,681 9,349 261,887 323,998 395,900 350,226 359,877 
52 46 43 3,562 4,245 4,575 3,750 3,567 
5,269 4,527 4,577 137,291 157,501 168,929 140,486 141,745 
26,775 24,647 25,726 315,713 407,140 523,373 497,079 484,886 
----1----
55,902 55,946 56,010 56,021 56,032 4.6 4.7 5.1 5.0 5.3 262 342 478 440 459 21.31 1---'----1----'----1----'--1---'----1--- ------------------
===T=o=T=A=L=W=E=U=. ·=·=· ·=·=·=· =!======== === ===I====== === 
68,596 83,098 98,749 88.247 89,401 1,929,964 2,337,155 2,679,697 2,341,464 2,333,628 249,447 250,043 250,833 251,427 251,941 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8 275 332 394 351 355 100.00 
Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million C. $ 
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million D. Kr. 
Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million Drachmas 
Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million N. Kr. 
Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million Escudos 
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million L. 
4,662 4,825 5,499 6,289 7,415 4,087 4,119 4,703 5,245 6,044 205,596 228,483 253,348 279,950 
7,250 7,990 9,061 10,230 . . 1,315 1,519 1,608 1,436 . . 56,464 65,047 66,594 57,579 
77,861 89,791 96,975 142,865 171,968 2,125 2,420 2,276 2,578 2,745 31,690 38,519 40,138 36,707 
6,854 7,362 8,242 9,468 10,844 1,307 1,454 1,669 1,650 1,803 40,647 47,130 57,400 57,143 
27,354 34,343 43,440 51,917 61,859 623 702 868 844 871 17,758 20,326 24,076 23,485 
66,239 93,268 185,656 313,067 447,790 2,728 3,001 2,442 2,815 3,031 52,499 69,371 56,886 57,560 
United States............... Million US $ 109,247 122,279 143,974 170,033 198,509 109,247 122,279 143,974 170,033 198,509 2,131,801 2,376,828 2,587,100 2,881,512 
-----------1-----l----l--~-~--~-l--~--l-~-l--~~-l----'----l-~~-l-~--'----
TOTAL NON-WEU 
. --
297,052 
58,883 
39,912 
59,179 
25,533 
57,355 
3,008,587 
23,493 
5,104 
9,360 
4,060 
9,820 
42,926 
222,585 
23,701 
5,117 
9,450 
4,073 
9,863 
43,821 
225,055 
23,959 
5,125 
9,599 
4,087 
9,905 
44,737 
227,627 
24,213 24,564 2.0 ~ ~ ~ -----;; -;-:;:; -;-:;:; 1961 217 - 246 
5,120 5,118 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 . . 258 297 314, 280 .. 
9,707 9,775 6.7 6.3 5.7 7.0 6.9 227 256 2371 266 281 
4,100 4,107 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 322 357 408, 402 439 
10,005 10,106 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.4 63 71 88 84 86' 
45,672 46,718 5.2 4.3 4.3 4.9 5.3 64 68 55 62 65 
5.96 
1.92 
3.10 
1.91 
0.91 
3.98 
159.26 229,805 231,988 5.1 5.1 5.6 5.9 6.6 491 543 632 740 856 
------------,---------1----
1979 
(27) 
4.37 
27.28 
29.82 
9.37 
0.05 
6.06 
23.05 
100.00 
4.96 
1.83 
2.91 
1.75 
0.84 
3.61 
147.15 
163.05 
================================1====== 1~====1======1======1======1 
I ToTAL NATO (d) ..... 
121,432 135,494 157,540 184,601 
190,028 218,592 256,289 272,8481 
2,536,455 2,845,704 3,085,542 3,393,936 3',546,501 317,348 321,080 325,039 328,622 332,376 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.4 . . 383 422 485 562 . . 177.02 
4.466,419 5,182,859 5,765,239 5,735,400 5,880,129 566,795 571,123 575.872 580,049 584,317 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.8 . . -m 3831 445 47o _. 1 277.02l==2=63=.o=s 
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Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States $ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by 
change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency 
conversion. 
For the period 1978-1982 the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Country Unit US S per unit Units per US $ Coulltry Unit US S per unit Units per US $ 
Belgium and Luxembourg Franc Italy 1,000 Lire 
- 1978 0.03184 31.41000 - 1978 1.17832 0.84866 
- 1979 0.03411 29.31860 - 1979 1.20357 0.83086 
- 1980 0.03420 29.24260 - 1980 1.16761 0.85645 
- 1981 0.02693 37.13101 - 1981 0.87969 1.13677 
- 1982 0.02312 43.24500 - 1982 0 77484 1.290W 
Canada Canadian Dollar Netherlands Guilder 
- 1978 0.87664 1.14073 - 1978 0.46224 2.16336 
- 1979 0.85371 1.17136 -- 1979 0.49849 2.00608 
- 1980 0.85523 1.16928 -- 1980 0.50299 1.98812 
- - 198! 0.83409 1.19891 - 1981 0.40077 2.49520 
- 1982 0.81518 1.22672 - 1982 0.38361 2.60680 
Denmark D. Krone Norway N. Krone 
- 1978 0.18134 5.51462 - 1978 0.19076 5.24224 
- 1979 0.19008 5.26097 - 1979 0.19747 5.06406 
- 1980 0.17743 5.63593 - 1980 0.20246 4.93922 
- 1981 0.14038 7.12337 - 1981 0.17423 5.73951 
- 1982 0.12594 7.94010 - 1982 0.16627 6.01421 
France Franc Portugal Escudo 
- 1978 0.22159 4.51276 - 1978 0.02276 43.94021 
- 1979 0.23505 4.25445 - 1979 0.02044 48.92344 
- 1980 0.23663 4.22604 - 1980 0.01998 50.06208 
- 1981 0.18401 5.43458 -- 1981 0.01625 61.54642 
- 1982 0.16294 6.13738 - 1982 0.01407 71.05603 
Fed. Rep. of Germany Deutschmar k Turkey T. Lira 
- 1978 0.49785 2.00863 - 1978 0.04118 24.28216 
- 1979 0.54559 1.83288 - 1979 0.03218 31.07752 
- 1980 0.55016 1.81767 - 1980 0.01315 76.03811 
-- 1981 0.44248 2.26000 - 1981 0.00899 111.21862 
- !982 0.42338 2.36195 - 1982 0.00677 147.75632 
Greece Drachma United Kingdom £ 
-- 1978 0.02729 36.64843 - 1978 1.91951 0.52097 
- 1979 0.02696 37.09694 -- 1979 2.12155 0.47135 
- 1980 0.02347 42.61666 - 1980 2.32628 0.42987 
-1n1 0.01805 55.40842 - 1981 2.02791 0.49312 
- 1982 0.01596 62.63780 - !982 1.81350 0.55142 
!''ere b: GDP (p.v.) = Gross dome~tic product in purchasers' values, current prices. 
Prior to 1978, tables of defence statistics published in reports of the committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international 
organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower 
than the percentages of GNP previously published. 
Note c: France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integr~ted military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only. 
Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available. 
e ~ Preliminary estimate. 
f = Forecast. 
Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(82)24. 
1980 
(28) 
4.01 
26.76 
27.03 
9.70 
0.05 
5.34 
27.11 
100.00 
1981 
(29) 
3.84 
27.05 
26.17 
9.84 
0.05 
5.13 
27.93 
100.00 
4.76 5.94 
1.63 1.63 
2.30 2.92 
1.69 1.87 
0.88 0.96 
2.47 3.19 
145.80 192.68 
1982 I 
(30) 
3.31 
26.45 
25.84 
10.46 
0.05 
5.12 
28.78 
100.00 
6.76 
3.07 
2.02 
0.97 
3.39 
222.04 
1----1----
159.54 209.19 
259.54 309.19 
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B. MANPOWER EFFORT- 1982 
Period of compulsory 1 
military service 
(months) 
Army Navy Air force 
Belgium 103 I 0 3 10 3 
France 12 4 12 4 12 4 
Germany 15 5 I 5 5 15 5 
Italy 12 18 12 
Luxembourg voluntary 
Netherlands 14-16 14-17 14-17 
United Kingdom voluntary 
TOTAL WEU 
Canada voluntary 
Denmark 9 9 9 
Greece 22 26 24 
Norway 12 15 15 
Portugal 16 24 21-24 
Turkey 20 20 20 
United States voluntary 
ToTAL NON-WEU 
ToTAL NATO 
Sources: 
l. IISS, Military Balance, 1982-83. 
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (82)24, 1st December 1982. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
4. Eighteen months for overseas. 
5. To be eighteen months. 
e = estimate. 
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Total in armed forces 2 
military personnel 
(thousands) 
(e) 
109 
578 
495 
517 
I 
106 
335 
2,141 
81 
31 
186 
40 
91 
769 
2,189 
3,387 
5,528 
APPENDIX I 
Total armed forces ' 
(military and civilian) 
as percentage 
of active population 
(e) 
2.8 
3.1 
2.5 
2.4 
0.8 
2.6 
2.2 
2.6 
1.0 
1.6 
5.9 
2.5 
2.3 
4.4 
2.9 
3.0 
2.8 
APPENDIX 11 
Defence expenditure as percentage of GDP plotted against income per capita- 1981 
Defence 
expenditure 
as percentage 
of GDP 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Selected indicators comparing defence contribution with ability to contribute 
Rat1o defence Ratio defence Rat1o actJve defence 
spendmg share/ spending share/ Manpower share/ 
Country GDP share prospenty index share population share 
1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983 
Belgium 0.88 0.86 0.85 0.77 0.77 0.94 1.29 1.11 1.11 
France 1.08 1.05 1.03 0.99 0.93 1.05 1.24 1.25 1.23 
Germany 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.71 0.68 0.81 1.02 1.02 1.02 
Italy 0.67 0.63 0.61 1.16 0.98 1.07 0.89 0.91 0.92 
Luxembourg 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.40 0.33 
Netherlands 0.92 0.81 0.79 1.11 0.74 0.87 0.85 0.90 0.88 
United Kingdom 1.38 1.33 1.31 1.90 1.52 1.59 0.96 0.98 0.97 
Canada 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 
Denmark 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.43 0.53 0.59 0.85 0.80 0.80 
Greece 1.50 1.45 1.73 3.60 3.63 4.93 2.07 2.09 2.05 
Norway 0.86 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.58 0.55 1.17 1.15 1.13 
Portugal 1.00 0.92 0.88 4.29 4.13 4.06 0.87 0.94 0.93 
Turkey 1.18 1.21 1.29 7.65 10.20 11.02 1.61 1.62 1.63 
United States 1.37 1.39 1.38 1.27 1.31 1.19 1.28 1.26 1.27 
Japan 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.21 
NATO less 
United States 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.91 1.02 1.09 1.09 1.09 
NATO plus 
Japan less 
United States 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.87 0.87 
Total NATO 1.15 1.13 1.15 1.12 1.09 1.12 1.16 1.16 1.16 
Total NATO 
plus Japan 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note. Years are date of Secretary of Defence report. 
"Share" means "share of total for NATO plus Japan". 
Source: Successive reports to United States Congress by the Secretary of Defence on allied contributions to the common 
defence. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Defence expenditure at constant 1980 prices 1 
$million 
Country 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 (e) 
Belgium 3,799 3,881 3,963 3,999 3,727 
France 24,880 24,974 26,427 27,467 27,387 
Germany 25,724 26,100 26,671 30,419 27,530 
Italy 8,904 9,106 9,588 9,552 9,816 
Luxembourg 43 45 53 55 57 
Netherlands 5,145 5,363 5,264 5,442 5,555 
United Kingdom 25,491 26,015 22,773 27,226 28,016 
ToTAL WEU 93,986 95,484 94,739 104,160 105,815 
Canada 4,581 4,551 4,696 4,867 5,011 
Denmark 1,592 1,597 1,609 1,613 1,662 
Greece 2,555 2,485 2,275 2,796 2,766 
Norway 1,608 1,641 1,667 L714 1,754 
Portugal 766 789 872 880 859 
Turkey 2,361 2,410 2,461 2,466 2,523 
United States 132,438 137,509 143,860 151,212 163,784 
ToTAL NON-WEU 145,901 150,982 157,440 165,548 178,359 
ToTAL NATO 239,887 246,466 252,179 269,708 284,174 
I. Calculated from NATO figures for per cap1ta expenditure. 
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1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
APPENDIX V 
United States ACDA official world military expenditures and arms transfers 
(Military expenditure, constant prices) 
March 1981 edition - March 1982 edition - 1978 prices 1977 prices 
NATO Warsaw United NATO Warsaw Soviet Pact States Pact Union 
174.7 129.4 128.8 192.4 150.0 127.8 
166.9 133.0 117.9 184.2 153.4 130.2 
169.3 138.0 117.4 187.1 158.9 134.4 
165.2 144.3 112.1 183.3 165.8 140.5 
167.8 150.1 112.3 185.8 173.1 147.2 
164.9 154.6 108.5 183.3 178.1 151.4 
161.5 161.2 103.3 179.8 185.4 158.2 
167.5 161.7 108.0 186.3 187.2 159.9 
169.1 165.1 108.4 188.8 189.0 161.6 
- - 112.3 195.2 193.6 166.7 
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$billion 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
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APPENDIX VI 
Roth-Glenn-Nunn Amendment 1 
The full text of the Roth-Glenn-Nunn 
Amendment on NATO Defence Industrial Co-
operation follows : 
Sec. 1122. (a) The Congress finds that-
(1) the United States remains firmly commit-
ted to co-operating closely with its North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter in this 
section referred to as NATO) allies in protect-
ing liberty and maintaining world peace; 
(2) the financial burden of providing for the 
defence of Western Europe and for the protec-
tion of the interests of NATO member coun-
tries in areas outside the NATO treaty area has 
reached such proportions that new co-operative 
approaches among the United States and its 
NATO allies are required to achieve and main-
tain an adequate collective defence at accept-
able costs; 
(3) the need for a credible conventional 
deterrent in Western Europe has long been 
recognised in theory but has never been fully 
addressed in practice; 
(4) a more equitable sharing by NATO 
member countries of both the burdens and the 
technological and economic benefits of the 
common defence would do much to reinvigo-
rate the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
alliance with a restored sense of unity and 
common purpose; 
(5) a decision to co-ordinate more effectively 
the enormous technological, industrial, and eco-
nomic resources of NATO member countries 
I. Approved by the United States Senate by 87 votes to I 
on 13th May 1982. 
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will not only increase the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of NATO military expenditures but 
also provide inducement for the Soviet Union 
to enter a meaningful arms reduction agreement 
so that both Warsaw Pact countries and NATO 
member countries can devote more of their 
energies and resources to peaceful and econo-
mically more beneficial pursuits. 
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that the 
President should propose to the heads of 
government of the NATO member countries 
that the NATO allies of the United States join 
the United States in agreeing-
(1) to co-ordinate more effectively their 
defence efforts and resources to create, at 
acceptable costs, a credible, collective, conven-
tional force for the defence of the North 
Atlantic Treaty area; 
(2) to establish a co-operative defence-indus-
trial effort within Western Europe and between 
Western Europe and North America that would 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
NATO expenditures by providing a larger pro-
duction base while eliminating unnecessary 
duplication of defence-industrial efforts; 
(3) to share more equitably and efficiently 
the financial burdens, as well as the economic 
benefits (including jobs, technology, and trade) 
of NATO defence; and 
(4) to intensify consultations promptly for 
the early achievement of the objectives descri-
bed in clauses (1) through (3). 
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APPENDIX VII 
Major United States equipment procured by European 
countries and vice-versa 
A. European equipment being procured by the United States 
- MAN truck for weapon systems in Europe (Germany) 
- MAG-58 armour machine gun 1 (Belgium) 
- 120 mm tank gun 1 (Germany) 
- 5.56 mm squad automatic weapon 1 (Belgium) 
- Muzzle bore sight (training) (United Kingdom) 
B. European equipment being evaluated by the United States 
- Anti-tank weapons : 
LAW-80 
M72-750 
M72A3 
Jupiter 
Panzerfaust Ill 
Armbrust 
Apilas 
Strim 
- Plessey groundsat rebroadcast radio 
- 90 mm Cockerill Mk III gun 
- Large-calibre bore brushes 
- Underground field shelter, MK-2 
- MH-842 (Markhandler rough terrain forklift truck) 
- 7.62 mm machine gun mount 
- Chemical agent monitoring system 
- Conventional generic mine devices (training mines) 
- HC smoke pots 
- Cartridge, 5.56 mm, ball, practice, Xm 858 
- 4.2 inch mortar sub-calibre training system 
- Cartridge, 50 calibre, ball and tracer, plastic training ammunition 
- OM 82 (hand grenade fuse) 
- FH-380 (personal dosimetry system) 
- Lightweight decontamination system (SANA TOR) 
- Inflatable decoy system for United States Hawk air defence system 
- 150 kW low noise generator 
- Aerial radiac system 
- 105 mm kinetic energy practice ammunition 
- Kinetic energy recovery rope 
- Penguin missile 
- PAP-104 mine neutralisation system 
- Minesweeper hunter (MSH-1) procurement 
- Searchwater radar 
- Versatile exercise mine (VEM) 
C. United States equipment being procured by European countries 
- Mll3 APC 
APPENDIX. VII 
- AN/TSQ-73 missile Minder (a part of the fire direction centre of the improved Hawk 
battery) 
- 1-Hawk (air defence system) 
- 66 mm M72 Law (a squad-level anti-tank weapon) 
- Projectile 155 mm M483A 1 (anti-personnel round delivered by the 155 mm Howitzer) 
I. Produced in the United States. 
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- 2.75 inch rocket (air-delivered anti-personnel round) 
-MOD Flir 
- Tow W /helicopter roof-mounted sight 
- Ml09A3 SP Howitzer 
- Stinger missile (man-portable infrared-homing air defence missile system) 
- Harpoon anti-surface ship missile 
- Submarine-launched Harpoon 
- MK-46 light-light anti-submarine torpedo 
- Sparrow advanced monopulse missile (AMM) AIM/RIM-7M 
- AIM-9L infrared air-to-air missile (The AIM-9L will be employed on the F-14, AV-8, F-16, 
F-15, F/A-18 and the MRCA Tornado. This Sidewinder missile differs from its predeces-
sors principally in having an all-aspect attack capability.) 
- High-speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) 
- F/ A-18 naval strike fighter aircraft 
- P-3 patrol aircraft Orion 
- Super rapid-blooming ofiboard chaff (SRBOC) 
- E2-C early warning aircraft 
- F-16 multinational fighter programme 1 
- Airborne early warning and control (AEW &C) programme 
- Navstar global positioning system (GPS) 1 
- Joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) (system adopted for the NATO 
AEW&C programme) 
- Advanced medium-range air-to-air missile 1 
- KC-135 (tanker fleet) re-engining (CFM-56) 1 
- Electronic countermeasure simulator 
- Peace Green communications equipment 
- ALQ-131 electronic countermeasure pods 
- ALQ-1 0 1 electronic countermeasure pods 
I. European coproduction. 
Source Standardisation of equipment within NATO (report to the United States Congress by Mr. Weinberger, January 
1983). 
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Type 
ICBMs 
Titan 11 
Minuteman 11 
Minuteman Ill 
Sub-total 
SLBMs 
Poseidon C-3 
Trident C-4 
Sub-total 
BM total 
Aircraft B-52 (G and H) 
ToTAL 
APPENDIX VIII 
Levels of nuclear weapons 
A. Total warheads all systems 
Numbers of nuclear warheads mid-1983 (Figures rounded to nearest hundred) 
United States Soviet Union 
ICBM 2,100 5,300 
SLBM 5,200 2,400 
Strategic bomber 1,900 300 
Total strategic 1 9,500 8,000 
All other 2 14,500 8,000 
Grand total 3 24,000 16,000 
Sources. 1. As in following table. 
2. Deduced by difference. 
3. Hearings United States Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, 13th November 1981. 
B. Levels of United States and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons 
(covered by SALT) 
(1) Umted States strategic systems (covered by SALT) 
Maximum range Number Number of independent (km) warheads each 
15,000 45 1 
11,300 450 1 
{ 250 (160 kt) } 13,000 300 (353 kt- 3 Mk 12A) 
1,045 
4,600 304 10-14 
7,400 264 8-14 
568 
1,613 
16,000 241 2 up to 10 or 
12 ALCM 
1,854 
I. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
2. Assummg all remaining 31 B-52Ds Withdrawn from serv1ce by 30th September 1983 as planned. 
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Assumed total 
number of warheads 
45 
450 
1,650 I 
2,145 
3,040 
2,112 
5,152 
7,300 
2,220 
9,500 
APPENDIX VIII 
(i1) Sov1et strategic systems (c01-ered by SALT) 
Maximum range Type Number (km) 
ICBMs 
SS-ll 10,500 550 
SS-13 10,000 60 
SS-17 10,000 150 
SS-18 9-10,500 308 
SS-19 11,000 330 
Sub-total 1,398 
SLBMs 
SSN-5 1,120 48 
SSN-6 2,400-3,000 384 
SSN-8 8,000 292 
SSN-17 5,000 12 
SSN-18 8,000 224 
SSN-20 2 8,300 20 
Sub-total 980 
BM total 2,378 
Aircraft Combat radius 
(km) 
Bear Tu-95 5-6,000 lOO 
Bison Mya-4 4-6,000 43 
Sub-total 143 
TOTAL 2,521 
I. On the assumption that the maximum number of warheads are fitted. 
2. Entry into service expected before end 1983. 
Number 
of mdependen t 
warheads each 
l 
l 
l or 4 
l or 8 
6 or l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
3-7 
6-9 
2-4 
l-2 
Note: Forces loadings for aircraft deduced from total warheads (rounded to nearest hundred). 
Source: 
- IISS, Military Balance 1983-84. 
- United States Department of Defence Annual Reports fiscal years 1982, 1983 and 1984. 
- Soviet military power, United States Department of Defence, March 1983. 
- Whence the threat to peace, Soviet Ministry of Defence, January 1982. 
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Assumed total 
number of warheads 
550 
60 
600 I 
2,464 I 
1,600 
5,300 
48 
384 
292 
12 
1,514 
150 
2,400 
7,700 
210 
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C. Levels of intermediate-range nuclear weapons of interest to Europe 
Maximum range Assumed Western estimates
1 
or combat warheads Weapons Total In range of Soviet claims3 
radius (km) per system inventory Europe2 
USSR: 
5,000 3 SS-20 35J5 243 
2,000 1 SS-4 223 l 223 "land-based" 4,000 1 SS-5 15d 496 
1,000 1 SS-12 120 70 
1,000 1 SS-22 100 100 
1,120 1 SS-N-5 48 48 "sea-based" 18 
4,000 3 or 4 Backfire 100 44\ 
2,800 2 Badger 220 88 
3,100 2 Blinder 125 50 "air-based" 
1,600 2 Fencer 800 160 461 
720 1 Flogger D 650 260 
600 1 Fitter CID 650 130 
ToTAL 3,412 1,416 975 (938 8) 
NATO inc. France: 
1,900 2 F-111 150 75 
2,000+ 4 or 6 FB-111A 56 56 
750 1 F-4 238 71 
800 1 F-104 261 78 
F-16 234 70 
1,000 2 A-6/A-7 68 34 
950 2 Buccaneer 45 25 
720 1 Jaguar 117 58 
1,600 1 Mirage IV-A 34 34 46 
560 2 Super-Etendard 16 8 
720 1 Pershing I 180 180 
4,600 1 Polaris 64 64 64 
3,000 1 M-20 80 80 80 
3,000 10 or 14 Poseidon6 40 40 (all other 723) 
TOTAL 1,583 870 913 4 
I. IISS Military Balance 1982-83 and 1983-84 and NATO NPG commumques of 23rd March 1983 and 28th October 1983. 
2. Military Balance estimate of numbers available in nuclear role in Europe. 
3. Lev Semeiko in Moscow News,_17th January 1982. 
4. Omitting 55 Vulcan bombers phased out in February 1983. 
5. Bases for some 27 further SS-20s being constructed in Soviet Far East. 
6. 400 Poseidon warheads are assigned to SACEUR but are also included in strategic table B. 
7. Withdrawn from service according to Andropov Pravda interview of 27th October 1983. 
8. 938 according to Moscow press conference of Marshal Akhromeyev, 14th September 1983. 
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D. Historical levels of SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20 missiles 
Total Total Total Total 
Year of SS-4 SS-20 Total Total yield equivalent warheads Notes 
missiles 'warheads1 in range of 
and SS-5 MTl megatons 3 Europe 4 
1962 200 - 200 200 200 200 200 Period of 
SS-4 and 
SS-5 
build-up 
1963-1971 700 - 700 700 700 700 525 
1972-1976 600 - 600 600 600 600 450 
1977 600 (20) 620 660 609 617 440 
1978 590 lOO 690 890 635 675 642 Start of 
SS-20 de-
ployment 
1979 590 120 710 950 644 692 682 
1980 440 160 600 920 512 576 650 
1981 380 230 610 1,070 483 575 745 
19825 230 324 554 1,200 376 504 820 
19835 239 351 590 1,300 397 447 970 
Source : Successive editions of IISS Military Balance. 
I. Assuming 3 warheads on all SS-20 missiles, but ignoring any reloads. 
2. Assuming I MT on SS-4, SS-5 warheads; 0.15 MT on SS-20 warheads. 
3. Total of Y} where Y is yield of each warhead in MT. 
4. Assuming ~SS-4, 5 and 1sS-20 in range of Europe. 
5. F1gures from NATO NPG communiques up to 28th October 1983. 
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The Assembly, 
APPENDIX IX 
RESOLUTION 15 I 
on the participation of observers in certain meetings 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
APPENDIX IX 
Considering the interests of member states of NATO which are not members of WEU, 
DECIDES 
1. That the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments may invite observers to attend its 
meetings from member states of NATO which are not members of WEU; 
2. That such observers shall have the right to speak. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1959 during the first part of the fifth ordinary session (6th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum : see the report tabled by Mr. Patijn on behalf of the Presidential Committee (Document 130 
and Addendum). 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
European security and burden-sharing in the alliance 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3 1 
tabled by MM. Bernini, Antoni and Martino 
28th November 1983 
1. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (viii) and insert: 
"Aware of the seriousness of the interruption of the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range 
nuclear weapons, of the risks of a further increase in rearmament and of the ever-growing dangers 
for European security that ensue ; ". 
2. Leave out paragraph A.2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"To promote steps for bringing about significant action by the great powers, postponement of the 
deployment ofPershing and cruise missiles and the start of the dismantling of the SS-20s in order 
to encourage, with the help ofthe European countries, the resumption of the Geneva negotiations 
and the conclusion of an agreement on the level of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in 
Europe at the lowest level of balance;". 
3. Leave out paragraph A.3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"To help to define adequate mutual confidence-building and joint security measures to ensure 
the complete success of the forthcoming Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe;". 
Signed: Bernini, Antoni, Martino 
I. See 6th sitting, 29th November 1983 (amendments negatived). 
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Amendments 4, 5, 6 and 7 
European security and burden-sharing in the alliance 
AMENDMENTS 4, 5, 6 and 7 1 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
28th November 1983 
4. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "which the allies jointly 
recognise as", leave out" directly". 
5. At the end of paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add " and the other 
countries ofthe Atlantic Alliance". 
6. In the first sentence of paragraph A of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " WEU 
member governments" and insert" governments of member countries of the alliance". 
7. In paragraph A.2 (b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out" WEU member countries" 
and insert " allies ". 
Signed: Cavaliere 
I. See 6th sitting, 29th November 1983 (amendments not moved). 
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Role and contribution of the armed forces 
in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
7th November 1983 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the role and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural or 
other disasters in peacetime 
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submitted by Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur 
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IV. Existing international arrangements 
V. Conclusions 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the commlftee: Mr. P1gnion (Chairman); 
MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen) ; Sir Frederic 
Bennett (Alternate: Wllkmson), MM. van den Bergh (Alter-
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Armaments 
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event of natural or other disasters in peacetime 
Ill. Extracts from NATO document on NATO co-operation for emergency 
disaster assistance in peacetime- 15th November 1971 
IV. UNDRO information sheet. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the role and contribution of the armed forces 
in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime 
The Assembly, 
(i) Having taken note of the results of the information study conducted by the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments of WEU on the role and contribution of the armed forces in the 
event of natural or other disasters in peacetime; 
(ii) Aware that the fundamental institutional task of the armed forces is to ensure national defence 
and security; 
(iii) Recognising the role of guidance and co-ordination incumbent on the civil authorities in estab-
lishing research and civil defence bodies, planning means of intervention and mobilising local 
authorities and the various civil protection agencies in order to afford assistance and relief to the 
victims of disasters; 
(iv) Stressing the essential contribution which the armed forces have to make in this context by 
affording relief and assistance in the hours immediately following disasters; 
(v) Stressing the international value in terms of human solidarity of the exchange of assistance 
between member countries in the event of disasters and of participation in assistance and relief 
operations in third countries thus struck, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
l. To pay particular attention to the role and contribution of the armed forces in studying and 
planning civil protection means; 
2. To this end to promote co-operation between member countries through: 
(a) the exchange of information and experience; 
(b) mutual invitations to and attendance at periodical national and, if possible, transfrontier civil 
protection exercises; and 
(c) the conclusion ofbi- or multilateral agreements on mutual assistance and relief; 
3. Together with NATO, in co-operation with the United Nations relief agencies, utilising such 
humanitarian aid as provided by the EEC, and in collaboration through the Council of Europe, to 
contribute to assistance and relief to third countries struck by a natural or collective man-made disaster 
by establishing the necessary structures and means. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
0.1. On 18th December 1980, your Rapporteur 
and several of his colleagues wrote to the Chair-
man of the committee proposing that the com-
mittee prepare a report on the role and con-
tribution of the armed forces in the event of 
natural disasters 1• My colleagues and I were 
motivated by our country's experiences during 
the earthquake which struck southern Italy in 
1980. At its meeting on 16th February 1981, 
the committee approved the proposal in prin-
ciple but extended the scope of the report to 
include man-made disasters too. The commit-
tee appointed your present Rapporteur on 
16th June 1981. 
0.2. To gather basic information on arrange-
ments made for this purpose by allied countries 
and on the experience they have acquired, your 
Rapporteur prepared a questionnaire on the 
various aspects of the subject which he arranged 
to be sent in February 1982 to the Ministers of 
Defence and of the Interior of the fourteen 
NATO countries having armed forces 2• 
0.3. Answers from most of the countries 
concerned were received by the Office of the 
Clerk in 1982 and the rest, after a letter of 
reminder, in spring 1983. These answers 3 
provide the basis for Chapter I of the present 
explanatory memorandum in which the condi-
tions for using military units in the countries of 
the alliance are examined. 
0.4. Your Rapporteur wishes to take this 
opportunity of conveying his thanks to all the 
ministries which answered his questionnaire. 
0.5. In recent years the armed forces have 
often come to the assistance of victims of 
disasters. 
0.6. They have intervened in various ways: 
- planned operations in the case of floods 
or forest fires; 
- more or less improvised participation in 
the case ofpollution of the sea; 
- emergency action in large numbers after 
earthquakes or cyclones. 
0. 7. Implementation of these humanitarian 
tasks has allowed a number of lessons to be 
I. See extract from the letter at Appendix I. 
2. Iceland has no armed forces and Spain was not yet a 
memberofNATO. 
3. The text of the questionnaire is given at Appendix II; 
the text of the answers from the ministries concerned may be 
consulted at the Office of the Clerk. 
214 
learned which should be emphasised at the start 
of this report. 
0.8. Humanitarian interventions must in no 
event jeopardise the implementation of the oper-
ational tasks of military units. This being said, 
the latter are generally well adapted to this type 
of task thanks to their graded structure, the 
flexibility of their chain of command and com-
munications and their abundant means of trans-
port, engineering equipment and field medical 
equipment. 
0.9. Apart from units of the medical corps, 
certain independent units responsible for field 
installations or supplies for troops can form the 
nucleus of an intervention group in the event of 
major disaster. 
0.1 0. It will be noted however that the inter-
vention of the armed forces is not automatic. It 
is the civil authorities that have the power and 
responsibility to call in the army. 
0.11. In this general context, consideration 
should be given to how various countries have 
approached this tricky problem and defined pro-
cedure for the use of the armed forces, account 
being taken of political structures, geographical 
situation and the degree of risk involved. The 
answers from countries of the alliance to the 
Rapporteur's questionnaire are examined here-
after. 
I. Analysis of conditions 
for the use of military units 
in various countries 
(a) Belgium 
1.1. Civil defence problems are governed by 
two legislative texts: 
1.2. The law of 31st December 1963 defines 
the aim of civil defence and describes the duties 
of the Minister of the Interior who is responsible 
for co-ordinating the preparation and applica-
tion of the measures necessary for civil protec-
tion. 
1.3. The royal decree of23rd June 1971 descri-
bes disasters in terms of extent, stipulates those 
which automatically lead to intervention by the 
civil protection services and defines the respec-
tive responsibilities of burgomasters, provincial 
governors and the Minister of the Interior. 
1.4. When a disaster calls for the application 
of means of assistance which depend on the 
state, province and communes, the burgomaster 
directly concerned informs the provincial gover-
nor. who passes the communication on to the 
Minister of the Interior and the provincial head 
adviser on civil defence. 
1.5. The governor, assisted by this adviser, is 
in principle responsible for co-ordinating assis-
tance operations. However, if the Minister of 
the Interior, assisted if necessary by other minis-
ters, calls in the army in application of the 
powers delegated to him, it is he who is respon-
sible for co-ordination. 
1.6. As can be seen, there is no permanent 
government body responsible for combating 
disasters. Conversely, there are five civil 
defence units, available round the clock, each of 
which is responsible for one area of intervention 
which together cover the whole territory. 
1. 7. These intervention services are manned 
by 445 full-time employees of the state with the 
help of about 150 conscientious objectors 
carrying out fifteen months' civil service. 
1.8. When these units are activated, volunteers 
are brought in through provincial civil defence 
offices. These volunteers undertake to join 
their units within three to eight hours depending 
on circumstances. They number more than 
9,000 and are trained in NBC lifesaving and 
defence techniques by qualified instructors from 
the Royal Civil Defence School. 
1.9. Intervention equipment for this personnel 
is stocked in depots near the provincial capitals 
for forming mobile civil defence units. 
1.1 0. There is no working relationship between 
voluntary charitable associations and the Civil 
Defence Corps, which operates as a self-suffi-
cient body. 
1.11. The civil defence annual operating budget 
amounted to 1 ,239 million Belgian francs in 
1983, of which 440 million Belgian francs for 
expenditure on staff. To this figure should be 
added the cost of communal fire services, i.e. 
6,643 million Belgian francs. In all, some 0.5% 
of the annual budget is spent on civil defence to 
which should be added special appropriations 
voted for specific disasters. 
1.12. In the field of international relations, 
agreements have been signed with the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg, France and the Federal 
Republic of Germany for mutual assistance in 
the event of major disasters. 
1.13. Intervention by the armed forces must be 
requested by the civil authorities concerned, and 
in such an event a special chain of command is 
set up. Starting from the top, there is the 
commander of internal forces, then the provin-
cial military commander, the military assistance 
commander, responsible for contacts with local 
civil authorities and calling in the relevant 
military units or detachments, and the comman-
ders of such units. In principle, there is no 
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specific provision for a special organisation or 
structure for civil defence, with the exception 
however of a helicopter squadron responsible for 
rescue at sea. Conversely, the commander of 
internal forces and the provincial commanders 
have issued orders defining the responsibilities 
of military leaders and the principles and proce-
dure to be applied in handling disasters on 
national territory. Furthermore, there are inter-
vention plans for floods and measures for the 
emergency recall of military personnel from 
leave in such circumstances. Apart from this 
particular task, the army may be asked to carry 
out any task compatible with its means and its 
operational missions, which continue to be given 
priority. 
1.14. For this purpose, it makes use of all 
military equipment considered necessary for the 
accomplishment of the task, e.g. means of trans-
port, engineering equipment, medical equip-
ment, signals equipment, camping equipment, 
field kitchens, mine detection and disposal 
equipment. etc. 
1.15. No units are designated a priori for 
conducting rescue operations; the choice is made 
according to the means available. However, in 
view of their equipment and the training of their 
personnel, engineering units are the most suit-
able for intervening in the early stages of emer-
gency operations. 
1.16. There is no provision in the national 
defence budget for civil defence; hence the use of 
military means for rescue operations is not free 
of charge. Authorities requesting army assis-
tance must reimburse the cost of such operations 
to the Ministry of Defence. 
1.1 7. Depending on circumstances, the provin-
cial governor or the Minister of the Interior 
ensures co-ordination of assistance measures. 
1.18. If the disaster is confined to the territory 
of a province, the Minister of the Interior dele-
gates responsibility to the governor; if several 
provinces are affected, the Minister of the 
Interior himself assumes responsibility. Simi-
larly, either the provincial military commander 
or the commander of internal forces joins the 
co-ordinating committee, depending on whether 
it is chaired by a provincial governor or by the 
Minister of the Interior. 
1.19. The technical director co-ordinating assis-
tance operations on the spot is a civil servant 
appointed by the governor. It will be noted that 
there is no permanent link between the civil 
authorities, the armed forces and voluntary asso-
ciations. In the event of disaster, the latter may 
be given appropriate tasks. 
1.20. At the level of implementation, there are 
no rules for stationing troops on the basis of a 
possible intervention in the event of disasters; 
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the size of the country and the mobility of units 
allow resources to be brought in within a few 
hours without resorting to national emergency 
transport plans. However, measures have been 
taken to meet the risk of flooding. The national 
territory has been divided into three interven-
tion areas, in each of which is stationed an 
engineering regiment. 
1.21. The greatest risk is in fact flooding due to 
the collapse of dykes when tides are exception-
ally high or when there are violent storms. In 
the last twenty years, only two other noteworthy 
disasters have required the intervention of the 
armed forces: the collapse of a tip and a fire in a 
city department store. 
1.22. Most lessons have been learned from 
flood-fighting and they have been turned to good 
account. It may therefore be said that Belgian 
engineering units now have proven ability in this 
field. 
1.23. Interventions abroad have been imple-
mented in the framework of international assis-
tance to disaster areas: 
- transport of food, medical supplies, etc., 
by sea, air and road; 
- transport by air of a mobile surgical 
team and its equipment to take part in 
medical assistance after the Friuli 
earthquake; 
- transport of civil defence teams and 
their equipment by the air force after 
the earthquake in southern Italy. 
1.24. These interventions abroad were carried 
out as military operations and did not allow any 
lessons to be learned which directly concern civil 
defence. 
(b) Canada 
1.25. In Canada, the intervention of the armed 
forces is governed by Emergency Planning Order 
PC (Privy Council) 1981-1305 of 21st May 1981 
which defines the responsibilities of the various 
ministers. There is further supporting legisla-
tion, i.e.: 
- acts of parliament establishing federal 
departments, agencies and crown cor-
porations and giving details on sections 
of the acts dealing with emergency and 
disaster responsibilities; 
- acts of parliament designating a specific 
minister to administer a field of federal 
responsibilities concerning emergency 
planning and response; 
- records of a cabinet decision indicating 
the authorities responsible for action in 
the event of emergencies or disasters; 
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- customs and conventions which have 
been used to assist in emergencies and 
disasters. 
1.26. Each province and territory has promul-
gated a provincial act to enable it to co-operate 
with the federal government in carrying out its 
responsibility for the security, defence, peace, 
order and welfare of its people in the event of 
peacetime disasters. In accordance with the 
Emergency Planning Order, every minister has 
permanent, specific emergency responsibilities 
in respect of civil defence and the organisation 
of relief. Furthermore, at federal, provincial 
and municipal levels disaster legislation pro-
vides the legal authority for an effective response 
by governments and government officials, just as 
it makes clear the extent of that authority and 
outlines procedures to be followed and measures 
to be implemented. 
1.27. The minister or other authority in control 
of relief operations is empowered to call on 
the armed forces for civil protection duties. 
Requests are set out on approved forms and 
addressed to the Minister of Defence and must 
be signed by the Premier or a cabinet minister 
designated by him. 
1.28. When the forces provide assistance, they 
act in a supporting role to the civil authorities 
and orders should come down the military chain 
of command of the units concerned. 
1.29. A feature of Canada is the abundance of 
permanent means available for meeting emer-
gencies at federal level: 
- the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Emergency Preparedness includes offi-
cials of the departments most usually 
involved in the response to emergen-
cies. It advises the cabinet on mea-
sures taken; 
- the Emergency Planning Secretariat of 
the Privy Council Office is responsible 
for developing emergency planning 
policy and providing direction; 
- Emergency Planning Canada is respon-
sible for co-ordinating the emergency 
planning of federal departments, agen-
cies and crown corporations and bet-
ween them and the provincial govern-
ments; 
- Emergency Planning Canada regional 
directors provide liaison between the 
federal government, provincial govern-
ments and private organisations. 
1.30. Provinces and municipalities also have a 
specific organisation on the lines of those 
existing at federal level. 
1. 31. The President of the Privy Council is 
responsible for emergency planning and pro-
vides ministerial guidance. However, the fed-
eral government is not responsible for organising 
relief; it assists provinces, territories and munici-
palities at the request of their authorities. But 
the federal government plays a leading role in 
the case of oil spills at sea or when disaster 
strikes in two or more provinces simultaneously. 
1.32. As regards the control of resources, the 
situation is very similar to the abovementioned 
procedure. Resources are decentralised in the 
various departments, agencies and crown cor-
porations in accordance with the kind and 
amounts of resources which might be needed 
and the situations in which they would be 
required. 
1.33. In the field of research, federal action is 
confined to sponsoring research and preparing 
plans to prevent or limit injury to persons or 
damage to property. In order to be able to 
intercept and interpret correctly indicators of 
impending emergencies, Emergency Planning 
Canada operates one central emergency situation 
centre and ten regional centres where reports 
from across Canada are received and the news 
monitored daily so that the government depart-
ments and provincial authorities concerned may 
be alerted. 
1.34. As it is the responsibility of the Emer-
gency Planning Canada emergency situation 
centre to inform the public on emergency pre-
paredness, it is also responsible for alerting the 
government. 
1.35. There are no non-military units organised 
to ensure civil protection. However, there are 
embryonic organisations at the provincial level 
in various fields: 
- health, first aid, collection, evacuation 
and treatment of casualties; 
- distribution of prepared food; 
- fire-fighting; 
- search and rescue teams; 
- auxiliary police; 
- public works. 
1.36. All these services would have to be 
supplemented by volunteers and special types of 
equipment. 
1.37. There are also a number of charitable 
organisations whose activities cover such varied 
fields as medical assistance, the provision of 
food, clothing and shelter for victims and the 
organisation of transport. These organisations 
take part in exercises on a municipal level in the 
setting of a disaster generally of minor impor-
tance. They receive no public subsidiaries and 
depend on fund-raising campaigns. 
1.38. Civil protection on the contrary has its 
own budget, amounting to $8,800,000 for the 
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financial year 1982-83 of which $2,800,000 for 
operating costs and the rest for the joint emer-
gency planning programme. 
1.39. At international level, Canada, which is a 
member of the United Nations and of NATO, 
has concluded agreements with those bodies to 
which it provides information and assistance in 
disaster relief. In 1967, it also concluded an 
agreement with the United States for co-ordin-
ating planning in peacetime between border 
states and provinces. An emergency communi-
cations link exists which is especially designed 
for the passage of civil defence information. 
1.40. Requests for the assistance of the armed 
forces normally originate at the provincial level. 
To provide a coherent military structure to 
respond to these requests the country has been 
divided into six military regions, each being 
superimposed over a functional military organis-
ation with a regional command. 
1.41. If regional resources are inadequate, addi-
tional resources are co-ordinated by National 
Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and in principle 
it is the regional commander concerned who has 
operational control of all resources. Military 
regional staff are responsible for co-ordinating 
the use of troops with the responsible civil 
authorities. Regional staffs are available on a 
24-hour basis and NDHQ operates a 24-hour 
operations centre. 
1.42. The use of armed forces for civil protec-
tion tasks is planned and prepared on the basis 
of permanent orders, i.e. " the provision of 
services to non-defence agencies " and " the 
Canadian forces' plan for internal security opera-
tions ". These tasks, for which all available 
military equipment and manpower resources are 
potentially available, concern natural disasters 
such as floods, forest fires, hurricanes, earth-
quakes, landslides and severe snow storms. 
Land combat arms and land service support 
units and air transport units are most frequently 
employed but there are no military units spe-
cially designed, trained or equipped to provide 
civil protection. Nor is there a budgetary head 
intended a priori to cover the cost of carrying 
out operations. The cost is recovered from the 
requesting authority unless it is waived by the 
Ministry of Defence. 
1.43. In principle, requests for assistance must 
be made through the provincial authorities. In 
cases of life and death, however, the most direct 
route is acceptable. There are moreover links 
between the civil and military authorities. 
They are established on a geographical basis and 
are outlined in municipal and provincial emer-
gency response plans. However, military parti-
cipation in local planning exercises is usually 
limited to advice by regional staff as the diver-
sion of defence resources to other than defence 
tasks must be prompted by necessity. 
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(c) Denmark 
1.44. There has been no major natural disaster 
in Denmark for a long time and no need has 
been felt to draw up special legislation for civil 
protection. Should it be necessary to call on 
military units on the occasion of such a major 
disaster, this would be done in the framework of 
the total defence concept which co-ordinates the 
use of the armed forces, the police and civil 
defence. In this event, the military elements 
would operate under the police force which, 
in Denmark, is responsible to the Ministry of 
Justice, whose attributions include the right to 
call on military resources. 
1.45. There is no permanent body for disaster 
relief. However, the civil defence mobile 
columns, of which there are seven, spread out 
geographically in the light of requirements, each 
maintain a detachment of two officers (civil 
servants) and sixteen conscripts 1 in a permanent 
state of alert so as to be able to intervene 
without delay if required. 
1.46. According to Danish doctrine, civil 
defence, which is intended for a wartime situa-
tion and organised independently of the armed 
forces, can meet the requirements of a disaster. 
There is a civil defence directorate covering 
seven civil defence regions which have authority 
over forty-six police districts plus Copenhagen, 
102 defence areas and seven mobile columns, i.e. 
a potential total of 65,000 men, including muni-
cipal firemen, volunteers and conscripts 1 with 
special status and access to the equipment of the 
mobile columns. 
1.47. There is no official relationship between 
civil defence and charitable organisations which 
receive no state subsidy. Nor is there a budget-
ary head for civil protection. Finally, no bi- or 
multilateral agreements have been concluded 
between Denmark and its neighbours. 
1.48. Denmark would probably envisage calling 
for military assistance only as a last resort. 
This would be under the authority of the police, 
the required personnel and equipment being 
defined case by case in the light of the situation. 
Similarly, the units called in would depend on 
the type of situation. Since no military unit is 
specially designated for civil protection opera-
tions, there is no provision in the defence budget 
for such an eventuality. In the circumstances, 
there is little reason why units should be sta-
tioned with a view to such use; such a measure 
would moreover be of little interest in view of 
the size ofthe country. 
1.49. Apart from heath or forest fires which 
have been extinguished easily, Denmark has 
fortunately had no natural disasters and has 
I. Recru!lcd for eight months' natwnal service. 
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practically no experience in this connection. At 
international level, Denmark afforded assistance 
to the Netherlands during the 1953 flooding, 
Hungary during the 1956 revolt and Yugoslavia 
after the 1963 and 1969 earthquakes. These 
operations were all carried out through the civil 
defence authorities and the Red Cross and no 
particular lessons seem to have been learned 
from them. 
(d) France 
1.50. In France. mayors and prefects are res-
ponsible for protecting the population against 
disasters in application of the communal law of 
5th April 1844, confirmed by Articles Ll31, 2, 7, 
and 13 of the Communal Code, all included in 
Law 82-813 of 2nd March 1982 (Rights and 
freedoms of communes, departments and 
regions). 
1.51. Under these texts, it is quite logically the 
Minister of the Interior who has permanent 
responsibility for civil protection; in certain 
special cases, this responsibility passes to the 
Prime Minister, for instance in the case of 
coastal oil pollution. These authorities are 
therefore empowered to call on the armed forces 
through the Minister of Defence. At depart-
mental level, these powers are delegated to the 
prefects, who are responsible for applying special 
relief plans. 
1.52. The Civil Security Directorate was set up 
to help them in this task. It depends on the 
Ministry of the Interior and is to organise and 
co-ordinate services responsible for studying and 
implementing prevention and relief measures 
intended to ensure the safeguard of persons and 
property in the case of accidents or disasters or 
in circumstances connected with civil defence. 
1.53. The Civil Security Director may sign on 
behalf of the Minister of the Interior for matters 
within his purview. The civil protection organ-
isation relies mainly on fire-fighting units: 
- firemen and marine firemen with mili-
tary status: 8,000 men respectively in 
Paris and Marseilles; 
- firemen with civil status: 220,000 
volunteers and 12,000 professionals; 
- resources directly dependent on the 
Civil Security Directorate: 
- an air unit consisting of 26 helicop-
ters and 12 aircraft for spraying 
water; 
- two battalion-size military units for 
civil security training, consisting of 
conscripts; 
- one mine-detection service. 
1.54. The Civil Security Directorate also has a 
sub-directorate on prevention and studies. It is 
responsible for conducting research and experi-
ments to assess risks, publishing security regula-
tions and cfeveloping equipment and inter-
vention tactics. 
1.55. Finally, the directorate has a command 
centre which groups information necessary for 
providing and co-ordinating assistance. 
1.56. Prefects are responsible for alerting the 
population, for which they use the fire service. 
1.57. Apart from firemen, marine firemen and 
civil security training units which have a per-
sonnel of 23 officers, 65 non-commissioned 
officers and 528 conscripts equipped for clearing 
operations, forest fire-fighting and handling 
chemical pollution, there are no permanent mili-
tary units specially assigned to civil protection. 
Conversely, there are volunteer corps which 
have various kinds of equipment stocked in 
areas where there is the most probability of their 
being used; more than 160,000 such civil pro-
tection volunteers are on call. 
1.58. Apart from these units, whose services are 
free of charge, special mention should be made 
of the work of the French Red Cross. 
1.59. The Civil Security Directorate assists 
charitable organisations by granting them 
subsidies and making its training facilities 
available to them. 
1.60. It supervises the training given and issues 
national diplomas; it also ensures that these 
associations are geared with the overall assis-
tance arrangements should the ORSEC plan be 
activated. This happens during major disasters 
in order to provide first aid, clothing, food and 
provisional housing for victims. 
1.61. They take part in ORSEC exercises organ-
ised periodically at departmental level on spe-
cific themes such as railway accidents, aircraft 
accidents, earthquakes, etc. 
1.62. For all these tasks, the Civil Security 
Directorate has a small annual budget of about 
0.09% of the national budget. 
1.63. At international level, France has conclu-
ded many bilateral agreements but none provid-
ing for the use of armed forces. There are 
agreements with Algeria, Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Morocco, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia and the 
United Kingdom. France also acceded to the 
Atlantic Alliance's multilateral civil defence 
agreement and the Civil Security Directorate is 
represented on the NATO Civil Defence Com-
mittee. It belongs to a permanent commun-
ications network which sends data to its opera-
tional centre (CODISC) by telex. 
1.64. With regard to the role and contribution 
of the armed forces, whereas the civil authorities 
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are responsible for organising and implementing 
assistance, the military units made available to 
them are responsible for deciding how to carry 
out the tasks entrusted to them. These units 
remain under their normal military chain of 
command. However, if military resources are 
used on a large scale, tactical headquarters may 
be set up to co-ordinate the use of these 
resources. In all cases, the framework of 
command is the same as for military operations. 
There is therefore no specific structure of 
command and organisation for civil protection. 
Similarly, the armed forces have drawn up no 
emergency plans for tackling disasters; conver-
sely, they are prepared to intervene on the 
various levels provided for by the Ministry of 
the Interior: ORSEC: organising relief, POL-
MAR: fighting sea pollution, SA TER: land 
rescue, SAMAR: sea rescue, etc. 
1.65. In this framework, they may be called 
upon to carry out many tasks: 
- medical assistance with deployment of a 
medical unit able to intervene at short 
notice (EMIR), 
- medical evacuation, 
- rescuing flood victims, 
- forest fire-fighting, 
- snow clearing, 
- cleaning polluted coasts, etc. 
During these operations they use all necessary 
equipment: wireless, bridges, transport vehicles, 
clearing equipment, ships, aircraft, helicopters, 
medical equipment, mobile kitchens. These 
resources are always used by military personnel 
but others may be loaned and used without 
military assistance: tents, electric generators, 
pierced steel plates, etc. 
1.66. Generally, the army assigns complete 
units, infantry companies of l 00 men and 
engineering companies with machinery, and it 
goes without saying that naval and air force 
units may be brought in in special cases. 
1.67. It should be noted that there are army 
units specially earmarked for civil protection 
tasks, in addition to the firemen, marine firemen 
and two civil security training units already 
mentioned; fourteen self-contained units known 
as specialised military units have been set up. 
These are companies of 100 men formed in 
certain regiments stationed south of the Loire. 
In addition to military training, they receive 
specialised training for fighting forest fires at the 
request ofthe civil authorities. 
1.68. In principle, there is no provision in the 
defence budget for civil protection and expen-
diture incurred by such operations normally has 
to be reimbursed by the authorities which 
request the assistance of the armed forces. In 
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general, the armed forces charge only for addi-
tional expenditure arising from the humanita-
rian operations they carry out and such services 
are frequently given free of charge. 
1.69. The work of the military units is simpli-
fied by the fact that the territory is divided up 
administratively and militarily in the same way: 
defence regions correspond to military regions, 
economic regions to military divisions and 
departments to departmental military delega-
tions. 
1. 70. Close liaison between the departmental 
military delegate and the prefect and specialised 
military units designated according to their 
probable use combine to make it easier to bring 
reinforcements into operation at short notice. 
Reinforcements may be transported to the scene 
of the disaster by helicopter or aircraft and even 
in the case of movement by road it takes no 
more than four hours to bring in the most 
conveniently-placed unit. 
1. 71. Armed forces have been used in the case 
of disasters in metropolitan France and overseas 
departments, for floods, cyclones, volcanic erup-
tions, forest fires and oil pollution of coasts. 
Their intervention under the responsibility of 
the civil defence authorities has proved very 
useful and experience acquired has allowed 
stand-by and alert warning times to be improved 
and has strengthened operational command 
arrangements. 
1. 72. Interventions in other countries based 
mainly on the use of airborne rapid intervention 
medical units were conducted as military oper-
ations and did not allow any particular lessons 
to be learned with regard to civil protection. 
(e) Federal Republic of Germany 
1. 73. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
choice of measures to be taken to protect the 
population against disasters is the responsibility 
of the Uinder. 
1.74. In peacetime, the Ministers of the Interior 
of the Umder are responsible for organising 
assistance and can therefore call on the federal 
armed forces when civil resources prove in-
adequate. Tasks are assigned to the armed 
forces by the civil authorities concerned, usually 
an official of the district or commune affected by 
the disaster. When carrying out such tasks, 
these forces remain under the command of their 
usual officers. 
1.75. The conference ofMinisters ofthe Interior 
of the Lander set up a working group to har-
monise measures to be taken in the event of 
disaster and to standardise equipment and 
training methods. It is composed of the direc-
tors responsible for assistance measures at the 
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level of the Ui.nder. Its role is purely consult-
ative; it has no decision-taking powers and has 
no responsibility for research, prevention or 
alert in respect of the most probable disasters. 
1. 76. The organisation of assistance in both 
peacetime and wartime depends on some 
1,300,000 volunteers (excluding the DLRG) in 
the framework of a large number of associations: 
- the League of Samaritan Workers (more 
than 15,000 members); 
- the German Red Cross (more than 
300,000 members); 
- the St. John's Ambulance Brigade 
(14,000 members); 
- the Order of Malta relief service (more 
than 26,000 members); 
- the German Lifesaving Association 
(DLRG) with 1,400 lookout posts and 
1 ,300 lifeboats; 
- fire-fighting units with some 946,000 
members, of which 20,000 professional; 
- the technical support service (52,000 
members). 
1. 77. Of all these, 142,000 auxiliaries are 
equipped and trained for carrying out special 
tasks in wartime, but it is obvious that they are 
also used in the case of disasters in peacetime. 
All these associations - provided they have 
informed the authorities that they have the 
requisite degree of preparation - are used for 
their specific specialities: medical assistance, 
distribution of food and clothing, provisional 
housing of victims, fire-fighting, rescue work, 
clearing ruins. 
1. 78. In principle, charitable and official organ-
isations attend joint training sessions organised 
at district level under the supervision of the 
official responsible for organising assistance. 
Charitable associations receive grants which 
vary from one Land to another. Such sums are 
difficult to assess. 
1. 79. Disaster control operates on funds granted 
by districts and Uinder according to local condi-
tions for carrying out operations. 
1.80. At international level, the Federal 
Republic takes part in EEC and NATO working 
groups dealing with civil defence and the organi-
sation of disaster relief. It has also concluded 
bilateral agreements with Belgium, France and 
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg which concern 
solely the organisation of civil resources and in 
this context there has been an exchange of telex 
and telephone numbers between the centres con-
cerned. 
1.81. The armed forces intervene without any 
break in the normal hierarchical chain. The 
civil servant responsible for organising assis-
tance is empowered to tell the commander of the 
unit designated to intervene what his task is to 
be. The military commander works out the 
methods to be used and gives the necessary 
orders through the normal chain of command. 
1.82. These operations are conducted in accor-
dance with "directives for the federal armed 
forces " relating to assistance to be afforded in 
the event of disaster or serious accident. 
1.83. On the basis of these directives, detach-
ments of the armed forces, in addition to their 
normal tasks, also have to be on call around the 
clock and ready to reinforce other means of 
assistance already being used. Other military 
elements may also be placed in a state of alert on 
a case-by-case basis, for instance when flooding 
is expected. Emergency plans have obviously 
been prepared to speed up the action of these 
reinforcements and although no specific units 
are used for assistance in the event of disaster it 
is mainly engineering, medical, communications 
and transport units which prove the most useful 
in the circumstances. However, no unit is 
specially organised or trained to carry out civil 
protection tasks. 
1.84. Similarly, there are no budget estimates to 
cover expenditure incurred by the intervention 
of armed forces. In principle, civil authorities 
who call in the armed forces must reimburse the 
expenditure incurred, but there are arrangements 
for dispensing them from paying all or part of 
such sums. 
1.85. By delegation of the Ministers of the 
Interior of the Umder, the district and com-
munal authorities may call in the armed forces 
in the event of disaster. To this end, they set 
up liaison headquarters to co-ordinate the action 
of civil bodies and military commands. In the 
event of a major disaster, the rule is that a 
liaison officer is seconded to the group respon-
sible for organising assistance. 
1.86. Although troops are not stationed in the 
light of the requirements of assistance opera-
tions, the regional territorial command organisa-
tion acts as an intermediary between the civil 
authorities and the armed forces. These terri-
torial commands are responsible for co-ordinat-
ing measures for training and using armed 
forces for civil protection operations. Their 
task is facilitated by the liaison which exists in 
garrison towns between the military and civil 
authorities. However, it is not easy to work out 
exactly how long it takes to bring in the military 
reinforcements made available to the civil 
authorities, but as units are highly mobile their 
deployment throughout national territory shows 
that it is possible to bring the first elements into 
the regions affected within a few hours. 
1.87. In spite of favourable conditions, experi-
ence at national level during relatively minor 
disasters such as floods, tidal waves and snow-
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storms required very considerable work at head-
quarters level due to lack of training and the 
unsuitability of available equipment. 
1.88. Co-operation has been good but it cannot 
be said that optimum efficiency has been 
achieved. Consequently, command post exer-
cises, joint manoeuvres and the participation of 
civil defence units in armed exercises have been 
organised, as well as increased civil/military 
contacts at command level. 
1.89. Experience at international level has been 
derived mainly from earthquakes in Italy and 
the organisation of air transport toward coun-
tries affected by disasters. 
1. 90. Lessons learned from these operations do 
not prompt the setting up of special structures at 
international level since the authorities consider 
that available military resources allow rapid, 
effective assistance to be given to countries 
suffering disasters in peacetime. 
(/) Greece 
1. 91. Assistance to disaster victims is governed 
by detailed legislation which allows the mobilisa-
tion of civilians, the requisition of transport, 
specific equipment and food. It also provides 
for various stages of alert. 
1. 92. The relevant legislation is the Royal 
Decree 356/71 and Legislative Decrees 857/71 
and 17 j74, which make the Ministers of the 
Interior, Defence. Health and Social Welfare, 
Public Works and Public Order and the local 
prefectures permanently responsible for organ-
ising assistance to victims of disasters in peace-
time. 
1.93. The Minister of the Interior, sometimes 
through the prefectures, is empowered to call on 
the armed forces in the event of disasters on 
land. The Ministry for the Merchant Marine 
has the same powers in the case of serious 
disasters at sea. Depending on the extent of the 
disaster, the armed forces are under the control 
of the Ministry of Defence or of the local mili-
tary commander. 
1. 94. There is a co-ordination relief body under 
the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, which 
brings into action the control and direction 
centres which exist in the abovementioned 
ministries, but it does not have its own resources 
since it is mainly responsible for controlling the 
equipment of the state and private sectors. 
1.95. There is no permanent body responsible 
for implementing assistance. There are no 
private associations and no exercises are held to 
test the capabilities of the means required. 
There is no head in the state budget for civil 
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protection~ funds are released on a case-by-case 
basis in the light of requirements. 
1. 96. Greece has a special arrangement with the 
NATO member countries for assistance in case 
of natural disasters. It has concluded no other 
bilateral agreements. Consequently. there is no 
provision for the use of units of the armed forces 
in the event of mutual assistance operations and 
Greece does not belong to a specialised signals 
network for supplying mutual assistance. 
1.97. In the event of major disasters, a joint 
civil/military organisation under the authority of 
the Prime Minister is set up at the Ministry of 
Defence. In local cases, a similar command 
centre is set up under the prefect and the mili-
tary commander. 
1.98. The armed forces have a permanent 
round-the-clock command system designed to 
set in motion and conduct an emergency plan 
known as the Xenokrates plan. 
l. 99. Under this plan, the main tasks of military 
units are to provide personnel, specialised equip-
ment, means of transport, food, assistance to 
persons in danger and transport of casualties. 
1.1 00. To carry out these tasks, the armed forces 
use transport (ships. aircraft, helicopters, trans-
port vehicles, ambulances), mechanical equip-
ment, tents and field kitchens. 
1.10 l. The special forces and engineering units 
which are the most appropriate for this type of 
operation are generally called in to provide 
prompt assistance in the early stages of a 
disaster. The navy also participates when the 
stricken area is an insular area. However. there 
are no units specially earmarked for assistance 
operations or budgetary estimates to cover the 
cost of humanitarian operations. These are 
normally paid for by transfer of funds between 
ministries. 
1.1 02. As already indicated, it is the prefectures 
that call on the armed forces. To this end, 
liaison is established between civil and military 
authorities so as to make the best use of the 
territorial deployment of the armed forces. 
There are no special units deployed in possible 
danger areas: it is generally considered that the 
mobility of units is sufficient and movement 
plans drawn up allow calls for assistance to be 
met within an acceptable lapse of time. 
1.1 03. Reactions have been tested on the 
occasion of earthquakes, fires and floods. The 
Greek armed forces have proved to be perfectly 
suited to such tasks and their assistance to 
victims of peacetime disasters is particularly 
effective in the early stages. 
1.1 04. Apart from its participation in NATO 
peacetime disaster assistance, Greece has entered 
into no other agreements on bi- or multilateral 
222 
assistance in the event of disaster in peacetime. 
However, it assisted Italy and Turkey when 
there were earthquakes recently by providing 
supplies through military channels. 
(g) Italy 
1.1 05. Struck by several national-scale disasters, 
Italy has introduced legislation governing the 
organisation of assistance to civilian victims of 
disasters. 
1.1 06. The organisation of civil protection in 
Italy is in a transitional stage. A Minister 
responsible for civil protection has been appoin-
ted whose main task is to co-ordinate the 
various forces deployed in the event of a disaster 
and to plan forecasting and prevention. How-
ever, although this Minister is already in office, 
the relevant law has not yet been passed by 
parliament. Under Law 996 of 8th December 
1970 and its implementing regulations and 
Presidential Decree 66. the Minister of the 
Interior was directly responsible for measures to 
be taken in both the preparatory and subsequent 
stages - this situation will be changed by the law 
which is to be promulgated. 
1.1 07. In this framework, the interministerial 
civil protection committee at present: 
- promotes studies for defining prevent-
ive measures likely to limit damage; 
- collects and circulates useful informa-
tion to those concerned with civil pro-
tection~ 
- co-ordinates the various emergency 
plans: 
- organises preliminary measures neces-
sary for government intervention. 
1.1 08. The mainspring of this committee is the 
general directorate for civil protection and fire-
fighting services, which depends on the Ministry 
of the Interior. It is assisted by the inter-
ministerial technical committee. which is more 
directly concerned with the technical aspects of 
organising civil protection. 
1.1 09. At regional level, a regional civil pro-
tection committee is responsible for deciding 
upon measures to be taken for avoiding or limit-
ing the risk of disaster and determining the 
contributions to be made by the region, com-
munes and other local bodies in the event of a 
serious disaster. 
1.11 0. The abovementioned bodies play a 
research and planning role whereas the law has 
made the Minister of the Interior responsible for 
directing assistance and co-ordinating action 
undertaken by the various administrations. 
1.111. In the event of a large-scale disaster. a 
commissioner responsible for directing assist-
ance and applying government directives is 
generally appointed by decree of the Prime 
Minister on the proposal of the Minister of the 
Interior. In the case of less serious disasters, 
responsibility for assistance is delegated to the 
local authorities, assisted by civil protection 
bodies. 
1.112. Participation by the armed forces in 
rescue operations is provided for in Article 1 of 
Law 382 of 11th July 1978 on the principles of 
military discipline. 
1.113. Prefects ask for the assistance of troops in 
accordance with plans drawn up by headquarters 
and commands at the various levels. These 
plans describe the organisation of the command, 
the designation of tasks to be accomplished and 
implementing procedure. 
1.114. At government level therefore there is a 
general directorate for civil protection under the 
Minister of the Interior with powers which are 
mainly limited to research and planning. It is 
assisted by the interministerial civil protection 
committee and the interministerial technical 
committee which, in the event of a disaster, 
become the combined operational centre provid-
ing all assistance by using the regional civil 
protection committees under it. 
1.115. For planning operations, each province 
has its own plan; there is also a plan for assis-
tance by armed forces in each territorial military 
command and a series of specific plans covering 
possible accidents. particularly in high-risk acti-
vities. 
1. 116. The resources and chain of command are 
as outlined. There are: 
- at national level, the civil protection 
operations centre which works round 
the clock. It is responsible for collect-
ing, assessing and circulating informa-
tion, alerting all administrations con-
cerned and finally activating, on the 
instructions of the minister, the com-
bined operations centre by convening 
those responsible for the units provid-
ing assistance; 
- at lower levels, mobile rescue units of 
firemen and depots situated in strategic 
areas where equipment and material are 
stocked to provide provisional housing 
and food for survivors of the disaster. 
1.117. Apart from the armed forces, the fire 
brigade, organised in units, is also used for civil 
protection and charitable organisations also play 
a part which is far from negligible. Mention 
may be made of the voluntary civil protection 
service set up by Law 996 of 8th December 
1970, the Red Cross, the Automobile Club and 
amateur radio associations. There are also the 
military corps of the Italian Red Cross and the 
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volunteer nursing corps which form a military 
element of the Red Cross, calling up those neces-
sary for setting up rapid intervention units. It 
is subsidised by the Ministry of Defence. 
1.118. Apart from these necessarily small sub-
sidies. the civil protection service, which 
includes the national fire brigade, had a budget 
of 415,411 million lire in 1982. 
1.119. Highly organised at national leveL there 
have not been many bilateral civil defence 
agreements. Apart from its membership of 
specialised NATO and United Nations commit-
tees. the only plan in view is a protocol with 
France. 
1.120. The place of the armed forces in the 
abovementioned system will now be examined. 
1.121. In normal times contacts between the 
civil authorities concerned and the military 
commands allow the use of armed forces in the 
event of a disaster to be planned. Provision is 
made for: 
- placing in a state of alert and ear-
marking the military personnel and 
equipment considered necessary; 
- requesting reinforcements in the event 
of insufficient forces being available 
immediately: 
- setting up the necessary commumca-
tions networks; 
- seconding military personnel to all the 
civil bodies concerned; 
- implementing special tasks resulting 
from the disaster (evacuation and 
hospitalisation of victims, supplying 
food and clothing, provisional housing 
for victims, implementation of a road 
traffic plan). 
1.122. In case of emergency, the Minister of the 
Interior or the Special Commissioner asks for 
the armed forces to be brought in, or the prefect 
may apply directly to the territorial military 
command in his area. 
1.123. These requests are met by the territorial 
commands within the limits of available 
resources and by the Ministry of Defence if 
reinforcements are necessary and co-ordination 
measures required. 
1.124. The commitment and action of the forces 
is directed by a functional command chain set 
up at the start and working twenty-four hours a 
day. 
1.125. An inter-branch operations centre is 
opened at defence headquarters to co-ordinate 
interventions at national level: it organises assis-
tance operations centres at the level of territorial 
military commands involved in assistance oper-
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ations and co-ordination groups for assistance 
operations carried out in the areas affected. 
1.126. The tasks to be carried out vary accord-
ing to the situation to be tackled: earthquakes. 
floods, forest fires, ecological accidents. They 
usually mean committing suitably-equipped 
units and providing various equipment. medical 
supplies and camping equipment. The most 
needed are transport of all kinds. engineering 
machinery and signals, sanitary, cooking and 
camping equipment. 
1.127. The units most suited to taking part in 
relief operations are those with technical know-
ledge of work in the field and which have large 
numbers of personnel and means which make 
them very mobile, e.g. sappers, motorised 
infantry, parachutists, ski regiments, signals 
units, light aviation, helicopters, air force trans-
port and photographic reconnaissance aircraft 
and naval landing units. 
1.128. At present, there are no units specifically 
earmarked for civil defence tasks; however, the 
formation of a rapid intervention force is now 
being studied. This measure is connected with 
the budget in which, since 1981, there has been 
an item allocating to defence purposes a propor-
tion of the appropriations earmarked for civil 
protection. These financial resources are 
intended for the procurement of suitable equip-
ment and improved training of units for action 
in the event of disasters. 
1.129. The Ministry of Defence bears the 
expenditure resulting from the intervention of 
armed forces for civil protection purposes, but if 
troops are sent to reinforce other state bodies the 
expenditure incurred is charged to the adminis-
trations concerned. 
1.130. The territorial organisation of the armed 
forces is not necessarily adapted to interventions 
in areas where there is the greatest risk of earth-
quakes. Studies are being conducted on the 
deployment of forces and logistic infrastructure 
to reconcile operational requirements and the 
assistance needed in known disaster areas. 
However this may be, units likely to be used for 
civil protection are mobile enough to be able to 
intervene within acceptable time limits. Move-
ment plans provide for the immediate commit-
ment of available resources in the disaster area, 
the arrival of the first reinforcements within 
twenty-four hours and the subsequent deploy-
ment of other units, depending on the scale of 
the disaster. 
1.131. These plans were put to the test on the 
pccasion of the earthquake in Friuli in 1976 and 
Campania and Basilicata in 1980. Without 
counting helicopters and transport aircraft, 
almost 14,000 men and 2,000 vehicles were used 
in Friuli and 35,000 men and more than 3,000 
vehicles at the time of the 1980 earthquake. 
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1.132. Although the participation of the armed 
forces was very effective, these operations 
demonstrated the need to improve training and 
reduce the time it took to bring in units. 
1.133. At international level, recent experience 
has been confined to the use of the armed forces 
to assist Algeria when it had an earthquake. No 
particular lesson was learned from that relatively 
limited experience. 
(h) Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
1.134. The organisation of civil protection in the 
Grand Duchy is governed by the Law of 
18th November 1976 which lays down that civil 
protection covers all measures and means 
intended to protect and come to the assistance of 
the population in the event of disasters. 
1.135. The Minister of the Interior is respon-
sible for civil protection; he co-ordinates prepa-
ration and implementation of appropriate mea-
sures in ministerial departments and public 
bodies. For this purpose, he may call upon the 
armed forces and in that event is responsible for 
co-ordinating operations. 
1.136. To carry out this task he has the national 
civil protection service which brings in the 
national alert centre, run by voluntary operators, 
and organises the ambulance service and the 
rescue service which operate twenty-four hours a 
day throughout the country with the help of 
almost 2,500 volunteers. 
1.137. There is a national NBC assistance group 
and a group of frogmen. 
1.138. In case of need, the national civil 
protection service may call on two charitable 
organisations, the national federation of volun-
tary firemen and the Luxembourg Red Cross 
with which it has close relations. 
1.139. Local civil assistance centres organise 
frequent exercises with the participation of 
voluntary firemen. 
1.140. The civil protection service has a budget 
equivalent to that of the army and 50% of the 
cost of procuring fire-fighting equipment is met 
by the state and the rest by the communes. 
1.141. At international level, the Grand Duchy 
has concluded agreements on mutual assistance 
in the event of disasters with its neighbours 
(Belgium. France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany). These make no reference to the 
possible use of military units. Finally, no 
special agreements have been signed with 
international organisations. 
1.142. No very elaborate plans seem to have 
been made for using armed forces for civil 
protection work. On the one hand, the army is 
very small and could provide only limited 
reinforcements and on the other hand the Grand 
Duchy has been very largely disaster-free and 
has probably felt no need to introduce procedure 
intended to allow the army to be used to assist 
victims of disasters. 
(i) Netherlands 
1.143. The Netherlands has suffered from fre-
quent natural disasters. particularly flooding, 
and has wide-ranging legislation for protecting 
the population. This legislation is in the 
process of being revised and two new texts are of 
special interest: the civil defence act and the 
emergencies act. In the event of disasters, 
section 37 of the civil defence act and the 
municipal disaster plans will be declared appli-
cable by royal decree. The remainder of the 
legal framework is contained in various statutory 
regulations which define the powers of local, 
district and national authorities in peacetime. 
1.144. Interim regulations govern mutual assis-
tance on a district and inter-district basis while 
the provision of intra-district assistance is left to 
co-operation between the municipalities in the 
district. 
1.145. Requests for assistance from districts 
within a province are submitted through the 
Queen's Commissioner (of the province) while 
requests for assistance from other provinces are 
submitted to the Minister for Home Affairs. 
1.146. A request for assistance is issued by the 
burgomaster responsible for disaster control, 
who submits requests for assistance from pro-
vincial and national services to the Queen's 
Commissioner. 
1.147. He may also, in very urgent cases, submit 
requests for military assistance to the provincial 
or district military commander. The mainten-
ance of public order and disaster control 
therefore lies with the burgomaster who is 
empowered to give any order which he deems 
necessary to maintain public order or to restrict 
the common danger. 
1.148. Those taking part in controlling the 
disaster are subject to his orders. 
1.149. The Queen's Commissioner ensures that 
arrangements are made for assistance and co-
ordinates organisation if provisions from more 
than one municipality are necessary. He may 
give burgomasters policy guidance and also 
provide for operational control. 
1.150. The Minister for Home Affairs gives 
Queen's Commissioners instructions concerning 
disaster controL decides on requests for assist-
ance to be given by the provincial services of 
other provinces, applies to the minister con-
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cerned for the assistance of national services and 
applies to the Minister of Defence for military 
assistance. 
1.151. Should the framework of legal regulations 
be inadequate under normal circumstances a 
number of suitable emergency acts may be 
brought into force by royal decree to broaden the 
powers of the authorities. 
1.152. Under the constitution, the armed forces 
were created "to protect the interests of the 
state". The law distinguishes between various 
kinds of aid, three of which are: 
- military assistance for the maintenance 
of public order ; 
- special military assistance to support 
the judicial authorities in the event of 
acts of terr'orism ; 
- military support in cases not covered by 
the above categories. 
1.153. Although there is a very elaborate legal 
basis for the intervention of armed forces in 
maintaining public order or fighting terrorism, 
the only legal basis for military support in the 
event of disaster or threat of disaster is an article 
of the constitution under which burgomasters 
and Queen's Commissioners may in very urgent 
cases request military support from the pro-
vincial military commander. 
1.154. This support seems very limited and 
units work under the command of the civil 
authorities which request assistance although the 
unit leaders have some degree of latitude in the 
methods used. 
1.155. There is no permanent body at govern-
ment level for co-ordinating resources for 
limiting the consequences of natural disasters. 
1.156. The central body for disaster control 
comes under the Minister for Home Affairs. 
Once the fire services bill and the disasters bill 
have been enacted, the fire service directorate, 
under the directorate general of public order and 
security, will be charged with this task, and it 
will have its own budget. The directorate will 
be charged with the statutory tasks of preparing 
and co-ordinating the control of disasters and 
providing operational leadership in the actual 
work involved. 
1.157. The directorate has a division concerned 
especially with prevention and information. 
1.158. The protection of the population is at 
present the responsibility of the civil defence 
organisation, assisted by organised self-pro-
tection. 
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1.159. There are now almost 300,000 profes-
sionals and volunteers able to assist in the event 
of major disaster: 
- 175,000 emergency guards; to be 
reduced to 50,000 in 1983; 
- 27,500 firemen, including 3,000 profes-
sionals; 
- 130,000 persons trained for industrial 
protection. 
1.160. The civil defence organisation is to be 
run down between 1983 and 1986 and its work 
will be taken over by district fire services (about 
25,000 persons) and the Red Cross (about 17,000 
persons). 
1.161. The Dutch Red Cross Society is a private 
organisation which has contacts with local or 
district authorities for the preparation and 
integration of certain tasks which the Red Cross 
will fulfil in the framework of the new disasters 
act. 
1.162. Should there be a disaster serious enough 
for a disaster command to be set up, the staff of 
the regional Red Cross Corps will join the 
commander of disaster control and a Red Cross 
Corps liaison officer will be attached to each 
sector command. Red Cross staff will be placed 
under the regional fire service commanders. 
1.163. Each year part of the budget is reserved 
for civil defence and in 1983 this amounts to 2% 
of the annual national budget, i.e. 216 million 
guilders, spread over various ministries. 
1.164. At international level, the Netherlands 
has concluded few agreements with other states. 
Apart from a convention on air pollution and 
arrangements with Belgium for civil co-oper-
ation in the event of disasters which might arise 
from irregularities in the functioning of nuclear 
power stations at Doel (Belgium), there is only 
the proposed agreements with Germany on 
assistance in the event of disasters and mutual 
support for sea rescue operations. These are 
still being negotiated. 
1.165. Regarding the position of the armed 
forces, the authorities appear to have been 
anxious to limit recourse to their use and to keep 
military units under the orders of the local civil 
authorities in all circumstances. 
1.166. Probably due to the acts of terrorism in 
1977, the texts go extensively into the particip-
ation of specialised military units in anti-
terrorist operations or maintaining public order 
but are relatively discreet about using armed 
forces to assist victims of a disaster. 
1.167. Requests for the provision of armed 
forces emanating from civil authorities must be 
immediately transmitted by provincial comman-
ders to the national territorial commander who 
refers to the commander-in-chief. 
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1.168. Operational command of units selected 
for providing support is exercised by a comman-
der appointed by the national territorial 
commander who acts on the instructions of the 
civil authority requesting assistance. Conver-
sely, administrative and logistic command is 
exercised by the commander-in-chief whose 
directives prescribe procedure to be followed. 
1.169. In general there are two types of inter-
vention: emergency non-planned support and 
pre-planned support (in the event of floods, 
forest fires, snow clearance, etc.) if the civil 
authorities are not fully capable of fulfilling 
these roles and have requested support. 
1.1 70. Military equipment used in such cases 
may be maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, 
naval vessels, communications equipment 
mobile kitchens, tents, etc. 
l.l 71. Among the units the most suited for the 
above tasks is the corps of mobile columns, 
intended primarily for use on the outbreak of 
hostilities. 
1.172. This is a military unit under the responsi-
bility of the Minister of Defence but for control 
and deployment there are common directives 
defining the responsibilities of the Ministers of 
Defence, Home Affairs and Health and Environ-
mental Protection. 
1.173. After the reorganisation of the civil 
defence organisation, the corps of mobile 
columns will render assistance in case of 
disasters in peacetime. 
1.174. In principle, the cost of assistance oper-
ations is charged to the body requesting assist-
ance as there is no explicit provision in the 
defence budget for civil protection, except for 
sea rescue operations. The body requesting 
support must bear the cost of the operation, 
including any damage caused. 
1.175. As already noted, the authorities 
empowered to request the support of the armed 
forces are the burgomasters and Queen's Com-
missioners, the latter being the normal channel. 
Command is exercised through liaison between 
the burgomaster and the relevant divisional 
commander. 
1.176. In principle, no exercises are held specifi-
cally to co-ordinate the use of civil and military 
means, but, to improve co-operation between 
the bodies which have to work together, attempts 
are being made to draw lessons from civil 
defence exercises. 
1.1 77. These indicate that, in view of the size of 
the country, the deployment of military units 
should not be geared to the requirement for civil 
protection since the armed forces are mobile 
enough to reach disaster areas quickly. 
1.178. Although the Netherlands has wide 
experience of dealing with floods, little inform-
... 
ation is available regarding m1sswns accom-
plished abroad. They were often once-only 
operations and do not therefore allow general 
suggestions to be made. 
(]) Norway 
1.179. The Ministry of Justice and Police is 
responsible for co-ordinating disaster relief, but 
disasters are generally dealt with at local or 
regional level by the police authorities, if 
necessary with the assistance of non-govern-
mental organisations such as the Norwegian Red 
Cross. 
1.180. Any local or regional police authority is 
empowered to call on the armed forces for civil 
protection duties. In this event they are placed 
under the command of the police. 
1.181. Depending on the extent of the disaster, 
the contribution and ways of using military 
means and also the home guard, the coastguard, 
civil defence and the Norwegian search and 
rescue service are established on a case-by-case 
basis, taking into account the requirements of 
each situation. 
1.182. To this end. it should be pointed out that 
a squadron of ten Sea King helicopters pur-
chased by the Ministry of Justice for search and 
rescue operations is used by the air force. 
Humanitarian operations abroad are co-ordina-
ted by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which has 
at its disposal about 200 million kroner per 
year. These operations are carried out by 
voluntary organisations. The armed forces 
have apparently never been used for such 
operations. 
1.183. In conclusion, Norway, which seems so 
far to have been spared natural disasters, intends 
to resort to a pragmatic case-by-case policy to 
overcome any problems arising from a disaster, 
without taking undue account of the speed with 
which assistance must be afforded. 
1.184. However, it should be noted that the 
Norwegian authorities seem to have been 
impressed by the disaster on the North Sea oil 
platform in 1980 and have set up a search and 
rescue service under the police force which calls 
on the air force, the navy, the army, civil defence 
forces, the ambulance service, voluntary firemen 
and the Red Cross. 
1.185. The search and rescue service is a perma-
nent body whose two rescue co-ordination 
centres work round the clock. There are rescue 
sub-centres most of which are established at 
Norway's fifty-three police headquarters. They 
have considerable communication facilities and 
employ qualified permanent staff assisted by air 
traffic controllers. This service can call on 
large-scale resources emanating from most state 
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bodies. On a small scale they foreshadow what 
might be a large civil protection service capable 
of affording with minimum delay the assistance 
required for saving victims of a disaster. 
(k) Portugal 
1.186. Portuguese legislation has attempted to 
define the limits of responsibility for assistance 
to the population on the basis of territorial 
criteria. 
1.18 7. There are three levels of responsibility for 
possible interventions: 
- the local level, meeting the require-
ments of municipalities ; 
- the regional level, meeting the require-
ments of departments ; 
- the national level, meeting the country's 
requirements. 
1.188. A special regulation has been introduced 
for disasters at sea. In that event, the naval 
authorities are responsible for organising assist-
ance. The Prime Minister delegates responsibi-
lity for the general organisation of civil protec-
tion to the Minister of the Interior. However, 
the civil protection service is empowered to call 
on the armed forces. This power may be 
delegated according to circumstances to local or 
regional civil protection organisers, who depend 
on the central body which is mainly responsible 
for the general co-ordination of studies, plans, 
programmes and action to be carried out by state 
services and private associations in the frame-
work of disaster prevention and the organisation 
of assistance. 
1.189. When there is a disaster, it sets up a civil 
protection operational centre to co-ordinate all 
assistance operations. 
1.190. As the civil protection service is under 
the authority of the Prime Minister, who in this 
field delegates his powers to the Minister of the 
Interior, the decision to bring the civil protection 
operational centre into action and to make 
available to it the means and resources required 
by the situation is a government responsibility. 
1.191. Consequently, in normal circumstances 
the civil protection service has only two 
permanent bodies responsible for listing avail-
able means and drawing up emergency inter-
vention plans: 
- the study and research directorate for 
civil protection ; 
- the planning and operations directorate 
for civil protection, responsible for acti-
vating the alert network. 
1.192. It has emergency telephone exchanges 
which may be reached by a national emergency 
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number and are connected to the communica-
tions networks of the armed forces, the police 
and fire brigade. 
1.19 3. The latter form the nucleus of Portuguese 
civil protection, with more than 400 units 
consisting main! y of volunteers. 
1.194. Round this nucleus there are volunteer 
members of the Red Cross, the lifesaving 
institute, UNICEF and Caritas. 
1.195. The national fire brigade, the Red Cross 
and the lifesaving institute are represented on 
the higher civil protection counciL which is a 
ministerial body at the emergency operational 
centre for civil protection, and in departmental 
civil protection co-ordination centres. 
1.196. There are no official subsidies as such for 
supporting the work of charitable associations. 
However, the national fire brigade receives 
14% of all fire insurance premiums. Civil 
protection does not have its own budget but a 
share in those ofthe departments. 
1.197. The international effort to develop the 
possibilities of mutual assistance is still small. 
Apart from its membership of the NATO Civil 
Emergency Planning Committee, Portugal has 
only signed a mutual assistance convention with 
Spain, mainly covering forest fire-fighting. This 
agreement is now to be applied, although 
there is as yet no relevant communications 
network. It provides for the use of military 
resources since water-spraying aircraft belong to 
the air force both in Spain and Portugal. 
1.198. When assisting the population, the armed 
forces retain their independence. They are not 
placed under the civil authorities responsible for 
the operation, but a command liaison as close as 
required by the co-ordination of efforts to fight 
disasters is set up at all levels. The armed 
forces are represented in all civil protection 
centres. It has therefore not been considered 
necessary to set up a special command channel 
to direct relief operations or to set up special 
units. Forces work in their usual structures and 
carry out the orders contained in emergency 
plans drawn up mainly for floods and forest 
fires. Military means are used for various tasks: 
fire-fighting, receiving, sorting out and evacuat-
ing casualties, transport, distributing prepared 
meals, creating emergency housing centres, 
operating specialised communications networks, 
clearing debris and roads, building emergency 
bridges, supplying electricity, etc. 
1.199. The variety of tasks shows that transport 
equipment, means of communication and engi-
neering equipment are widely used and that 
apart from specific tasks reserved for specialised 
units (engineers, medical service, signals units) 
all units may be called upon to accomplish 
ordinary tasks. 
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1.200. There is no budgetary provision for these 
operations. Expenditure is partly reimbursed 
by certain civil services, but part of the expen-
diture incurred is borne by the armed forces. 
1.201. In principle, it is the prefects who request 
the assistance of military units which remain 
under the orders of their usual officers, who are 
in close liaison with the departmental civil 
protection co-ordination centre responsible for 
directing the operation as a whole. Apart from 
this co-ordination in action, there is provision 
for exercises designed to improve performances, 
but none have yet been held. 
1.202. As in most other countries, the territorial 
deployment of troops has not been influenced by 
the degree of risk of catastrophe, but present 
deployment allows any civil protection require-
ments to be met, although not all units are 
mobile enough to reach the scene of a disaster 
quickly. 
1.203. The most likely cases in Portugal are, in 
order of priority, forest fires, floods and earth-
quakes. The most recent disasters were the 
Ribatejo floods in 1979 and the Azores earth-
quake in 1980. 
1.204. The work of the armed forces proved 
essential, but the efficiency of the means used 
suffered from a certain lack of preparation. To 
overcome this, national and regional emergency 
plans have been drawn up. 
1.205. Finally, it should be pointed out that 
Portuguese armed forces have never taken part 
in assistance operations outside the country. 
(f) Turkey 
1.206. In accordance with Article 119 of the 
Turkish constitution, the cabinet is empowered 
to declare a state of emergency in the event of 
natural disasters. Law 7264 concerning the 
protection of the civil population in the event of 
peacetime disasters deals with the measures to 
be taken and assistance to be provided in the 
event of disasters, including earthquakes, fires, 
floods, ground movements and avalanches. 
1.207. The Ministry of Construction and 
Housing and provincial governors are respon-
sible for taking charge of disaster relief. 
1.208. The cabinet or, in the provinces, the 
governors are empowered to call on the armed 
forces for civil protection duties. They operate 
under the direction of their commander and in 
compliance with the instructions of the governor 
concerned. 
1.209. Government duties relating to specific 
civil protection measures are carried out by the 
general directorate of disaster affairs of the 
Ministry of Construction and Housing which 
... 
has access to " disaster funds " and can use 
various municipal bodies for organising emer-
gency relief. One organisation giving very 
considerable assistance is the Red Crescent 
which distributes aid from abroad. Moreover, it 
is the only Turkish body to have concluded 
mutual assistance agreements with other 
countries. 
1.210. If a state of emergency is declared, civil 
and military rescue units work within their own 
command channel and have no special 
command arrangements or contingency plans. 
1.211. Civil and military rescue units work in 
mutual co-operation and can perform tasks such 
as removing debris and providing health and 
medical services and temporary accommod-
ation. 
1.212. There is no rule for choosing units. 
They may be drawn from the army, the air force 
or the navy, and are financed from the defence 
budget. 
1.213. The present territorial deployment of the 
armed forces meets likely requirements for civil 
protection and they are sufficiently mobile. 
There are no contingency plans. 
1.214. Turkey's civil protection experience 
appears to be limited to the country itself. 
1.215. There have recently been earthquakes, 
floods and forest fires in Turkey and it considers 
the armed forces can ensure most efficient 
service in the event of disaster. Improvements 
are possible, particularly new legal arrangements 
providing for action by the armed forces in civil 
protection operations ; once this basis has been 
laid it will be possible to ensure the necessary 
equipment and train staff. 
(m) United Kingdom 
1.216. In the event of disaster, if a substantial 
portion of the community were deprived of the 
essentials of life, the Emergency Powers Act 
1920 as amended by the 1964 act would be 
invoked. Following proclamation of a state of 
emergency by Her Majesty the Queen, regul-
ations may be made under the act for securing 
the provision of the essentials of life to the 
community. This act provides that the Defence 
Council may authorise the employment of 
servicemen on urgent work of national 
importance. 
1.21 7. In the case of localised incidents, the 
police and local authorities act under the Local 
Government Act 1972 (in England and Wales) 
and the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 
obliging local authorities to provide essential 
services to the community. In Northern Ire-
land, the Emergency Powers (Northern Ireland) 
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Act 1926 as amended in 1964 provides for equi-
valent services. 
1.218. No minister is designated a priori to take 
charge of civil protection ; usually the minister 
most closely involved would take the lead except 
in Northern Ireland where responsibility rests on 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. 
Lead ministers may call for the assistance of the 
armed forces which would operate under control 
of their own military commanders. 
1.219. For England, Scotland and Wales the 
Cabinet Office ensures that arrangements are 
made for the co-ordination of activities and 
provision of resources in connection with civil 
protection. This is the level at which contin-
gency plans are made and kept up to date to 
, cope with foreseeable civil protection needs. 
They also provide a basis for planning in the 
event of an unforeseen disaster. 
1.220. Similar considerations apply in Northern 
Ireland but co-ordination there is undertaken by 
the Northern Ireland Emergency Steering Com-
mittee. 
1.221. In accordance with those guidelines, units 
independent of the armed forces may be used for 
civil protection: the police (numbering about 
150,000), the fire service (about 60,000 firemen) 
and the ambulance service (about 18,000 person-
nel). Mention should also be made of volun-
tary organisations capable of intervening in the 
event of disaster: the Red Cross, the Women's 
Royal Voluntary Service, St. John's Ambulance 
Brigade, St. Andrew's Ambulance Association 
and the Samaritans. 
1.222. In England, Scotland and Wales the 
efforts of voluntary organisations in disaster 
relief are co-ordinated by the local authority 
emergency planning officer. The Women's 
Royal Voluntary Service looks after the home-
less and those in need of emergency feeding, 
clothing, etc. Samaritans also assist in this 
area. The WRVS receives an annual grant of 
about £4 million from the Home Office, while 
the Department of Health and Social Security 
makes small annual grants to the Samaritans 
and St. John's Ambulance Brigade. Some local 
exercises organised by the health authorities are 
carried out with voluntary associations. 
1.223. In Northern Ireland, the Red Cross, St. 
John's Ambulance Brigade and the Order of 
Malta have informal contact with officials in the 
Department of Health and Social Services for 
Northern Ireland. They provide an ambu-
lance service for which they are paid a mileage 
allowance. 
1.224. There is no annual civil protection 
budget as such. The public expenditure plans 
include a reserve for contingencies which would, 
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if necessary, cover expenditure in response to 
unforeseen disasters. 
1.225. Outside the national framework, apart 
from co-ordination at NATO leveL there are no 
permanent links with neighbouring countries for 
disaster purposes, but a bilateral agreement is 
being negotiated with France for dealing with 
nuclear incidents. It will not involve the use of 
armed forces. 
1.226. At purely national level, the appropriate 
local authority may request service assistance. 
1.227. Requests may be made at unit, district, 
command or Ministry of Defence level. The 
most important levels are the Ministry of 
Defence, working to requests by other govern-
ment departments, and the military districts, 
working to civil authorities. In the event of 
widespread disasters, headquarters United King-
dom Land Forces will control the operation 
using tri-service resources. However, there is 
provision for special procedure for specific 
cases. The navy and air force carry out search 
and rescue work at the request of the police or 
the coastguards and in the event of oil pollution 
at sea, naval assistance may be requested by the 
Department of Trade. In the event of onshore 
pollution, requests for assistance may be made 
by local authorities or the Department of the 
Environment. 
1.228. Apart from bodies specially designed to 
meet specific requirements (search and rescue 
and pollution control) which can be made 
available to the civil authorities, there are no 
special command arrangements for disaster 
relief work. The army's normal command 
chain is used and the duty officer system at all 
service commands provides a twenty-four hour 
response to any requests for assistance. 
1.229. Apart from a plan for assistance in the 
event of major flooding in London. all other 
disaster relief work requires ad hoc planning. 
The services can perform any task within the 
capabilities of their expertise: transport, commu-
nications. medical assistance, engineering and 
technical assistance, using any appropriate item 
of service equipment. No units are specially 
trained, organised or equipped for disaster 
relief. There is no provision in the defence 
budget to cover expenditure incurred by the 
services in providing assistance which is gen-
erally financed by the civil authority requesting 
the assistance. 
1.230. Where an immediate threat to life exists, 
anyone may request service assistance by 
approaching the nearest service unit or military 
district headquarters. Guidance on using mili-
tary aid to the civil community is distributed to 
local authorities. The police organise joint 
exercises of all emergency services and voluntary 
bodies concerned. 
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1.231. The territorial deployment of armed 
forces meets the requirements for most contin-
gencies. The country is divided into ten 
military districts which provide a framework for 
any necessary reallocation of resources in the 
event of major or widespread disaster, parti-
cularly as units have sufficient mobility to reach 
possible disaster areas rapidly. There are 
movement plans in Northern Ireland but not 
elsewhere since there are no specific possible 
disaster areas. There have been no disasters in 
Great Britain in recent years and the effects of 
occasional major accidents such as floods or oil 
pollution have been purely local. 
1.232. In conclusion. except for the provision of 
emergency communications and transport, the 
armed forces have had no recent experience of 
protracted disaster relief work in the United 
Kingdom. Conversely, the air force with army 
support supplied 1,005 tonnes of grain to 
famine-stricken villages in Nepal. The navy 
gave first aid relief to victims of hurricanes in 
Dominica and St. Lucia. Royal Engineers 
subsequently provided assistance in the repair of 
public buildings. After the earthquake in Italy 
in November 1980, Royal Engineer teams super-
vised the construction of buildings at two 
villages. 
(n) United States 
1.233. The 1974 Disaster Relief Act (Public Law 
93-288) prescribes the assistance available from 
the Federal Government to supplement state 
and local government efforts to save lives and 
protect property, public health and safety, or to 
avert or lessen the threat of a disaster. 
1.234. In addition, the 1941 Flood Control Act, 
as amended, authorised an emergency fund to be 
expended in flood emergency preparation, flood 
rescue operations or the repair or restoration of 
any flood control work threatened or destroyed 
by flood, including the strengthening, raising, 
extending or other modification thereof as may 
be necessary at the discretion of the chief of 
engineers. In an emergency he may at his 
discretion repair and restore any federally 
authorised protective structures damaged or 
destroyed by wind, wave or water action. 
1.235. The chief of engineers is further autho-
rised to provide emergency supplies of drinking 
water to any locality confronted with a source of 
contaminated drinking water. 
1.236. Congress has given the President autho-
rity to implement the provisions of the Disaster 
Relief Act. He has delegated most of his 
authority under the act to the Director of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
1.237. The chief of engineers of the United 
States army corps of engineers is designated to 
/ 
oversee the provisiOns of the 1941 Flood 
Control Act. The administrator of the Agency 
for International Development is designated as 
the President's special co-ordinator for inter-
national disaster assistance pursuant to the 1961 
Foreign Assistance Act. The office of United 
States foreign disaster assistance co-ordinates all 
official United States assistance to disasters 
abroad. 
1.238. If military personnel are sent to a disaster 
area they come under the operational authority 
of the United States Ambassador to the country 
concerned while remaining under United States 
military command. 
1.239. Inside the United States, the director of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency or 
his designees may request the Department of 
Defence to provide military forces for use m 
civil emergency relief activities. 
1.240. The forces are under the command of 
their military superiors. However, the military 
representative(s) on the scene respond to the 
requirements of the federal co-ordinating officer 
who is the lead federal official appointed with 
the concurrence of the President. The chief of 
engineers may also request assistance from the 
active military. When provided, military per-
sonnel function under their normal command 
channels. 
1.241. Operating in a well-defined legislative 
framework, there are two permanent govern-
mental disaster control bodies in the United 
States. 
1.242. The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency has authority to "' establish federal 
policies for, and co-ordinate, all... civil emer-
gency planning, management, mitigation and 
assistance functions of executive agencies". 
1.243. The agency operates under the delegated 
authority of the President pursuant to the 1974 
Disaster Relief Act. It may direct any federal 
agency to utilise its resources in support of state 
disaster assistance efforts. It operates a pro-
gramme of disaster preparedness. It organises 
research. prevention and warning in areas likely 
to be affected by hurricanes, floods and earth-
quakes. A national warning system is used to 
alert local governments in areas endangered by 
disasters. 
1.244. The chief of engineers supervises imple-
mentation of the 1941 Flood Control Act. The 
corps of engineers is organised into districts 
based on flood risk. Under the act, each district 
monitors conditions, constructs and inspects 
flood control works and fights floods in its own 
district. The chief of engineers has direct 
control over the resources of the corps of engi-
neers, which is authorised to expend funds for 
flood and coastal storm preparedness. 
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1.245. As can be gathered from the above infor-
mation, FEMA maintains a staff of approxima-
tely 130 professionals located at its headquarters 
or in each of its ten regional offices to administer 
the programme of disaster relief. This number 
can be increased if necessary by the employment 
of disaster reservist personnel and by augmenta-
tion from within the agency. 
1.246. FEMA maintains continual contact with 
volunteer agencies, including them in its activi-
ties. These agencies have entered into memo-
randa of agreement with FEMA that provide for 
their accepting direction and co-ordination from 
the Federal Co-ordinating Officer when the 
Federal Government is engaged in providing 
disaster assistance. 
1.247. Major volunteer agencies are the Ameri-
can National Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the 
Mannonite Disaster Services, the Seventh Day 
Adventists and Church World Services. They 
assist in relief operations and distribute 
medicine, food and other consumable supplies. 
The Office of United States Foreign Disaster 
Assistance maintains regular contact with the 
American Red Cross and its international 
affiliates and also calls on private voluntary 
organisations already functioning in a foreign 
disaster area to participate in providing relief 
and rehabilitation assistance. Emergency grants 
may be made for this purpose but no subsidies 
are paid to the organisations as such. 
1.248. FEMA continuously involves representa-
tives of major volunteer agencies in its prepared-
ness planning and programmes of public educa-
tion, including those exercises conducted perio-
dically by FEMA regional staffs. 
1.249. To carry out its work, FEMA has access 
to the President's disaster relief fund, set up by 
Congress. The fiscal year 1982 appropriation to 
this fund was $301 million, ofwhich $27 million 
was appropriated for foreign disaster assistance 
purposes. 
1.250. Where international assistance is con-
cerned, the United States uses a mechanism 
within NATO to exchange information on 
disasters affecting member nations. It also 
exchanges information with the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Office and Red Cross agencies. 
1.251. These relations are informal but work 
satisfactorily in the event of major disasters. 
There is a formal bilateral agreement with 
Mexico for disaster relief along the Rio Grande 
and arrangements with Canada for assistance in 
case of forest fires. 
1.252. On the purely national level, the Secre-
tary of Defence has designated the Secretary of 
the Army as executive agent. The operations 
readiness mobilisation directorate, military 
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support division, serves as the point of contact 
between FEMA and the Department of Defence. 
1.253. The military is capable of responding to 
requests for support to civil authorities on a 
24-hour basis provided the resources to be used 
are not immediately required for the execution 
of the primary military missions. General 
plans have been developed whereby appropriate 
military commanders have the task of providing 
the necessary resources to conduct relief oper-
ations. Military forces can perform any tasks 
for which they have an expertise and the 
necessary equipment. Their assistance is gener-
ally restricted to the immediate emergency phase 
of disaster relief and limited to functions which 
cannot be performed by the public sector. Mili-
tary forces are authorised to use whatever equip-
ment they have with the exception of weapons. 
Equipment requested most often includes 
helicopters, communications equipment, earth-
moving equipment and lorries. Particular mili-
tary units are selected at the time of the 
request for support based on the mission to be 
accomplished, the location of the emergency 
situation and other defence priorities. No 
single unit of the armed services is specially 
earmarked for civil protection duties but the 
corps of engineers has been organised, trained 
and equipped to react during disaster situations, 
inter alia in the case of floods. It is considered 
to be the best able to act at short notice and the 
most efficiently. The chief of engineers is 
empowered to determine necessary emergency 
measures. 
1.254. The defence budget makes no provision 
for financing civil protection operations and the 
Department of Defence requests FEMA and the 
corps of engineers to reimburse expenditure 
incurred, especially for expenses incurred in 
flood-fighting. 
1.255. Under American legislation, any local or 
state government official may request emergency 
assistance from armed forces located within his 
area of authority. The army and the national 
guard are organised by state to provide the 
necessary military resources to state govern-
ments. 
1.256. In such cases, local government officials 
may go directly to the commanding officer of a 
military unit located within their area of autho-
rity. If resources are not locally available or the 
situation is massive in scope, they may process 
such requests through the state office of emer-
gency services to FEMA. Local governments 
from time to time conduct disaster preparedness 
exercises. Military units and voluntary agen-
cies are generally involved. 
1.257. Although no units are stationed with a 
view to likely requirements for civil protection, 
territorial deployment does to a large extent 
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enhance the availability of the military for civil 
emergencies, particularly as all units are suffi-
ciently mobile to reach disaster areas rapidly 
without there being any contingency movement 
plans specifically for response to natural 
disasters. 
1.258. Floods, tornadoes and severe storms are 
the most frequent causes of requests for disaster 
assistance, although hurricanes, earthquakes and 
volcanoes have had a great impact upon the 
American economy. 
1.259. On the occasion of such disasters, the 
military's ability to respond quickly has had an 
immediate impact, and it has also been seen that 
prediction, warning and mitigation preparedness 
planning lessens the effects of natural disasters. 
1.260. These conclusions have been confirmed 
in over a hundred American interventions 
throughout the world. 
1.261. Help is often in the form of military air-
lift of relief commodities (food, medical 
supplies, field kitchens, tents, etc.), plus skilled 
expertise. 
1.262. Many lessons have been learned. It 
must be ensured that help is provided at the 
right place at the right time. It is therefore very 
important to have complete communications 
and liaison, clear identification of needs, careful 
prior planning and responses tailored to actual 
needs. Finally, there must be clear under-
standing of the mission to be performed and the 
capabilities of the resources to be provided. 
(o) Conclusions on country replies 
1.263. To close this review, the following 
remarks may be made: 
- most countries have introduced legis-
lation to overcome disaster prevention 
problems, to provide assistance and to 
define the duties of those responsible ; 
- with some exceptions, such legislation 
does not cover action abroad and in any 
event the use of military resources for 
that purpose ; 
- except in the United States, where the 
corps of engineers is permanently res-
ponsible for flood-fighting, armed units 
do not automatically intervene in the 
case of disasters, even in France, where 
there are units specialised in fire-
fighting, and in Belgium, where three 
engineering regiments are earmarked for 
requisition for special tasks in the event 
of flooding : 
- it is therefore the civil authorities, 
usually the Minister of the Interior or 
an official delegated accordingly, who 
are empowered to call on the armed 
forces when other means prove inade-
quate; 
- military units called in receive their 
orders from the civil authorities but in 
most countries implementation of these 
orders is left to the initiative of the mili-
tary commander, who organises resour-
ces and assigns tasks through normal 
channels; 
- when a centre for co-ordinating assist-
ance is set up, in the majority of cases it 
is directed by civil protection experts 
who usually belong to the Ministry of 
the Interior. When armed forces take 
part in relief operations, a military 
representative participates and his rank 
depends on the level at which the centre 
is set up; 
- while in most countries a small budget-
ary head covers civil protection, there 
are no appropriations to cover military 
expenditure incurred in relief oper-
ations and the cost of operations has to 
be reimbursed to the Ministry of 
Defence; 
- in general, the civil authorities organise 
the first stage of assistance using the 
civil protection service's own means 
and assisted by firemen and voluntary 
organisations like the Red Cross, volun-
tary ambulance drivers and other chari-
table associations ; 
- the armed forces intervene only in the 
second stage and when the problems are 
more than the civil authorities can cope 
with; 
- for relief operations, military resources 
are chosen in the light of their specialis-
ation and may use all their equipment 
except weapons ; 
- depending on circumstances, engineer-
ing, medical, signals, transport, light 
aviation or air force transport units may 
be called upon, but it is also possible to 
call on rapid intervention units which 
are well-equipped with signals equip-
ment and have a large number of 
personnel; 
- there are some contingency plans but 
this is not general since the civil and 
military authorities find it difficult to 
define probable objectives : 
- it is evident that having military staff at 
every level on duty round the clock and 
means of transport in a state of readi-
ness in all units means that they can 
react at very short notice : 
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- similarly, these factors and the need to 
give priority to defence tasks means that 
it has not been considered useful to 
deploy troops in accordance with the 
degree of risk of disaster ; 
- the problem of intervention abroad has 
hardly been touched. Most such oper-
ations, whether purely civil or calling 
upon specialised military means (air 
transport, field surgical hospitals or 
engineering units) are definitely planned 
on a case-by-case basis ; 
- agreements concluded between coun-
tries are rudimentary, concern only 
certain aspects of operations and do not 
cover the use of armed forces ; 
- finally, when rescue operations have 
involved armed forces, they have been 
handled as military operations using 
traditional military techniques. Few 
noteworthy lessons have therefore been 
learned, although three points are an 
essential basis for preparations: 
- Is assistance wanted? 
- Where is it required? 
- When should it be given ? 
11. Carrying out relief operations -
possibilities and limitations of the armed forces 
2.1. Without in any way claiming to suggest 
plans for operations or conduct to which the 
armed forces should conform and which are 
quite obviously dictated by principles and stan-
dards in force in the various member countries, 
your Rapporteur feels, on the basis of experience 
of natural disasters in Italy, that it might be 
useful to present a few considerations aimed at 
giving a fuller picture of the action required of 
national armed forces. 
(a) Earthquakes 
2.2. Earthquakes are generally considered to be 
major disasters in view of their suddenness, the 
large number of victims, the extent of the 
damage caused, their psychological impact and 
the emotional processes they set in motion. 
2.3. Of all natural disasters, earthquakes 
demand the broadest spectrum of means of 
assistance. For this reason it has been decided 
to use the case of a large-scale earthquake as a 
basis for examining measures to be taken to 
limit insofar as possible the effects of a natural 
disaster. 
2.4. After this examination, the main diffe-
rences between techniques for affording ass1s-
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tance required by the type of disaster concerned 
will be defined. 
2.5. In the specific case of a large-scale earth-
quake. the chronological sequence of operations 
may be described as follows. 
2.6. Assistance is implemented in two stages 
depending on the nature of the operations and 
the means used. 
2. 7. The first stage corresponds to the state of 
emergency, when as many human lives as 
possible have to be saved, the distress of survi-
vors alleviated and acceptable living conditions 
established for them without delay. This stage 
lasts a few weeks or a few months. and all 
available means of assistance, including military 
resources. should be called on. 
2.8. The goal of the second. so-called recon-
struction, stage is to re-establish the traditional 
lifestyle of the region and at least all the services 
which existed before the disaster. This stage 
may last several years. 
2.9. The state of emergency corresponds to the 
first stage and may be divided into three phases 
which are rather artificial because they follow 
one from the other although not continuously. 
The first covers immediate action, the second 
more general assistance and the third is conclu-
ded when acceptable living conditions have been 
achieved for the victims. 
2.1 0. Armed forces can take part in operations 
as long as the state of emergency exists. As 
soon as the disaster is announced, the most 
suitable units are alerted but are deployed only 
after the geographical limits of the disaster have 
been ascertained. 
2.11. This is the task of the seismological 
service. If it operates correctly it can quickly 
pinpoint the epicentre and intensity of the 
disaster, measured on the Mercalli scale, and the 
general outline of the area affected. In prin-
ciple, it can also indicate the approximate extent 
of damage in the light of habitation and its 
position in relation to the epicentre of the 
earthquake. 
2.12. If the seismological service fails, the area 
of destruction can be measured by military 
means. Weather permitting, this is done by 
visual or photographic air reconnaissance and in 
greater detail by land units reconnoitring the 
area, but recourse to such methods delays the 
start of relief operations. 
2.13. As soon as the extent and the worst areas 
of damage are identified, headquarters allocate 
sectors of responsibility and determine the tasks 
of the operational groups which are sent in as 
and when they arrive. 
2.14. Assignment of tasks is based on known 
information and the nature of the available 
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units. While first aid is being started, rescue 
workers have to look for victims and bring them 
in. This essential task cannot usually be given 
to the armed forces as it requires special techni-
ques in which engineering troops are not 
expert. In such cases, speed is essential; rescue 
operations must start as quickly as possible since 
the number of human lives saved depends on 
action being taken immediately. 
2.15. In the meantime, the armed forces can 
open first aid posts for preparing the evacuation 
of victims while areas of responsibility are 
determined at higher levels. A command and 
communications chain is set up and logistic 
supply areas are organised in the light of the 
possibilities of access and foreseeable require-
ments. The reopening of main roads is also 
started. 
2.16. This phase of the first stage lasts several 
hours. It may be compared to a military opera-
tion and the results obtained depend on two 
main factors: 
- the efficiency of the seismological 
service which provides information: 
- the speed with which the troops inter-
vene, this obviously depending on the 
peacetime location of units but also on 
their degree of immediate availability -
in other words their operational value. 
This last remark illustrates the usefulness of 
using armed forces in a disaster situation. In 
view of their organisation, training and state of 
preparedness they are practically the only state 
body able to intervene in large numbers and 
without delay. 
2.17. Their own transport affords them free 
movement on the whole road network to reach 
the place where they are needed the most. 
2.18. Once first aid facilities have been progres-
sively installed, there will be a gradual move to 
the second phase. Co-ordination of the mobili-
sation of various national resources, the armed 
forces, civil protection services. firemen. Red 
Cross, charitable associations, etc., will be the 
biggest problem to be solved, while the search 
continues for victims to be rescued and more 
and more military assistance is brought in. 
2.19. Military units are particularly suitable for 
transporting items essential for the survival of 
the victims and equipment needed to protect 
them from bad weather. The army will set up 
bakeries, butchers shops and field kitchens to 
distribute hot meals. It will distribute clothing, 
blankets and means of heating and put up tents. 
At the same time, medical aid will be organ-
ised, fleets of ambulances and, if necessary, 
medical helicopters will be organised between 
relief centres. Mobile field surgeries will handle 
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the more urgent cases and field hospitals will 
give longer-term treatment. 
2.20. Engineering units will continue the work 
started, clearing roads for relief units and 
building temporary bridges. 
2.21. Communications networks set up during 
the first phase will be progressively reinforced to 
form a grid ensuring that centres co-ordinating 
relief may know what is required throughout the 
area and allocate appropriate assistance. 
2.22. The existence of permanent communica-
tions centres makes it easier to exercise 
command and to ensure close liaison between 
civil and military personnel at all levels. 
2.23. Finally, as units arrive in the disaster area, 
military detachment commands will be set up in 
tandem with local political authorities on a terri-
torial basis. 
2.24. The establishment of such working units 
enables the centre of gravity of the efforts made 
to be correctly positioned. 
2.25. The psychological effect of this coexis-
tence is undeniable ; it easily calms susceptibi-
lities and automatically settles the problem of 
subordination. The civil authorities concerned 
have legal responsibility. They usually know 
where there is the greatest urgency while the 
military commander is generally able to respond 
to it by using his own resources or calling on a 
higher level. The civil authorities indicate the 
task to be fulfilled and the military commander 
carries it out in accordance with normal 
command procedure. Thus, during the second 
phase and in the light of the damage recorded at 
every level, integrated civil/military teams, 
mayor/squad leader, company commander/pre-
fect, battalion or brigade commander, etc. 
working in close co-operation are set up in order 
to make optimum use of available resources. 
Progressively, linked by communications net-
works, these homogeneous command structures 
exist all along the line, from the relief co-
ordination centre - integrating the government 
representative, leaders of various relief bodies 
and military authorities at every level - to the 
relief command post of a small village where the 
mayor and the seconded adjutant squad leader 
work together. 
2.26. Bringing in reserves. engineering machi-
nery and first aid equipment can be arranged 
through logistic centres whose location is chosen 
in the light of the available road network for 
setting up within easy reach stocks of food, 
essential items and field or works equipment. 
2.27. The third phase follows on from the first 
and second phases and starts imperceptibly. As 
soon as the victims have been rescued, the dead 
removed and first aid given, acceptable living 
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conditions have to be provided for the survi-
vors. 
2.28. To this end, an attempt is made to replace 
tents by temporary housing as soon as possible 
and to re-establish essential public services 
(drinking water, electricity, etc.). Thus, clearing 
ruins and repairing roads proceeds simulta-
neously and as soon as the necessary equipment 
has been assembled a start is made on building 
temporary housing. 
2.29. Engineering units with their equipment 
can carry out preparatory work: levelling the 
ground, laying concrete, etc. At the same time, 
transport units, and even helicopters. bring in 
pre-assembled wooden frames and partitions. 
Assembling huts is the responsibility of civil 
experts, possibly with the help of military labour 
working in crews. 
2.30. During this phase, improvisation is 
progressively replaced by detailed planning and 
the systematic organisation of work in which 
military personnel can still take part but on an 
ever-smaller scale. Non-specialised units are 
withdrawn and, as soon as permanent hospital 
services can take over, field medical services are 
also withdrawn. 
2.31. Engineering units are the last to leave. 
2.32. The second stage is a period of rebuilding 
with durable materials. It may begin before the 
end of the first stage. As the work is spread 
over several years. it is mainly the responsibility 
of the civil authorities. 
2.33. Military assistance is limited to specific 
operations such as the removal of temporary 
bridges after they have been replaced by perma-
nent ones. In the absence of tasks suitable for 
the armed forces, such operations become gra-
dually fewer and come to an end within a 
relatively short lapse oftime. 
(b) Other disasters 
2.34. Taken as examples, disasters such as 
floods. forest fires and oil pollution of the sea 
have special features which distinguish them 
from earthquakes. 
2.35. Flooding from seas or rivers is not usually 
so unexpected as earthquakes. A study of 
meteorological conditions and the state of dykes 
usually allows forecasts to be made, the problem 
to be diagnosed and the population to be 
alerted. Consequently, the number of victims 
is often small and assistance can be afforded 
before the disaster has reached its climax. 
However, there is always widespread material 
damage and livestock is often destroyed, thus 
causing a major health problem. 
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2.36. A~ soon as the alert has been given, the 
fire brigade is called and then, at the request of 
the local authorities, the army. During daylight 
hours, aircraft and helicopters can observe how 
the flooding is developing, detect persons cut off 
by rising water and indicate the location of 
breaches in dykes, etc. Depending on the 
degree of urgency, victims are rescued by 
helicopters. which can operate only in daylight, 
or by naval and engineering craft operating both 
day and night. 
2.3~. While victims are being rescued, civil 
engmeers try to contain the flooding with the 
assistance of armed forces. by strengthening 
dykes which are still intact or trying to fill in 
breaches. 
2.38. For this purpose, use is made of engineer-
ing units and also crews from units of all services 
and all means of transport. These crews fill 
sandbags and load them on lorries to be taken to 
dykes which are threatened, where engineering 
personnel use them to fill in breaches or streng-
then installations. 
2.39. As in the case of earthquakes, the 
implementation of relief operations means set-
ting up logistic centres where appropriate items 
(food, blankets, etc.) can be assembled before 
being distributed in the light of requirements. 
2.40. In principle, the problem of medical care 
for victims will not be so acute as in the case of 
an earthquake. Similarly, until the water goes 
down, it will generally be possible to accommo-
date victims in public buildings, schools, concert 
halls or convents near the flooded area. 
2.41. The great problem will be to repair houses 
when the water goes down. At the same time, a 
health problem will also have to be solved so as 
to limit the risks of epidemics. This will 
normally require the assistance of many teams 
of health service workers. For health reasons, 
too, there will be a need for amphibious equip-
ment to remove the bodies of dead animals even 
before the water goes down. 
2.42. Problems caused by major forest fires are 
different. Except in special cases such as the 
Cote d'Azur, where many holiday homes and 
camping sites have been built in the pine forests, 
the population density in wooded areas is relati-
vely low and the number of human victims is 
small. 
2.43. In order to limit damage, speed of inter-
vention is essential. Therefore, fire-fighting will 
always start with specialised civil means located 
near the fire and with specific fire-fighting equip-
ment such as water-spraying aircraft. If the 
army is called in, use is mainly made of engineer-
ing equipment to establish fire barriers and 
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large teams of troops, who are often brought in 
by air, to try to stop the progress of the fire with 
extinguishers under the orders of civil experts. 
2.44. Oil slicks are another ecological disaster 
and are usually fought with the help of the 
maximum possible military means. 
2.45. As soon as an alert has been given, 
helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft reconnoi-
tre the polluted area. The progress of the oil 
slick, its size, the speed and direction at which it 
is moving, are indicated by small naval craft. 
2.46. To avoid the oil slick reaching sensitive 
areas such as oyster beds, the navy puts in place 
floating anti-pollution barriers to divert the oil 
and treat it with special detergents. 
2.47. As soon as it reaches the coast, army units 
can be brought in, particularly engineering 
troops with earth-moving equipment to try to 
divert as much oil as possible towards areas 
where it can be contained and if possible 
pumped away. Units of all branches are 
responsible for cleaning beaches. 
2.48. Although varied, the examples studied 
therefore show that there are a number of con-
stant factors in fighting disasters : 
- the alert must be given without delay : 
- speedy action allows many human lives 
to be saved and adds considerably 
to the effectiveness of relief operations ; 
- for maximum effectiveness, the various 
means of assistance must be co-ordi-
nated. 
2.49. Finally, whatever type of disaster is 
involved, logistic centres must be set up where 
everything needed for the conduct of relief 
operations (food, clothing, blankets, tents, other 
essential items, spare parts, fuel, etc.) can be 
stocked within reach of the area of operations. 
2.50. There are obviously limits to the use of 
armed forces in relief operations. For instance, 
it is essential that they remain operational and it 
is ?ut of the question to designate a covering 
umt to take part in a humanitarian operation 
hours away from its area of responsibility. 
2.51. Similarly, armed forces cannot carry out 
just any task; the search for and rescue of buried 
victims, for instance, usually requires experts in 
view of the risk of false movements. 
2.52. Finally, it is also obvious that as well as 
technical units, which are given specific tasks it 
is essential to call on units of all branches which 
can at very short notice provide a large number 
of troops in groups under the command of their 
usual officers and aware of the capital impor-
tance ofthe operation. 
Ill. Lessons learned from recent disasters 
Proposals 
3.1. The foregoing demonstrates the impor-
tance of organising civil-military co-operation 
for conducting relief operations in the event of a 
major disaster. 
3.2. This is fundamental for establishing the 
framework for effective civil protection in which 
all efforts have to be co-ordinated. Legislation 
must therefore specify the powers and responsi-
bilities of all who have to intervene in this field, 
it being understood that the civil authorities 
have the responsibility of directing operations. 
For instance, depending on the extent of the 
disaster, a prefect or government representative 
appointed by the minister concerned should be 
made responsible for co-ordinating available 
means. He should exercise his duties with the 
assistance of a co-ordination centre which will 
include leaders representing all the means 
deployed. He should be immediately located in 
a position in the disaster area from which he will 
be able to direct to good avail the means at his 
disposal, particularly the military units which 
play an essential role during the state of emer-
gency. 
3.3. The organised structure of the armed 
forces makes them practically the only state 
bodies able, twenty-four hours a day, to assign 
large numbers of personnel, grouped in units 
with their leaders and having their own means of 
transport and communications. 
3.4. The military functions of these units 
naturally require them to be prepared to take 
immediate action and at every level men are 
therefore on permanent duty who, correctly 
alerted, are able to take the measures required to 
go into action. Thanks to this permanent state 
of readiness, when the armed forces are called on 
for assistance in disasters, the first relief units 
can thus be despatched at extremely short 
notice. Moreover, military ethics, based on the 
principles of service and discipline, require the 
priority of the task to be respected in all circum-
stances and help to shape a state of mind found 
in all officers and men when in action. A 
military presence in all places affected by a 
disaster therefore helps to speed up the provi-
sion of assistance. 
3.5. Although it is absolutely essential to co-
ordinate all rescue efforts, it must be borne in 
mind that when means of assistance are brought 
in it is not possible to co-ordinate them all. 
Thousands of persons have to be used to counter 
a disaster, and it would be difficult to control all 
their activities. As a large number of persons 
are provided by the armed forces it is logical for 
the civil authority to leave a margin of initiative 
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to lower-ranking officers who are prepared for 
such tasks by their training for wartime opera-
tions. 
3.6. Similarly, in order to make best use of the 
specific characteristics of the agencies available, 
the civil authorities concerned should co-
ordinate their work with due regard for the 
operational capabilities of the military units 
involved. leaving them the maximum amount of 
initiative compatible with the task. 
3. 7. In this connection, experience has shown 
that civil protection operations are considerably 
more effective when integrated teams are set up 
grouping the civil authority concerned (the 
mayor) and representatives of the armed forces 
and other bodies working in the area for which 
he is responsible. Such teams provide a basis 
for efficient assistance and the psychological 
repercussions are considerable. Although these 
teams are essential links in the chain of assis-
tance, there is no question of them being able to 
work alone and out of touch with the higher 
levels or even their neighbours. It is therefore 
essential to organise a chain of command with 
reliable communications for conducting success-
ful assistance operations. The chain of 
command and its network of communications 
should be given legal authority. Their opera-
tion should be verified periodically during 
command post type exercises, together with 
frequent spot checks of communications. 
3.8. Another lesson has been learned from 
recent experience, i.e. the importance of the 
military territorial infrastructure in the area 
where the disaster occurs. While it is evident 
that the requirements of operational deployment 
do not always allow military installations to be 
spread uniformly throughout national territory, 
a minimum presence is in all circumstances a 
useful factor. Relief equipment, food, medical 
supplies, blankets, clothing, tents, huts, etc., 
have to be available at very short notice. This 
is possible insofar as stocks have been built up in 
high-risk areas and plans have been drawn up 
for their handling and transport to logistic 
centres by all available means (air, road, rail) 
and kept up to date. 
3.9. Finally, although there may be an efficient 
civil protection organisation, the disaster might 
be so extensive that immediately-available 
national resources fall short of requirements. 
This points to the need for organising interna-
tional co-operation for assistance to areas 
affected by natural disasters. 
3.1 0. It would be usefuL therefore, to make 
international arrangements which, as a film-
mum, would allow, without prior diplomatic 
consultations : 
- an exchange of information on the orga-
nisation of civil protection and lessons 
learned from major disasters ; 
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- the loan of equipment essential for relief 
workers; 
- simplification of administrative proce-
dure for unarmed units crossing fron-
tiers and for obtaining overflight autho-
risation for military transport aircraft. 
3.11. Thus, in case of need, the intervention of 
specialised medical and engineering units from 
neighbouring countries would be simplified and 
speeded up. 
3.12. Such international co-operation might 
also be developed without committing large 
sums of money. To this end, a first step might 
be to set up a permanent regional warning 
network, using existing means, for instance the 
networks of the meteorological or civil aviation 
control services. 
3.13. The efficiency of such a service would 
obviously d((pend on the standardisation of 
warnings, requests for assistance and responses 
by the countries concerned. This means defin-
ing a joint doctrine for the organisation of 
assistance and keeping up to date national stocks 
of assistance equipment. However, when the 
decisions to set up a warning and request 
network and to standardise doctrines have been 
taken to obtain maximum efficiency, it will in 
practice be necessary to create the nucleus of an 
international co-ordination centre to avoid 
duplication of effort and delays in bringing in 
external assistance. 
3.14. This nucleus of a centre, which might be 
attached to committees handling similar matters 
in NATO. the United Nations or the European 
Community, would be activated in case of 
emergency and serve as an intermediary between 
the country affected by a disaster and countries 
able to provide appropriate assistance. 
IV. Existing international arrangements 
4.1. International assistance in cases of 
disasters in peacetime has been discussed in 
various governmental and non-governmental 
international organisations, but not apparently 
with specific reference to the possible use of 
armed forces. NATO. in particular, has had the 
matter under review since 1953, the present 
status of its arrangements being defined in a 
document last revised in 1971 1• 
4.2. The NATO document mentions in parti-
cular the need for international agreements to 
cover questions of cost and frontier crossing 
formalities : 
I. NATO co-operation for emergency dtsaster assistance 
in peacettme. Document C-M(58)102, 1971 editwn. 15th 
November 1971. 
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"C. Financial and other responsibilities 
20. Insofar as possible, emergency assis-
tance should be given without cost to the 
stricken member country. 
21. In regard to questions of pay and 
insurance coverage of disaster assistance 
personnel, transport of non-expendable 
equipment and supplies used by them, 
customs clearances, cost of local transpor-
tation, accommodations. feeding, etc .. 
experience has shown that the absence of 
appropriate bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments was a serious hindrance to expedi-
tious actions in times of disaster. 
22. This deficiency could be gradually 
overcome by drawing up model memo-
randa of understanding, which member 
countries could develop into bilateral or 
multilateral agreements applicable in the 
case of disasters. Such model memo-
randa of understanding should be intro-
duced in NATO, at the level of the Senior 
Civil Emergency Planning Committee. " 
4.3. NATO action in a peacetime emergency is 
essentially limited to making available the 
NATO situation centre and alliance-wide com-
munications system for the dissemination of 
information and requests for assistance from a 
member country, and establishing contact with 
international relief agencies. These arrange-
ments are described in Annex 11 to the NATO 
document. which also has a useful summary of 
international emergency relief agencies at 
Annex I - these two texts are reproduced at 
Appendix Ill to the present report. 
4.4. The Office of the United Nations Disaster 
Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) at the United 
Nations Headquarters in Geneva has been 
created and reinforced by three recent resolu-
tions of the United Nations General Assembly!. 
The text of the latest UNDRO information 
sheet is at Appendix IV. 
4.5. UNDRO organised an international 
meeting on mobile reserve units in Geneva in 
1982, the proceedings of which show that several 
countries have military units specially organised 
for providing international disaster relief: these 
include France (Element Medical Militaire d'In-
tervention Rapide EMMIR) and Sweden 
(Swedish Stand-by Force for Disaster Relief). 
Appropriate military units of many countries 
have of course been involved in international 
disaster relief, organised both through United 
Nations auspices and in other frameworks. 
I. Resolutwns 2816 (XXVI). 14th December 1971. 
36/225. 17th December 1981 and 37/114, 17th December 
1982. 
V. Conclusions 
5.1. The committee's principal conclusions are 
set forth in the draft recommendation. 
5.2. (Paragraph 1 of the draft recommenda-
tion) Particular attention should be paid to the 
possible role and contribution of the armed 
forces in planning for disaster relief. They can 
play a vital part in an emergency and in the first 
stage of disaster relief; within the framework of 
the civil authority the armed forces, when called 
upon, should be given a sufficient margin <?f 
initiative in order to make the best use of thetr 
resources. Multi-service depots for the storage 
and management of equipment and consum-
ables (food, medicines, tentage and huts, 
clothing) can be established in proximity to 
areas of high disaster risk. 
5.3. (Paragraph 2) Co-operation between coun-
tries can be invaluable in many fields : 
(a) Exchange of information. Rapid and 
effective disaster relief requires the 
immediate dissemination of warning 
and the communication of as accu-
rate information as possible on the 
nature, location and extent of the 
catastrophe, as well as of the damage 
caused. Information can be gathered 
through aerial and surface reconnais-
sance, and through the seismological, 
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flood control, fire-watching and coast-
guard services. Such information can 
be exchanged internationally through 
the NA TO-wide communications 
system (paragraph 4.2 above). Infor-
mation on experience of past disasters 
and lessons learnt should also be 
exchanged internationally. 
(b) The co-ordination of resources avail-
able to relieve disaster cannot be 
improvised effectively; it should be 
prepared in advance through com-
mand post exercises involving the 
directing authorities, the testing of 
communications, and designed to 
cope with the most likely disasters. 
International participation in such 
exercises should be fostered. 
(c) Bi- or multilateral agreements, cover-
ing inter alia frontier and customs 
formalities and payment for services. 
are necessary to prevent administra-
tive delay in providing international 
assistance in disaster relief (paragraphs 
3.10 and 4.2 above). They could 
cover communications links and 
channels to be used in emergencies. 
5.4. (Paragraph 3) International arrangements 
for disaster relief should also provide for 
assistance to third countries. 
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Letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Rome, 18th December 1980 
Dear Mr. Chairman, 
Further to the initial exchange of views we had with you at the last meeting in Paris, we take this 
opportunity of officially proposing to include in the programme of work of our committee for the 
coming months a study of the role and contribution of the armed forces in the event of natural 
disasters. 
This is an especially topical question for our country in view of the recent earthquake which so 
severely struck areas in the south. It is also a subject of great importance and of international 
significance. In various countries in recent years, the armed forces, in the event of earthquakes, floods 
and other natural disasters, by their supporting action often at international level, have played an 
important and often irreplaceable role in affording assistance to the populations who have suffered and 
by acting quickly to organise essential emergency services and to commence the work of reconstruction. 
A study of past experience would allow useful knowledge to be exchanged on the type of 
assistance practised, the organisational structure that possibly had to be set up in the various armed 
services and their relations with the organisers of civil defence services, and proposals and suggestions 
might be prepared for the attention of member governments, national parliaments and the WEU 
Council. 
The importance of this study would be enhanced if it were sent, not only to member countries, 
but also to the governments of countries which are not members of WEU as a contribution - for the 
latter countries too - to the development of a relationship of mutual understanding and co-operation 
essential for detente and security. 
Signed: Pecchioh. Bernini. Calice 
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APPENDIX 11 
Questionnaire on the role and contribution of the armed forces 
in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime 
(submitted to Ministers of Defence and of the Intenor 
of the allied countries by Mr. Pecchioli, Rapporteur) 
Scope of the report 
The Committee is to prepare a report with 
the above title which will examine chiefly the 
role of the armed forces and their possible 
contribution to the protection of the civil 
population in peacetime : 
(a) To meet emergencies due to: 
- natural disasters (earthquakes, 
floods, hurricanes, earth move-
ments, avalanches, forest fires, 
etc.); 
- industrial disasters (large-scale pol-
lution, rail accidents, accidents at 
sea, etc.); 
- terrorist acts (attacks on dams, 
nuclear plants, public buildings, 
etc.); 
and to save endangered human lives. 
(b) By providing fundamental assistance: 
- prevention (systems for collecting 
and studying data, preparation and 
alert); 
- rapid intervention (first aid to those 
affected); 
restoration of essential services 
(communications, housing, hygiene). 
Aim of the questionnaire 
The first part of the report will describe 
existing arrangements and the experience acquired 
in this field as far as the armed forces of the 
allied countries are concerned. In order to 
compile this information in comparable form, 
the Rapporteur is addressing the following 
questionnaire to the Ministries of Defence and 
of the Interior of the allied countries. 
Terminology 
The questionnaire employs the expression 
" civil protection "to mean protection of the civil 
population in peacetime- the sense in which the 
expression is used in many countries. It is not 
synonymous with " civil defence " which 
concerns measures to protect the civil popula-
tion in war. 
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Questionnaire 
I. Arrangements at the level of national govern-
ments 
1. What legislation is in force concerning 
protection of the civil population in the event of 
disasters in peacetime (" civil protection ")? 
Describe briefly its provisions. 
2. (a) Which government ministers or other 
authority are designated to take charge of civil 
protection or disaster relief? Are such designa-
tions permanent, or are they ad hoc in the event 
of particular disasters ? 
(b) Which government minister or other 
authority is empowered to call on the armed 
forces for civil protection duties, and under 
whose control do they operate if called upon ? 
3. (a) Is there any permanent governmental 
disaster control body or organisation with speci-
fic civil protection functions? If so describe 
briefly and state : 
(b) under whose authority it operates; 
(c) what powers it exercises in an emer-
gency: 
(d) what resources it controls ; 
(e) whether it has a research, prevention 
and warning function in respect of the most 
likely disasters, and if so whether it operates data 
collection posts and alert warning systems in 
peacetime. 
4. Are there any civil protection/disaster 
relief personnel organised in units independent 
of the armed forces? If so, give details of 
numbers of personnel, equipment, etc. 
5. What official contact is maintained with 
private organisations with a possible civil pro-
tection function (e.g. Red Cross) and how are 
their efforts co-ordinated with official oper-
ations? 
(a) Which are the voluntary organisations 
concerned? 
(b) What are their respective functions; 
what tasks do they undertake? 
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(c) What joint exercises are conducted by 
voluntary organisations with official bodies? 
(d) What public subsidies are paid to 
these organisations? 
6. Is there an annual civil protection budget 
(apart from special funds voted for specific 
disasters)? If so, state amount and percentage 
of total government expenditure. 
7. What bi- or multilateral arrangements 
exist with other countries to provide exchange of 
information or experiences of disasters, or 
mutual assistance in disaster relief: 
(a) specific multilateral agreements or 
agreements in the framework of international 
organisations (United Nations and specialised 
agencies; NATO; OECD; Council of Europe; 
European Community); 
(b) bilateral with neighbouring allied 
countries (e.g. Franco-German convention on 
mutual assistance in the event of disasters 
or serious accidents, signed in Paris on 3rd 
February 1977): 
(c) bilateral with other neighbouring 
countries? 
(d) Do any of the foregoing arrangements 
specifically cover the use of elements of the 
armed forces for mutual civil protection assist-
ance? If so, in what way? 
(e) Are any communications links estab-
lished, permanently or on an ad hoc basis, with 
neighbouring countries for the provision of 
mutual assistance or the co-ordination of protec-
tion in the event of disasters? 
11. The r6/e and contribution of the armed forces 
8. (a) What is the command channel within 
the armed forces between the civil authority 
referred to in questions 2 and 14 (a) and the 
military unit called on to intervene? 
(b) Are there command and organisation 
arrangements within the armed forces specially 
concerned with civil protection or disaster 
relief? Are they on 24-hour duty? 
(c) Do contingency plans exist within the 
armed forces for particular civil protection 
functions? 
9. What particular civil protection tasks can 
the armed forces perform when called upon? 
10. What equipment held by the armed forces 
can be used in civil protection functions, e.g. 
transport (trucks; ships and boats; aircraft; 
helicopters); engineering (cranes, bulldozers); 
telecommunications (radio); medical services; 
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emergency feeding arrangements; emergency 
accommodation (tents, etc.)? 
11. What particular types of unit, of which 
service (army, navy, air force) is most suited to 
performing the tasks intended in question 9? 
12. Are any units of the armed services 
specially earmarked for civil protection duties 
and if so are they: 
(a) specially organised; 
(b) specially trained; 
(c) provided with special equipment for 
civil protection duties? 
13. (a) Is there any provlSlon within the 
defence budget for civil protection purposes; if 
so what is the amount and is it included under 
question 6? 
(b) If not, how are costs incurred by the 
armed forces on civil protection duties financed 
(e.g. cost of fuel; expendables; damage to equip-
ment)? 
Ill. Territorial structure of civil protection - the 
armedforces and the population 
14. (a) Is any delegated local civilian author-
ity empowered to call upon the armed forces in 
his area for civil protection functions? 
(b) Further to questions 2 and 8, what is 
the local channel of authority between civilian 
(municipal or local representative of central 
government) and the armed forces? 
(c) Are local links established and 
rehearsed. formally or informally, between the 
armed forces ; the local authorities, and local 
voluntary organisations (e.g. Red Cross)? (See 
also question 5). 
(i) Which are the voluntary organis-
ations concerned? 
(i1) What particular tasks do they 
perform? 
(1i1) What joint exercises are conducted 
locally between the voluntary organ-
isations and official bodies? 
15. (a) Does the territorial deployment of the 
armed forces happen to meet the likely require-
ments for civil protection? 
(b) Are some units specially stationed in 
areas with possible civil protection require-
ments? 
16. (a) Do units of the armed forces most 
likely to be concerned have sufficient mobility to 
reach possible disaster areas rapidly? 
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(b) Do contingency movement plans exist 
for civil protection duties, and how long is it 
anticipated that units will take to reach possible 
disaster areas? 
IV. Natwnal and International experience 
17. What national catastrophes and disasters 
have occurred the most frequently in your 
country? 
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18. What has been the most significant 
experience of the contribution of the armed 
forces in such cases? 
19. What conclusions have been drawn and 
what measures taken to strengthen specific 
sectors of civil protection? 
20. On what occasions and in what form have 
the armed forces provided civil protection assist-
ance to other countries? What lessons have been 
learned therefrom and what suggestions can be 
made? 
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Extracts from NATO document on NATO 
co-operation for emergency disaster 
assistance in peacetime 
15th November 1971 
I. International emergency relief agencies 
1. While the basic document is oriented to 
assistance actions taken by member countries, it 
is necessary also to speak to the emergency relief 
activities of the non-governmental agencies, 
both at the time of the emergency and early 
rehabilitation phases of post-disaster assistance. 
An interrelationship exists between measures 
taken by the governmental and non-govern-
mental sectors. Many emergency relief items 
arising from governmental stocks are provided 
to the disaster victims through the national 
and international non-governmental voluntary 
agencies. 
2. The exchange of information proposed by 
the basic document envisions the exchange of 
data on both the governmental and non-
governmental assistance to the stricken country. 
This hypothesis, carried to its logical conclu-
sion, would indicate that each nation should, so 
far as it could, take appropriate steps to ensure 
that the responses from the non-governmental 
sector, especially the national Red Cross/Red 
Crescent societies and other voluntary organis-
ations, both private and religious, are properly 
co-ordinated and considered in any national 
disaster assistance action. Further, it is sensible 
that national disaster plans consider and inte-
grate, where possible, the capabilities for action 
of the non-governmental relief agencies. 
3. Among the many agencies providing 
disaster relief directly to stricken countries and 
the victims of a disaster, several at the inter-
national governmental and non-governmental 
level are of interest: 
(a) The League of Red Cross Socteties. foun-
ded on 5th May 1919, is the world federation of 
national Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Lion 
and Sun societies. The objectives of the league 
are to encourage and facilitate at all times the 
humanitarian activities of the national societies, 
with a view to assisting them in the organisation 
and exercise of their activities, both national and 
international. When a disaster occurs, the relief 
programmes of the Red Cross provide emer-
gency assistance including food, clothing, shelter, 
medical and nursing care, and other basic 
necessities of life, and such social services to 
individuals, families, groups and communities 
as are needed. 
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Several European countries do not yet 
have national disaster relief plans, while others 
have not perfected their plans. From the 
league's viewpoint, this not only weakens the 
responsiveness of the national Red Cross socie-
ties, but also makes the national effort, govern-
mental and private, less than totally effective. 
The LICROSS secretariat, in recent years, has 
been encouraging and assisting national societies 
to organise and prepare for relief actions. They 
have suggested that, where national disaster 
relief plans do not exist, national societies 
take action to remedy this deficiency. The 
LICROSS has published and distributed a 
" Guide to a national disaster relief plan " for 
use by all governments and national societies. 
The LICROSS secretariat would welcome the 
endorsement and efforts of NATO governments 
towards national disaster relief planning, both 
for internal and external application. 
The LICROSS "Guide to a national 
disaster relief plan " sets forth the following four 
principles and rules for disaster relief 
- Prevention of disasters, assistance to 
victims and reconstruction are first and 
foremost the responsibility ofthe public 
authorities. In principle, Red Cross 
help is of an auxiliary and complemen-
tary nature and operates basically in 
the emergency phase. However, if cir-
cumstances require and provided the 
Red Cross is assured of the necessary 
resources and means, it may undertake 
longer-term assistance programmes. 
- In order to cope with the effects of 
disasters, each country should have a 
national plan outlining an effective 
organisation of relief. If such a plan 
does not exist, the national society 
should instigate its establishment. 
- To ensure rapid mobilisation as well as 
complete and effective use of material 
and personnel resources, the national 
plan should envisage co-ordination 
through the establishment of a central-
ised direction. Such central direction 
should be able to provide precise and 
official information on the effects of a 
disaster, its evolution and the needs. 
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- The extent of the Red Cross relief 
programme depends on the responsibili-
ties delegated to the national society by 
its government or by the national relief 
plan. As a general rule the Red Cross 
programme is limited to the provision 
of: first aid, medical and nursing care, 
food supplies, clothing, shelter, social 
welfare, tracing services and other 
forms of emergency assistance. 
(Approved by the XXIst International 
Red Cross Conference, Istanbul, Sep-
tember 1969, with the participation of 
governments and Red Cross societies.) 
(b) International Relief Union. At present 
only five members of the alliance retain 
membership in this organisation. 
The objectives of the IRU as stated in 
Article 2 of the 1927 convention are to: 
(i) provide first aid to stricken popula-
tions in disasters due to acts of God, 
the exceptional seriousness whereof 
exceeds the people's capabilities and 
resources, and to collect therefore 
donations, resources and assistance of 
all kinds; 
(ii) co-ordinate, if need be, the efforts of 
relief organisations in all public disas-
ters; (generally, to encourage studies 
and measures for the prevention of 
disasters) and to intervene so that all 
nations put into practice mutual relief 
on an international scale. 
During the period 1967-68 an agreement 
was formulated and executed by the union 
whereby UNESCO assumed the responsibility 
for the continuance of the union's work encom-
passed by the bracketed working above. Efforts 
have not yet been successful to have the United 
Nations assume the other aspects of the union's 
objectives. 
(c) International Council of Voluntary Agen-
cies. The ICY A results from a 1962 amalgama-
tion of three existing non-governmental co-
ordinating bodies primarily concerned with 
refugees' and migrants' problems. The forma-
tion of the ICY A was intended to enable non-
governmental groups to bring to bear experience 
acquired in other fields, such as assistance to 
developing countries and peacetime emergency 
assistance. The present membership of the 
ICYA is approximately 100 organisations. 
Included in this council are such agencies as 
Caritas Internationalis, the World Council of 
Churches, OXFAM, with significant resources 
and worldwide interests, along with similar non-
governmental societies having a specialised and 
localised character. 
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Three commissions drawn from its mem-
bership have been established, one on refugees 
and migration, one on emergency aid and a third 
on social and economic development. 
The Commission on Emergency Aid is 
primarily concerned with promoting and 
strengthening relationships among the voluntary 
agencies themselves, and between the voluntary 
agencies collectively and the League of Red 
Cross Societies. The league is viewed as the 
best equipped organisation for mobilising relief 
resources in emergency situations. The ICYA 
Commission on Emergency Aid has the follow-
ing functions: 
"In its activity in the emergency aid 
sphere, ICY A thus aims firstly to be of 
assistance to its membership in promoting 
voluntary agency participation in pre-
disaster planning, at the national and 
international level, including improving 
liaison with bodies outside the immediate 
ICYA circle. Secondly, ICYA aims to 
assist the agencies better to co-ordinate 
with each other and with outside institu-
tions in their responses to actual disas-
ters. In all of this, there is clear impor-
tance to be attached to the channelling of 
public responses, and to informing a wider 
public on the existence of the agencies and 
on their potentiality for useful work prior 
to and in disaster situations. " 
(d) The United Nations Organisation. The 
United Nations specialised agencies have been 
active in disaster matters in accordance with 
their resources and constitutional obligations. 
Over the years they have built up a considerable 
capacity for assisting governments, at such 
times, and for contributing to the control or 
mitigation of the effects of disasters. Due to the 
severity of several recent disasters, the members 
of the United Nations have urged the Secretary-
General to accelerate activities and planning for 
disaster assistance within the United Nations. 
To this end, the United Nations Secretary-
General has recently forwarded for the consider-
ation in the fall of 1971 of the Economic and 
Social Committee, United Nations document 
E/4994, 13th May 1971, containing a number of 
recommendations, identifying four main areas 
in which international assistance might be 
strengthened: 
- prevention, control and prediction ; 
- planning and preparedness ; 
- better organisation of relief action when 
the disaster occurs ; 
- rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
The United Nations Economic and Social 
Council at its 51st Session adopted a resolution 
(E/RES/1612(LI) of 29th July 1971) which in the 
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main accepted the United Nations Secretary-
General's document and recommended that the 
United Nations General Assembly at its 26th 
Session endorse the proposals and recommend-
ations of the resolution. It is pointed out in the 
United Nations document that while the govern-
ment should be able to count on the help of the 
international community, provided through 
governments, the League of Red Cross Societies 
and other voluntary agencies of the United 
Nations Organisation. in its preparations against 
or its efforts to meet such emergencies. the 
primary responsibility for protectzng the lz{e, 
health and property of people within its frontiers 
and for maintainmg the essential public services 
rests with that government. 
Many areas of activity will. on the other 
hand. require strengthening if the United 
Nations system (in co-operation with donor 
governments, the League of Red Cross Societies 
and other voluntary agencies) is to play the 
larger role expected of it. The document states: 
to stimulate further action in the various areas 
in question and to help in ensuring that interna-
tional assistance is as effective and well co-
ordinated as possible, will call for a concerted 
effort among the organisations of the United 
Nations system. The role of the competent 
organs of the United Nations - including that of 
the Secretary-General himself- in ensuring co-
ordination will be of particular importance. 
The United Nations Secretary-General, in 
recommending a more active role for the United 
Nations, wishes a modest increase in staff for 
this purpose. Briefly. this office would: 
(i) maintain continuing contacts with 
the governments of potential reci-
pient and donor countries. as well as 
countries of transit~ with the United 
Nations aid-giving agencies and pro-
grammes which will be expected to 
maintain close contact with the office 
and keep it advised of all relevant 
activities. as well as with the League 
of Red Cross Societies and other 
major voluntary agencies; and with 
the resident representatives. to whom 
it must be in a position to provide 
the support of experienced staff in 
time of emergency~ 
(1i) arrange assistance to disaster-prone 
countries in pre-disaster planning and 
disaster-preparedness arrangements: 
(iu) collect, digest. keep up to date and 
disseminate to those concerned the 
mass of detailed information concer-
ning the affected country and its 
resources which is essential for the 
effective organisation of assistance. as 
well as concerning available aid from 
within and outside the United 
Nations system. 
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The United Nations document, in one of 
the closing paragraphs of the recommendations, 
sounds a note of caution: 
" While the office. at least at the outset. 
can be quite smalL it would in the 
Secretary-General's view be better not to 
increase United Nations involvement in 
the area of assistance in connection with 
natural disasters if the funds necessary for 
the modest staffing and other costs required 
(including facilities for rapid communi-
cation) cannot be guaranteed. The risk 
must be avoided of raising hopes that 
cannot be fulfilled. " 
11. NATO headquarters arrangements for 
disaster assistance information and co-ordination 
1. On behalf of the Secretary-GeneraL the 
Director. Civil Emergency Planning Directorate 
will be responsible for taking. in a disaster 
situation. the actions specified in document 
C-M( 58) 102- 1971 edition. 
2. The NATO Situation Centre, operating on 
24-hour basis. provides a means for following 
events as they occur in a disaster situation, since 
it has direct access to the alliance communica-
tions systems and news services' teleprinters. 
The duty watch officer of the Situation Centre 
will normally be the first officer of the head-
quarters to have information of a disaster. This 
would be particularly true in regard to such 
incidents occurring outside of normal duty hours 
and on holidays and weekends. Accordingly, 
he will immediately inform the Director, Civil 
Emergency Planning Directorate, or his repre-
sentative, of all pertinent information received 
and indicate the source. 
3. The Civil Emergency Planning Directorate 
will furnish the Situation Centre with a list of 
assigned officers in the order in which they are 
to be called in the event of a disaster, by the 
Situation Centre duty watch officer. 
4. The Director. Civil Emergency Planning 
Directorate will establish an ad hoc watch 
system to closely follow events and take such 
actions as may be necessary. The physical 
location of this ad hoc watch will be determined 
by the severity of the disaster and the degree of 
activity emanating therefrom. For this ad hoc 
system he will first draw on personnel of his own 
staff and then on other elements on the inter-
national staff. as may be required. 
5. Functions of the Director. Civil Emer-
gency Planning Directorate or his delegated staff 
officer in carrying out the role of information co-
ordinator are to: 
APPENDIX Ill 
(a) Pre-d1saster preparedness: 
(i) maintain, on a current basis, a list of 
the national central co-ordinating 
agencies, as designated by each mem-
ber government, which would be the 
source and recipient of all official 
messages concerning a disaster; 
(ii) maintain a list oftelephone numbers 
of the central co-ordinating agencies 
and key individuals in each capital ; 
this list will only be used when tele-
graphic communications will not 
suffice; 
(iii) consider and recommend changes, 
modifications or updating of proce-
dures as may be required either in 
the C-M or in its annexes to the 
appropriate committee, or to the 
Secretary-General where internal 
procedures are concerned. 
(b) Disaster operations: 
(i) advise the Secretary-General of the 
situation; 
{ii) contact the appropriate delegation 
officer of the stricken member coun-
try; 
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(iii) ensure that the information received 
from the stricken member country is 
retransmitted, as necessary, to all 
capitals, delegations and NATO 
authorities concerned; 
(1v) maintain liaison with the Directorate 
of Council Operations and the Situa-
tion Centre ; 
( t) maintain an overview of the 
situation as it develops with the aim 
of providing information to assisting 
countries which may facilitate or 
help expedite the delivery of assist-
ance to the stricken country ; 
(vi) establish contact, as may be required 
and on instructions of the Secretary-
General, with international relief and 
assistance agencies, with a view to 
obtaining supplemental information ; 
(vri) prepare. as necessary, briefings for 
the Secretary-General and/or the 
Council on the disaster and the 
assistance being provided. 
(c) Post-disaster: 
prepare a report for the Secretary-
General for his consideration and 
subsequent dissemination in accord-
ance with his directions. 
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APPENDIX IV 
UNDRO 1 information sheet 
Organisation 
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator 
A Disaster Relief Co-ordinator was 
appointed at Under-Secretary-General level, in 
March 1972. He acts on behalf of the UN 
Secretary-General and reports directly to him. 
The Co-ordinator's Office is a separate entity 
within the UN Secretariat, and consists of a 
Relief Co-ordination and Preparedness Branch 
and a Prevention and Support Services Branch. 
Co-ordinator: M'Hamed Essaafi (Tunisia). 
Field organisation 
UNDRO is represented in developing coun-
tries by the UN Resident Co-ordinators/Resi-
dent Representatives of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). UNDRO 
also has a Liaison Office at UN Headquarters in 
New York. 
Functions 
The Co-ordinator's mandate derives from a 
number of General Assembly resolutions, 
mainly resolution 2816 (XXVI) " Assistance in 
case of natural disaster and other disaster situa-
tions", resolution 36/225 "Strengthening the 
capacity of the UN system to respond to natural 
disasters and other disaster situations", and 
resolution 37/144 "Office ofthe United Nations 
Disaster Relief Co-ordinator ". 
The Office has three broad functions. The 
first is that of relief co-ordination: to ensure that 
in case of natural disaster or other disaster situa-
tions, emergency relief activities of all donor 
sources are mobilised and co-ordinated so as to 
supply the needs of a disaster-stricken country 
in a timely and effective manner. Its second 
function is that of preparedness: to raise the 
level of pre-disaster planning and preparedness, 
including disaster assessment and relief manage-
ment capability, in disaster-prone developing 
countries. Thirdly, there is the function of 
prevention: to promote the study, prevention, 
prediction and mitigation of natural disasters. 
through the application of appropriate measures. 
These include the collection and dissemina-
I. Established in 1972 to mobilise and co-ordmate inter-
national emergency relief to d1saster-stncken areas, and to 
promote disaster preparedness and prevention. 
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tion of information concerning scientific and 
technological developments. In order to 
strengthen the collective efforts of the United 
Nations system, UNDRO developed and signed 
with most of the agencies, a series of Memor-
anda of Understanding defining areas and means 
of co-operation. 
Activities 
During 1982, UNDRO was directly 
involved in and launched international appeals 
for some 15 major natural disasters and three 
man-made emergencies, the most important of 
which were drought and civil strife in Chad, 
cyclones in Madagascar. Tonga and Viet-Nam, 
floods in Nicaragua, Honduras. Tunisia and 
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
volcanic eruptions in Indonesia, the emergency 
in the Lebanon. and earthquakes in the Yemen 
Arab Republic. As a co-ordinating Office, 
UNDRO is not itself a principal source of relief 
assistance, although the Co-ordinator has the 
authority to make from his regular budget and 
from his voluntary trust fund direct emergency 
grants not exceeding US $50,000 for any one 
disaster (and not exceeding in total US $600.000 
in one year) to meet immediate emergency 
needs, such as medicines, food or the transport 
of life-saving equipment. The Co-ordinator has 
moreover been empowered to receive from 
donors contributions in kind and in cash which 
are used for the provision of relief supplies. 
However, the greater part of the emergency 
assistance provided by the international com-
munity goes direct to the country concerned and 
it is expected that the amount and nature of 
these contributions will be based upon the infor-
mation given in UNDRO's disaster " situation 
reports " which are sent by telex to donor 
sources and other interested organisations 
throughout the world. During 1982, contribu-
tions for emergency relief reported to UNDRO, 
mobilised by it or channelled through it, 
exceeded 400 million dollars. UNDRO staff 
members are often sent to a disaster-stricken 
country to assist governments in the tasks of 
assessment of damage and needs. and of local 
co-ordination of relief activity. During the 
year, UNDRO organised or participated in 
almost 30 multi-agency disaster assessment 
missions. The most important of these 
missions took place in China, Benin, Chad, the 
Lebanon and Poland. 
Disaster preparedness advisory missions are 
usually undertaken by UNDRO staff or by 
APPENDIX IV 
consultants hired by the Office. They advise 
governments on the best methods of improving 
their organisation to deal with all kinds of 
disasters, and not just those which arise from 
natural causes. The recommendations of these 
missions sometimes call for specific projects to 
be carried out, and if these cannot be funded by 
the government then UNDRO may be asked to 
seek the necessary financing from donors. Pre-
paredness organisations naturally need trained 
personnel, and UNDRO arranges or takes part 
in many seminars for disaster managers and 
others concerned in relief work, in the prepara-
tion and issue of warnings, and in the applica-
tion of new technologies to disaster work gener-
ally. UNDRO is also engaged in attempts to 
remove obstacles to the rapid delivery of 
international relief, and this requires willingness 
by donors as well as by potential recipients to 
streamline procedures and to waive normal legal 
requirements for the movement of relief goods 
and personnel. 
UNDRO operates a Co-ordination Centre 
with a modern computerised communications 
system, which processes and distributes informa-
tion before and during emergency situations. 
The Centre's Data Bank and Reference Library 
complete UNDRO's data base. 
In the area of disaster prevention UNDRO 
is engaged in the development of techniques of 
vulnerability analysis and their application: in 
trying to ensure that precautions against existing 
hazards are observed in the planning of new 
development projects, and that the projects 
themselves should not create new hazards; and 
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m promoting the use of legislation, land-use 
planning and other inexpensive methods of 
reducing or eliminating disaster risks. During 
1982 technical assistance in disaster prevention 
and preparedness was provided to countries in 
the Caribbean, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Western 
Samoa and Yugoslavia. 
The amount allocated to UNDRO in the 
regular budget of the UN for the biennium 
1982-1983 is US $5,136,700. Additional 
expenditures, which amount to approximately 
$800,000 per year, are met from the voluntary 
trust fund, established by the General Assembly 
in 1974. 
Publications 
- Annual Report to the UN General 
Assembly. 
- UNDRO NEWS (six issues each year). 
- Ten Questions on UNDRO (leaflet). 
- Dijaster Assessment Mission Reports. 
- Case Reports. 
- Disaster Prevention and Mitigation: 
A Compendium of Current Knowledge 
(ten volumes). 
- Guidelines {or Disaster Prevention (three 
rolumes). · 
- Technical Papers. 
Geneva, March 1983. 
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The Assembly, 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 393 to 395 
and supplementary reply to Recommendation 380 
RECOMMENDATION 393 1 
on China and European security 2 
23rd November 1983 
(i) Considering that the priority given to internal development in the People's Republic of China 
is directing it on a lasting basis towards the search for international peace; 
(ii) Considering that the People's Republic of China is an essential factor in the world balance and 
that the development of its economy should lead it to play an increasingly important role in 
international relations; 
(iii) Considering that in spite of differences in their political and social regimes the interests of 
Western Europe and of China converge in many fields: 
(iv) Considering that the development of trade and co-operation between Western Europe and 
China is in their joint interests; 
(v) Considering that the People's Republic of China is now making proposals to European states 
and firms for co-operation of mutual interest: 
(vi) Reaffirming the commitments which closely link Western Europe with the United States, 
particularly for all aspects of defence and security, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that the Western European countries start regular consultations with the Government of 
the People's Republic of China in the most appropriate frameworks on matters relating to the 
maintenance of peace in the world; 
2. Carefully examine in the appropriate frameworks the possibility of increasing Western Europe's 
trade and economic co-operation with China; 
3. Remove as far as possible all current obstacles to the development of this trade and co-
operation and, in particular, no longer subject the latter to Cocom restrictions on trade with the 
eastern countries; 
4. Impress this point of view on the United States and on its partners in the OECD; 
5. Insist that the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons do not allow the Soviet 
Union to deploy in Asia weapons withdrawn from Eastern Europe; 
6. Urge its members to pursue a concerted policy in order to lay the foundations for lasting peace 
in Eastern Asia and, inter alia, to endeavour to re-establish an independent state in Cambodia and to 
facilitate the search for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1983 during the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 
945). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 393 
The Council have noted with interest Recommendation 393 from the Assembly on China and 
European security. 
The Council are pleased to inform the Assembly that : 
- The member states of WEU individually maintain a wide range of political contacts with the 
Government of the People's Republic of China through exchanges of visits and other channels. These 
contacts provide good opportunities for consultations on international questions, and on many of these 
similar views are shared. Moreover in May 1983, the member states of the European Community, 
acting within their political co-operation framework, decided to establish regular political consultations 
every six months between the Ten and the People's Republic of China. Pursuant to this decision, the 
first consultations took place at the end of May 1983. 
- Generally speaking, trade and economic co-operation between China and the individual member 
states of WEU are growing in a spirit of equality and mutual benefit. The member states of WEU 
welcome this development and will endeavour to encourage its continuation. 
- The member states of WEU do not consider that either individual national policies or other 
existing regulations currently present a major obstacle to the development of trade and co-operation 
with China. They believe however that the application of those regulations to trade with China should 
be reviewed from time to time. Member states will continue to maintain close contact with the 
United States and the other OECD partners on this matter. 
- As they have already stated within the alliance, the member states of WEU support the position 
that the threat posed to Europe by Soviet missiles should not be reduced at the expense of countries of 
the Far East. 
- The member states of WEU have repeatedly declared their opposition to the presence of 
Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, their demand for the complete withdrawal of these troops and their 
wish to see Cambodia return to its former neutral, non-aligned and independent status. 
- The United Kingdom's partners share complete confidence in the United Kingdom in its search 
for a negotiated solution for Hong Kong which will maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th November 1983. 
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The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 394 1 
on the political activities of the WEU Council -
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 2 
(i) Reaffirming its determination to fulfil the whole range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as 
possible with the many aspects of European security; 
(ii) Recalling that the exercise of its responsibilities calls for a meaningful dialogue with the 
Council; 
(iii) Convinced that this dialogue will be easier to develop if the Council plays a more active role in 
concerting European activities in areas within its competence; 
(iv) Welcoming the full-bodied report on European political co-operation submitted by the Council 
but noting that, in exercising its mandate, the Council does not yet seem to have taken account of the 
desire expressed by several of its members to strengthen their co-operation in various fields relating to 
their security; 
(v) Welcoming the transmission by the Council of the declassified version of the study by the 
Standing Armaments Committee on member countries' armaments industries and noting that in its 
reply to Recommendation 379 the Council confirmed the task given to the SAC; 
(vi) Recalling that the mandate instructing the SAC to promote European armaments co-operation 
implies that it take account of all the latest technological developments in this field, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Apply its competence in full by studying and tackling certain security problems which call for 
a concerted European approach; 
2. In that context instruct the SAC inter alia to complete its study without delay, with the addi-
tion of proposals to remove economic and legal obstacles to better co-operation between the arma-
ments industries of member countries and transmit the results of this study to the Assembly; 
3. Instruct the SAC to study the possible implications for European armaments production of all 
the latest technological developments in the armaments field. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1983 during the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the General AffalfS Committee 
(Document 944 ). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 394 
1. The Council welcome the reaffirmation by the Assembly of its determination to fulfil the whole 
range of its duties by dealing as thoroughly as possible with the many aspects of European security. The 
proper exercise of this great responsibility requires a dialogue with the Council, for which the Council 
hold themselves continuously available. 
As the Council explained in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 379, European consul-
tations on security questions take place in various bodies at various levels. The twenty-eighth annual 
report referred to in the recommendation contains details of exchanges of view which took place in the 
Council on a number of security-related problems, including East-West relations, the situation in 
Afghanistan, in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and elsewhere. The Council naturally intend 
to continue fulfilling their responsibilities under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. The study carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee on the member countries' arma-
ments industries appears to be a step towards improved co-operation between the members and could 
help them in directing their programmes and military investment expenditure. The Council consider 
it expedient that the study be concluded without delay. They have asked the SAC to carry out, with 
the assistance of its international secretariat, the annual updating, in simplified form, of the statistics 
contained in this study. 
3. The head of the international secretariat ofthe Standing Armaments Committee has, as stated to 
the Assembly, made a number of study proposals to the Council which might be carried out by the 
Committee for which he is responsible. One of the proposed topics, which echoes the concern 
expressed by the Assembly in its recommendation, basecommendation, basically relates to the 
implications of new conventional weapons on the armaments industries of the member 
countries. This proposal is at present before the Council, who duly note the interest shown by the 
Assembly in this topic. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1983. 
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RECOMMENDATION 395 1 
on the law of the sea 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 377 on implications of the law of the sea 
conference that the aim pursued by the governments of member states was to reach a universally-
accepted international convention on the law of the sea, which would constitute an important factor 
in maintaining peaceful and friendly relations between states, especially between western industria-
lised countries and developing countries in the third world; 
(ii) In agreement with the Council's opinion that a satisfactory international regulation of deep-
seabed mining was strategically and economically of great importance, especially for industrialised 
Western European countries which are highly dependent on imports of raw materials; 
(iii) Conscious of the third world's claims to a share of deep-sea mineral resources ; 
(iv) Aware of the shortcomings of the proposed seabed mining regime and regretting the individual 
and divergent positions which the member states of Western European Union, the EEC and NATO 
have taken up as to whether the convention should be signed; 
(v) Considering that these positions may be detrimental to Europe's strategic position in the world, 
more particularly in relation to the developing countries; 
(vi) Aware of the danger of losing what has been gained in some fourteen years of negotiations and 
the benefits to be derived from the convention for the greater part of the globe, whereas the navies of 
the signatory countries, including those of the Soviet bloc, may derive far-reaching advantages with 
the backing of international law, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Examine the strategic and tactical disadvantages of the present situation and seek to eliminate 
the differences in the policies of member countries towards the draft law of the sea convention ; 
2. Request the Governments of France and the Netherlands to devote their efforts in the 
preparatory commission to the introduction of rules and regulations to govern the seabed mining 
regime in an equitable manner with less state control and protectionism than proposed by the Soviet 
bloc and many third world countries ; 
3. Request the Governments of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom to adopt policies with a view to making full use of Europe's political and 
industrial influence in the preparatory commission to achieve constructive and acceptable solutions 
to problems relating to the seabed mining regime; 
4. Pursue its efforts to convince the United States Government of the negative consequences of its 
policy and of the advantages of a duly-signed unambiguous convention on the law of the sea and, 
consequently, the rule of law of the world oceans, as opposed to a mere customary law situation 
which cannot be enforced. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1983 during the first part of the twenty-ninth ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions (Document 946). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 395 
l. First, the Council have to acknowledge that there exist different views among WEU member 
countries concerning the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea due to the fact that 
member countries have differing interests in marine matters. 
Two member countries ofWEU (France and the Netherlands) have signed the convention while 
the others do not at present intend to do so or have not yet taken a decision. This fact has been an 
obstacle to their acting unanimously on issues related to the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea. It should be noted that the obstacles which prevent signature of the convention by the 
majority of member countries lie mainly, if not entirely, in the deep-seabed regime, beyond national 
jurisdiction, as it has been drafted in the convention. The Council therefore take the view that every 
effort must be made to arrive at constructive and acceptable solutions to the issue of the deep-sea bed 
regime. Success in this respect would undoubtedly advance the general acceptability of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
2. In the present situation, only France and the Netherlands, which have signed the convention, 
have voting rights as members of the preparatory commission responsible inter alia for the elaboration 
of rules and regulations for deep-seabed mining. Those member states which have not yet signed the 
convention may participate fully in the commission's deliberations as observers, but are not entitled to 
participate in the taking of decisions. The Council welcome the fact that the first meetings of this 
preparatory commission in Kingston, from 15th March to 8th April and from 15th August to 
9th September 1983, demonstrated that co-operation between WEU member states, whether in the 
capacity of full voting members or of observers, is very good and that the WEU full voting members of 
the preparatory commission made every effort to ensure that the observers are allowed to participate in 
the work of the commission to the full extent as laid down in Resolution I of the final act of the 
conference. Their success in defending observers' rights of participation in the negotiations in a 
constructive manner is of course in the interests ofthe commission as a whole. For in working out the 
deep-seabed regime it is necessary to make maximum use of the knowledge and expertise in the field of 
deep-seabed mining which is primarily available in those states which have a deep-sea mining 
capability. 
Obviously the influence of the preparatory commission members with deep-sea mining expertise 
will facilitate the establishment of satisfactory rules and regulations for the mining regime and help 
avoid any unnecessary control or protectionism. France and the Netherlands together with WEU 
member countries participating as observers will work to this end in the negotiations within the 
preparatory commission. 
3. The Council can give the assurance that all WEU member states will do everything possible, 
through the appropriate channels, to achieve constructive and acceptable solutions to problems relating 
to the deep-seabed regime. 
4. In this context it should be observed that the United States is not participating in the preparatory 
commission sessions in Kingston. As is known, the United States has serious objections to the regime 
for deep-sea mining as laid down in the convention. Although WEU member states also subscribe in 
part to these objections, only the United States among potential deep-sea miners has adopted the point 
of view that it should not participate in the preparatory commission, not even as an observer. 
It is to be hoped that with the elaboration of a satisfactory seabed mining regime, the convention 
can be made fully acceptable not only to WEU member countries, but also to the United States. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 19th October 1983. 
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RECOMMENDATION 380 1 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
- reply to the twenty-seventh annual report of the Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the wide agreement between the Council and the Assembly on the application of 
the Brussels Treaty, revealed in Recommendation 365 and the Council's reply thereto; 
(ii) Noting that the Council and Assembly alike recognise that the fundamental provisions of the 
Brussels Treaty, particularly the mutual security provisions of Articles IV, V and VIII.3, retain their 
full value, and that there is interest in making greater use of Western European Union as an instru-
ment of European security; 
(iii) Believing that several arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty no longer serve 
any useful purpose, and noting the Council's view that " in applying the provisions of Protocol No. 
Ill and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the 
situation in Europe "; 
(iv) Believing therefore that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. In application of Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancel para-
graphs IV and VI of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. III; 
2. In application of Article V of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty, vary by redu-
cing the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill; 
3. Call on member countries which participate in the integrated system of NATO, and are not 
already bound by Article VI of Protocol No. 11, to make unilateral declarations concernIng the level 
of forces they undertake to assign to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and station as agreed 
with him, and not to withdraw against the wishes of a majority of the high contracting parties; 
4. To include in future annual reports a statement on the levels of all assigned forces; 
5. To communicate its annual report, as in the past, before the end of February. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1982 during the first part of the twenty-e1ghth ordmary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Prussen on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questwns and 
Armaments (Document 908). 
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to Recommendation 380 
The Council welcome the fact that the Assembly recognises that the fundamental provisions of 
the Brussels Treaty retain their full value and that it stresses the importance of WEU in the sphere of 
security. 
1. The Council recall their position, namely, that in applying the provisions of Protocol No. Ill 
and its annexes, account should be taken, to the fullest extent possible, of the evolution of the situa-
tion in Europe. This is why Annex Ill of that protocol has been amended on several occasions 
since 1958. The Council have received with great interest and are considering the Assembly's 
recommendation to cancel paragraphs IV ("Long-range missiles and guided missiles") and VI 
(" Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes ") of the list at Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill according to the 
procedure laid down in Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
2. As regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, the Council welcome the fact that, 
as a result of the debate and vote by the Assembly, the initial draft recommendation was amended to 
take account of certain legal and political considerations. 
The Council are considering the technical, military and political aspects of this problem. 
3 and 4. The overall system organised under the treaty and its protocols, the implementation of 
which, as regards level of forces, regularly appears in the annual report, enables the Council to be 
informed of and to assess the situation of the level of forces and their armaments assigned to 
SACEUR for the common defence. 
The level of forces thus assigned results from the undertakings made by the member states 
within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance as stated notably in 11.5 and 6 and IV of the final act 
of the nine-power conference, held in London between 28th September and 3rd October 1954. The 
forces assigned by the various countries to the common NATO defence are in fact defined on the 
basis of a plan which is kept up to date within NATO. Decisions relating to the forces result from 
the joint effort of the member countries in accordance with the capacity of each to contribute and 
with the aim of ensuring at all times an adequate level of forces. 
Consequently, there appears to be no need to invite the states concerned to make unilateral 
declarations to the WEU Council concerning a matter which is already dealt with in the multilateral 
context of NATO. Nor does there appear to be any possibility of including in future annual reports 
any statements on the level of forces other than those which are already given. 
5. The Council will endeavour, as in the past, to communicate its annual report to the Assembly 
before the end of February. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th November 1982. 
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to Recommendation 380 
Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill 
of the modified Brussels Treaty 
In their reply of 15th November 1982 to Recommendation 380, the Council stated that, as 
regards varying the list at Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill, they were considering the technical, military 
and political aspects of this problem. At the joint meeting in Brussels on 17th May 1983 with the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the Chairman-in-Office stated that the Council had 
asked the Agency for the Control of Armaments for a technical opinion, which had recently been 
transmitted to them and was being studied by the governments. 
The Council wish to inform the Assembly that this question remains on their agenda and that 
they are continuing to examine it in depth, bearing in mind the various aspects of a problem whose 
complexity the Assembly clearly perceives. The Council will naturally inform the Assembly as soon as 
possible after the completion of their examination of the problem. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 22nd November 1983. 
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Written questions 233 to 240 and replies of the Council 
to written questions 233, 234 and 236 
QUESTION 233 
put by Mr. Dejardin 
on 7th June 1983 
Answering a question put in tbe Assembly 
on 7th June, Mr. Claude Cheysson, French 
Minister for External Relations and Chairman of 
the Council, said French nuclear forces were not 
intended to protect the other European members 
of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Such a declaration may seem highly 
disturbing in the event of an attack on one ofthe 
other six WEU member countries. 
In application of Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, should France not be notified 
that it must react in such circumstances? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 27th July 1983 
The French Minister for External Rela-
tions, in his reply to the WEU Assembly on 
7th June, did not make the remarks attributed to 
him by the honourable parliamentarian. Mr. 
Cheysson, in reply to questions put to him after 
his speech, simply made the observation that 
" French nuclear weapons are not intended for 
the protection of all the countries of the alliance, 
of the continent of Europe. " (Official Report, 
page 72) 
All the same: 
- as recalled by the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council in that same speech, the 
member countries are determined to 
honour the contractual obligations 
under the modified Brussels Treaty and 
in particular the commitment to collect-
ive self-defence agreed in Article 
V. This is true of France wno fully 
assumes the obligations and solidarities 
arising from her membership of WEU. 
No one could question France's fide-
lity to the the commitments that she has 
concluded and the determination that 
she would show alongside her allies if 
the conditions required for the imple-
mentation of Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty were to come about; 
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- at the same time, account should be 
taken of the particular nature of nuclear 
weapons, which imply specific condi-
tions of use for all the powers in posses-
sion of such weapons. 
Based on the doctrine of the deterrence of 
the strong by the weak, France's nuclear strategy 
is aimed at the defence of her vital interests 
which, as emphasised on several occasions, 
could not be defined. This factor of un-
certainty, rather than weakening the deterrent, 
tends, on the contrary, to strengthen it. 
QUESTION 234 
put by Mr. Dejardin 
on lOth August 1983 
The Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments of the parliamentary Assembly 
has often visited national or NATO military 
installations. 
During these visits, in particular to NATO 
installations, it seems that committee members 
have access only to unclassified information. 
On 4th May 1983, the committee was 
received at the NATO anti-submarine warfare 
research centre of SACLANT at La Spezia. The 
SACLANTCEN Director stated at the outset 
that briefings would be limited to the subject 
of anti-submarine and oceanographic research 
since systems research was secret. 
He also said he would be prepared to 
answer certain questions provided this did not 
mean giving classified answers. He added that 
it was SACLANT's principle to apply a security 
procedure whereby only persons specifically 
empowered by the responsible authority could 
have access to secret information. 
What does the Council think of the strict 
application of this principle to members of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments of the WEU parliamentary Assembly? 
Does it consider that this is likely to faci-
litate understanding and acceptance of military 
requirements by parliamentarians who, in parti-
cular, vote appropriations intended to cover 
defence expenditure? 
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Could not such an attitude be considered 
as an affront to parliamentary democracy and, in 
this case, to the dignity of members of the 
Assembly? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 21st October 1983 
1. The Council have taken note of the points 
put forward in the honourable parliamentarian's 
question. 
2. The Council wish to recall that in the past, 
in response to concerns expressed by the Assem-
bly, they have carefully considered, in consult-
ation with the North Atlantic Council, means of 
giving the maximum possible information to 
the Assembly on military questions which are 
within NATO competence. 
3. In 1958 a procedure was established 
covering the communication by NATO to the 
WEU Assembly of unclassified information. 
This procedure has subsequently been reviewed, 
but NATO security regulations do not permit 
the release of classified information. The 
Council therefore can only say that there is no 
possibility of changing it. 
4. While tight security measures are some-
times difficult to reconcile with the requirements 
of parliamentary democracy, they are necessary 
for effective defence. The Council fully appre-
ciate the interests of the Assembly but trust that 
the honourable parliamentarian will recognise 
the need both for the military requirements to 
which he refers, and for the security measures 
designed to ensure their maximum effectiveness. 
However, whenever they can, the Council will 
naturally continue to keep the Assembly as fully 
informed as possible. 
QUESTION 235 
put by Mr. Cox 
on 13th September 1983 
In reply to questions in the Assembly 
on 7th June 1983, General Bernard Rogers, 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, said: 
"There are over 2,100 SS-20 warheads 
deployed. There are 351 launchers deployed 
today. There are three warheads to each 
launcher and there is a second missile deployed 
at the launcher site ... there is some uncertainty 
whether there may be three missiles deployed at 
each launcher ... " 
This warhead count is double that of the 
latest NATO Nuclear Planning Group estimate 
in the communique of 23rd March 1983 which 
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states that: " ... the Soviet Union now has 351 
launchers for the ... SS-20 missiles deployed and 
operational, comprising 1,053 warheads." 
Does the Council agree with General 
Rogers' estimate of SS-20 warhead numbers, and 
was he authorised to give it? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
QUESTION 236 
put by Mr. Blaauw 
on 15th September 1983 
Since the EEC Council of Ministers failed 
to condemn the shooting down of the South 
Korean Airlines Boeing 747 flight 007 by the 
Soviet Air Force killing 269 people from 13 dif-
ferent countries, would it not be in the interests 
of the defence of Western Europe for the WEU 
Council to express their unambiguous condem-
nation of this action? 
Will the Council consider convening a 
special meeting for this purpose? 
Could the Council inform the Assembly 
what measures have been taken in the member 
countries as a result of this aggression? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 28th September 1983 
As stated in the press communique, the 
text of which was transmitted for information to 
the President of the Assembly: " The Permanent 
Council of Western European Union at their 
meeting of 21st September 1983 strongly 
condemned the destruction of a civil airliner of 
the Korean Airlines on 31st August 1983. They 
deeply deplored this action caused by Soviet 
military aircraft, which resulted in the tragic loss 
of a great number ofhuman lives." 
The Council, consequently, do not envi-
sage calling an extraordinary meeting. 
In their communique the Council recalled 
that " the seven WEU member states have 
already made public their positions and reac-
tions, and also expressed their determination 
within the ICAO that the necessary measures be 
adopted to avoid any recurrence of such a tra-
gedy. " 
QUESTION 237 
put by Mr. Lenzer 
on 21st September 1983 
Does the Council agree that the Airbus 
320 is absolutely vital for the future of the Euro-
pean aircraft industry? 
Is the Council aware that, if this aircraft is 
not produced, Boeing will have a world mono-
poly for this type of aircraft? 
Will the Council urge member govern-
ments to give their financial and political 
backing to the production of the Airbus 320? 
Which airlines have already shown an 
interest in this type of aircraft? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
QUESTION 238 
put by Mr. Blaauw 
on 30th September 1983 
Could the Council inform the Assembly 
when France is expected to decide on procure-
ment of an airborne warning and control 
system? 
What is the place of the British AWACS 
unit in the overall NATO system? 
What will be the place of the French 
system in the European AWACS cover? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
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QUESTION 239 
put by Mr. Blaauw 
on 30th September 1983 
Will a European procurement co-
ordination body be set up to define joint specifi-
cations for the advanced combat aircraft for the 
1990s? 
If not, will there then be a tripartite group 
-United Kingdom, France, Germany? 
If so, what is the timetable for defining 
such specifications? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
QUESTION 240 
put by Mr. Bassinet 
on 13th October 1983 
Since European co-operation in arma-
ments matters is essential, can the Council give 
the Assembly information about the tripartite 
discussions between France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the United Kingdom in 
Paris on 21st September 1983? 
Will co-operation in overall research and 
development be strengthened? 
Is standardisation possible for NATO fri-
gates, guided anti-tank weapons, helicopters and 
above all tactical combat aircraft? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the harmonisation of research in civil and military high technology fields 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting with satisfaction that the governments of the WEU member countries have declared that 
they are fully aware of the security interests which determine European collaborative projects in high 
technology fields, including aeronautics, space and microelectronics; 
(ii) Considering that it is essential to master the principal branches of technology covering all 
material needed by the armed forces of member countries and that the evolution of defence research 
makes it necessary to develop intellectual capabilities by a sustained effort of continuous education at 
various levels - engineers, technicians, operatives; 
(iii) Considering that mastery of research and development in the defence field would strengthen the 
defence capability of the European states if they could co-operate without restriction in their respective 
financial and technological efforts; 
(iv) Considering that the growing cost of armaments programmes for the WEU countries calls for 
increased and balanced co-operation in a European framework so that the armaments industries of the 
member countries may contribute fully to defence by mastering new technology to the best of their 
ability; 
(v) Considering that intra-European exchanges of technology are already extensive, as is the joint 
production of sophisticated devices of European design, and that further progress can be made in this 
direction by exploiting new technology to the full; 
(vi) Considering that the balance of technology exchange between member states and the United 
States favours the latter and results in a markedly unequal relationship within the Atlantic 
Alliance; 
( vii) Considering that it is essential not to confuse new technology, weapons systems and strategies but 
that on the contrary our countries should master new tactical concepts, any European effort in the field 
of emergent technology having to take account of the real possibilities of high technology co-operation 
and, as a first stage, of the possibilities offered by the existence of the Standing Armaments Committee 
for independent European thinking, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to prepare for it a study in the form of a review and 
proposals on the possibilities of co-operation between member countries in advanced technology for 
the development of future weaponry, this study, covering both research and the industrialisation of the 
products of such research, to include inter alia: 
- an analysis of the decision-taking structure and the budgetary facilities of each member 
country; 
- an analysis of means available and the possibilities of making optimum use of these means to 
protect innovative capabilities and ensure competitive production costs; 
- proposals on the direction the research and development policies of member countries should 
take to provide Western Europe with the industrial base necessary for components for future 
weaponry; 
2. Invite the governments of member countries to encourage contacts between the responsible 
authorities in their industries with a view to promoting the establishment, as soon as possible, of a 
strong, co-ordinated European industry for advanced military technology meeting our defence 
requirements; 
3. Invite the governments of member countries to give preference to the procurement, as and when 
necessary, of new weapons whose design and production are the fruit of co-operation between several 
member countries. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Bassinet, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In the first part of its report dated 18th 
May 1982, the committee drew attention to the 
need to draw up a list of priority areas for 
improving co-operation in science and tech-
nology. Because of their cost, technical 
complexity or special interest, military research 
and development programmes require special 
attention, being directly related to European or 
international co-operation. In its reply commu-
nicated to the Assembly on 24th November 
1982, the Council considered it opportune that 
such a list should be drawn up by the 
Standing Armaments Committee and this task 
might be included in its future arrangements 
concerning the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee's activities. 
2. In its reply to Recommendation 385 1 on 
international aeronautical consortia - guidelines 
drawn from the colloquy on 9th and 1Oth 
February 1982, the Council stated further that 
the Standing Armaments Committee had been 
set up in 1955 with the aim of increasing the 
efficiency of the forces of the countries of WEU 
by improving their logistics and the use of the 
resources available to them for equipping and 
supplying their forces and by sharing, in the best 
interests of all, the research on, development of 
and production of new armaments. The Coun-
cil stated further: 
" It maintains an interest in operational 
research and several technical areas; 
furthermore, it was instructed by Council 
to carry out a study of the armaments 
industry of the WEU member states. 
The completed parts of this study have 
been transmitted to the Council, who have 
kept the Assembly informed. At the 
1974 Conference of National Armaments 
Directors, it emerged that many more 
countries were interested in co-operation 
than the member states of WEU. As a 
result of this conference, the Independent 
European Programme Group was set up. 
That body is now an important instru-
ment of European multinational co-opera-
tion in the sphere of armaments. The 
fact that its composition is not identical 
with that of WEU suggests that members 
of the WEU Assembly should receive 
progress reports on its work by way 
of national procedures. The IEPG is 
already directed by a high-level political 
figure. 
I. Document 916. 
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The Conference of National Armaments 
Directors of the Atlantic Alliance is a body 
through which the countries ofthe alliance 
are able to co-operate in the definition and 
execution of equipment and research pro-
jects. It is a forum where information on 
military requirements, national concepts 
and programmes as well as emerging tech-
nology is exchanged in order to promote 
equipment collaboration and standardis-
ation. Considerable efforts are made, 
moreover, to rationalise and co-ordinate 
the activity of its subsidiary groups. 
Finally, the military staffs of the WEU 
member countries are fully aware of the 
need to have a solid industrial basis for 
equipping their forces as economically as 
possible, thereby promoting marketable 
equipment at competitive prices. " 
3. One of the reasons why it has become so 
difficult to achieve better co-operation is the fact 
that all countries wish to strengthen their 
national competitive positions which they fear 
might be endangered by more co-operation. 
However, co-operation and competition should 
be regarded as complementary. This was 
acknowledged in the many discussions your 
Rapporteur had in preparing this report but it 
was often difficult to make the political will 
prevail over national short-term goals. 
4. Individual national laws and regulations 
are often a great handicap for co-operation 
between armaments industries. Administra-
tions are of course used to their own laws and 
have to overcome many psychological diffi-
culties in order to handle collaborative ventures. 
5. Despite persistent negative attitudes in 
certain sectors of the public with regard to 
specific instances of scientific and technological 
development in the military field, there is never-
theless increasingly widespread general apprecia-
tion of science and technology as prime movers 
in economic progress. The policy of science 
and technology is often found more at fault than 
science and technology itself. Priority should 
therefore be given to better policy and the role of 
governments in providing the correct climate. 
At the Versailles summit meeting of the seven 
most industrialised countries in 1982, the 
decision was taken to set up a technology 
task-force. At the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in Bonn on 1Oth June 1982, 
the heads of state and of government partici-
pating in the meeting stated: 
" Modernisation and expansion of 
Warsaw Pact conventional forces continue 
to accelerate and include the addition 
of advanced aircraft, surface ships, sub-
marines, a full range of armoured vehicles 
and artillery and other systems. In this 
context, and recognising particularly the 
need for strong conventional forces, 
Ministers discussed the results of the 1982 
annual defence reviews, adopted the 
NATO force plan for 1983-87, and agreed 
to provide resources to implement the 
necessary force improvements. 
Ministers endorsed the need to seek ways 
to redress escalating defence costs by more 
effective application of national resources 
to defence, particularly in the conventio-
nal field. Some improvements can be 
achieved through the rationalisation and 
better co-ordination of NATO defence 
planning aimed at a greater harmonisation 
of such planning activities as those 
involving infrastructure, armaments and 
logistics. In this context Ministers 
emphasised the special importance which 
they attach to armaments co-operation 
within the scope of the transatlantic 
dialogue and especially with regard to the 
concept of families of weapons. 
Consistent with the Bonn summit man-
date, Ministers received a United States 
paper on taking advantage of emerging 
technologies to improve conventional 
capabilities and thereby enhance deter-
rence and defence. They agreed that 
NATO should actively seek ways to 
exploit these technologies within the co-
operative defence planning process and 
endorsed the pursuit of NATO efforts 
to look for the economical and efficient 
application of emerging technologies. " 
11. New technology and defence costs 
6. New technology offers promising innov-
ations in virtually every category of weapons 
systems. Unfortunately, their development 
calls for heavy expenditure. The central 
problem for all countries in defence is cost 
escalation. 
7. Lord Trenchard, United Kingdom 
Minister of State for Defence Procurement, 
stated at the colloquy on international aero-
nautical consortia in London on 9th and 1Oth 
February 1982 that as an industrialist and a 
minister he had found no other area where cost 
escalation was so great a problem as in defence 
equipment. One of the reasons was that the 
Soviet Union continued to add great numbers of 
new weapons systems to its existing strength. 
In particular the improving quality of their 
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weapons made it increasingly expensive to 
sustain the numbers of traditional main weapon 
platforms such as warships, tanks and aircraft. 
Another was the microelectronic revolution 
which had an important degree of applicability 
of new technology to the weapons and equip-
ment of the armed forces. 
8. Looking at the figures one has to accept 
that the cost of an aircraft, its armaments or of a 
ship is increasing at more than 5% of the general 
rate of inflation and in many cases it is much 
higher. Member countries are therefore obliged 
to increase their defence budgets 1 every year in 
real terms in order to avert a steady reduction in 
the numbers of aircraft, ships and tanks. The 
consequence of trying to keep pace with the 
growing size and sophistication of the threat is 
that unit production costs increase in real terms 
from one generation to the next. Unless one is 
willing to do something to alter these trends, 
countries will find themselves with too few 
extremely sophisticated weapons. They have 
therefore to be very selective in choosing where 
to apply new technology. They have to select 
which aspects of each new weapon system 
must be fulfilled by new technology and which 
should be manufactured according to existing 
technology. Here, of course, a risk has to be 
taken. Each member country and, to a large 
extent, each industrial company within each 
country needs to select areas where it has a lead 
technology and develop them. 
9. All countries need a greater degree of self-
discipline than they have shown in the past in 
selecting a smaller number of areas where they 
should apply their limited research and develop-
ment resources. Your Rapporteur was told 
several times that governmental international 
collaboration would be more successful if it 
followed the pattern already set by collaboration 
between industrial firms in various countries. 
Industries should be prepared to move ahead 
and collaborate across frontiers and govern-
ments should encourage industries by pledging 
orders and money for collaboration. They 
should offer industries national support and 
financial backing provided they established 
workable conditions for harmonisation. It has 
also been said that the impetus should also come 
from the industries concerned. Probably the 
discipline of taking operating results (profits and 
losses) into account will impel industrial firms to 
seek and strengthen international collaboration 
in their areas of activity. 
10. There is no doubt that cost control for 
individual nations can help to make collabor-
ation work. They should try to agree on 
different areas in which they will concentrate 
their research and their main industrial thrust. 
I. See Appendix I. 
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This would give greater volume to each 
country and it could make two-way street work 
between European countries and between the 
United States and Europe. 
11. The circumstances of low growth and 
pressure on ~efence budgets will induce govern-
ments to achieve the most effective return from 
reso1;1rces available for defence through 
maximum co-operation and rationalisation 
This has been discussed for many years i~ 
NATO and elsewhere with only relatively 
meagre results so far. Pressure is now how-
eye_r, much stronger than in the past ~nd in 
civil fields new technologies have led to impor-
tant benefits for the industries concerned. One 
can point to the microelectronic revolution 
which has brought many benefits to the televi-
sion and watch industries but also to the general 
public. M<:>reover? it should not be forgotten 
that many mdustnal firms carry out both civil 
and military work. 
12. New technology will also change the 
~ature of defence concepts, strategic and opera-
tional. However, to achieve this important 
sums of money will have to be released for 
research and development and therefore less can 
be spent on traditional weapon platforms. New 
technology should be used for example to find 
news ways to meet the tank threat by more 
effective anti-tank weapons (warheads), to 
dev_elop new s~mar data-processing technology 
agamst submannes, new early-warning systems, 
better control systems, weapons systems with 
lasar beams, etc. 
13. Using advanced computing techniques 
and the latest large-scale integrated circuits the 
size of individual components and eve~ of 
whole weapons may well be reduced much 
further and make production far more eco-
nomic. If member countries at the same time 
could improve co-operation by avoiding over-
l~pping in research and development, produc-
tiOn costs could be reduced. New technologies 
should be capable of bringing costs down in the 
defence field just as well as in many civil fields. 
14. Your Rapporteur is happy to learn that 
the NATO Committee on the Challenges of 
Modern Society is studying the problems arising 
from new technology. They are aware that the 
c1;1rrent m~jor technical changes, microelectro-
mcs, robotics,_ co~munications, bio-technologies 
and the explOitatiOn of space and the oceans will 
have a great impact on socio-economic struc-
tures. Moreover there are continuous increases 
in productivity in all branches of production and 
~n the service sector which will accelerate the 
I~pa~t to an ever-increasing extent. The ques-
t~on IS how the relationship between technolo-
gical developments and economic and social 
change can be influenced in order to reduce 
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social risks and make full use of the benefits of 
new technologies. 
15. In the military field, the question will 
become more acute because of the central role of 
the United States in defence from the economic 
point of view. Considerable distrust between 
some European countries and the United States 
has developed as the former sometimes think 
that American stress on the need for arms 
stand~rdis~tion is j_ust another version of a " buy 
Amencan campaign or a formula for relegating 
the Europeans to a subcontractor role, which 
often also means high production costs. On the 
other hand, Americans regard European atti-
tudes as narrow and leading to the continued 
manufacture of obsolescent weapons. 
16. Your Rapporteur wishes to conclude the 
chapter by ~eferring to. the address given by 
~r. Klappench, Managmg Director of Panavia 
Aucraft Company. He stated that the financial 
advan_tages for the participating governments in 
adoptmg the consortia approach when starting 
deyelopment o_f advanced systems were clearly 
evident. The mdustries of Western Europe had 
clearly demonstrated that they had the manage-
ment tools and experience to handle the chal-
lenges of international programmes. On the 
government side, it was necessary to establish 
cost control interfaces between national accoun-
ting systems, avoiding duplicating efforts 
between the participants. 
Ill. Research and development activities 
within NATO 
17. The role of NATO is one of advice 
and C?-ordination on armaments co-operation, 
plann~ng _and support. It is not a supranational 
org~msatwn but consists of sixteen sovereign 
nat~ons_ ~ach_ responsible for equipping and 
mamtammg Its own armed forces. Neverthe-
le_ss, NATO ~ctivities can and do catalyse the 
different natwnal defence requirements and 
procurement executives 1• This means that 
common denominators should be found for 
defence research and development. The 
defence ministries in the member countries 
could and should be influenced towards har-
monising their respective equipment policies 
~nd armaments production industries. Such an 
mfluence can be exerted through committee 
work and through personal contacts. Research 
and equipment expert groups provide the means 
of exchanging information on operational 
concepts, national equipment programmes and 
appropriate technical and logistical matters. 
!hr~mgh them valuable aid is given for harmon-
IsatiOn of national concepts and practices in 
many fields. The main aim is to inform 
I. See Appendix 11. 
national authorities of what is being done in 
member countries and invite them to participate 
in common ventures. 
18. Direct research and development in 
NATO is carried out on a small scale at the 
SHAPE technical centre at The Hague and the 
SACLANT submarine research centre at La 
Spezia. 
19. The SHAPE technical centre was set up in 
1954 to overcome the weaknesses of air defence 
within the NATO defence system. Initially the 
task was limited to air defence problems but 
since 1963 its programme has been directed 
towards three major areas of concern to the 
political and military authorities of the alliance; 
they are: force capability and force structure 
including effects of new weapons technology, 
command and control including application of 
automatic data-processing and, thirdly, commu-
nications, systems engineering and support to 
operations. It retains its original task of helping 
SHAPE in its function as executive command 
for the integrated air defence system. 
20. The SACLANT anti-submarine warfare 
research centre has been in existence since 1959 
and provides scientific and technical advice to 
SACLANT in the field of anti-submarine war-
fare. The centre may also render scientific and 
technical assistance to individual NATO nations 
in this field. It carries out research and limited 
development including oceanography, opera-
tional research and analysis. The scientific 
programme covers underwater acoustic research, 
oceanographic research and anti-submarine 
warfare studies. 
21. In this context mention should also be 
made of the von Karman Institute for fluid 
dynamics which is at the disposal of the NATO 
countries through the Advisory Group for Aero-
space Research and Development (AGARD). 
It was founded in 1956 by Dr. von Karman and 
provides a number of academic and research 
programmes for postgraduate students. The 
same Dr. von Karman was also at the origin of a 
section which deals with aerospace questions 
within the Military Committee. 
22. Since 1966, the main NATO body for 
research, development and production of arma-
ments has been the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors. It helps the member 
countries to join together in equipment and 
research projects and also provides the means 
for exchanging information on operational 
concepts, national equipment programmes and 
appropriate technical and logistical matters. It 
further encourages discussions on longer-term 
research activities with a view to providing 
guidance on the possibility of meeting future 
military needs through the application of 
advanced technology or scientific discoveries. 
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23. Six main organs operate under the 
auspices of the Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors: the three service armaments 
groups (the NATO Naval Armaments Group, 
the NATO Air Force Armaments Group and the 
NATO Army Armaments Group), the Defence 
Research Group and the Tri-Service Group on 
Communications and Electronic Equipment. 
Another group having equal status is the NATO 
Industrial Advisory Group. 
24. In 1981, a new system was accepted by 
which a more organised and pragmatic approach 
to armaments co-operation was adopted. The 
new system is more flexible in order to allow 
countries wishing to co-operate to act in as free a 
manner as possible, subject only to such general 
rules as are necessary in an alliance. The new 
system is called " the periodic armaments 
planning system" and its overall objective is to 
provide a systematic and coherent framework 
for promoting co-operative programmes on the 
basis of harmonised military requirements. 
The procedures and guidelines for implementa-
tion are based on two general principles: the 
recognition of the sovereignty of nations 
regarding equipment decision-making and the 
utilisation of the basic existing alliance structure, 
roles, relationships and responsibilities. The 
periodic armaments planning system would 
reconcile the two general principles with (i) 
fulfilling the most pressing military equipment 
needs of the alliance, (ii) adapting to political, 
economic and technical realities, and (iii) 
establishing and maintaining broad co-operation 
throughout the weapon system's life cycle. 
Important decisions have to be made during the 
life of a weapons systems programme and the 
periodic armaments planning system is intended 
to provide a structured approach to aid decision-
making at the crucial stage. The system also 
clarifies the roles of the national and inter-
national military authorities and the NATO 
staff in the decision-making process. This 
system should contribute to enhanced arma-
ments co-operation and the collective defence 
effort. 
25. The Defence Research Group has 
sponsored several joint ventures of a scientific or 
technical nature. The group encourages discus-
sions on long-term research activities with a 
view to providing guidance on the possibility of 
meeting future military needs through the appli-
cation of advanced technology or new scientific 
discoveries. A number of sub-groups have been 
established: (i) on long-term scientific studies, 
(ii) on physics and electronics, (iii) on optics and 
infrared, (iv) on defence applications of opera-
tional research, ( v) on defence applications of 
human and biomedical sciences, (vi) on elec-
tronic warfare concepts and technology, (vii) on 
long-term research related to air defence, and 
(viii) a special group of experts on concealment, 
camouflage and deception. 
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26. Nearly all participants of these groups are 
representatives of governmental institutions or 
laboratories and industrial representatives are 
very rarely present. The sub-groups work up to 
the level of a prototype ; for instance, with 
regard to electronic warfare, studies are being 
undertaken on the best type of equipment to be 
used to prevent jamming by enemy forces. So 
far as basic research is concerned, few member 
countries hesitate in participating. In the case 
of high technology applications, the working 
groups automatically become more restricted. 
27. When direct economic and industrial inte-
rests are involved and industrial secrecy plays an 
important role, some of the most advanced 
countries might not want to participate in the 
working groups and member countries are not 
inclined to provide the necessary information 
needed to bring the studies to a successful 
conclusion. 
28. This is true not only for the Defence 
Research Group but also for the main groups 
under the Conference of National Armaments 
Directors (CNAD). Nevertheless, as soon as 
sensitive information is considered the initial 
open working groups become closed working 
groups and the participants are obliged to keep 
all information received within such a working 
group to themselves. The crucial moment 
arrives when participating countries provide 
money for detailed studies on requirements. 
Those countries which do not want to invest 
money in more advanced studies are then 
excluded from further participation. This is what 
happened with the Tornado multi-role combat 
aircraft and what might happen now with the 
NATO frigates for the 1990s. Your Rapporteur 
will return to this issue later on as it provides a 
good example of how such projects are deve-
loped and progress. Even if only a few 
countries participate in a venture originating in 
NATO it still remains a NATO venture as this 
may facilitate means of collaboration and 
especially budget allocations earmarked for 
longer periods or even for the duration of the 
venture. It is also possible that some projects 
are not pursued further within NATO but 
bilaterally or trilaterally instead. Reports are sent 
periodically to member countries to keep them 
informed on the state of activities of the organs 
under the CNAD. 
29. In June 1968 the Conference of National 
Armaments Directors established the NATO 
Industrial Advisory Group. Although the mem-
bers of the group are representatives of specific 
industries they represent at the same time the 
whole of the industry from their home coun-
try. Normally there are three to four represent-
atives from each country and two governmental 
representatives. The objectives of this group 
are to provide a forum for free exchanges of 
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views on the various industrial aspects of NATO 
armaments questions. It promotes interna-
tional involvement in research, development 
and production amongst the industries of the 
member countries and encourages exchanges of 
information between defence ministries and 
defence industries. It has undertaken a wide 
range of prefeasibility studies accompanied by 
estimated costs and other economic and tech-
nical data. It has become a significant aid in 
NATO's co-operative equipment endeavours. 
(a) Eurogroup 1 
30. The Eurogroup is an informal grouping of 
European member countries created in 1968 at 
the suggestion of the then United Kingdom 
Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Healey, to 
co-ordinate European defence efforts within the 
alliance. The basic aim was to ensure that the 
European contribution to the common defence 
would be as strong, cohesive and effective as 
possible. It is an informal body which operates 
without a permanent secretariat. It usually 
meets twice a year just before the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee. 
31. Every year the Eurogroup countries bring 
into service a wide range of new equipment2, 
both additional and replacement, and make 
qualitative improvements to equipment already 
in service. They are placing increasing emphasis 
on equipment collaboration and in achieving 
standardisation or interoperability in this field. 
32. Various Eurogroup countries are involved 
in a number of collaborative projects such as the 
Tornado multi-role combat aircraft. On other 
occasions Eurogroup countries have undertaken 
joint procurement of United States equipment 
such as the F-16, the Lance missile system, the 
improved Sidewinder air-to-air missile, and the 
Harpoon anti-surface ship missile. 
33. Joint procurement of defence equipment 
led to the establishment of meetings of the 
national armaments directors of Eurogroup 
·member countries (EURONAD). They con-
cluded an agreement on the exchange of 
information on their plans for acquiring new 
equipment for their forces. 
34. A result of the Eurogroup meetings was 
the establishment in 1975 of the Independent 
European Programme Group. EURONAD acti-
vities were then more or less taken over by 
this group. 
I. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
United Kingdom. 
2. See Appendix Ill. 
(b) Independent European Programme Group I 
35. The four main objectives of the IEPG set 
out in February 1976 when the group 'was 
created, were: 
- to make more effective use of the 
financial means available for research 
development and procurement ; ' 
- to increase standardisation and inter-
operability of equipment in view of 
improving co-operation in logistics and 
training; 
- to ensure the maintenance of a sound 
European industrial and technological 
base in the field of defence ; 
- to give the European countries greater 
weight in their relations with the United 
States and Canada. 
36. There were two basic ideas in favour of 
creating a framework for co-operation of all the 
European. partners of the alliance (including 
France, given the fact that the non-participation 
of one of the biggest defence industries in 
Europe would have been a very serious draw-
back): 
(i) striving for a kind of " European 
preference " in armaments research/ 
development and production ; 
(ii) reversing the trend in the transatlantic 
dialogue in research and development 
and in procurement in favour of 
Europe, by increasing the European 
part in this two-way street. 
37. The first goal demands that the European 
defence industries achieve closer co-operation 
~ight at the research and development stage, and 
m parallel with the efforts by the IEPG to 
establish a long-term framework for planning 
and . for harmonising the national military 
reqmrements. The evidence available suggests 
that up to now little progress has been achieved 
in this field. 
38. The prospects are not too bright today as 
far as the major weapons systems are concerned. 
Decisions on a new battle tank for the 1990s 
(or~ginal~y a German-British-Dutch project, but 
which, m February 1980, became merely a 
Franco-German one) and on a new tactical 
fighter plane (with the four major European 
weapons producers involved) have been post-
poned, due to financial uncertainties and acute 
problems of research funding. The project for a 
medium-range transport plane seems also to be 
in doubt. There are areas of totally new equip-
ment, however, where a common European 
I. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
Umted Kmgdom. 
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effort could come to fruition: electronic warfare 
systems, guided missiles (tactical) of the third 
generation and terminal guided munitions and 
submunitions. 
39.. I~ th~ years of financial stringency ahead, 
ration~hsatwn of arms production and procure-
ment IS more necessary than before ; the IEPG 
could play a more active role. 
40. The IEPG meets at the level of Under-
Secretaries of Defence or of National Arma-
ments Directors. At working level it has three 
panels. 
41. Panel I of the IEPG, composed of 
representatives of the National Armaments 
Directors under the chairmanship of the United 
Kingdom, draws up each spring a schedule of the 
major equipment replacement intentions of each 
member country for a period up to fifteen or 
twenty years ahead, under general headings such 
as: "guided weapons- air", "mine systems-
land"," control and ADP systems", etc. 
42. For each item of equipment the schedule 
sho~s first: the task or mission of the proposed 
eqmpement ; the planned or expected in-service 
d~te ; details of equipment presently in service ; 
typ~ of replacement equipment ; quantities 
envisaged. 
43. Identified opportunities for co-operation 
are. then pass~d to Panel. 11, chaired by Belgium, 
which establishes special groups for detailed 
study of particular projects or requirements. 
44. The schedules are passed then from the 
IEPSJ to the . NATO Armaments Planning 
Review Co-ordmator who adds similar inform-
ation supplied by Canada and the United States 
for use by the NATO Conference of National 
Armaments Directors in which these two coun-
tries participate together with the twelve IEPG 
countries. In this way opportunities for purely 
European co-operation are investigated first, 
before transatlantic opportunities are consi-
dered. 
45. Panel Ill of the IEPG, under the chair-
manship of Germany, is concerned with econo-
mics and defence co-operation procedures. It is 
also considering models of compensation 
competition, work-sharing, industrial co~ 
operation and export arrangements for jointly-
produced equipment 1• 
IV. Common efforts 
(a) A NATO frigate for the 1990s 
46. As your Rapporteur indicated earlier, a 
more detailed description of the studies made in 
NATO for about two years on a frigate for the 
I. See Appendix IV. 
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1990s might be useful in this context. Tenta-
tively the frigate replacement plan for the 1990s 
is aimed at having the new ships entering service 
towards the middle of the 1990s. This suggests 
that these vessels will not be intended only to 
replace the present generation of frigates which 
at that time will be between ten and fifteen years 
old, but also to fill other replacement needs. 
The programme will be the single most impor-
tant NATO naval project of the future. This 
type of frigate of some 4,500 tons has been the 
subject of joint prefeasibility studies by all 
maritime member countries of NATO. The 
defence ministries of Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and the United States are parti-
cipating ; the NATO Industrial Advisory Group 
was heavily involved in preparing the pre-
feasibility study. 
47. Different variants of this standard frigate 
have been studied depending on whether the 
ship is to be used in the Atlantic, the Mediter-
ranean or the North Sea and the Baltic. The 
variants will also have different weapons 
systems since, for instance, anti-submarine war-
fare requirements are not the same for the 
Mediterranean, the Atlantic or the more shallow 
waters of the North Sea and the Baltic. The 
assumption is that 100-200 frigates will have to 
be built for the participating countries in the last 
decade of the century and with identical 
hulls considerable cost-saving can be achieved. 
Much more important savings could be achieved 
if the weapons and electronic systems could be 
reduced to two or three standard models. It 
appears that industry and governments are 
favourably inclined towards both aspects. 
48. The national authorities are expected to 
sign the memorandum of understanding on the 
NATO frigate for the 1990s in February 1984 in 
order to start work on the feasibility study. 
(b) Anti-tank guided weapons 
49. Another example is the third generation 
anti-tank guided weapon. On 16th February 
1983 France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
signed an intergovernmental agreement on 
definition studies. Euromissile Dynamics 
Group would lead the technical and industrial 
organisation of the project, France being repre-
sented by Aerospatiale and Germany by 
MBB. The sum involved would be F300 mil-
lion and the joint studies should be concluded in 
the middle of 1985. The anti-tank guided 
missile should be operational in 1992 to replace 
the second generation missile. Two types will 
be developed, one for short distances in replace-
ment of the Milan and one for long distances in 
replacement of the Franco-German Hot missile 
and the American Tow missile. The potential 
market might be in the 1 OO,OOOs for a total sum 
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of some F30,000 billion. The prime contractor 
for this project is the Euromissile Dynamics 
Group, which comprises Aerospatiale, British 
Aerospace Dynamics Group and MBB. Within 
this framework, Aerospatiale will take the lead 
in co-ordinating the development of the 
medium-range missile, while BAe and MBB 
will take the lead in co-ordinating the long-range 
ground-to-ground and air-to-ground versions 
respectively. Other European countries from 
the IEPG have been invited to participate but 
this will not basically change the industrial 
set-up as agreed. 
(c) Transport aircraft 
50. In the field of air transport aerospace com-
panies from three European countries and the 
United States have agreed to study future civil 
and military cargo airlift requirements. They 
involve Lockheed, Aerospatiale, British Aero-
space and MBB. Long-term airlift needs will 
first be defined followed by an evaluation of 
transport concepts to meet the needs thus 
defined. The arrangement was set up in accord-
ance with a memorandum of understanding 
signed by the four companies. The preliminary 
study effort does not necessarily mean that the 
four companies will jointly develop a new 
transport aircraft. 
51. Up to now, new military transport aircraft 
have not been given high priority and govern-
ments might be inclined to opt eventually for a 
version of the Airbus. This should be used to 
replace Transall and Hercules military transport 
planes. For long-distance air transport, flight-
fuelling facilities are a first priority as the 
Falklands war clearly showed. 
(d) Helicopters 
52. The Anglo-French helicopter package of 
the late 1960s led to the family of weapons 
concept whereby the need for more than one 
system in a given class of family of weapons was 
recognised by all participating countries. A new 
opportunity may now arise because of the 
initiative taken by the helicopter industries 
of France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom in the 1970s which resulted in their 
Ministers of Defence deciding that they would 
endeavour to meet future helicopter require-
ments amongst themselves. 
53. The Italian and United Kingdom Govern-
ments, having similar requirements for a new 
naval helicopter of some thirteen tons for the 
1990s, took a bilateral initiative recently to meet 
these requirements jointly. An agreement on 
the EH-101 has now been concluded between the 
governments and the work will be carried out by 
Westland and Agusta which have jointly set up a 
company, EH Industries Ltd., which has its 
offices in London. The helicopter will be used 
for civil as well as military applications and a 
large export market can be expected. The 
Ministries of Defence and of Industry were 
involved in this venture and, as the market for 
the Anglo-ltalian helicopter may be much larger 
than initially envisaged, the civil sector was a 
key element which of course also had conse-
quences for the funding of research and develop-
ment for this new type of helicopter. 
54. A NATO helicopter project is being 
discussed between France, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands. The project concerns a heli-
copter of nine tons to be used mainly in the 
NATO frigate. The operational requirements 
are being discussed and prefeasibility studies are 
being conducted. The possibility is being consi-
dered whether this helicopter could also be used 
for army purposes. British participation might 
be possible. 
55. Anglo-French collaboration on the Puma, 
Lynx and Gazelle helicopters has been quite suc-
cessful but, considering the above, no decision 
has yet been taken on the follow-up. 
(e) European wind tunnel 
56. A project of great importance now being 
considered by France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom concerns the establishment of a Euro-
pean wind tunnel. The European transonic 
wind tunnel (ETW) had its origins in an 
AGARD conference that took place in 1971 on 
the needs for high transonic wind tunnel 
testing. This led to the formation of a working 
group which noted United States intentions to 
proceed in this field and provided a focus for 
European thought which was subsequently chan-
nelled into a specially formed NATO/ AGARD 
large wind tunnel group (soon to become known 
as LAWS). Two specific requirements emerged 
from discussion in LAWS - the need for a low 
speed tunnel and one for transonic operation 
which eventually was identified as the ETW. 
57. Design studies proceeded on the feasibility 
of different forms of operating principle until the 
mid-1970s when opinion crystallised in favour 
of a cryogenic tunnel utilising cooled nitrogen to 
achieve the required density and, hence, operat-
ing Reynolds number. The interests of the 
major constructing countries, comprising the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands were protected in the ETW steering 
group which was appointed to prepare the ETW 
specification. The expert representation in the 
ETW steering group was provided by seconded 
government wind tunnel experts, joined before 
long by representatives from European aero-
space companies. 
58. The specification went through a series of 
stages as the requirements evolved to provide 
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full-scale RN testing over virtually the whole 
flight envelope of the kind and size of civil air-
craft that Europe was interested in, typified by 
the A-300B, plus the capability of meeting the 
extreme manoeuvring requirements of military 
aircraft. The latter had the effect of enhancing 
the wind tunnel performance specification. 
The tunnel was also intended to have a low 
supersonic capability. The final specification 
provided full-scale RN testing up to Mach 
1.3/1.35 in a working section of 8ft by 
7ft (roughly 2.5 metres square). 
59. The initial design studies have virtually 
ended and the tunnel go-ahead awaits high-level 
government decisil:lns which will require express 
commitments to cost sharing and agreement on 
the country in which the tunnel is to be sited. 
The participating governments are at present 
formally declaring their positions in order to 
establish support for the tunnel. In determin-
ing national positions governments are known to 
be asking their industries if they would be 
willing to contribute a proportion of the national 
expense. 
60. If and when the go-ahead decision has 
been taken, which will require ministerial 
endorsement in the participating countries, the 
close connection with NATO will be disconti-
nued in favour of more specific government-to-
government co-operative arrangements. 
61. The three main countries will each contri-
bute an equal share and the Netherlands slightly 
less. A feasibility study is now being conducted 
and the country in which the wind tunnel will be 
located will pay an extra 10%. France and 
Germany have both offered sites. If such a 
European facility is established it will be used for 
civil and military aircraft and would have the 
same functions as the corresponding NASA 
facility. The original outlay would be some 
£100 million. 
V. Research and development 
in individual countries 
62. In the United States military planning 
circles, Congress and the administration are 
afraid that the United States' dominant techno-
logy role is being eroded through a lack of long-
range planning while other industrialised nations 
increase their advance in research. The United 
Kingdom, France and Germany are moving 
towards exports of high technology products and 
Japan, which has severe strictures on military 
spending, is moving its funding into consumer 
goods while maintaining a technical base for 
military projects. It is going into consortia in 
engines, airframes and parts and in the 1990s 
will probably become a strong competitor in the 
aerospace field. The United States Govern-
ment is proposing substantial growth for its 
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research and development outlay in the 1983-84 · 
budget. This will be increased from $23.5 bil-
lion to $30.5 billion. The civil research and 
development budget will remain at $16.6 billion. 
63. A large-scale increase in defence research 
and development includes about $900 million 
for research in microelectronics, computer hard-
ware and software and high-speed integrated 
circuits. There will also be major increases for 
strategic programmes, missiles, advanced tech-
nology aircraft such as the B-1 B bomber and 
satellite command and control systems. 
64. From 1984 onwards great emphasis will 
be put on the development of manufacturing 
tools and techniques for a manufacturing basis. 
The air force is studying the requirements for the 
advanced tactical fighter, built with composites 
and with stealth characteristics. Composite 
technologies are vital to this aircraft and work is 
already being done in many American aircraft 
factories as well as in British Aerospace. Full 
research is also being conducted on vertical 
take-off and landing aircraft operating off small 
carriers. This would be an improvement on the 
British Aerospace AV-8A and the McDonnell 
A V -8B (Harrier). 
65. New focus is being put on ram jet 
propulsion to upgrade the advance medium-
range air-to-air missile, AMRAAM. The navy 
budget earmarks $1.5 billion for the develop-
ment of new ballistic missile systems and the 
army budget the same amount for ballistic 
missile defence. 
66. Within industry as well as at government 
level important policy papers have been drawn 
up on national priorities in order to strengthen 
technological innovation capacity (and, as far as 
private firms are concerned, to consider new 
institutional arrangements between universities 
and groups of industrial firms) as well as on co-
operative industrial research ventures. Tax 
incentives should be offered for research and 
development investments and anti-trust laws 
should be changed to allow for co-operative 
research between firms of related industries. 
67. The United Kingdom defence activities 
include a comprehensive science and technology 
research programme, closely linked to the 
development and procurement of defence equip-
ment and systems, and carried out both in 
government research laboratories and industry. 
The total budget of the British Ministry of 
Defence for 1982-83 is £15 billion, of which 
£7 billion is assigned to procurement. Of that 
sum, £1.8 billion is assigned for research and 
development combined, and within this sum, 
£285 million is assigned to research, mainly 
applied. This is some 2% of the total defence 
budget. Overall, three-quarters of government 
defence research and development funds are 
spent in industry ; government policy now being 
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implemented is that this ratio, particularly as 
regards development, should increase, to 
improve the exploitation of defence technologies 
and to make more Ministry of Defence research 
and development establishment effort available 
for longer-term research. 
68. Discussions are proceeding on a new 
technology research programme between indus-
try, several departments of government, Depart-
ment of Industry, Ministry of Defence, and 
Department of Education and Science, directed 
towards the overall field of information techno-
logy and covering such topics as very large-scale 
integrated electronic components, software engi-
neering, man-machine interfaces and intelli-
gence knowledge-based systems. The programme 
is planned to run for five years, with an overall 
cost of some £350 million. 
69. The question has also been raised whether 
the originally-proposed five-year period can be 
maintained and whether the programme should 
not be extended to seven or ten years, adding 
other technology areas in the meantime. 
70. Apart from the Ministries of Defence and 
Industry the British academic community is 
expected to participate through the Education 
and Science Ministries. 
71. The British Government has committed a 
substantial sum to an experimental aircraft 
programme designed to explore the technologies 
needed for a next generation combat aircraft. 
This parallels the separate agile combat aircraft 
project launched by British Aerospace with 
German and Italian industrial partners. Many 
studies have been conducted and the British 
Government is convinced that in Europe there is 
no place for research and development on two 
separate types of combat aircraft. The French 
firm, Dassault, should therefore come in as well 
to make this a quadripartite venture. 
72. British Aerospace is also seeking funds for 
the research and development of an advanced 
vertical take-off and landing fighter aircraft. 
73. Rolls-Royce hopes for development funds 
for an advanced engine for this type of aircraft. 
It also is looking for funds to power the pro-
posed 150-seat civil transport aircraft. 
74. In France the task of the Ministry of 
Research and Industry includes spearheading 
improvements in research and development and 
transferring them into French factories. On the 
defence side the Defence Minister presides over 
a council for defence research and studies which 
draws up guidelines for the research effort in 
areas for which it is responsible. A centre 
dealing with prospects and assessments works 
out details with the active participation of the 
general staffs of the armed forces. The military 
programme law for 1984-88, apart from giving 
acknowledged priority to nuclear forces, starts a 
process of modernisation and reorganisation of 
conventional forces. These preparations for the 
future involve strengthening industry and 
making a greater defence effort. Appropriations 
for research will represent one-quarter of invest-
ment appropriations. At present the defence 
department's share of research is 30% of the 
national research effort. In particular, this 
allows the French armaments industry to remain 
in the vanguard oftechnological developments. 
75. The French Government attaches parti-
cular importance to the continuation of its key 
development programmes in the aerospace and 
electronic sectors. France's aerospace industry 
is in a strong position because of the emphasis 
placed in recent years on research and develop-
ment. High priority is now given to the deve-
lopment of new materials linked with the imple-
mentation of aerospace projects. The materials 
must be available at the start; for instance, 
Concorde was made of aluminium because tita-
nium technology in France and the rest of Eur-
ope was not ready. 
76. France can only hold its leading role in 
composite materials if the research and develop-
ment effort is not only maintained but 
improved. 
77. A focal point for French aerospace 
research and development effort is the Office 
nationale d'etudes et de recherches aerospatiales 
(ONERA). This government-sponsored organi-
sation receives its main funding through the 
French Ministry of Defence as the technical 
aspects of nearly all French military and civil 
programmes come under its jurisdiction. Activ-
ities at ONERA cover a wide range of aero-
space technologies such as active flight controls 
and new wing designs. Separate research activ-
ities are the wind tunnel establishment at 
Modane and the hydrodynamics laboratory at 
Chatillon. 
78. In co-operation with CNES, ONERA 
studies and defines future space systems, includ-
ing the follow-on launchers to the Ariane 
family. 
79. Other specialised establishments are the 
Franco-German institute for research and 
development in St. Louis and the nuclear energy 
agency for nuclear research and development for 
civil and military purposes. 
80. The five-year defence plan proposed by 
the French Government calls for spending 
approximately F 830 billion (about $114 billion 
at current exchange rates) on France's land-, air-
and sea-based military forces between 1983 and 
1988. This total represents an 11% real growth 
in defence spending. 
81. Projected systems acquisitions include 
continued purchase of Dassault-Breguet Mirage 
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2000 fighters in both conventional and nuclear 
attack configurations, purchase of an airborne 
early warning aircraft, placement of initial 
production orders for Dassault-Breguet's 
Atlantic New Generation patrol aircraft and the 
acquisition of airborne command and control 
centres, to be carried in Aerospatiale C-160 
Transall transports, to provide hardened and 
redundant communications links for the use of 
French nuclear forces. 
82. The French air force will retain a front-
line complement of 450 combat aircraft, includ-
ing the 165 newly-acquired Mirage 2000s that 
will be ordered in yearly lots of thirty-three. 
France is proceeding with development of its 
ACX future fighter-demonstrator aircraft and is 
continuing to seek European support for it. 
83. New programmes for the French nuclear 
deterrent force include construction of an 
advanced generation submarine to be opera-
tional in 1994, the start of studies on the mobile 
SX strategic missile, which will replace nuclear-
armed Dassault-Breguet Mirage IVs beginning 
in 1996, and acquisition of the Hades mobile 
tactical nuclear missile in a programme leading 
to activation of the first Hades regiment in the 
early 1990s. 
84. Target acquisition capability for French 
nuclear forces will be improved with the deploy-
ment of Dassault-Breguet Mirage F-1 CR combat 
reconnaissance aircraft and the Canadair/ 
Dornier CL-289 drone. 
85. The Defence Minister, Mr. Charles Hernu, 
said the government had not yet selected an air-
craft as the platform for its airborne early 
warning system, narrowing the competition to 
the Boeing E-3A AWACS, Grumman E-2C, 
British Aerospace Nimrod or a French airframe. 
He said France was considering all these air-
craft types to ensure the best negotiating position 
for the airborne warning system purchase. 
86. France's effort in the field of defence 
research is comparable to that of the United 
Kingdom but very much less than that of the 
United States and probably of the Soviet Union 
for which there is a lack of reliable statistics. 
87. This remark must, however, be taken with 
moderation. There is still a lack of compar-
able data, even in the western industrialised 
countries, so great is the feeling of governments 
that military secrets must be concealed behind 
silence or budgetary approximation. 
88. In Germany the Federal Government is of 
the opinion that the Conference of National 
Armament Directors (with the Americans) and 
the Independent European Programme Group 
(with the French) provide all the necessary possi-
bilities for co-operation. The only question is 
how effective the organisations are. Everyone 
agrees on the need for co-operation in general 
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but when practical conclusions have to be drawn 
and political agreements executed, then many 
obstacles arise. Everyone is also in agreement 
that, in order to collaborate with the Americans, 
Europe should speak with one voice. Only then 
would it be possible for Europe to talk with the 
United States as equals. 
89. The past has taught us that collaboration 
between two or three states is the most effective. 
The most pragmatic solution would probably 
be to seek to develop collaboration between two 
countries and then try to increase this to include 
three or four countries. Secondly, one needs 
concrete projects and a definite goal on which to 
base science and technology research. Thirdly, 
the best results can be achieved only if the 
general staffs indicate limited well-defined 
requirements. Here again, detailed agreements 
are a necessity without which no results can be 
achieved. One should not forget that weapons 
systems are becoming more and more expensive 
because they require the most advanced techno-
logy. Agreement on specific operational 
concepts are much easier to arrive at in a bi-
lateral or sometimes trilateral framework. There 
are examples between France and Germany, 
such as the Nordatlas, Transall, Alpha-Jet, 
Roland, Hot, Milan, etc. 
90. Once agreement has been reached on 
operational concepts and projects are being 
executed, as in the abovementioned examples, 
great economies can be achieved and financial, 
logistic and commercial advantages then follow. 
91. Apart from the working groups within the 
NATO and IEPG frameworks, bilateral Franco-
German and German-British working groups are 
considering possibilities of collaboration in the 
production of military hardware based on the 
general staff requirements of those countries. 
92. On 24th September 1983, a trilateral 
summit meeting took place of defence ministers 
(British-Franco-German) to consider the pos-
sibilities of collaboration in microelectronics 
which are of great importance for the air forces, 
the navies and for communications in general. 
Experts are now studying the possibilities of 
such co-operation. Other groups of experts are 
considering joint weapons systems, tanks, air-
craft construction and marine technology for the 
future procurement of the forces. Each of the 
three countries is convinced that " going-it-
alone " is no longer possible and that bilateral or 
trilateral collaboration has therefore become an 
absolute necessity. Once agreement is reached, 
then a decision will have to be taken on which 
country should have the leadership. The other 
two countries, however, should produce impor-
tant essential complete subsystems. 
93. As far as transport aircraft are concerned, 
the German air force will continue with the 
Transall up to the year 2000. This is made 
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possible due to many new elements having been 
built into the second generation of this aircraft. 
Under discussion are a further wide range of 
projects which, if developed, would become 
operational in the 1990s. They include larger 
and faster Airbuses and, in the military field, the 
Franco-German construction of a new second-
generation anti-tank helicopter. The largest 
project which will come up for decision in the 
near future is the replacement for the McDon-
nell Douglas F-4F Phantom fighter. Several 
possibilities are being studied each involving a 
French and/or British partner or a possible deal 
with a United States aerospace company. The 
German aerospace firm MBB is studying 
requirements for the new combat aircraft, whose 
primary mission would be air-to-air combat. 
The government is hesitant because of the 
ultimate cost of launching such a plane. 
94. Dornier, the other German aircraft manu-
facturer, is proposing an alternative and possibly 
less costly plane in collaboration either with 
Dassault or Northrop in the United States. 
At the same time studies are being conducted 
on the possibility of producing a new powerful 
European jet engine for this type of plane. 
There is no doubt that in Germany the Tornado 
venture has not received general approval. 
95. Nevertheless, government and industry 
are aware that no individual European country 
would be able to obtain a European market 
without bi- or multilateral co-operation. Only a 
collaborative project would open the market for 
some 800 to 1,000 planes whereas a national 
market would mean not more than 200. 
96. The discussions on the European tank did 
not come to a successful conclusion as France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom all had their 
own model and too much national work had 
gone into the development of these for them to 
agree on a common type. In the early 1960s the 
German army had already ordered what later 
became the Leopard tank and once a country has 
a good product it is extremely difficult to 
accommodate the elements for joint production. 
The British developed the Chieftain and now 
have the Challenger and the French army the 
AMX. Moreover, timetables have never been 
fully harmonised. 
97. In Italy the government is firmly convin-
ced of the need to co-operate on armaments for 
the year 2000 and of the great importance of 
arriving at a European consensus on the building 
of new weapons systems. It has adopted a prag-
matic approach and is of the opinion that insti-
tutional arrangements are of less importance. 
In the military aeronautical field its policy is to 
promote European collaboration and the main 
issue in the Directorate-General for armaments 
procurement is the successor to the F-104F. 
This aircraft could be replaced by a European 
combat aircraft or by an aircraft ordered from 
the MRCA consortium which built the Tor-
nado ; a third solution is the establishment of a 
new European construction project and the 
fourth solution would be to order such a plane 
from the United States and produce it in Italy 
under American licence. Such a venture would 
be the last chance to build a European fighter 
aircraft for the 1990s and to establish a Euro-
pean partnership for such a production. The 
United Kingdom, Germany and Italy are work-
ing on it on a governmental and industrial 
level and a partnership with France is hoped 
for. However, the air forces of the four coun-
tries do not have identical requirements for their 
future combat aircraft and alternatives are still 
being considered. 
98. From the institutional point of view a 
lightweight structure has now been set up 
between Agusta and W estland for building the 
EH-101 helicopter which might be better than 
the MRCA organisation. The latter is rather 
heavy; the Agusta-Westland structure has been 
copied from the Franco-British construction for 
the building of the Jaguar. 
99. With regard to the light fighter, Italy is 
working with the Brazilian company, Embraer, 
which has great experience of collaboration with 
the Italian firm, Aermacchi. 
100. The Italian budget for aeronautical con-
struction and development is some $1,000 mil-
lion a year, half of which is allocated for the 
MRCA. For real research there is only some 
$80 million per year which, of course, is mainly 
used for applied research, for instance for the 
development of a new engine for the Agusta-
Westland helicopter. 
1 01. In missiles the Selenia Spada-Aspide 
programme is now at the production stage and 
these missile systems are being exported. An 
alternative version of this missile system, the 
ship-to-air Albatros, has also been developed 
and is ready for export. There is therefore not 
much room for further joint development. 
102. In Italy research and development is 
carried out in military establishments for each of 
the three armed forces, in nationalised industries 
and in private industries. Nearly all research is 
applied research and where it is carried out 
depends entirely on the projects undertaken. 
The government is careful to avoid duplication 
or overlapping. 
103. The emphasis is on industrial collabor-
ation both in the case of complete systems or of 
a series of subsystems. 
104. In each sector of the three armed forces 
there is considerable awareness of the needs of 
the national industrial economy and the neces-
sity to use the money voted in the national 
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parliaments as efficiently as possible. National 
considerations were preponderant and it is 
doubtful whether there is great willingness in 
national administrations to co-operate. Export 
considerations also count very much and are 
difficult to reconcile with international ventures 
such as the Tornado or the standardisation of 
frigates. 
105. It would, of course, be possible to estab-
lish international consortia for the production of 
major weapons systems but this might weaken 
European competition. Theoretically harmon-
isation in electronics equipment, for instance, 
could be possible if one part of a single elec-
tronics industry could be established in each of 
the four main countries, France, Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom but until now this has 
not been possible because of the various types of 
national laws, regulations and customs. 
106. In the European Community scientific 
and technological research and development 
activities are largely concentrated on energy 
problems such as reactor safety, the long-term 
project on thermonuclear fusion, new forms of 
energy and energy saving. There has also been 
a certain amount of activity in the field of 
industrial competitiveness, particularly in the 
steel sector and new technology industries such 
as computers. All efforts made until now fall 
well short of matching up to the importance of 
the issues involved. A new scientific and tech-
nological strategy is therefore proposed for the 
years 1984-87. In order to cope with inter-
national competition three main priorities 
should be adopted: development of standardised 
measurements, modernisation of traditional 
industries and promotion of new technology 
such as information technology which will be the 
largest sector of manufacturing industry by 1990. 
107. One of the main difficulties in co-ordi-
nating research and development in Western 
Europe stems from the fact that governments are 
not willing to provide extra research and 
development money for a joint effort. Some of 
the national research and development funds 
have to be used for European projects too and it 
was logical for national organisations to be 
unwilling to spend their own money on Euro-
pean projects, especially since research in a 
European framework was automatically more 
costly than in a national framework. Any inter-
national programme should place research in a 
stronger position to face up to the challenges of 
the second half of the 1980s and 1990s. 
108. The European Commission has attempted 
to create a uniform European public market by 
encouraging common standards in telecommu-
nications and computer hardware, urging the 
development of microelectronic technology and 
co-ordinating work of telecommunications 
organisations. In addition, the twenty-six-
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member Conference of European Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) 
and other groups urge a unified approach and 
co-ordinated strategy in numerous areas - com-
ponents, terminals, networks - to provide larger 
markets for manufacturers and a cost-effective 
range of products for consumers. But, such 
efforts notwithstanding, each European country 
still has its own data-processing, microelec-
tronics and telecommunications industry. It 
appears that if a project is too expensive to 
finance domestically, like the Airbus wide-
bodied aircraft or the Ariane launcher, a 
collaborative programme will be started. 
109. One potential project is the $1.5 billion 
European strategic programme of research and 
development in information technology 
(ESPRIT) which might produce a serious five-
year crash research effort. ESPRIT would 
co-ordinate EEC research and development and 
curtail duplication in European laboratories. 
Participating companies have mapped out goals 
in microelectronics, software, artificial intel-
ligence systems, office automation, and com-
puter-aided design. 
110. On 5th November 1983, the EEC Council 
reached important conclusions. With regard to 
financial appropriations, a majority of eight 
countries voted for a sum of 700 million ECU s 
for the five-year period 1984-88 ; two member 
states (the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
United Kingdom) adopted no position on the 
amount of the appropriations pending the results 
of the European Council meeting in Athens on 
budgetary reforms. However, these two coun-
tries did not question the unanimously acknow-
ledged importance and priority attached to the 
ESPRIT programme. 
111. The EEC Council is to continue its di~cus­
sions at its next meeting on 13th December with 
a view to taking a final decision on the whole of 
this important programme. 
VI. A possible role for WEU 
112. The preceding chapters have shown the 
interest of improving co-operation between 
WEU member countries in research and deve-
lopment, particularly in sectors relating to 
advanced technology. 
113. A few examples have also shown that 
current activities in this area (if not the result of 
bilateral agreements) are mainly conducted, not 
without difficulty, in: 
-NATO, in the SHAPE and SACLANT 
research centres, in multilateral groups 
which depend on the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors (e.g. the 
Defence Research Group and its 
various sub-groups) or between indus-
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tries concerned which are members of 
the NATO Industrial Advisory Group; 
and 
- the IEPG (grouping the European 
members of NATO), a main aim of 
which is precisely to make the most of 
the financial resources available for 
research, development and procure-
ment. 
114. Finally, an outline has been given of the 
course now being followed in the United States 
and the principal European countries in research 
and development. 
115. This is an incomplete framework with 
which the Assembly cannot be satisfied in view 
of its responsibilities as the only defence-
oriented European assembly. 
116. The fact that European armaments co-
operation takes place in wider frameworks than 
that of WEU does not prevent the latter, as an 
independent organisation with its own structure 
and organs, following the possibilities which 
exist in this area of primordial importance and 
being able to take initiatives to the specific 
advantage of its member countries. 
117. The Assembly has on many occasions 
recommended that the Council instruct its 
Standing Armaments Committee to carry out 
one or other task, but it has often had a reticent 
reception due to the legitimate concern to avoid 
duplicating the work of other bodies, particularly 
the IEPG. 
118. Yet in its twenty-eighth annual report to 
the Assembly, the Council asserted that: 
" Inspired by a constantly reaffirmed poli-
tical will, the various competent inter-
national bodies, each within the frame-
work of their responsibilities, have a 
particular role to play in this co-oper-
ation. In the Council's opinion, the 
machinery available for consultation must 
function as efficiently as possible within 
the Independent European Programme 
Group, the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee of WEU and the Conference of 
National Armaments Directors of the 
Atlantic Alliance. " 
119. When presenting this report, Mr. Cheys-
son, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, infor-
med the Assembly that Mr. Hintermann, as head 
of the international secretariat of the Standing 
Armaments Committee, had "submitted a 
number of proposals, mainly for fresh studies by 
the SAC which might provide governments with 
the information required to enable member 
countries to progress with the standardisation, 
production and procurement of armaments ". 
120. Your Rapporteur trusts that these studies 
will include one on the subject of the present 
report; in any event, the committee considers 
the governments should not be the sole bene-
ficiaries of information gathered by the Standing 
Armaments Committee; the Assembly too is 
interested. 
121. As already said, your Rapporteur under-
stands the difficulties encountered by govern-
ments and industries in divulging " sensitive " 
information at the level of research and in such a 
delicate area. However, it should not be diffi-
cult - as was already the case for the study on 
armaments industries - to publish, for this study 
too, a declassified version giving the Assembly, 
without too many technical details but on the 
basis of official data, information about the true 
extent of the effort made by each member coun-
try in high technology research and present and 
planned harmonisation of such research at Euro-
pean level. 
122. To proceed in this way would give the 
WEU governments the Assembly's support even 
in the case of efforts in forums other than WEU, 
particularly as the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee might turn to advantage the links which 
its international secretariat has, or is to have, 
with the other bodies concerned. 
123. In this last respect, it should be remem-
bered that the active role of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee is particularly desirable since 
it is distinguished from other European bodies in 
that: 
- it works in the context of political 
directives from the ministers for foreign 
affairs; 
- it has an international secretariat; 
- it brings together representatives of all 
the more industrialised European coun-
tries, the usual partners in agreements 
on armaments co-operation. 
VII. Conclusions 
124. In Europe, and usually in close liaison 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
there is an extensive network of connections, 
institutions, working groups, etc. which can be 
used for starting or improving co-operation in 
the armaments field and particularly in branches 
of technology necessary for our future defence. 
125. This observation leads to the following 
conclusions: 
(i) European co-operation in the armaments field is necessary 
126. Three factors have to be borne in mind: 
the evolution of the threat, the growing cost of 
equipment and economic difficulties. 
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127. The Warsaw Pact is steadily increasing its 
present potential by introducing many new 
systems whose technological quality has 
definitely progressed. This effort is based on a 
far higher proportion of the GNP earmarked for 
defence than in the western countries and on the 
availability of a large reserve of manpower 
through a period of military service which is, on 
average, three times longer than in France or in 
allied countries which still have military service. 
128. In the face of this evolution, the western 
countries cannot respond with a like effort for 
obvious economic and social reasons. They 
have to use their own means and capabilities, i.e. 
their capacity for technological innovation. 
Since the level of their forces and equipment is 
traditionally lower than that of the Warsaw Pact, 
their forces have to be more efficient and their 
equipment of a higher performance. 
129. But this requirement leads, on the one 
hand, to very significant growth in the cost of 
research and development as a percentage of the 
total cost of each armaments programme and, 
on the other, to the cost of equipment rising 
more quickly than inflation. 
130. This phenomenon is further amplified by 
the emergence of a specifically military aspect in 
certain branches of technology. In the last 
fifteen or twenty years, the development of new 
armaments programmes has drawn extensively 
on technology, basic components, etc., available 
on the civil market and developed for civil 
purposes: electronics, computers, special 
materials, etc. The effort to be made to meet 
defence requirements has therefore generally 
been limited, where the research and develop-
ment sector is concerned, to the militarisation of 
components already on the market and their 
integration into systems. 
131. The need for radical improvements in 
future armaments in terms of survivability and 
efficiency is now leading to technological 
developments which can generally find no short-
or medium-term outlets in the civil field. 
Hence these developments must be financed 
mainly by defence budgets. This is the case of 
high-density and/or high-speed microelectronics 
(submicronic VLSI, VHSIC), optronics, software 
(processing of signals), etc. In other words, the 
military sector, after having been the driving 
force in technology during and just after the 
second world war (mainly in the United States 
and then in France at the beginning of the sixties 
with the launching of strategic and nuclear 
programmes), as from the mid-sixties benefited 
from the existence of a civil industrial techno-
logical base and once again became (for how 
long we do not know) primarily an initiator of 
research and development in a large number of 
advanced technological sectors, but also the 
payer ... 
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132. Such a trend would require an increase in 
the defence budgets of the western countries only 
with difficulty compatible with present econo-
mic possibilities. The only solution is therefore 
co-operation. The sole or main aim of such co-
operation is nc:r longer, as it was in the past, to 
reduce the cost of producing one or other piece 
of equipment by lengthening production runs 
but must now also take account of the need to 
share the cost of research and development. 
(ii) But this co-operation, essential for the western, 
or at least European, countries, is encountering obstacles 
National interests. 
133. Each state has so far considered that the 
research sector should in general be kept clear of 
active co-operation, in the absence, moreover, of 
a clear-cut requirement. Admittedly, there 
have been many and generally fruitful exchanges 
of information. But few examples can be 
quoted of real co-operation in the early stages, 
apart from that practised in the Franco-German 
Institute at Saint Louis. 
134. The same is obviously true for each firm 
whose future survival depends partly on its 
investments in research and the risk inherent in 
every effort made and every long-term con-
tingency. Transferring or sharing technology is 
often considered to be an unacceptable short-
term sacrifice, whatever the long-term benefits 
maybe. 
Timetables 
135. Until now, co-operation between Euro-
pean countries has mainly been within well-
defined armaments programmes for which parti-
cipating countries have been able to harmonise 
their timetables and specifications. These time-
tables are obviously directly linked with 
schedules for replacing equipment in service. 
The weight of the past therefore plays an 
essential role and in many cases is the reason for 
failures or difficulties (for instance, the Franco-
German tank). It is difficult to find a com-
promise: the obsolescence of certain equipment 
does not allow its replacement to be delayed too 
long and for budgetary reasons this cannot be 
brought forward. Difficulties are probably less 
in the case of co-operation in the earlier stages 
not so directly linked with a given weapons 
system. Common objectives still have to be 
defined since at industrial level co-operation will 
have to produce components which can be used 
in one or several programmes. Perhaps 
emphasis should be placed on co-operation in 
research or development of subsystems usable in 
several programmes. 
Spec((ications 
136. Here too the past carries great weight. 
All general staffs have their own ideas about the 
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use of their forces, often in spite of the desire 
to achieve harmonisation which exists in the 
alliance or in bilateral relations between coun-
tries. But there are also real differences: the 
Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, in 
view of its geographical position does not have 
the same air defence problem as the United 
Kingdom and France. Logistic problems are 
also different. In certain cases, therefore, the 
aim should be to seek, for a given system, the 
highest possible common denominator rather 
than try to work out identical systems: the 
existence of several versions of a system must be 
accepted. 
The free use of technology resulting from 
co-operation. 
137. Each country has its own policy for arms 
exports. For some of them the decision to 
export certain materiel or not is a major part of 
their foreign policy and the independence of that 
decision must be preserved. Co-operation must 
not lead to the co-operating countries aligning 
themselves on the country with the most restric-
tive policy. Sooner or later, this would consi-
derably reduce Europe's weight in the inter-
national concert. 
(iii) How can co-operation be improved, at least in Europe? 
138. It is evident that political will is an 
essential factor. This will must be shown by a 
real effort by each country to harmonise the 
timetables of programmes and operational and 
technical specifications in order to reach realistic 
compromises, solve problems relating to the free 
use of jointly-developed technology, etc. An 
essential factor should be to take greater account 
of the possibilities of co-operation when working 
out the long-term equipment plans of the forces 
of each nation. But these plans are generally 
drawn up in terms of national requirements 
alone and once they have been fixed there is 
little room for adjusting timetables. 
139. But political will is not enough without 
the active support of industry. There are many 
examples of programmes with political support 
which have failed because they were too remote 
from industrial interests. There is not a single 
example of a programme which has succeeded 
against the will of industry. Conversely, certain 
successes are due solely to industrial initiatives. 
Co-operation must correspond exclusively to a 
definite advantage for participating industries. 
Such initiatives must therefore be encouraged 
and obstacles to the establishment of close, 
intra-European, inter-firm links should be 
removed. Obstacles include: different policies 
and options for basic types of components 
(electronics, optronics), standards and procedure 
for procurement, financing research, protecting 
patents, etc. 
140. These difficulties and obstacles would be 
fewer if European co-operation were developed 
in the earlier stages: joint research on advanced 
technology, joint exploratory work, etc. An 
effort to co-operate in these fields can but lead to 
joint options for components, standards, etc. 
Moreover, co-operation is necessary to streng-
then or establish links between given firms 
since it allows joint future goals to be established 
and hence conditions for their joint survival, 
thus facilitating transfers of technology and 
the optimum use of the capability of each co-
operating party. 
(iv) Co-operation in high technology 
141. The factors to be taken into account to 
promote or to improve co-operation are explai-
ned in the above analysis. To sum up: 
(a) Certain aspects of technology, necessary 
for the maintenance of credible defence in the 
western countries, now have to be developed for 
strictly military purposes, the civil sector having, 
in the short- and medium-term at least, no 
clearly-established requirements or specific-
ations. 
(b) Such technology relates to the attainment 
of two essential goals of any future defence: the 
survival of forces and the efficiency of equip-
ment. Survival is mainly a problem of resisting 
a first enemy strike, whether conventional or 
nuclear, and of countermeasures. Efficiency is 
a question of accuracy (intelligent weapons) and 
obtaining information. The corresponding 
technology may be divided into three categories: 
- various electronic components - VLSI 
(submicronic) or VHSIC (high-speed); 
- sensors: optronic or millimetric; 
- software for processing signals or data. 
(c) Industrial components stemming from 
current research into such technology will 
probably not be available on the market of the 
West, contrary to what has been the case in the 
last twenty years. There is in fact a certain 
hardening of American policy towards trans-
atlantic exchanges in this field. If Europe 
wishes to retain its independence for supplies, 
and hence also for its decisions, it must develop 
an independent industrial capability. This 
raises a question of markets: no individual 
European country is large enough, compared 
with Japan or the United States, for its domestic 
market to allow competitive production of basic 
components. Serious consideration should be 
given to setting up a common market for these 
components, i.e. a pooling of research efforts 
and means of producing the components result-
ing from this research. 
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(d) The joint development of advanced 
technology and the co-ordinated industrialisa-
tion of the resulting components are prior condi-
tions for co-operation in the weapons systems of 
the future insofar as these components are the 
key to the performances required of these 
systems. 
(e) Such an attitude or course must first be 
based on better mutual information and a 
concerted approach to future requirements. 
Co-operation in advanced technology must no 
longer be solely in the framework of agreements 
on the joint development of specific systems, it 
must increasingly be a particular goal. 
(f) Such a course must take account of two 
apparently contradictory constraints: the need 
for competition, essential in research and 
creativeness, and the need to group production 
in order to meet Japanese and American compe-
tition. 
(g) Moreover, this course means solving diffi-
culties inherent in each country's own structure 
or policy: 
- different weight carried by the decisions 
and financing of different ministries: 
defence, economy, industry and 
research; 
- different financing structures: research 
budgeted or financed by a percentage of 
each contract concluded with industry, 
etc.; 
- ratio of research to the total budget 
which varies widely among European 
countries; 
- independence of decision of each coun-
try on the use of jointly-developed 
technology. 
(v) Initiatives to be taken by WEU 
142. While recognising that for several reasons 
multilateral armaments co-operation is concer-
ted in wider frameworks than that of Western 
European Union, there seems to be a role for 
WEU in research on advanced technology if it is 
borne in mind that such research is an aim in 
itself, that the European countries the most 
concerned are members of WEU and that 
Japanese and American competition must be 
met. 
143. The first step in this direction would be 
independent European reflection in which the 
Standing Armaments Committee, appropriately 
instructed by the Council, might afford its 
assistance. 
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APPENDIX I 
National defence expenditure figures for WEU countries 
On I st December I982 NATO published the following figures relating to national defence 
expenditure for the WEU countries. 
The expenditure is at current prices in national currency units. 
Belgium ........................ . 
France .......................... . 
Germany ....................... . 
Italy ............................ . 
Luxembourg .................... . 
Netherlands ..................... . 
United Kingdom ................ . 
I2 7,90 I million BF 
I45, I 55 million FF 
54,553 million DM 
I2,066 billion lira 
I ,976 million LF 
II ,932 million guilders 
I4,I86 million £ 
This represents as a percentage of the gross domestic product: 
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3% 
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1% 
Germany ....................... 4.3% 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6% 
Luxembourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 % 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2% 
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3% 
NATO figures 
($ 3.56 billion) 
($ 26 billion) 
($ 25 billion) 
($ 8.89 billion) 
($ 50.6 million) 
($ 4.93 billion) 
($ 28.66 billion) 
Equipment expenditure as a percentage of the total defence expenditure: 
Belgium....................... I5.3% 
France ....................... . 
Germany ..................... . 
Italy ......................... . 
Luxembourg .................. . 
Netherlands .................. . 
29.0% 
17.6% 
I8.I% 
2.5% 
20.4% 
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.8% 
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Department of Defence 
report on allied commitments 
to defence spending 
Report to United States Congress by Caspar W. Weinberger 
Secretary of Defence (March 1981) 
In recent years most of the allies have 
been allocating a growing share of their defence 
spending to capital expenditures, thereby revers-
ing a downward pattern that existed during the 
late sixties and early seventies. (The informa-
tion available on allied spending by resource 
category for 1980 and beyond is not sufficiently 
refined to enable us to provide relatively firm 
figures for those years. Based on preliminary 
data we are inclined to believe that the patterns 
depicted here will not change drastically during 
1980 and 1981.) "Capital" is defined to 
include RDTeE, procurement of major equip-
ment and ammunition and construction of 
facilities including NATO infrastructure. The 
share allocated to capital by the non-US NATO 
nations combined declined from 30% in 1967 
to 23 % in 1971, but increased to 28 % in 
1979. A similar pattern is indicated for procu-
rement of major equipment and ammunition -
the largest component of capital. This category 
declined from 19 % in 1967 to 14 % in 
1971 and then gradually increased to 19 % in 
1979. During the same period the US capital 
percentage fell from around 40 % in 1968 to 
30 % in 1975, reflecting in part the South-East 
Asia phasedown. This share remained in the 
neighbourhood of 30 % during 1975-78 and 
moved upward to 33 % in 1979. US spending 
for major equipment and ammunition followed 
a comparable trend, declining from 30 % to 
18 %between 1968 and 1975, holding steady at 
about 18 % during 1975-78 and increasing to 
22 %in 1979. 
In May 1979, when the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee ministers set the current 
1 billion IAU ($ 4. 721 billion) ceiling on 
infrastructure funding for five years (1980-84), 
they also agreed, among other things ( 1) to seek 
means of expediting the programme and (2) to 
have a mid-term review of the adequacy of the 
fund ceiling. They also agreed to allow the 
major NATO commanders (MNCs) latitude in 
programming early in order to deal with pri-
ority military requirements. (An IAU is an 
international accounting unit which was worth 
$4.721 in 1980 and$ 4.61 in early 1981). 
Accordingly, the MNCs have program-
med heavily in Slice 31 (285 million IAU) and 
in their proposed Slice 32 (352 million IAU). 
They have maintained the need to press 
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forward with high priority projects in these two 
slices, in order to cope with the changes in the 
world situation and the threat to NATO since 
the May 1979 decision. In addition, the 
MNCs have now cited the need for an increase 
of almost 700 million IAU above the current 
1 billion IAU ceiling to handle additional high 
priority military projects, after having deferred 
other projects estimated at an additional 
700 million IAU. 
The US has pressed for these increases 
both to enhance NATO burden-sharing and to 
secure funds sufficient to permit fulfilment of 
NATO missions stemming from agreed ministe-
rial guidance, force goals, the LTDP and other 
urgent programmes, including many large pro-
jects for the use of US forces under the new 
reinforcement support category. Such increa-
ses are also necessary to offset the effects of 
inflation on the cost estimates used as a basis 
for the 1 billion IAU ceiling. The majority of 
the NATO countries support the need for the 
early mid-term review advocated by the US and 
the need for some increase. 
The NATO long-term defence program-
me, initiated by the US in 1977 and approved 
by NATO leaders in Washington in 1978, adds 
a new dimension to NATO force planning. It 
provides a long-term, detailed programme of 
modernisation and other improvements in ten 
high-priority functional areas. Moreover, it 
was designed to provide rationalisation of 
alliance programmes through greater co-ordina-
tion and co-operation between national pro-
grammes. It contains many requirements for 
joint alliance action on the development of 
new, standardised equipment and families of 
weapons. This together with the NATO force 
goals represents a reasonable challenge to which 
the NATO nations have dedicated themselves. 
In general, LTDP progress has been satis-
factory, but implementation in certain areas has 
been disappointing A detailed look at perfor-
mance in each of the ten programme areas is 
contained in the January 1981 DOD report on 
rationalisation/standardisation within NATO. 
The L TDP is a long-term effort spanning 
this decade and into the 1990s. Sustained 
national efforts and wills are necessary to see 
the programme through. Not all alliance 
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members have sufficient financial resources to 
fulfil their requirements without external assis-
tance. Others could make a greater effort more 
commensurate with their economic capabili-
ties. Time and sustained resource commit-
ments are necessary for successful completion 
of the agreed LTDP. But the ultimate result 
will be a stronger, more cohesive alliance and 
greater deterrence of aggression through a more 
capable defence posture. 
NATO long-term defence programme (LTDP) 
The L TOP calls for NATO nations to 
implement over 120 major defence measures in 
ten high-priority areas. US representatives, in 
various NATO fora and in bilateral discussions 
with allied officials, have urged our allies to 
accelerate implementation of the LTDP mea-
sures. US officials also have questioned our 
allies concerning gaps in their L TDP implemen-
tation throughout the annual defence review 
within NATO. The US was a leader in setting 
up the LTDP follow-through process which 
established high-level programme monitors to 
assess progress, identify problem areas and 
recommend remedial action in each programme 
area. An extensive reporting system including 
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annual progress reports to ministers serves to 
measure implementation. 
A major burden-sharing element of the 
LTDP is that of arms co-operation. Almost 40 
potential or actual LTDP projects have been 
identified as having potential for co-operative 
research, development, testing and production. 
A major focus of our efforts in this regard has 
been to reduce the cost of research and deve-
lopment through joint development program-
mes and coproduction and to increase allied 
participation. A prime example of joint deve-
lopment is the multiple launch rocket system, 
developed by the US under an agreement 
whereby France and the UK contributed fund-
ing. A more ambitious approach has been 
the "family of weapons" concept, with an 
apportioning of responsibilities for development 
of specific systems between the US and the 
European allies. There are plans for a number 
of other families - air-to-air missiles, anti-tank 
guided weapons, air-to-ground munitions, 
advanced naval mines and mine counter-
measures systems - all of which involve 
allied contributions. Greater allied participation 
and resource savings are also realised through 
licensed coproduction of existing systems, 
which provides modern equipment to alliance 
armies without duplicative development costs. 
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New Eurogroup equipment 1 
This statement describes some of the 
major equipment acquisitions and improve-
ments planned for 1983 by Eurogroup countries 
participating in NA TO's integrated military 
structure. 
Land forces 
1. Eurogroup countries have continuous 
programmes for introducing new equipment 
into their inventories, both to replace existing 
equipment and to add to their stocks. Among 
the land force equipment improvements in 
1983 will be the introduction of nearly 550 
main battle tanks, together with some 450 other 
armoured vehicles. The great majority of the 
new tanks will be the advanced Leopard 11 
which continues to be introduced into the 
forces of a number of Eurogroup countries. 
The figure also includes the first deployment of 
the new Challenger tank. 
2. In addition to these armoured vehicles, 
there is a wide range of qualitative improve-
ments planned to the tank fleets of Eurogroup 
countries, including the introduction of night-
firing devices and improved fire control sys-
tems. 
3. A variety of forces is needed to counter 
the increasing armoured threat posed by the 
Warsaw Pact and, in addition to their own 
armoured vehicles, Eurogroup countries are 
continuing to expand other elements of their 
anti-armour inventory. Over 700 new Milan 
and Tow missile systems will be brought into 
service, two-thirds of which will be additional 
and not replacement equipment. There are 
also programmes to improve the effectiveness of 
the present Tow missiles and to give Milan and 
Swingfire missile systems an all-weather capabi-
lity. 1983 will also see the introduction of 
over 50,000 new hand-held anti-tank rocket 
launchers in the forces of Eurogroup countries. 
Maritime forces 
4. The maritime capability of Eurogroup 
countries continues to improve. Plans for 
1983 include the introduction of: 
I. Appendix to Eurogroup communique of 29th 
November 1982. 
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11 destroyers/escorts; 
11 minelayers/sweepers/hunters; 
8 fast patrol boats; 
2 submarines (one nuclear-powered). 
An aircraft carrier, HMS Illustrious, was due to 
enter service in 1983 but the programme was 
accelerated and the ship entered service during 
1982. 
5. Eurogroup countries have also under-
taken a wide range of programmes to enhance 
weapons, sensors and communications systems 
on their vessels as well as improving facilities 
for electronic warfare and for protection against 
missile attack. 
Air forces 
6. In 1983, Eurogroup countries plan to 
bring into service over 270 combat aircraft. 
The majority of these will be the Tornado and 
the F-16. Three countries are introducing the 
all-weather swing-wing Tornado while a further 
four countries are continuing their joint intro-
duction of the US-designed F-16. Among the 
other aircraft types are the first of the airborne 
early warning Nimrod fleet. 
7. Qualitative improvements are planned in 
the airforces of many Eurogroup countries, par-
ticularly in the field of electronic counter-
measures and radar warning systems. A range 
of chaff and flare dispensing systems are to be 
introduced as well as modernised weapons and 
weapon delivery systems. 
8. In the field of air defence, a range of 
improvements is planned in a number of Euro-
group countries. For example, the Rapier air 
defence missile system will continue to be 
improved with further deployment of the Blind 
Fire radar guidance system. 
9. In the maritime sphere, about 20 helicop-
ters will be introduced into service, either at sea 
or on shore establishments, together with nearly 
40 fixed-wing aircraft, most of which will be 
Tornado but 6 of which will be maritime patrol 
aircraft. Advanced electronic countermeasures 
will be incorporated into a number existing 
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and the new 
Searchwater radar will continue to be deployed. 
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IEPG and NATO armaments projects 
IEPG 
- tactical fighter aircraft; 
- anti-tank mines; 
- anti-tank guided and non-guided 
missiles; 
- helicopters; 
- surface-to-air missiles; 
- mine-sweepers and mine-hunters; 
- maritime patrol aircraft; 
- drones; 
- transport aircraft. 
NATO 
A. Dual production in the United States: 
- Roland 11 air defence system; 
- Mag-58 armoured machine gun; 
- 120 mm tank gun; 
B. 
C. 
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- CFM engine (KC-135 re-engining); 
- squad automatic weapon. 
Dual production in Europe: 
- F-16; 
-MOD Flir; 
- M-483 (munitions); 
- improved conventional munition; 
- Stinger manportable air defence 
system; 
- AIM-9L improved short-range air-to-
air missile; 
- Patriot air defence missile. 
Co-operative programmes: 
- NATO-AWACS; 
- multiple launch rocket systems 
(MLRS); 
- rolling air frame (RAM); 
- NATO small arms ammunition. 
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Department of Defence 
standardisation of equipment within NATO 
Ninth report, January 1983 
Report to the United States Congress by Caspar W. Weinberger, 
Secretary of Defence 
Within the Department of Defence a 
major study was completed on policies regar-
ding codevelopment/coproduction and other 
international industrial participation arrange-
ments. This study will serve as the basis for 
pursuing future multinational programmes 
more effectively. At the same time, the 
Defence Science Board has convened a task 
force to examine the obstacles to and incentives 
for greater industry-to-industry collaboration 
within the alliance. This task force recently 
met with a large number of key European 
company executives in Brussels and held 
detailed discussions with NATO parliamenta-
rians on the two-way street 1• Finally. in a 
major effort to improve our dialogue with 
leaders of American industry on defence trade 
and industrial base issues, the Department of 
Defence and United States trade representatives 
have chartered a new Defence Policy Advisory 
Committee on Trade (DPACT). The DPACT 
will, among other things. help focus the 
attention of American defence industry on the 
importance of our standardisation and interope-
rability objectives within NATO and elicit 
ideas on how best to achieve them. 
Co-operation with NATO allies to deve-
lop and deploy common conventional defence 
equipment is an extensive process, one the pre-
sent administration vigorously supports. In a 
related effort heads of state and government at 
the June 1982 NATO summit in Bonn agreed 
to urgently explore ways to take advantage of 
emerging technologies. both technically and 
economically, to improve NA TO's conven-
tional capability. The United States has intro-
duced a paper on this subject into NATO as a 
step towards development of a programmatic 
plan of action. 
Assessments and programmes 
Progress toward the standardisation of 
equipment of the United States and NATO 
allies continues in many programmes. Narra-
tive summaries of major weapons systems are 
I. The committee met with the task force of the 
Defence Science Board on industry-to-mdustry co-operation 
on 20th October 1982. 
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discussed in detail later in this report, but of 
particular note are the F-16 multinational 
fighter programme and the NATO airborne 
early warning and control (AEW &C) programme. 
F-16 multinational fighter programme 
At the end of 1981, the United States had 
accepted 474 aircraft and the four European 
participating governments 235 aircraft. A 
multinational testing and tactics development 
agreement is currently being formulated to 
continue this co-operative effort in the develop-
ment of F-16 tactical employment concepts. 
NATO airborne early warning and control 
(AEW&C) programme 
The acquisition phase, as well as initial 
operations and support activities, will continue 
through the scheduled delivery of the eigh-
teenth NATO E-3A in 1985. The first four 
aircraft were delivered to NATO ahead of 
schedule. with the fourth delivery being made 
in November 1982. Follow-on operations and 
support are the subject of a separate MOU 
under negotiation. 
Before 1979 common technical require-
ments for weapons systems were achieved on 
an ad hoc basis as a result of information 
exchange in the main armament groups of the 
Conference of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD). Since then the CNAD has been 
using the periodic armaments planning system 
(PAPS). 
The PAPS procedures call for decisions 
at various milestones in the development pro-
gramme. The documentation associated with 
these milestones proceed from an initial mis-
sion need document (MND), through an outline 
NATO staff target (ONST), NATO staff target 
(NST), NATO staff requirement (NSR), etc. 
Electronic wm:fare protection of army 
helicopters 
Canada, France, United Kingdom and 
United States are participants. 
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MK-60 Captor mine 
Captor is a moored, influence-activated 
anti-submarine mine system employing a modi-
fied MK-46 torpedo as the payload. The Cap-
tor system is delivered by aircraft, surface ships 
and submarines and is designed to detect, class-
ify, and attack the most advanced diesel and 
nuclear submarines. Captor is a prime United 
States contribution to the NATO family of 
mines under the NATO family of weapons 
concept and is NA TO's only deep-water mine. 
Medium-range air-to-surface missile (MRASM) 
The medium-range air-to-surface missile 
is a conventional variant of the Tomahawk 
cruise missile being developed jointly by the 
United States air force and the United States 
navy. The NATO air force armaments group 
(NAF AG) has approved a NATO staff target 
(NST) for a long-range standoff missile 
(LRSOM). The NST for the long-range stand-
off missile identifies requirements for a wea-
pon system with characteristics and capabilities 
similar to the MRASM. MOU negotiations 
for feasibility studies of the LRSOM have been 
conducted by the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Germany. 
Advanced medium-range air-to-air missile 
(AMRAAM) 
AMRAAM is an all-weather, all-aspect 
radar missile capable of engaging numerically 
superior aircraft forces before they close to 
within visual range. This missile will provide 
the capability for multiple launches beyond 
visual range and become autonomous soon after 
launch to permit the launch aircraft to manoeu-
vre and/or engage more targets quickly. 
AMRAAM will be compatible with the F-14, 
F-15, F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft, as well as 
applicable NATO air defence and air superio-
rity aircraft of the late 1980s. The AMRAAM 
programme has completed the competitive vali-
dation phase, including a series of prototype 
missile launches. Hughes Aircraft Company 
was selected as the developer of the 
AMRAAM. 
In August 1980, the United States signed 
a MOU with France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom for a co-operative programme for a 
family of air-to-air missile systems. Germany, 
the United Kingdom and the United States are 
full participants while France currently has a 
special observer status. 
Rolling airframe missile (RAM) 
The rolling airframe missile is designed 
to help meet the maritime self-defence require-
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ments of the United States, Germany and Den-
mark through the mid-1990s by providing 
increased firepower and supplementing other 
point defence systems. 
Infrared search and track (!RST) system 
The United States is co-operating with 
Canada in the development of a shipboard 
infrared search and track (IRST) system. The 
United States has signed the agreement and 
Canada is expected to sign in the near 
future. The two countries will co-operate in 
full-scale engineering development and opera-
tional testing at sea. 
NATO Seasparrow point defence missile srstem 
The NATO Seasparrow surface missile 
system (NSSMS) provides ships with an effec-
tive short-range, quick-reaction, self-defence 
capability against a wide spectrum of threats, 
including very low altitude aircraft and mis-
siles. Under a 1968 MOU for development 
and production. Belgium. Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United 
States have participated in this co-operative 
programme. Canada and Greece recently 
joined the consortium. 
NATO Sea Gnat 
This project ts an international co-
operative development programme for a new 
shipboard decoy system. All work is being 
accomplished in the United States under a 
memorandum of understanding signed in 
January 1977. The programme is developing 
three separate decoys to protect ships against 
missile attack. Participants include Denmark, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 
NATO forces sensor and weapon accuracy 
check sites in Europe (FORACS) 
Based on a MOU signed by Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, three FORACS 
activities were authorised. These are -the 
northern and southern FORACS ranges at Sta-
vanger, Norway, and Souda Bay, Crete, and 
the NATO FORACS Office in Brussels, Bel-
gium. The northern FORACS range began 
operations in August 1978. Civil works cons-
truction began for the southern FORACS range 
in October 1982. Target completion date is 
October 1983. 
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Harrier vertical/short takeoff and landing 
(VISTOL) 
The United Kingdom-developed AV-8A 
Harrier V /STOL aircraft has been operational 
in the United States Marine Corps since 
1971. Based on this ten years of operatio-
nal experience, the Marine Corps views the 
A V -8B advanced vertical/short takeoff and land-
ing (V /STOL) aircraft as a vital element of the 
future USMC force projection capability in the 
mid-1980s as a replacement light-attack air-
craft. Full-scale development of four aircraft 
commenced in July 1979 with first flight com-
pleted in November 1981. The United States 
and United Kingdom recently signed a memo-
randum of understanding for completion of 
development and collaborative production of 
the aircraft. The United Kingdom programme 
will consist of 60 aircraft for the Royal Air 
Force. Spain has expressed an interest in pur-
chasing 12 aircraft. . 
NATO frigate replacement for the 1990s 
(NFR-90) 
The NATO frigate project (NFR-90) is a· 
multinational effort by NATO maritime 
nations to design and build a frigate capable of 
meeting the needs of NATO against the 1990s 
threat. A prefeasibility study was completed 
in late 1982 by the NATO Industrial Advisory 
Group (NIAG) which is being evaluated by 
interested nations to determine whether the 
project will meet individual country's require-
ments for frigates in the 1990s. Decisions by 
nations to continue participation in the follow-
on feasibility study will be made in early 
1983. The project offers potential for cost 
savings to be achieved through a co-operative 
production effort. 
Maritime electronic warfare support group 
(MEWSG) 
MEWSG is an international project to 
develop and establish within NATO an organi-
sation capable of providing regular and realistic 
training for NATO units in all aspects of elec-
tronic warfare (EW) with particular emphasis 
on the maritime environment. The United 
States is an active participant in the project 
group which includes Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway and the United Kingdom. Phase I of 
the MEWSG project, fully funded through 
NATO common infrastructure funds, is pro-
gressing satisfactorily. Necessary EW equip-
ment will be procured in 1983 and the 
MEWSG organisation will have an initial ope-
rating capability by early 1984. Follow-on 
phases to enhance the capabilities of MEWSG 
are in the planning stages. 
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Memorandum of understanding between the 
United States and France for a co-operative 
research project in titanium alloys 
The United States and French Govern-
ments are each engaged in research in the field 
of titanium alloys for turboshaft engines and 
they have identified certain exploratory deve-
lopment areas where similar interests exist. 
This titanium project provides for a co-
operative research programme in which com-
plementary efforts will be performed by each 
participating government and the results thereto 
will be exchanged. It is intended that the co-
ordination of efforts through this co-operative 
venture will benefit both countries by more 
effective utilisation of resources and by achieve-
ment of a broader coverage of the fundamental 
knowledge esssential to the advancement of 
titanium alloys. Specific titanium alloy objec-
tives are to explore micromechanics and defor-
mation at elevated temperatures, fatigue mecha-
nisms and microstructural effect, creep-fatigue 
interactions, forging and process control, pro-
perty characterisation and fabricability and 
non-destructive inspectability. 
Memorandum of understanding between the 
United States and France concerning a joint 
study of icing cloud formation 
This memorandum of understanding pro-
vides for a co-operative joint project to be 
conducted by both governments for testing and 
evaluation of water atomisers which are used to 
create an artificial cloud in simulated altitude 
test facilities. 
Aircraft flight control concepts 
Aircraft flight control systems have been 
used to augment airframe characteristics for 
improving flight qualities and reducing pilot 
workload. The combined effect of increased 
experience and confidence in the system, aided 
by the phenomenal growth in computer capabi-
lities, has resulted in more functions and added 
authority being assigned to the active use of the 
primary flight control system 
A memorandum of understanding to · 
generate task-oriented flying qualities criteria 
acceptable to aircraft highly augmented with 
various advanced control concepts was entered 
into between the USAF and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany in 1979 and a programme is 
currently ongoing. Under this programme, 
Germany is investigating task-oriented handling 
qualities of various direct force control modes, 
especially for precision flight path tracking 
tasks. The goal is to develop a technology data 
base from which handling qualities criteria can 
be defined for new control concepts. 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
Harmonisation of research in civil and military 
high technology fields - Part 11 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 31 
tabled by Mr. Worre/1 
29th November 1983 
1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after" European states", leave 
out the remainder of the sentence. 
2. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out" extensive" and insert 
"promising". 
3. In the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" 4. Strongly support the need for co-operation within the Independent European Programme 
Group." 
l. See 8th sitting, 30th November 1983 (amendments I and 3 negatived; amendment 2 agreed to). 
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Application of the Brussels Treaty 
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council 
PREVIOUS QUESTION 1 
moved by Mr. Lagorce on behalf of the Socialist Group 
under Rule 3 2 of the Rules of Procedure 
28th November 1983 
Mr. Lagorce moves the previous question on Document 948, Application of the Brussels Treaty-
reply to the twenty-eighth annual report of the Council. 
l. See 6th sitting, 29th November 1983 (previous question negatived). 
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Middle East crises and European security 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 1 
by Lord Reay, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on Middle East crises and European security 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The war between Iraq and Iran 
Ill. The situation in Lebanon 
(a) The civil war 
(b) Foreign intervention 
(c) Lebanon and European security 
IV. Palestine 
V. Conclusions 
29th November 1983 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 2 with 
3 abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Michel (Chairman); 
MM. Hardy, van der Werff (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, 
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier 
(Alternate: Dreyfus-Schmidt), Bogaerts, Caro, Conti Persini, 
De Poi, Hill, Lagneau (Alternate: Pecriaux), Lagorce, 
Lord McNair, MM. Muller, Prouvost, Lord Reay, MM. 
Reddemann (Alternate: BtJhm), Ruet, Rumpf, van der 
Sanden, Thoss, Valiante (Alternate: Cavaliere), Vecchietti, 
Vogt, Zito. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Middle East crises and European security 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling its Recommendations 341, 349, 361, 371, 386 and 389; 
(ii) Considering that armed conflicts in the Middle East are a serious threat to Europe's security ; 
(iii) Considering in particular that if the war between Iran and Iraq continues there is a grave threat of 
it spreading and further endangering stability in the Gulf area ; 
(iv) Considering also that the present unstable situation in Lebanon with its multitude of warring 
local parties, military actions by countries in that area and the confrontation, through the intermediary 
of other countries, of the two superpowers, constitutes, the longer it continues, an ever-graver risk of 
provoking an international crisis ; 
(v) Considering that it is important to avoid oversimplifying the nature of the situation in Lebanon 
in terms ofEast-West conflict; 
(vi) Believing it seems desirable for peace in Lebanon that the Lebanese Government reflect, as is the 
tradition in that country, the demographic balance of its composite parts; 
(vii) Deploring the heavy losses suffered by two units of the multinational buffer force on 
23rd October 1983 and recognising the usefulness of its presence for assuring the protection of the 
population and for helping Lebanon to recover its integrity and sovereignty ; 
(viii) Believing that all other foreign forces should leave Lebanese soil completely; 
(ix) Considering that the establishment of lasting peace in the Middle East also requires neither a 
vicious circle of terrorism and repression nor the installation of settlements but recognition: 
- by those who have not yet done so, including most Arab countries and the PLO, of the right of 
Israel to exist within secure and internationally-recognised frontiers, 
- by Israel that the PLO is still effectively representative of the Palestinian people and the right 
of the latter to its own national homeland, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Examine what measures could be taken by its members to help to terminate the war between Iraq 
and Iran and to avoid its extension; 
2. Examine the policies of member countries towards the belligerents with a view to ensuring that 
actions are not taken by them which contribute to the continuation of the conflict; 
3. Redefine the purposes of their peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, while giving every encoura-
gement to the emergence of a generally-accepted settlement; 
4. Insist on the complete withdrawal from Lebanon of all other foreign forces; 
5. Provide food, medical and humanitarian assistance to the victims of the fighting in Lebanon; 
6. Reaffirm that peace on the territory of former Palestine depends on the PLO and all nations 
recognising Israel and its rights and on Israel recognising the fact that the Palestinian people is at 
present represented only by the PLO and that Palestinians have the right to their own national 
homeland; 
7. Repeat its condemnation of Israel's continued settlement policy on territories occupied since 
1967 and condemn also the Syrian Government's policy of destabilisation in Lebanon. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Lord Reay, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. It was only on 21st September 1983 that 
the Presidential Committee of the Assembly 
decided to include a report on the Middle East 
in the agenda of the November session. 
2. Your Rapporteur, however, may lean on 
the results of far-reaching study and reflection 
accomplished in the General Affairs Committee 
in earlier years on matters relating to this 
important region. After Sir Frederic Bennett, 
who was Rapporteur in 1979, 1980 and 1981 
(Documents 820, 844 and 871 ), your Rapporteur 
already presented a report on European security 
and the Middle East in December 1982 (Docu-
ment 927) when he drew up a list of documents 
on the subject. Hence, the present document 
will not go back over past history but merely 
refer to developments in 1983 which are the 
reason for the Presidential Committee deciding 
to include this matter again in the agenda of the 
November session. 
3. In fact, two quite separate matters have 
made events in the Middle East a subject of keen 
concern for Europe's security. One is the 
resumption of civil war in Lebanon during the 
summer, but in which foreign powers have been 
involved from the outset, including certain 
member countries of WEU or the Atlantic 
Alliance. The other is the continued fighting 
between Iraq and Iran and the risk of this war 
spreading, which Europe cannot disregard. 
11. The war between Iraq and Iran 
4. In the course of 1983 there seem to have 
been substantial shifts in the balance of power 
towards Iran which has been much more able to 
maintain its oil exports and therefore its oil 
revenue than Iraq. Moreover, Iraq has become 
heavily dependent on subsidies from Saudi 
Arabia and certain Gulf states which those 
countries are unlikely to be able and perhaps 
will not wish to maintain at the same level 
indefinitely. It is this which has induced a 
certain sense of desperation in Iraq to end the 
war as soon as possible. Iran has just managed 
to push the theatre of operations back over its 
frontier. However, as Iran has a larger 
population and abundant oil reserves, is capable 
of replacing its equipment, inter alia by 
procuring American weapons from Israel or 
directly from the United States, and has shown 
that Iraq is unable to break the Iranian national 
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spmt, it seems to be better placed than its 
opponent. 
5. At the present time Iran has still not 
dropped its demand for the removal of the 
present Iraqi Government as a precondition for 
peace. Obviously this demand cannot be accep-
ted by the present Iraqi regime. However, the 
purchase of five Super-Etendard aircraft from 
France with sixty Exocet missiles can be seen as 
an attempt by Iraq to increase its leverage in 
order to bring about peace as soon as possible. 
For the past year Iraq has been calling for 
peace on the basis of the status quo ante bello. 
Thus, whatever opinion one may have of the 
respective responsibilities of the two govern-
ments at the beginning of the war, it is now 
quite clear that Iraq wants peace to be restored 
and it is Iran that is imposing unacceptable 
conditions for its enemy. 
6. Western Europe's reasons for being inte-
rested in this matter are not quite the same as 
for the fighting in Lebanon. There is obviously 
a fear of internationalisation which would be 
particularly dangerous as Iran is a neighbour of 
the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The Soviet 
Union is the main supplier of weapons to the 
Iraqi army while the United States, after a long 
crisis in relations with Khomeiny's Iran, has 
again begun to supply it with weapons. 
7. But the Europeans are far more concerned 
about the oil question. In spite of a consider-
able drop in western oil supplies from the 
Middle East due on the one hand to reduced 
consumption and on the other to increased 
output in other regions - Africa, the Soviet 
Union, the North Sea, for instance- more than 
12% of the world's oil consumption still comes 
from the Gulf. The shares produced by Iran 
and Iraq respectively have admittedly fallen to a 
very low level because of the war. But most of 
the output of Bahrein, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates still passes 
through the Gulf and it is now possible for Iran, 
which has taken control of the islands scattered 
in the Strait of Hormuz, to cut off oil shipments 
through this sole gateway to the Gulf. Any 
prolonged interruption of supplies would be 
enough to cause another oil crisis whose effects 
on the price of oil and on the whole world 
economy cannot be foreseen. 
8. It is therefore essential for Western 
Europe to put an early end to the threats to this 
essential trade route, in other words, the war 
must be terminated. 
9. So far, the only measures taken by the 
West to avert this danger have been to build up 
the naval forces of countries- mainly the United 
States, France and the United Kingdom- in the 
Indian Ocean and the formation of the United 
States rapid deployment force, which is still far 
from complete. Perhaps the concentration of 
these forces in the area of the Strait of Hormuz 
and the co-operation of the rather small naval 
forces of the Arab countries near the Gulf would 
be enough to stop any attempt by Iran to block 
traffic through the Strait. However this may be, 
the destruction of a few giant tankers in the Gulf 
would seriously perturb movement and cause 
severe damage through the resulting water pollu-
tion to the cost of the coastal countries. 
10. France for its part has gone further than 
any other country in direct assistance to Iraq. 
It supplies it with large quantities of weapons 
plus, in October 1983, five Super-Etendard 
aircraft belonging to the French navy and 
equipped with Exocet air-to-sea missiles which 
could cause serious damage not only to Iranian 
ships but also, if necessary, to Iran's oil 
terminals in the Gulf. 
11. The reasons given by French authorities 
for justifying this contract and those suggested 
by certain observers vary widely. Some of the 
explanations given by France are: 
(i) France considers it must respect a 
contract which it signed nine months 
ago; 
(ii) France considers that since the 
balance of forces has shifted in 
favour of Iran and in view of Iran's 
uncomprom1smg attitude, peace 
cannot be restored unless Iraq is 
strengthened; 
(iii) France insists that its support is 
limited; 
(iv) France points out that if it failed to 
fulfil its commitments the Soviet 
Union would take advantage of this 
to increase Iraq's dependence on it, 
which would not facilitate the restora-
tion of peace but increase the risk of 
the war becoming internationalised. 
12. On the other hand, certain observers have 
pointed out: 
(i) that Iraq is heavily in debt to France 
and that if it is defeated France 
would suffer a heavy financial loss; 
(ii) that arms exports, which formed a 
large proportion of France's trade 
balance, fell by 28% in 1982 and it 
may be tempted to try to give new 
impetus to this aspect of its external 
trade. 
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13. In any event, the implementation of this 
contract has caused concern among France's 
partners, particularly because of Iran's repeated 
declarations that if Iraq used the Exocet missiles 
Iran would block the Strait of Hormuz. And it 
is hard not to draw the conclusion that the whole 
story illustrates the danger of any Western 
European country lending excessively to any 
third country. 
14. The French Government's gamble that the 
mere threat of using these missiles might induce 
the Iranian Government to make a settlement is 
perhaps not unfounded. However, the great 
danger is that in the past Ayatollah Khomeiny's 
government has not been very responsive to 
rational arguments and careful not to appear to 
yield to external threats. Furthermore, it is 
regrettable that in a matter which is of such 
importance for joint security France did not feel, 
as far as the Assembly knows, that it should 
consult its partners which would suffer from the 
same inconvenience as France in the event of 
the outcome of this contract not being what 
France expects. 
15. In expressing these reservations, your 
Rapporteur in no way wishes to dissociate 
himself from the precautionary measures taken 
by certain countries to ensure the continued 
movement of shipping through the Strait of 
Hormuz, but he considers it risky to rely on 
military measures alone, to take sides too clearly 
in this matter and, a fortiori, to supply one of the 
parties with armaments, thus increasing the 
danger of the conflict spreading. 
Ill. The situation in Lebanon 
(a) The civil war 
16. President Amin Gemayel, who was elected 
in Beirut in September 1982 at a time when part 
of the town was occupied by the Israelis and the 
assassination of his brother, President Bechir 
Gemayel, had raised the clashes between Leba-
nese communities to a new level, has not 
managed, in 1983, to impose his authority on 
Lebanon as a whole. The Syrians were invited 
to come to the assistance of the Lebanese 
Government in 1976 but this invitation was 
withdrawn on 2nd September 1983 by President 
Gemayel, who then called upon the Arab League 
to withdraw Syrian and Palestinian troops 
from Lebanon, while Israel occupied a strip 
along its frontier on 14th March 1978 but 
invaded a larger part of Lebanese territory in 
June 1982. The north and east of the country 
are still occupied by Syria, while Israel occupies 
the south. Under these two occupations, the 
communities protected by one country or 
another, particularly the Druzes, armed by Syria, 
and the Christians in the south under Corn-
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mander Haddad, armed by Israel, do not 
recognise the authority of the go-yernment in 
Beirut. President Gemayel admits that he 
controls only a tenth of Lebanese territory. 
17. The latter came under strong criticism 
from many Christian groups and most Moslems 
in Lebanon. They all objected to his privileged 
relationship with Israel and with the United 
States and the collusion between the armed 
forces of the Lebanese state and the Christian 
Phalangists led by his father, Pierre Gemayel. 
In short, it seems difficult to claim that he can 
be a president capable of rallying the Sll:PPO~ ~f 
the entire Lebanese society and restonng civil 
peace. 
18. In these circumstances, the decision by the 
Israeli Government on 4th September 1983 to 
evacuate the mountainous Chuf area between 
Beirut and the River Awali, where Christian and 
Druze populations are closely intermingled, 
could but lead to a resumption of the civil war, 
each of the communities being determined to do 
its utmost to control the area. Admittedly, 
Israel and the Lebanese Government signed a 
convention on 17th May on the evacuation of 
Lebanese territory, but this convention was n~t 
ratified and made the departure of the Israehs 
dependent on the Syrians leaving too. The 
United States asked the Israelis to postpone 
their evacuation until Lebanese armed forces 
were able to occupy the area effectively, but to 
no avail. 
19. The result was a month of open warfare 
between the Druzes and their Syrian allies on the 
one hand and the Lebanese army and Christian 
Phalangists on the other, and the military opera-
tions brought the Druzes and Syrians to the 
outskirts of Beirut. The international buffer 
forces composed of American, British, French 
and Italian units have been under attack several 
times and there have been casualties. The 
Americans and French have retaliated by 
shooting or bombing. 
20. Although another cease-fire put an end to 
military operations at the beginning of October, 
it solved none of the problems and it may be 
wondered whether it will ever be possible to 
restore the unity of the Lebanese state. On the 
Israeli side, there seem to be more efforts to 
consolidate the strength of the clans controlling 
southern Lebanon than to restore state sove-
reignty. During the autumn, Israeli weapons 
were distributed not only to Commander 
Haddad's militia, which associates Christians 
and Shiites, but also to the southern Lebanese 
Shiite community. The sharp reduction in the 
Israeli force in Lebanon, reportedly from 30,000 
to 10,000 men after the evacuation of the Chuf, 
seems to confirm the Israelis' intention of taking 
advantage of the fighting between Lebanese 
communities to have their frontiers protected by 
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dissident Lebanese forces, while Syria for its part 
refuses to consider any evacuation of the part of 
Lebanon which it controls, i.e. about two-thirds 
of the country. An attack on the Israeli forces' 
command post at Tyre on 5th November 1983 
resulted in twenty-nine victims among the 
Israeli forces and 32 others including some of 
their prisoners. The retaliatory mea_sures t~ken 
by the Israelis further helped to stram rel~t10ns 
between the Israeli army and the populatiOn of 
the occupied area. 
21. The attempt by King Fahd of Saudi 
Arabia at the beginning of October to convene a 
Lebanese national reconciliation congress led to 
the opening of a meeting in Geneva at the 
beginning of November. The refusal by several 
Lebanese heads of clans to take part had forced 
several postponements and changes in proposed 
meeting places and the idea of holding. the 
congress in Lebanon had to be &Iven 
up. Discussions in the Lebanese nat10nal 
congress in Geneva produced some results and 
they have now been suspended to allow 
President Gemayel to implement the first 
decisions which were first to recognise Lebanon 
as an Arab country, then to insist on the 
evacuation of Israeli troops, confirm the 
cease-fire which began in the Chuf and Lebanese 
mountains on 25th September and, finally, 
accept the principle of a discussion on reforms to 
be introduced in Lebanon. Furthermore, most 
of the leaders other than President Gemayel 
insisted on the denunciation of the 
Israeli-Lebanese agreement of 17th May 
1983. He was finally instructed to consult with 
the capitals concerned in order to negate this 
agreement. 
22. Certain steps by the clan leaders indicate 
that in any event several of them do not wish to 
revert to a state based on the national compro-
mise of 1943. Thus, Mr. Walid Jumblatt, 
leader of the Druze community and of the Pro-
gressive Socialist Party, started to requisition 
land belonging to Christians in the Chuf, 
announced on 4th October the creation of a civil 
administration in that area and appealed to 
Lebanese soldiers and officers to show insubor-
dination. Again, there is no indication that the 
Phalangists are prepared to accept anything less 
than a dominant place in a Lebanese state. 
Finally, the massacres perpetrated by all parties 
during ten years of civil war and quite recently 
during the occupation of the Chuf by the Druzes 
offer no hope of abatement. Many Lebanese 
have had to leave their homes to take refuge in 
sectors controlled by their political friends or 
co-religionists, particularly in certain quarters of 
Beirut, which makes it even more to be feared 
that this small country will be divided between 
the communities and the clans. 
23. In any event, it seems most unlikely th~t 
Lebanese unity can ever be restored on the basis 
of the 1943 national compromise. The nume-
rical breakdown of the communities in Lebanon 
is no longer the same and the compromise failed 
to institute a true democracy but tipped the 
balance in favour of the Christian element, 
dividing the country between rival clans. If the 
unity of Lebanon can be restored, it will have to 
be on new political bases. It is not yet possible 
to say whether the Geneva congress has man-
aged to define such bases satisfactorily, but it is 
to be hoped that a first step has been taken in 
this direction. 
24. Nevertheless, even if the war in Lebanon 
is a civil one, it has assumed such international 
dimensions that agreement between the Leba-
nese parties, however necessary, cannot be 
expected to suffice to restore peace, which quite 
obviously depends on the withdrawal of the 
foreign armed forces occupying the country. 
(b) Foreign intervention 
25. The rivalry between Lebanese clans can 
certainly not be attributed to foreign interven-
tion, but intervention considerably enhanced the 
effects of rivalry, particularly by helping to pro-
vide certain communities with large quantities 
ofvery sophisticated weaponry. 
26. (i) Until 1982, the main foreign force 
involved in Lebanese affairs was Palestinian, 
expulsed from the territory which became Israel 
in 1949 and then from the territories occupied in 
1967 and accepted into Lebanon as 
refugees. The revolt of the Palestinians in 
Jordan in September 1970 and the ensuing 
repression further increased the number of 
Palestinians in Lebanon, which they made the 
PLO centre. Forced to leave Lebanon in 1982 
after the Israeli attack, some of them have 
returned. Yasser Arafat, after the split in the 
PLO in June 1982, had to leave Syria where 
dissident elements had the upper hand under the 
protection of the Syrian authorities. He has 
now taken refuge in Tripoli, in northern 
Lebanon, where the PLO exercises de facto 
control but is threatened by the Syrian army 
which surrounds the town and at the beginning 
of November 1983 was trying to force Yasser 
Arafat out. 
27. (ii) The Syrian army controls most of Leba-
non. It is powerfully equipped, thanks to mili-
tary assistance from the Soviet Union which 
provides it with the latest weapons, particularly 
anti-aircraft missiles. Syria seems to have a 
twofold aim: first, to prepare a partial or total 
annexation of Lebanese territory which Syria has 
always considered to have been unfairly snatched 
from it after the first world war and, second, 
to obtain the complete submission of the Palesti-
nian armed forces, perhaps with a view to using 
them to retrieve the Golan area, occupied by 
Israel since 196 7. 
295 
DOCUMENT 965 
28. (iii) The Israeli army, which had been in the 
frontier area to the south of the Litani since 
1978, reached Beirut in 1982. The evacuation 
of the Chuf seems to indicate an evolution in 
Israeli policy: after trying to restore the unity 
of Lebanon round a government which was 
favourable to it and having managed to chase 
the Palestinians out of Lebanon, Israel now 
seems to have given up the first of these aims 
and is relying on the division of Lebanon to 
protect its frontier. 
29. (iv) Most Arab countries still consider the 
unity of Lebanon to be necessary for the restora-
tion of peace in the Middle East but they hardly 
have the means to carry this into effect. 
30. (v) Although the United nations force in 
southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been unable to 
play its role since 1982 because of the limits 
imposed on it, this is not true for the multinatio-
nal buffer force which first came to protect the 
refugee camps, and has to a certain extent been 
effective in preventing inter-community clashes 
from getting out of hand in the town of Beirut 
after the civil war flared up again in September 
1983 before the Lebanese army was strong 
enough to take over. The very fact that it has 
been the target of Syrian and Druze shooting and 
perhaps also of other elements shows that its 
political role was not scorned by the belligerents. 
31. However, this involvement of the buffer 
force has led the governments concerned to 
re-examine the true task of the force. At the 
outset, it was simply a matter of keeping the 
various factions apart, at the request of the legiti-
mate Lebanese Government, but implying no 
intervention in Lebanese policy or possible 
fighting. When the force was attacked and 
bombed, the question then arose as to whether it 
would retaliate, remain without reacting in posi-
tions which were liable to become impossible to 
hold, or be evacuated. The countries concerned 
were not absolutely unanimous about the choice 
to be made. 
32. The British and Italian units remained on 
the spot without reacting to attacks which, 
admittedly, mainly affected the French and 
American contingents. The question of evacua-
tion was raised in Italy. Conversely, France 
and the United States sent large naval forces, 
now including an American battleship and 
three aircraft-carriers and a French aircraft-
carrier. They reacted when attacks were perpe-
trated against the buffer force, the Americans 
with artillery and bombing and the French with 
an air attack on a Syrian artillery battery. 
33. However, France and the United States do 
not appear to have had the same view of their 
role insofar as the United States equips the 
Lebanese army and seems to envisage the 
restoration of Lebanese unity only round 
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President Gemayel to whom it supplies strong 
political and military assistance, wh~reas F~a~ce 
is far more reserved about the possible pohtlcal 
aspect of restoring Lebanese unity and does not 
wish to appear to be supporting any particular 
party. 
34. In the night of 22nd to 23rd October 1983, 
there were two extremely serious attacks which 
destroyed the buildings housing the United 
States and French forces in Beirut. There were 
230 American and 58 French victims. These 
attacks were carried out with lorries loaded with 
explosives which were crashed into the build-
ings. Responsibility has been claimed by a 
hitherto unknown Islamic association, but the 
powerful means implemented seem to indicate 
that this association has the backing of a state 
seeking to whip up public opinion in the two 
countries contributing most troops to the buffer 
force against maintaining a contingent in Leba-
non. The first American and French reactions 
indicate that the governments of both countries, 
in agreement with the Lebanese Government, 
have decided not to yield to terrorist pressure 
but to intensify their political and military 
action to promote the restoration of Lebanese 
sovereignty. 
35. (vi) One may wonder to what extent the 
Soviet Union has refrained from direct interven-
tion in the fighting, since some of the missiles 
used were in the hands of Soviet experts. It 
has, in any event, delivered arms to Syria where 
it has replaced the missiles destroyed by the 
Israelis in the Bekaa Valley. The new missiles 
have been deployed on Syrian territory in order 
to be less provocative to the Israelis. It has at 
least 6,000 "military advisers" in Syria, thus 
ensuring control over Syria's use of the weapons 
it has supplied. It has also protested at the 
American and French retaliation to attacks on 
the buffer force, but it seems anxious not to 
become too deeply involved in a matter beyond 
its control. It is at present impossible to know 
whether the Soviet Union played a part in these 
attacks but it has not condemned the one on 
23rd October and its presence is being felt 
increasingly in the conflict. 
36. The internationalisation of the Lebanese 
conflict has therefore become a fact which no 
longer concerns only neighbouring countries but 
in which European countries and the two great 
powers are playing a growing role. Henceforth 
this fact must no longer be disregarded. 
(c) Lebanon and European security 
37. The importance Western Europe attaches 
to restoring peace in Lebanon is evident, as is 
testified by the fact that at the present economic 
and political juncture three Western European 
countries, without any national objective, main-
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tain and support contingents in Lebanon in face 
of strongly-armed opponents merely to form a 
buffer between the combatants. 
38. (i) First and foremost it is a matter of 
preventing continued fighting in Lebanon from 
bringing the two great powers into direct 
confrontation, first in that country and then in 
the rest of the world. The very special nature of 
the Lebanese civil war signifies that no solution 
can be found by a compromise between the two 
great powers, whereas they both might leave 
Lebanese affairs alone if they were sure that 
lasting peace could be restored in the coun-
try. In this case, it is quite obviously a local 
conflict whose duration has led to the direct or 
indirect intervention of the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and not a local form of a 
worldwide conflict. 
39. (ii) Nor does Western Europe have any inte-
rest in the further continuation in Lebanon or 
elsewhere of a regional conflict which in this 
instance has been smouldering for thirty-five 
years and which is always liable to flare up, pro-
voking more widespread hostilities which might 
cut off the West's oil supply lines, as was the 
case in 1956 and 1973. 
40. (iii) For historic reasons, the West is com-
mitted to ensuring acceptable living conditions 
for Christian minorities in the East. As far back 
as 1860, fighting between Druzes and Maronites 
was at the origin of a conflict between France 
and Turkey. Today, too, the disappearance of 
the Christian minorities from the Levant in an 
Arab-Islamic world in the grip of a fundamen-
talist revival would be difficult for certain sec-
tions of western public opinion to accept since it 
would appear to be a renunciation of the values 
upheld for two centuries. 
41. This is in no way a call for some kind of 
crusade as Mr. Jumblatt claimed in an attack on 
Lebanese Christians, the United States and 
France. On the contrary, your Rapporteur feels 
the western countries should confine themselves 
to the application of a few principles: 
(i) to spare human lives constantly 
threatened by the relentless nature of 
the fighting in which there is no hesi-
tation about massacring civilians, 
particularly refugees in camps; 
(ii) not to intervene in Lebanon's inter-
nal affairs, i.e. to leave it to the Leba-
nese themselves to decide what type 
of institutions should govern the res-
toration of peace in their country; 
(iii) to obtain the total evacuation of the 
country by all foreign armed forces 
and the full restoration of its sove-
reignty, which would also imply the 
withdrawal of the PLO's armed for-
ces; 
(iv) to consider that peace in Lebanon 
can be assured only with the agree-
ment of the countries in the area and 
consequently with the establishment 
of peace throughout the Middle East 
on a sufficiently fair basis to inspire 
confidence that it will be lasting. 
This implies the re-establishment of 
fair peace between Israel and its 
neighbours and your Rapporteur 
considers that this can be achieved 
only through the application of the 
principles set out in Security Council 
Resolution 242. This is in any event 
what the General Affairs Committee 
has resolutely upheld since 1967. 
42. For the immediate future, application of 
these principles implies: 
(i) keeping the multinational buffer 
force in place to ensure the conti-
nuity of the West's support for the 
restoration of peace in Lebanon; 
(ii) seeking a negotiated agreement 
between Lebanese groups with a view 
to drawing up a national pact based 
on new and more democratic bases 
than those of the 1943 compromise; 
(iii) refusing to intervene in Lebanese 
internal affairs; 
(iv) reaching agreement between all the 
Western European countries, particu-
larly those involved in Lebanon, on 
the aims and the means which those 
countries might deploy to achieve 
them. 
IV. Palestine 
43. Although the Lebanese conflict is becom-
ing increasingly international and is liable to 
worse~ and spread not only to neighbouring 
countnes but even to the great powers, it is 
evident that no lasting solution can be found as 
long as the Palestine question has not been 
solved. Some four million Palestinians are in 
fact now scattered throughout the Arab world. 
The map on page 7 4 of the brief on European 
security and _the Middle East prepared by your 
Rapporteur m December 1982 showed their 
location at that time. They are still a factor of 
instability for the weaker states among those in 
which they are living and an instrument for 
action by others such as Libya and Syria. 
44. Syria's attempt in 1983 to take control of 
the Palestinian organisations, first on its own 
territory and then in Lebanon, to the detriment 
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of the PLO which it seems to wish to take over 
might give that country possibilities of action: 
particularly terrorist action, throughout the 
world, but above all in Arab countries, whose 
extent it is difficult to assess. 
45. Now even more than in the past, it there-
fore seems clear that peace cannot be restored in 
the Middle East through agreements between 
Israel and the neighbouring countries but only 
by guaranteeing Palestinians their right to a 
homeland and self-determination, at the same 
time of course guaranteeing Israel secure and 
recognised frontiers. Israel's illegal occupation 
of the West Bank since 1967 has prevented the 
restoration of any such peace. It is to be hoped 
however that ~he new Israeli Government, led 
by Mr. Sham1r following the resignation of 
Mr. Begin in October 1983, will show greater 
understanding in the light of its composition and 
the serious internal problems it has to solve. 
The first measure one is entitled to expect is that 
settlements on the West Bank will be termi-
nated. 
46. These settlements, which multiplied under 
Mr. Begin's government, constitute hardly 
implicit threats to annex the West Bank and 
ex pulse the Arab section of the population which 
remained in that area. The very nature of the 
state of Israel in fact precludes acceptance 
of long-term cohabitation between a native 
Moslem and Arab population and an immigrant 
Jewish population. Jewish immigration in 
Israel now accounts for only a small proportion 
of a population whose rate of natural reproduc-
tion is very low, like that of the population of 
most industrialised countries. Conversely, the 
J\rab populati~m continues to have a very high 
b1rth rate, wh1ch means that in two decades it 
would be in the majority in a state of Israel to 
which the West Bank would be annexed. Israel 
is therefore condemned to accord true indepen-
dence to the West Bank and its people or to 
annex it, in which case it would almost 
inevitably have to expel the Arab population 
which, because of its numbers, would make it 
impossible to maintain a religious and demo-
cratic state. 
47. There is no need to emphasise that such 
measures would make it even more difficult to 
solve the Middle East problems, particularly the 
restoration of unity and sovereignty in Leba-
non. It should also be recalled that the Palesti-
~ians are pl~yii?-g an increasingly important part 
m the pubhc hfe of many Arab countries and 
consequently, just when Syria is seriously threa-
tening the survival of the PLO leaders and their 
last armed forces in Lebanon, the influence of 
the Palestinians, the great majority of whom 
seem to be still loyal to Y asser Arafat, remains 
strong in the Arab world. Any policy which 
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sought to separate the Arab countries from the 
Palestinian cause would therefore have little 
future. 
V. Conclusions 
48. Your Rapporteur considers that develop-
ments in the Middle East in 1983 are unlikely to 
change significantly the conclusions he reached 
in December 1982, but they allow them to be 
completed and clarified in certain respects. He 
proposed to prepare a draft recommendation 
urging WEU member countries: 
(i) for those concerned, to continue to 
take part in the multinational buffer 
force in Lebanon; 
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(ii) to set as a goal the restoration of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Lebanon through the evacuation of 
all foreign armed forces, and to inter-
vene in no way in that country's 
internal rivalries, other than to avoid 
the massacre of civilians; 
(iii) to pursue the search for peace in the 
Middle East on the basis of United 
Nations Resolution 242; 
(iv) to help to maintain freedom of navi-
gation in the Strait of Hormuz and 
the Gulf; 
( v) to consult each other prior to any 
action in the Levant or in regard to 
arms supplied to countries involved 
in armed conflicts. 
Document 965 
Amendment 1 
Middle East crises and European security 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Hardy 
30th November 1983 
1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add " and equally do everything 
possible to discourage the sale of arms by non-member countries ". 
Signed: Bennett, Hardy 
I. See lOth sitting, lst December 1983 (report referred back to committee). 
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Document 965 
Amendments 2, 3 and 4 
Middle East crises and European security 
AMENDMENTS 2, 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Lord McNair 
30th November 1983 
2. Leave out the second sub-paragraph of paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommen-
dation and insert" by Israel that the Palestinian people have a right to their own national homeland". 
3. In line 1 of paragraph 6 ofthe draft recommendation proper, leave out" the PLO and". 
4. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " is at present represented only by 
the PLO and that Palestinians". 
Signed: McNair 
l. See lOth sitting, 1st December 1983 (report referred back to committee). 
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Document 965 
Amendments 5 and 6 
Middle East crises and European security 
AMENDMENTS 5 and 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Caro 
30th November 1983 
5. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, after " its rights and " insert " , on that 
condition, ". 
6. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"Condemn firmly any action calling in question the frontiers and sovereignty of the states in the 
area as recognised by the United Nations." 
l. See lOth sitting, lst December 1983 (report referred back to committee). 
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Signed: Caro 
Document 965 
Amendments 7, 8, 9 and 10 
Middle East crises and European security 
AMENDMENTS 7, 8, 9 and 10 1 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen 
30th November 1983 
7. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out" and the confronta-
tion" and insert" and the danger of confrontation, either directly or". 
8. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out" seems". 
9. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, add "based on the principle of 
self-determination". 
10. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " and condemn also the Syrian 
Government's policy of destabilisation in Lebanon ". 
1. See lOth sitting, 1st December 1983 (report referred back to committee). 
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Signed: Sto.ffelen 
Document 965 1st December 1983 
Amendments 11. 12. 13, 14 and 15 
Middle East crises and European security 
AMENDMENTS 11. 12. 13, 14 and 15 1 
tabled by Mr. Gansel 
11. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out all the words after 
"population ". 
12. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out" other" and, at the 
end, insert" unless they are there at the request of the Lebanese Government". 
13. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"Give every encouragement to the emergence of a generally-accepted settlement". 
14. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "other" and, at the end, add 
"which are not in the country at the request of the Lebanese Government". 
15. Add a new paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation proper: 
"Appeal to the Arab League. the Conference of Islamic States and the United Nations to 
shoulder the responsibility of bringing about a peaceful settlement of the various conflicts in the 
Middle East". 
Signed: Gansel 
1. See I Oth sitting, I st December 1983 (report referred back to committee). 
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